Seelöwe: German Air Operations and anti-ship Capabilities

Discussions on WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic.
Post Reply
RichTO90
Member
Posts: 4238
Joined: 22 Dec 2003, 19:03

#91

Post by RichTO90 » 01 Aug 2007, 04:23

Walter_Warlimont wrote:And if the majority of the Luftwaffe planes are kept nearer to their bases in France because they are providing cover for the Invasion Forces in the channel, attacking the Royal Navy in the Channel & approaches to the Channel & covering the forces landing on the beaches in England, then the RAF is forced to travel farther than they normally would, because normally the Luftwaffe is battling the RAF in Southern England.
See, it may be a hard thing for you guys to believe too, but I've been spending months now trying to be nice and yet all I get is the same dataless constructs? And you don't understand why I'm frustrated?

So "if the majority of the Luftwaffe planes are kept nearer to their bases in France"? I assume from that you mean they don't have as far to fly?

And "because they are providing cover for the Invasion Forces in the channel, attacking the Royal Navy in the Channel & approaches to the Channel & covering the forces landing on the beaches in England"?

You have an "if" - "so" statement that ends in " then the RAF is forced to travel farther than they normally would, because normally the Luftwaffe is battling the RAF in Southern England"?

What is generally called a hypothesis, right? You are building a theory that somehow by virtue of not having so far to fly the Luftwaffe is going to be more effective? Yes?

But you see that is actually testable - the next step after hypothesis. And we can find that when major operations were being conducted in that very area - the coast and channel during the attacks on radar, the Fighter Command bases, and the Channel convoys, Royal Navy and merchant ship losses in July were:

July 2 – British steamer AENEAS (10,058grt, Convoy Commodore), in convoy OA.177G, was sunk by German bombing at twenty miles southeast of Start Point.

3 July - British steam barge BIJOU (98grt) was sunk by German bombing at Mistley Quay, near Harwich.

July 4 - Auxiliary anti-aircraft ship FOYLE BANK (R, 5,582t, 1930), German aircraft, Portland, S England
British steamer DALLAS CITY (4952grt) was sunk by German bombing in 50 09N, 02 01W.
Dutch steamer DEUCALION (1796grt) was sunk by German bombing twenty miles south, southwest of Portland.
Dutch steamer BRITSUM (5255grt) was sunk by German bombing off Selsey, in 50-04N, 1-55W.
Estonian steamer KOLGA (3526grt) was sunk by German bombing 50 13N, 02 00W.
British tug SILVERDIAL (55grt) was sunk by German bombing in Portland Harbour.

July 10 - British tanker TASCALUSA (6499grt) was sunk by German bombing in Falmouth Harbour, alongside the Northern Arm.
Greek steamer MARI CHANDRIS (5840grt), which had been towed to Falmouth in June after a collision, was set afire by TASCALUSA. The entire crew of the Greek steamer was rescued. TASCALUSA was refloated on 29 August and beached at Mylor Flats for scrapping.
British steamer WATERLOO (1905grt) was sunk by German bombing two and a half miles NE of Smith's Knoll Bouy. The crew was rescued.
Dutch steamer BILL S. (466grt) was badly damaged by German bombing six miles 260° from Dungeness from convoy CW.3, escorted by destroyer VERSATILE. The steamer sank 6.7 miles 67° from Dungeness.

July 11 - Yacht WARRIOR II (R, 1,124t, 1904), sunk by aircraft off Portland.

July 12 – British steamer HORNCHURCH (2162grt) was sunk by German bombing off Aldeburgh Light Vessel, in 52-11-15N, 1-52-30E.

14 July - British steamer ISLAND QUEEN (779grt) of convoy CW.5 was badly damaged by German bombing four cables off A Buoy, Dover, east of Folkestone Gateway Light Vessel. ISLAND QUEEN sank in tow of British trawler KINGSTON ALALITE (412grt) later that day one half mile 350° from Folkestone Light Vessel.
Belgian trawler PROVIDENTIA (139grt) was sunk by German bombing in 49-55N, 9-12W.

15 July - British steamer HEWORTH (2855grt) in convoy FN.223 was damaged by German bombing ten miles south of Aldeburgh Light Vessel. The British steamer was taken in tow for Harwich, but was grounded three cables 267° from East Shipwash Buoy.
British steamer CITY OF LIMERICK (1359grt) was sunk by German bombing, 100 miles 270° from Ushant in 48 39N, 07 12W.
Polish steamer ZBARAZ (2088grt) in convoy FN.223 was badly damaged by German bombing ten miles south of Aldeburgh Light Vessel. The steamer was taken in tow by tug ST OLAVES, but sank near South Ship Head Buoy.
Portuguese steamer ALPHA (853grt) was sunk by German bombing in 48 51N, 06 34W.

