Seelöwe: German Air Operations and anti-ship Capabilities

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Lkefct
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#16

Post by Lkefct » 15 May 2007, 16:42

THe issue where is not whether the luftwaffe can sink the RN. We know they can. THe issue wi with a relateively small force of dive bombers and a larger force of less effective anti-shipping aircraft, can they sink the RN fast enough to prevent them from interdicting the invasion, while acting as the army's artillery for the troops who are landed as they will be very short of artillery and armor. Either one of those tasks seems like a good size task to take on for the luftwaffe. It has always struck me that the 2 tasks together are well beyond the means of the luftwaffe, particuarly since they luftwaffe never seemed to have figured out how to defeat the RAF. They where unable to do it historically, so it is hard to imagine that they would then have the extensive strenght to also carry out 2 very extensive task beyond that.

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#17

Post by RichTO90 » 15 May 2007, 17:52

Lkefct wrote:THe issue where is not whether the luftwaffe can sink the RN. We know they can.
Of course, but they cannot 'kill' them in numbers that will be effective, not when the maximum sinkings they were capable of inflicting in a single day were four. And not when the majority of the action could occur before daylight.
THe issue wi with a relateively small force of dive bombers and a larger force of less effective anti-shipping aircraft, can they sink the RN fast enough to prevent them from interdicting the invasion, while acting as the army's artillery for the troops who are landed as they will be very short of artillery and armor.
But they don't have a "larger force" of anti-shipping aircraft, effective or not. They have the Stukageschwadern, which were reforming and re-equipping and they have one maritime strike Gruppe operational,I/KG 40. And as you say it is difficult for them to do two jobs at once.
Either one of those tasks seems like a good size task to take on for the luftwaffe. It has always struck me that the 2 tasks together are well beyond the means of the luftwaffe, particuarly since they luftwaffe never seemed to have figured out how to defeat the RAF. They where unable to do it historically, so it is hard to imagine that they would then have the extensive strenght to also carry out 2 very extensive task beyond that.
Exactly.


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#18

Post by fredleander » 15 May 2007, 18:37

RichTO90 wrote:But they don't have a "larger force" of anti-shipping aircraft, effective or not. They have the Stukageschwadern, which were reforming and re-equipping and they have one maritime strike Gruppe operational,I/KG 40. And as you say it is difficult for them to do two jobs at once.
Are you saying that the KG40-gruppe sank all the RN vessels before Dunkirk...?

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#19

Post by fredleander » 15 May 2007, 18:46

RichTO90 wrote:It has always struck me that the 2 tasks together are well beyond the means of the luftwaffe, particuarly since they luftwaffe never seemed to have figured out how to defeat the RAF. They where unable to do it historically, so it is hard to imagine that they would then have the extensive strenght to also carry out 2 very extensive task beyond that.
The Luftwaffe consisted of how many Staffeln...? To go after RN vessels in the near Channel isn't the same as acquiring air superiority over London. It is a little funny, and I have seen this several times. When it comes to the Luftwaffe it is as if they had to fly all together, holding their hands. As if they couldn't fly more than one sortie a day or attack different targets at the same time...... :)

And, I agree, finding the targets during night would have to be somebody else's mission. Even if they managed to sink one of their own destroyers with several direct hits Winter 1940. Well, it might be a mine that finally sank it.

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#20

Post by fredleander » 16 May 2007, 16:24

RichTO90 wrote:
leandros wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:But they don't have a "larger force" of anti-shipping aircraft, effective or not. They have the Stukageschwadern, which were reforming and re-equipping and they have one maritime strike Gruppe operational,I/KG 40. And as you say it is difficult for them to do two jobs at once.
Are you saying that the KG40-gruppe sank all the RN vessels before Dunkirk...?
Yep, on the ignore list unless you respond substantively.
Am I to understand you so that you don't know about any British ships sunk, other than by I/KG 40, before Dunkirk? If I remember correctly this unit had then recently equipped with the FW200, first participating in operations during the "Weserübung".

If so, this must have been a very efficient unit since, to my knowledge they werent' operational, and built up to complete Gruppe (3 Staffelns) status, untill after they moved to Norway April/May '40. And, this was all that was available to the Germans for anti-shipping duties during the Seelöwe? Since no other bomber unit could sink ships? Except maybe the Stukas? BTW, I believe the Stuka units were replenished to somewhat equal to full strength ultimo September......