17 July - Estonian steamer LEOLA (554grt) was sunk by German bombing in 49 00N, 07 30W, sixty miles east of the Scillies.

July 19 - Tanker/oiler WAR SEPOY (5,574t, 1919), damaged by aircraft off Dover. Constructive total loss
Trawler CRESTFLOWER (550t, 1930), foundered after damage by aircraft off Portsmouth.

July 20 - Destroyer BRAZEN (1,360t, 1931), sunk by aircraft off Dover, S England
British steamer PULBOROUGH (960grt) from convoy CW.7 was sunk by German bombing two and a half miles southeast, south of Dover Pier.

21 July - British steamer TERLINGS (2318grt) was sunk by German bombing ten miles southwest of St Catherine's Point.

July 24 - Trawler FLEMING (R, 356t, 1929), sunk by aircraft, Thames Estuary.
Trawler KINGSTON GALENA (550t, 1934), sunk by aircraft off Dover.
Trawler RODINO (R, 230t, 1913), sunk by aircraft off Dover.

July 25 – (concentrated attack on CW.8)
German air attacks sank British steamers CORHAVEN (991grt) off Dover, POLGRANGE (804grt) off Dover, LEO (1140grt) off Dover, HENRY MOON (1091grt) two miles off Folkestone, and PORTSLADE (1091grt) four to five miles northeast of Dungeness.

July 27 – (concentrated attack on Dover)
Destroyer CODRINGTON (Leader, 1,540t, 1930), bombed and sunk in Dover Harbour, S England
Destroyers WREN (Cdr F. W. G. Harker) was sunk in 52 10N, 02 06E

28 July - British steamer ORLOCK HEAD (1563grt) was badly damaged by German bombing in 58 44N, 04 21W. The steamer was hit by three bombs and was also damaged by strafing. Steamer ORLOCK HEAD sank later that day 6.7 miles 320° from Strathie Point.

July 29 - Destroyer DELIGHT (1,375t, 1933), bombed and sunk off Portland, S England
Yacht GULZAR (R, 197t, 1934), sunk in air attack, Dover Harbour.
British steamer GRONLAND (1264grt), which had been damaged on the 25th, was sunk in outer Dover Harbour by German bombing.
Total 12 naval and 28 merchant vessels.

In August although the campaign continued through the 12th when the Stuka operations were broken off, only 6 RN vessels were sunk in Channel waters.
I know it's a hard thing to believe, but based on that assumption, the Luftwaffe then has more fuel to conserve for what they are doing & where thay are doing it, while the RAF has less fuel to use as they are having to fly farther to engage the Luftwaffe in combat than they normally would.
Why, yes, it is hard to believe, since most RAF operations already extended beyond the coast, while through mid-August most Luftwaffe operations barely went inland. The Jagdwaffe endurance simply wasn't good enough even in the shorter ranged missions, gaining at most some 5 to 10 minutes. It improves Luftwaffe endurance marginally, but is hardly dramatic enough to be remarked upon.

User avatar
fredleander
Member
Posts: 2175
Joined: 03 Dec 2004, 21:49
Location: Stockholm
Contact:

#92

Post by fredleander » 06 Aug 2007, 15:12

Tim Smith wrote:
LWD wrote:I remember looking up an account of one of the cruisers sunk or heavily damaged at Crete. One of the points made is that they didn't take any serious damage until they were out of AA ammo. Other ships in their unit were also very low on ammo when they took serious or fatal damage.
Running out of AA ammo could have been a problem for British warships during Operation Sealion.

While the individual German bombers might not be that accurate, there would certainly be a lot of them. And the more there are, the more separate attacks there will be on British ships. And the more separate attacks there are, the more AA ammunition the ships will shoot off.

While the battleships were big enough to carry vast amounts of ammunition, the cruisers couldn't carry so much, and the destroyers even less.

The temptation for the British will be to put into port at night to replenish ammunition stocks.
I am afraid neither the Scandinavian campaign, Dunkirk or Crete can be compared with the potential Seelöwe scenario. In these other scenarios the LW forces were operating on much longer ranges (at Dunkirk most still from their home bases in Germany) therefore increasing their turn-around times, their forces were smaller (at Dunkirk the effort still had to be upheld at the other fronts - Dunkirk did not have priority). In September '40 a large airfield system had been established close to the Channel (in Greece the German airfields were notorious for the dust plague during the fighting there). During "Weserübung" LW bases in Southern Norway were quite primitive and far between and in the latter part of the campaign the closest airfield to the North Norwegian territory was Værnes airfield, Trondheim. But, most importantly, in Seelöwe planning and orders the anti-ship effort was given priority. It was well understood that RN was the factor that could diminish the success of the invasion. This is shown by dedicated stand-by units being stationed at the Eastern and Western approaches of the Channel, as well as general warning orders for such missions.

As for LW anti-ship capacity the below list should be of interest. According to "Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945" in 1939 and 1940 following Allied destroyers were sunk by the Luftwaffe. In addition comes, cruisers, sloops, trawlers and auxilliaries. Only at Dunkirk 234 vessels of all sorts were sunk. A few of those by KM vessels and army units. In addition comes those damaged. To deduct from this that the LW did not have anti-ship capability is rather far-fetched. Just my opinion.

One is free to look into the various events listed here - whether they were lying still or moving..... :) .

Wicher - 3/9-39 (Polish)
Gurkha - 9/4-40
Afridi - 3/5-40
Bison - 3/5-40 (French)
Grom - 5/5-40 (Polish)
Van Galen - 10/5-40 (Dutch)
Valentine - 15/5-40
Whitley - 19/5-40
L'adroit - 21/5-40 (French)
Orage - 23/5-40 (French)
Chacal - 24/5-40 (French)
Wessex - 24/5-40
Grenade - 29/5-40
Foudroyant - 1/6-40 (French)
Basilisk - 1/6-40
Havant - 1/6-40
Keith - 1/6-40
Brazen - 20/7-40
Codrington - 27/7-40
Wren - 27/7-40
Delight - 29/7-40

In 1941 18 Allied destroyers were sunk by LW units.
In 1942: 15


User avatar
fredleander
Member
Posts: 2175
Joined: 03 Dec 2004, 21:49
Location: Stockholm
Contact:

#93

Post by fredleander » 06 Aug 2007, 15:32

Andreas wrote:What is interesting however regarding Crete is that in the case of the second convoy, the Luftwaffe and the single escort together managed to drive off the vastly superior attacking surface units. But that was a year later, in conditions of German air supremacy, probably better weather conditions, and a more capable Luftwaffe. Nevertheless I think you are maybe a bit harsh on the Luftwaffe. The performance at Crete was not that bad, especially if you also look at damaged units, not just sunk.

All the best

Andreas
When comparing Crete and Dunkirk it should be noted that only part of the Stuka force was in action during the Dunkirk evacuation. Also, approximately the same number of fighter sorties were flown by both parties with approximately same total losses - half of the German ones being bombers. The LW fighter units were mostly flying from Germany so the comparison should be viable for operations over the English coast, the LW fighter units in the meantime (September) having moved forward.

User avatar
Bronsky
Member
Posts: 825
Joined: 11 Apr 2003, 10:28
Location: Paris

#94

Post by Bronsky » 06 Aug 2007, 16:53

leandros wrote:One is free to look into the various events listed here - whether they were lying still or moving..... :) .
No time to check the whole list, so I'll review those French DD whose fate I know from the top of my head:

L'Adroit - not in port but just outside Dunkirk, waiting for large tanker Salomé to exit the port.
L'Orage - moving, but not maneuvering (shore bombardment mission off Boulogne).
Chacal - at sea but had stopped, and was getting underway when attacked.
Foudroyant - under way in a corridor in the middle of a mine field, so no possibility of maneuver.

So they were all under way but not taking evasive action for various reasons. Further note that the Luftwaffe damaged a lot of the light craft plying back and forth between the shore and the transports. Ships in that position are very vulnerable, and the Germans would have been the ones in a sitting duck position for Seelöwe.

RichTO90
Member
Posts: 4238
Joined: 22 Dec 2003, 19:03

#95

Post by RichTO90 » 06 Aug 2007, 18:42

Welcome back! Where you been? Are you sure you are ready for this? :D
leandros wrote:I am afraid neither the Scandinavian campaign, Dunkirk or Crete can be compared with the potential Seelöwe scenario. In these other scenarios the LW forces were operating on much longer ranges (at Dunkirk most still from their home bases in Germany) therefore increasing their turn-around times, their forces were smaller (at Dunkirk the effort still had to be upheld at the other fronts - Dunkirk did not have priority). In September '40 a large airfield system had been established close to the Channel (in Greece the German airfields were notorious for the dust plague during the fighting there).
Er, really? The problem with making such statements is that they are fairly simple to check leandros, which seems to be something you neglect? :D

The actual basing of the Sturzkampfgeschwader during the Dunkirk operations is fairly clear, although for a few it is unclear when some base shifts occurred, so I have taken an average of those to be fair. They were:

I/StG2 – Beaulieu (c. 20 May) (100 miles)
II/StG2 – Cambrai (75 miles) and Guise (100 miles) (average (87.5 miles)
III/StG2 – Beaulieu (20 May) (100 miles)
I/StG76 – Guise (95 miles) and Soissons (125 miles) (average 110 miles)
I/StG77 – Rocroi (120 miles)
Average 103.5 miles to Dunkirk

For Seelöwe the situation is a bit more complex, since most of the Stuka units were withdrawn from the cost for reconstitution in mid August, so I have taken their basing from where they were when conducting Channel operations in July and August. The first measure is from that basing to the nearest proposed Seelöwe beaches.

I/StG1 – Saint Pol (50 miles)
II/StG1 – Pas-de-Calais (65 miles)
III/StG1 – Falaise (135 miles)
I/StG2 – Cherbourg (90 miles)
II/StG2 – Lannion (195 miles)
III/StG2 – St. Pierre sur Dives (130 miles)
I/StG77 – Maltot (120 miles)
II/StG77 – Bruges (85 miles)
Average 108.75 miles to the invasion beaches

So a whopping average increase of....5.25 miles? :lol: 8-) :P

But, to be fair some of those are extended to reach their bases to the beaches, so instead we can look at them as minimum distance for sea-control missions, so from base to the closest part of the English coast.

I/StG1 – Saint Pol (50 miles)
II/StG1 – Pas-de-Calais (65 miles)
III/StG1 – Falaise (135 miles)
I/StG2 – Cherbourg (75 miles)
II/StG2 – Lannion (100 miles)
III/StG2 – St. Pierre sur Dives (130 miles)
I/StG77 – Maltot (120 miles)
II/StG77 – Bruges (85 miles)
Average 95 miles to the invasion beaches.

So 8.5 miles saved? :D 8-) :P
As for LW anti-ship capacity the below list should be of interest. According to "Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945" in 1939 and 1940 following Allied destroyers were sunk by the Luftwaffe. In addition comes, cruisers, sloops, trawlers and auxilliaries. Only at Dunkirk 234 vessels of all sorts were sunk. A few of those by KM vessels and army units. In addition comes those damaged. To deduct [sic] from this that the LW did not have anti-ship capability is rather far-fetched. Just my opinion.
No one has "deduced" that? But it can be deduced that given that the Luftwaffe had little training in the art of attacking naval vessels maneuvering at high speed in open waters and given that they hit so few vessels doing so, that their capability was minor not non-existant. Your assumption that anyone has claimed that is silly.

As was already established, the numbers of "vessels of all sort sunk" at Dunkirk include everything from actual naval and merchant ships sunk
One is free to look into the various events listed here - whether they were lying still or moving..... :) .
Okay, sure....

Wicher - 3/9-39 (Polish) - was attacked in the Gulf of Gdansk, three times by German aircraft, on 1 Sep by an estimated 33 Stuka with the result being several near misses, which killed the captain and killed and wounded some other crew and caused some minor hull damage. On 3 September she engaged two German destroyers (Z-1 and Z-9) without damage, was engaged twice by German air attack without damage, and then in the third attack by 1./Trägergruppe 186 (Ju-87) was hit in the bow and suffered a second near miss that opened her hull, causing uncontrolled flooding.

Gurkha - 9/4-40 - "As the British Bergen raiding force arrived back at the Main Fleet, the Luftwaffe, which was alerted by U.56's report arrived on the scene with 47 Ju.88 and He.111 bombers. German attacks on the British fleet continued from 1430 to 1730. Destroyer GURKHA, which had reduced speed to improve her gunnery in heavy seas, was fatally damaged by near misses aft in these attacks one hundred miles southwest of Bergen." (RN Day-by-Day) Of the 31 other Allied vessels under attack, only Rodney was hit (and undamaged) while 3 others suffered near misses and slight splinter damage and three suffered near misses and no damage.

Afridi - 3/5-40 - was encumbered by 69 survivors from Bison when hit by a single bomb during a second attack, foundering 45 minutes later.
Bison - 3/5-40 (French) - struck by a single bomb during a massed German attack that penetrated the magazine. None of the other 18-odd Allied vessels were so much as near missed in these two attacks.

Grom - 5/5-40 (Polish) - er, this was actually at 0828 on 4 May, not 5 May, while conducting a shore bombardment off Narvik. She was struck by a single bomb on her torpedo tubes, which resulted in a massive secondary explosion. None of the other 7 vessels in the area was even near missed.