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#21

Post by fredleander » 16 May 2007, 16:30

RichTO90 wrote:
leandros wrote:Are you saying that the LW didn't sink destroyers on the move....?
Stop being assinine.
Sorry, I do not understand the word. You made a point of the fact that the targets hit at Dunkirk were laying still (which wasn't exactly correct). How shall I understand this, please.....

On another point, have you considered the AA capacity of all those vessels, in such a concentrated area. Still......

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#22

Post by LWD » 16 May 2007, 17:57

Are you referring to the AA capacity of the German invasion fleet? Didn't you state in another thread that just one pat of it occupied over 10 square km?

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#23

Post by RichTO90 » 16 May 2007, 18:39

leandros wrote:Am I to understand you so that you don't know about any British ships sunk, other than by I/KG 40, before Dunkirk?
How you got that understanding out of my statements is beyond me?
If so, this must have been a very efficient unit since, to my knowledge they werent' operational, and built up to complete Gruppe (3 Staffelns) status, untill after they moved to Norway April/May '40.
Er, no, 1./KG40 was formed 1.11.39 at Bremen with Fw 200C bombers. Stab I. and 2./KG40 was formed 1.5.40, and 3./KG40 on 1.6.40. (http://www.ww2.dk/) And it's successive stations were Bremn, Aalborg-West, Copenhagen, Bordeaux-Merignac, they weren't stationed in Norway until 17 March 1942 (although of course aircraft and detachments flew in and out continuously there as did those of many other units especially in support of Weserübung, but they did not move there in the sense of changing stations).
And, this was all that was available to the Germans for anti-shipping duties during the Seelöwe? Since no other bomber unit could sink ships? Except maybe the Stukas? BTW, I believe the Stuka units were replenished to somewhat equal to full strength ultimo September......
I still can't figure out how you reached this conclusion from my statements. In fact, at this time all naval vessels (except those of the USN) were extremely vulnerable to dive bombing attacks, albeit less so to torpedo bombing attacks. The reason being that all badly miscalculated the requirements needed to counter their potential adversaries (in effect everyone was well equipped to counter level bombers). That is why so many British ships were hit by dive-bombers without inflicting the heavy damage on the attackers that for example the USN was capable of inflicting just a scant year after Crete. It is also why Bismarck was in trouble about the same time, her 'medium' 3.7cm batteries were crap guns, her 2cm batteries were too short-ranged, and the heavier guns high-angle directors were virtually incapable of calculating the rate changes generated.

Balanced against that though is that the German dive-bombers weren't all that capable either against moving, maneuvering, high speed targets. Virtually all the British naval vessels lost or damaged to dive bombing at Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Calais were either stationary or maneuvering slowly in the confines of a harbor or shallow estuary.

And I've given you the Stuka strengths numerous times, why do I have to post them again?

10 May 360 on hand, 326 operational
13 August 347 on hand, 276 operational
7 September 161 on hand, 123 operational

Do you notice a pattern? BTW, the damage done to the British fleet off Crete was done by an on hand force of 205 Stukas (no information on the number operational) (the Stukagruppen on 21 June 1941 only totaled 466 on hand with 314 operational). So given that on a 'good' day the Stukas were capable of sinking perhaps four major naval combatants and damaging perhaps three times as many (with about half that 'damage' being insignificant), how are they supposed to stop or inflict a significant check - in the night - on an immediate reaction force of 80 to 100 such ships, followed up by possibly 60 to 70 more (including heavier ships) within 24 hours? Remember, Dynamo was sustained for eight days and acheived its mission.

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#24

Post by fredleander » 18 May 2007, 00:38

RichTO90 wrote:Er, no, 1./KG40 was formed 1.11.39 at Bremen with Fw 200C bombers. Stab I. and 2./KG40 was formed 1.5.40, and 3./KG40 on 1.6.40. (http://www.ww2.dk/)

I/KG 40 was formed end of '39, yes. But not with FW200C bombers. It was not operational untill the "Weserübung" when it supported the invasion.
RichTO90 wrote:And it's successive stations were Bremn, Aalborg-West, Copenhagen, Bordeaux-Merignac, they weren't stationed in Norway until 17 March 1942 (although of course aircraft and detachments flew in and out continuously there as did those of many other units especially in support of Weserübung, but they did not move there in the sense of changing stations).
:) :) :) ......"of course" they flew in and out continuosly. Their main base during that operation was Værnes/Trondheim. Nowarra writes: "Most of the KM transport units were withdrawn from Norway mid-April. I/KG 40 stayed on there".