Van Galen - 10/5-40 (Dutch) - was sunk while bombading the airfield at Waalhaven. In both her case and that of Grom the vessels were in shallow coastal waters conducting shore bombardments, which required relatively slow speeds. In the case of Van Galen she was in the Waal east of Rotterdam, so could hardly maintain any kind of speed or maneuver. :roll:

Valentine - 15/5-40 - was in the Scheldt Estuary, less than a mile off Terneuzen, in the ship channel, so was again limited in her speed and maneuverability.

Whitley - 19/5-40 - was along the coast, two miles east of Nieuport, when near missed by three bombs, but she was 'lost' when she was run aground to do repairs, in the process she broke her keel.

L'adroit - 21/5-40 (French)
Orage - 23/5-40 (French)
Chacal - 24/5-40 (French)
Wessex - 24/5-40
Grenade - 29/5-40
Foudroyant - 1/6-40 (French)
Basilisk - 1/6-40
Havant - 1/6-40
Keith - 1/6-40

Have all been discussed before, most were lost in the shallow coastal waters off Dunkirk, or in the harbor itself.

Brazen - 20/7-40

Codrington - 27/7-40 - was under refit in Dover Harbor when hit.

Wren - 27/7-40
Delight - 29/7-40

Brazen, Wren, and Delight probably are the best evidence for what the effectiveness would be. All were attacked by Stukas AFAIK, in the Channel, from the 'closer' and 'better' German airbases. During a time when the Channel convoys were still being run on a near daily basis, escorted by destroyers (the Channel convoys were finally suspended in early September IIRC?). So three sunk at sea during July to mid-August (when the Stuka operations were suspended), so maybe one per say 15-20 convoys? :roll:
Last edited by RichTO90 on 06 Aug 2007, 19:20, edited 1 time in total.

RichTO90
Member
Posts: 4238
Joined: 22 Dec 2003, 19:03

#96

Post by RichTO90 » 06 Aug 2007, 19:39

leandros wrote:When comparing Crete and Dunkirk it should be noted that only part of the Stuka force was in action during the Dunkirk evacuation.
Really? Which part was and which wasn't? AFAICT only StG 1 didn't participate, since it was still engaged for the most part in Norway? So five of eight Gruppen did participate. And in any case, those units were stronger than the greater number of units were by September after the losses of the campaigns.
Also, approximately the same number of fighter sorties were flown by both parties with approximately same total losses - half of the German ones being bombers.
And that merely says that the Luftwaffe bombers would be more heavily attritted than the fighters. By September the strengths of single engine fighters were approaching parity - even with the RAF losing more fighters on a relative basis - so I'm not sure how that helps the Germans?
The LW fighter units were mostly flying from Germany so the comparison should be viable for operations over the English coast, the LW fighter units in the meantime (September) having moved forward.
Again, leandros, this sort of thing is easily checkable, so, for those I bothered to check - I'm not about to do all your work for you again, we can find the following had moved to forward bases from Germany:

I/JG1 - Guise-Nordost (Tupigny) (22-25 May), Monchy-Breton (25-31 May), Guise-Nordost (31 May-6 June)
I/JG2 - Possible candidates: Neuville lez Beaulieu or Rejet de Beaulieu according to Bronsky (edited by Andreas) (18 May-2 June)
II/JG2 – Tirlemont (17-25 May), Grandglise (25 May-3 June)
III/JG2 - Signy-le-Petit (20-31 May), (Guise (31 May-1 June), Couvron (1-13 June)
I/JG3 – Philippeville (17-21 May), Cambrai-Niergnies (21-23 May), Cambrai-Süd (23-24 May), Montecouvez (24 May-4 June)
II/JG3 – Philippeville (19-23 May), Cambrai (23-24 May), Montecouvez-Süd (24 May-4 June)
III/JG3 - St. Trond (18-22 May), Charleroi-Gosslies (23-25 May), Maubeuge (25 My-2 June)

Andreas
Member
Posts: 6938
Joined: 10 Nov 2002, 15:12
Location: Europe

#97

Post by Andreas » 06 Aug 2007, 20:54

HMS Delight - lost 29 July when leaving harbour during daytime against Admiralty orders. Picked up by Freya radar at Cherbourg, attacked by 15 fighter bombers (Me 109 and Me 110) in three consecutive low-level waves. Near missed repeatedly, no direct hits, but one of the near misses started a fire onboard. 18 sailors lost.

HMS Brazen - lost 19 July as escort of convoy CW7. Attacked by an estimated 'some' 30 Ju 87 accompanied by fighters. One hit under the hull vic. engine room broke her back. 1 sailor lost.