In that period the strength was built up to three complete staffeln.

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#25

Post by fredleander » 18 May 2007, 01:23

RichTO90 wrote:It is also why Bismarck was in trouble about the same time, her 'medium' 3.7cm batteries were crap guns, her 2cm batteries were too short-ranged, and the heavier guns high-angle directors were virtually incapable of calculating the rate changes generated..
Was Bismarck attacked by high-level bombers...?....I mean to have read somewhere that Bismarck's problem was the low speed of the Stringbag. They simply calculated the aproach speed wrongly because it was so low. Not a fault of the guns themselves....
RichTO90 wrote:Balanced against that though is that the German dive-bombers weren't all that capable either against moving, maneuvering, high speed targets. Virtually all the British naval vessels lost or damaged to dive bombing at Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Calais were either stationary or maneuvering slowly in the confines of a harbor or shallow estuary...
Have you studied the various cases....?
RichTO90 wrote:And I've given you the Stuka strengths numerous times, why do I have to post them again?

10 May 360 on hand, 326 operational
13 August 347 on hand, 276 operational
7 September 161 on hand, 123 operational..
Well, you can look at 5 different sources and get 5 different answers on that question - according to the author's inclination....How was it on Sept. 25th, then? The last practical S-day according to the actual conditions.
RichTO90 wrote:Do you notice a pattern? BTW, the damage done to the British fleet off Crete was done by an on hand force of 205 Stukas (no information on the number operational) (the Stukagruppen on 21 June 1941 only totaled 466 on hand with 314 operational). So given that on a 'good' day the Stukas were capable of sinking perhaps four major naval combatants and damaging perhaps three times as many (with about half that 'damage' being insignificant), how are they supposed to stop or inflict a significant check - in the night - on an immediate reaction force of 80 to 100 such ships, followed up by possibly 60 to 70 more (including heavier ships) within 24 hours? Remember, Dynamo was sustained for eight days and acheived its mission.
Are you implying that only the LW Stukas could sink ships in this period...? You are so good at statistics. It must be relatively easy to find out exactly how many sorties were flown at Crete when you so easily find out how many aircrafts were available.

If you know the conditions during the Dunkirk and Crete operations wouldn't you agree that the Seelöwe scenario would be very different regarding number of aircrafts and nearness to the operational area for the LW. After all, at Dunkirk the Luftwaffe flew only approx. 1.500 bomber sorties for 236 vessels sunk and an equal number damaged to some degree.....at the same time as the Fighter Command flew an equal number of sorties. Stukas didn't fly at all two of these days.

I don't believe any of the RN vessels around Crete were lying still when hit. Except maybe some in Suda bay.

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#26

Post by RichTO90 » 18 May 2007, 06:08

leandros wrote:I/KG 40 was formed end of '39, yes. But not with FW200C bombers. It was not operational untill the "Weserübung" when it supported the invasion.
Really? Curiously, Lexikonder Wehrmacht, Michael Holm, and every other source I've bothered to check pretty much say:
Aufgestellt am 23. September 1939 (I. Gruppe), der Stab folgte im Juli 1940. Am 22. Dezember 1940 wurde der Stab zum Stab des Kampfgeschwaders 28 und durch einen neuen Stab ersetzt. Im Januar 1941 wurde die II. Gruppe aufgestellt, die III. Gruppe folgte im März 1941 aus der I./KG 1. Im Juli 1940 wurde eine IV. (Ergänzungs-) Gruppe aufgestellt. Im August 1942 wurde in Nantes eine zusätzliche V. Gruppe aufgestellt. Ausgestattet war das Geschwader wie folgt:

Stab: Erste He 111 H, dann Fw 200 C

I. Gruppe: erst Fw 200 C und einige He 111, ab 1943 die He 177
:) :) :) ......"of course" they flew in and out continuosly. Their main base during that operation was Værnes/Trondheim. Nowarra writes: "Most of the KM transport units were withdrawn from Norway mid-April. I/KG 40 stayed on there".
How mixed up can you possibly get? Only the Stab of I. Gruppe and 1. Staffel were formed. The Stab was nominally equipped with He-111H, but it doesn't appear that they were issued at this time, 1. Staffel was equipped with Fw-200C, which may have been drawn from KG z.b.V. 105, which otherwise was the only unit with Fw-200C operational at this time (it was formed from school units Holtenau with 8 aircraft and participated in Weserübung, but was partly disbanded in June with its aircraft and personnel supposedly returning to the schools, but some may have been turned over to 2. and 3./KG 40). On 10 May 1940 1./KG 40 was reported at Copenhagen with 4 Fw-200C on hand of which 2 were operational. On 7 September Stab/KG 40 was at Bordeaux with 2 Ju-88 on hand of which 1 was operational, I/KG 40 was also at Bordeaux, with 7 Fw-200C on hand of which 4 were operational.
In that period the strength was built up to three complete staffeln.
No, sorry, but you are wrong again. As late as 7 September the rest of I. Gruppe were still forming because of a lack of operational aircraft.

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#27

Post by RichTO90 » 18 May 2007, 06:57

leandros wrote:Was Bismarck attacked by high-level bombers...?....I mean to have read somewhere that Bismarck's problem was the low speed of the Stringbag. They simply calculated the aproach speed wrongly because it was so low. Not a fault of the guns themselves....
Of course not. Rate changes in aircraft flying at low level can be very high as well. And of course it wasn't the fault of the 8.8cm and 10.5cm guns, it was a fault of their director design, a fault they shared with most other navies, although it had the virtue of not being as bad as the British design. In essence, it was assumed that because torpedo bombing was considered so problematic (the Germans had just begun to experiment with them themselves and their aerial torpedoes simply didn't work) and dive bombers were so specialized (effectively at this time only the USN, IJN, and Luftwaffe utilized dive bombers, and the Luftwaffe was practicing ground attack), that the only real threat to ships was level bombing, so that is what the directors were designed to combat, and that is about the only thing they were reasonably good at (remember, Bismarck fired at a bunch of low-level torpedo bombers and didn't come close to hitting one of them, but she also fired quite a few rounds at a slow, lumbering Catalina at about 5,000 feet.... and missed her completely as well.

Simply put, the story about the Swordfish being "too slow" for the guns to track is simple hogwash.
Have you studied the various cases....?
DO. IT. YOURSELF. FOR. ONCE.

I'm tired of holding your hand and spoon feeding you. Try go finding something out for yourself for once.
Well, you can look at 5 different sources and get 5 different answers on that question - according to the author's inclination....How was it on Sept. 25th, then? The last practical S-day according to the actual conditions.
Oh, the cowards way out of it. Just declare the 'sources' to be unreliable without providing any evidence. Hint, there is no "author's inclination", the data is taken from the strengths reported to the Ob.d.L. In other words if you go to five different authors quoting from the same original source you'll find the same figures....which are the ones I posted.

And no, I don't have the 25 September figures. So why don't you go find one of your five authors and use the figure you like, or make one up yourself.
Are you implying that only the LW Stukas could sink ships in this period...? You are so good at statistics. It must be relatively easy to find out exactly how many sorties were flown at Crete when you so easily find out how many aircrafts were available.
No, sadly sortie data is incomplete for the Luftwaffe at the best of times. But simply assume one sortie-per-day-per aircraft, so a maximum of maybe 200 Ju-87 sorties, the result....on their best day....was three ships sunk (four if you count York in Suda Bay, but she was already immobilized).
If you know the conditions during the Dunkirk and Crete operations wouldn't you agree that the Seelöwe scenario would be very different regarding number of aircrafts and nearness to the operational area for the LW. After all, at Dunkirk the Luftwaffe flew only approx. 1.500 bomber sorties for 236 vessels sunk and an equal number damaged to some degree.....at the same time as the Fighter Command flew an equal number of sorties. Stukas didn't fly at all two of these days.
Oh, now you have precise figures for the sinkings at Dunkirk? 236? And an equal number damaged? How much is "to some degree"? And what were they? How many were naval combatants? How many were hit at night? How much "closer" do you think the "operational" area will be than Dover, Folkestone, Maidstone, and the other areas on the coast that saw the August battles that resulted in so many Stuka losses? Fundamentally the best that can be hoped for is two sorties per day, just as they did in real life, one at mid morning and one at late afternoon....so long as they survive and are relatively undamaged.