For another example the same day that ended differently: HMS Beagle (1), sailing alone off Dover attacked by an estimated 40-50 aircraft including escorts. High-speed evasion, no hits, but several near misses damaging gyro and fan engines. Sent to Portland for examination and then to Devonport for full repair. Hms Beagle (2) same day, attacked by ten Stukas while leaving Portland for Devonbort. No serious damage, no cas reported, one attacker claimed s/d.

Source for all this is Smith, Peter 'Hold the Narrow Sea'.

All the best

Andreas

Andreas
Member
Posts: 6938
Joined: 10 Nov 2002, 15:12
Location: Europe

#98

Post by Andreas » 06 Aug 2007, 21:25

It is also important to note that these destroyers were not the most modern in the arsenal, and lacked the HA dual-purpose armament of the Hunt class which came into service then, except for one uncontrolled gun.

HMS Beagle and Brazen were B-class, which had one HA gun, and 2x1 2pdr AA. HMS Delight was D-class with the same armament. By contrast, the new Hunts which by September made up the whole of the 1st Flotilla at Portsmouth had controlled 4x4.7" HA dual-purpose, one quad-AA 2-pdr, and 2x1 Oerlikon 2-pdr.

The first of these was HMS Atherstone, which was attacked and severely damaged on 11 September 1940. It could not maneuver due to minesweepers crossing the convoy route, and the route being narrow. She held the aftermost position of CW11 which was attacked by 21 Ju 88 accompanied by Me 110. No fighter cover was provided. HMS Atherstone was attacked by 11 Ju 88 and machine-gunned by Me 110. She received three direct hits and at least 5 near misses which would have have made it doubtful for her to stay afloat, 'had the swell been any greater'. Importantly though her fire dissuaded the bombers from attacking the convoy after finishing with her.

Same source as before.

All the best

Andreas

Walter_Warlimont
Member
Posts: 114
Joined: 24 May 2007, 02:59
Location: Germany

#99

Post by Walter_Warlimont » 06 Aug 2007, 23:47

Andreas wrote:By contrast, the new Hunts which by September made up the whole of the 1st Flotilla at Portsmouth had controlled 4x4.7" HA dual-purpose, one quad-AA 2-pdr, and 2x1 Oerlikon 2-pdr.
How many Destroyers does it take to completely comprise a Destroyer Flotilla in The Royal Navy?????

Also, The Hunts were Destroyer Escorts, were they not?

I ask, because at best there were only up to 10 Hunt Atherstone Class Destroyer Escorts that were Completed before or By September 21st, 1940, and of these......................

The H.M.S. Cleveland was Completed on September 18th, 1940 & the H.M.S. Quorn was Completed on September 21st, 1940.

There were also 2 other of the Hunt Atherstones that I think might have been questionable as to their availability because if we are to believe that after having been completed, ALL warships are required to go through a "shakedown" & training exercise, then...........

The H.M.S. Eglington & The H.M.S. Fernie also may not have been available as they had only been completed on August 28th, 1940.

The H.M.S. Holderness, having been completed on August 10th, 1940, possibly could have been available depending on her location & results of her shakedown cruise.

Taking into account the 5 listed above, that leaves only 5 Hunt Atherstones that could possibly be in that 1st Flotilla @ Portsmouth.

JonS
Member
Posts: 3935
Joined: 23 Jul 2004, 02:39
Location: New Zealand
Contact:

#100

Post by JonS » 07 Aug 2007, 00:19

Walter_Warlimont wrote: It is also a fact that from the Luftwaffe's Air Bases in France to The English Channel & even to the Southern Coastal areas of France where the Proposed Invasion would be taking place, the distance is far shorter than their normal destinations such as London and all over Southern England.
What you probably don't realise is that there have been posters in these thread - and I think Lenadros was probably one of them - that took the statement "the GAF moved to forward bases in France" and simply measured the distance across the narrowest part of the Channel. Hey presto, the GAF can fly to Liverpool!

Yeah. Luftflotte 2 & 3 were all balanced on the head of a pin at Calais :roll:

User avatar
fredleander
Member
Posts: 2175
Joined: 03 Dec 2004, 21:49
Location: Stockholm
Contact:

#101

Post by fredleander » 07 Aug 2007, 01:09

Bronsky wrote: Foudroyant - under way in a corridor in the middle of a mine field, so no possibility of maneuver..
This is an interesting observation. Which might be a common occurence in a Seelöwe scenario.
Bronsky wrote:So they were all under way but not taking evasive action for various reasons. Further note that the Luftwaffe damaged a lot of the light craft plying back and forth between the shore and the transports.
It might also be the case that all these smaller vessels saturated the target area to the extent that larger, more valuable vessels got away unscathed.
Bronsky wrote:Ships in that position are very vulnerable, and the Germans would have been the ones in a sitting duck position for Seelöwe.
You mean for the RAF...?

User avatar
fredleander
Member
Posts: 2175
Joined: 03 Dec 2004, 21:49
Location: Stockholm
Contact:

#102

Post by fredleander » 07 Aug 2007, 01:26

RichTO90 wrote:Brazen, Wren, and Delight probably are the best evidence for what the effectiveness would be. All were attacked by Stukas AFAIK, in the Channel, from the 'closer' and 'better' German airbases. During a time when the Channel convoys were still being run on a near daily basis, escorted by destroyers (the Channel convoys were finally suspended in early September IIRC?). So three sunk at sea during July to mid-August (when the Stuka operations were suspended), so maybe one per say 15-20 convoys? :roll:
And you would know how many of these convoys were actually escorted by destroyers...? Isn't it correct that RN stopped using destroyers as escort for these convoys after the losses mentioned above...? Same as they did at Dunkirk.

RichTO90
Member
Posts: 4238
Joined: 22 Dec 2003, 19:03

#103

Post by RichTO90 » 07 Aug 2007, 04:38

Walter_Warlimont wrote:[With all due respect Rich, neither Leandros, Myself or even Phylo-Roadking I would suspect, want you doing any of the so called Work for us, as the things that we talk about here we are pretty much on the money with most of the time.
And with all due respect back WW, I have repeatedly shown you all where some of the primary resources are readily available on the net. And if you were to make use of them you and leandros might not make some of the rather basic errors in assumptions that you continually make.

BTW, it is realitivly easy to plug those locations into Google Maps, Google Earth, or even Mapquest to find where they are.

Show some initiative man! You're supposedly a trained Generalstabs offizier! :roll: :lol:
Such as The Luftwaffe Moving to bases in France to attack England in 1940.

Sources of proof are not needed because these things are known facts.
As Andreas mentioned, I was replying to the statement from leandros to the effect that the Luftwaffe at Dunkirk was "hampered" because their basing remained in Germany. That was incorrect, as is shown by both the Stukas and the sample of the Jagdwaffe I showed. IIRC - and I admit I haven't done the work to check :D - the Kampfgeschwader also moved forward fairly early on, making very good use of the complex of Dutch airfields around Schipol.
It is also a fact that from the Luftwaffe's Air Bases in France to The English Channel & even to the Southern Coastal areas of France where the Proposed Invasion would be taking place, the distance is far shorter than their normal destinations such as London and all over Southern England.
Uh, I just demonstrated for the Stukageschwader that wasn't true. Nor was it always true for the Kampfgeschwader. And the reason for that was quite simple, the bombers and divebombers when loaded weighed quite a bit and unimproved grass fields - although usable - were unfavorable and could be problematic, especially in wet weather. The result of basing those aircraft on grass fields was generally more flight accidents and also they were usually limited in their max takeoff weight. Which meant that improved fields were preferable and at a premium.

OTOH the Jagdgeschwader could more easily use grass fields and you see it quite commonly in film from this period. But the Bf-109 with its unforgiving undercarriage was also prone to accidents on slick wet grass, which probably added to the number of non-operational accidents and the general low readiness in the Jagdwaffe by September (and yes, the RAF wasn't immune to the problem as well, although the Hurricane was pretty well suited to rugged fields, I think that may be why you often find the Spitfires based at the sector stations rather than the satellite stations?)
And that shortage of distance that the Luftwaffe has to fly just means that The RAF has to fly that much farther in order to engage the Luftwaffe.
Er, I'm sorry, but that simply doesn't logically follow? The RAF has to defend the coast and the approach of the RN, along the coast? Or do you think the RN needs to sail into the Gulf of Biscay, the North Sea, or the Baltic to get to the invasion fleet? :lol: :roll:

RichTO90
Member
Posts: 4238
Joined: 22 Dec 2003, 19:03

#104

Post by RichTO90 » 07 Aug 2007, 05:23

leandros wrote:And you would know how many of these convoys were actually escorted by destroyers...? Isn't it correct that RN stopped using destroyers as escort for these convoys after the losses mentioned above...? Same as they did at Dunkirk.
Still want me to do it for you? So you can then ignore yet again what the facts are? :D

The destroyers were withdrawn from basing at Dover following the loss of Codrington. The Thames-Tyne (FN) and Tyne-Thames (FS) convoys ran on a nearly daily basis throughout this period and were normally escorted by at least one and occasionally two destroyers and a sloop. The Thames end was regularly attacked by German bombers. The CW and CE convoys running from the Thames-Southampton and vice versa were not as frequent, running once about every five days. They were usually escorted by at least two destroyers. Those of course were heavily attacked and were suspended from 26 July to 7 August because of the losses incurred to merchant vessels.