And why do you think the Stukas didn't fly on two days? Could it be....weather?
I don't believe any of the RN vessels around Crete were lying still when hit. Except maybe some in Suda bay.
York was in Suda Bay, but then she had already been hit by a MAS boat IIRC and was immobile.


Yet again....I suppose one day you might answer....

What about weather?
What about night?
What about Fighter Command?

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#28

Post by T. A. Gardner » 19 May 2007, 00:49

One thing left out of the list of destroyers sunk given above is that all were:

1. Operating in daylight.
2. In the case of those off Dunkirk and Boulougne they were almost certainly at anchor rather than maneuvering at high speed seeing as how they were primarily engaged in removing troops.

This makes the list a bit useless as a comparison to the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe against maneuvering vessels (Crete is a bit better but many of the losses there happened under similar circumstances). It also ignores the horrendous lopsided single action between the RN and a German invasion convoy off Crete which was completely sunk for no RN losses in a night action.
For the Germans, air power alone will not stop the RN from disrupting, if not outright crushing, the invasion at sea. It is no substitute for a real navy; something the Germans do not have.

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#29

Post by RichTO90 » 21 May 2007, 00:19

T. A. Gardner wrote:One thing left out of the list of destroyers sunk given above is that all were:

1. Operating in daylight.
2. In the case of those off Dunkirk and Boulougne they were almost certainly at anchor rather than maneuvering at high speed seeing as how they were primarily engaged in removing troops.
Uh, I think I've been harping on those two subjects now for about two months....so if you expect to get any kind of answer from the 'wouldn't it be neat if the nifty Nazis had gone ahead with Seelöwe and so showed the silly Brits a thing or because it's just sooooo obvious that it woulda worked' crowd (I think they have a fan club and you can buy bumper stickers)....don't hold your breath.

Because:

1.) Germans got the bestest radar and kool dive bombers with carrot-eating pilots. :roll: :roll:
2.) They did manage to sink some ships that were maneuvering, so QED, they obviously would sink all ships that were maneuvering. :roll: :roll:
This makes the list a bit useless as a comparison to the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe against maneuvering vessels (Crete is a bit better but many of the losses there happened under similar circumstances). It also ignores the horrendous lopsided single action between the RN and a German invasion convoy off Crete which was completely sunk for no RN losses in a night action.
BTW, is it only me that noticed that at least two of those RN ships sunk 'at Crete' were actually sunk after attempting to execute a night bombardment of Luftwaffe bases on the mainland? :o
For the Germans, air power alone will not stop the RN from disrupting, if not outright crushing, the invasion at sea. It is no substitute for a real navy; something the Germans do not have.

Uh-huh. :D

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#30

Post by fredleander » 21 May 2007, 14:46

RichTO90 wrote:How mixed up can you possibly get? Only the Stab of I. Gruppe and 1. Staffel were formed. The Stab was nominally equipped with He-111H, but it doesn't appear that they were issued at this time, 1. Staffel was equipped with Fw-200C, which may have been drawn from KG z.b.V. 105, which otherwise was the only unit with Fw-200C operational at this time (it was formed from school units Holtenau with 8 aircraft and participated in Weserübung, but was partly disbanded in June with its aircraft and personnel supposedly returning to the schools, but some may have been turned over to 2. and 3./KG 40). On 10 May 1940 1./KG 40 was reported at Copenhagen with 4 Fw-200C on hand of which 2 were operational. On 7 September Stab/KG 40 was at Bordeaux with 2 Ju-88 on hand of which 1 was operational, I/KG 40 was also at Bordeaux, with 7 Fw-200C on hand of which 4 were operational.
According to Nowarra the first aircrafts supplied to the KG 40 (Fall '39) were six civilian versions of the FW200 which were originally ordered by Japan. These were confiscated and used for procedural and navigational training. The first really military version of the FW200 - the "C", was supplied just before the "Weserübung".

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