And you have been told time after time that the statement that "destroyers were withdrawn from Dunkirk because of losses" is simply incorrect. Force K, which was formed to perform the last evacuations on 2 June, consisted of pairs of destroyers. Windsor-Icarus, Codrington-Sabre, Shikari-Esk (although Esk was relieved before sailing because she had been making contnuous trips since 27 May), Winschelsea-Whitshead, Epervier-Leopard, Finally, Vivacious escorted the blockships to Dunkirk departing at 0300 on the 3rd.

So I can only hope that your advanced age is being characterized by Alzheimers, since I would hate to think you were delibrately posting disinformation? :roll:

Andreas
Member
Posts: 6938
Joined: 10 Nov 2002, 15:12
Location: Europe

#105

Post by Andreas » 07 Aug 2007, 10:13

Walter_Warlimont wrote:
Andreas wrote:By contrast, the new Hunts which by September made up the whole of the 1st Flotilla at Portsmouth had controlled 4x4.7" HA dual-purpose, one quad-AA 2-pdr, and 2x1 Oerlikon 2-pdr.
How many Destroyers does it take to completely comprise a Destroyer Flotilla in The Royal Navy?????

Also, The Hunts were Destroyer Escorts, were they not?

I ask, because at best there were only up to 10 Hunt Atherstone Class Destroyer Escorts that were Completed before or By September 21st, 1940, and of these......................

The H.M.S. Cleveland was Completed on September 18th, 1940 & the H.M.S. Quorn was Completed on September 21st, 1940.

There were also 2 other of the Hunt Atherstones that I think might have been questionable as to their availability because if we are to believe that after having been completed, ALL warships are required to go through a "shakedown" & training exercise, then...........

The H.M.S. Eglington & The H.M.S. Fernie also may not have been available as they had only been completed on August 28th, 1940.

The H.M.S. Holderness, having been completed on August 10th, 1940, possibly could have been available depending on her location & results of her shakedown cruise.

Taking into account the 5 listed above, that leaves only 5 Hunt Atherstones that could possibly be in that 1st Flotilla @ Portsmouth.
RN Day by Day wrote:Destroyer HOLDERNESS arrived at Scapa Flow on the 12th for working up at Scapa Flow in the 23rd Destroyer Division. She departed on 2 September for duty in the Nore with the 21st Destroyer Flotilla.
Three weeks to work up for Holderness.

HMS Fernie escorted CW9 on 8 August, so I am a bit surprised you think she was only completed on 28 August. I guess you mean repairs? She was completed on 29 May.

29 May: Escort destroyer FERNIE was completed. Following a brief working up at Portland, she was employed in the evacuation of the French north coast.
http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4005-14MAY04.htm

HMS Fernie was hunting a sub on 30 May and employed in the evacuation of the French north coast from 8 June.

Eglinton (note spelling) was in service by 12 September.
http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4009-22SEP01.htm

So recounting based on that makes seven available.

Portland, not Portsmouth - my error last night. Looking at this: http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-400 ... me2.htm#nc 10 seems to be a normal number, but it goes down to seven, not all of which would be expected to be operational. The flotilla also had two Polish destroyers attached, Blyskawica and Burza, which were well armed. Smith seems to be disinclined to talk too much about allied warships in his book. So the total strength of the Flotilla was nine.

There is some interesting info on aerial attacks in the Blyskawica history BTW:
5 May, 1940
Blyskawica was on patrol in Rombaken Fjord. German aircraft conducted a heavy but unsuccessful attacks which lasted for 12 hours. In the evening, Blyskawica traded fire with a german 88mm gun battery. She was hit eleven times, but suffered only minor damage. The enemy guns were silenced.

6 May, 1940
Another day and again heavy fighting with German aircraft. Lot of bombs exploded in the water, causing no damage. The Polish ship fired it's entire supply of Anti-Aircraft ammunition and shot down one enemy bomber. After that, she entered Skjel Fjord where an Allied supply base was located.

10 May, 1940
Another heavy air attack. Blyskawica was operating in Skjel Fjord. She avoided all bombs and shot down one enemy bomber. Some fragments of wing of this airplane were found by Norwegian fishermen and were given to the Polish crew as a present.
http://www.solentwaters.co.uk/Medina%20 ... page7.html

All the best

Andreas
Last edited by Andreas on 07 Aug 2007, 11:07, edited 3 times in total.

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic”