US Army Funnies?

[Delta Tank]

To all,

I read the following in the book entitled: "D-Day 1944 Omaha and Utah Beaches", by Steven J. Zaloga, printed 2005. pages 21-23

" Since the Allies expected to confront fortifications along the beach, armored support was deemed essential. In theory, each regimental combat team (RCT) would be preceded onto the beach by three companies of tanks to knock out any remaining bunkers not destroyed by the bomber attack. After the Dieppe experience, the British Army had developed an assortment of specialized tanks, dubbed "funnies", to aid in amphibious assaults. The myth has developed over the years that the US Army spurned the use of these specialized tanks. In fact, by February 1944, the US Army had submitted a request for 25 Sherman Crab anti-mine flail tanks, 100 Sherman Crocodile Flamethrower tanks, and other Sherman combat engineer equipment for Overlord. The original US plans expected the use of the Churchill AVRE (Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers) to support the engineer breaching operations. None of these were provided in time for D-Day as British industry could barely keep pace with the needs of the British Army. Since it would take time for US industry to manufacture these, priority was given to those items deemed most necessary -the controversial DD tanks. In place of the Churchill AVREs, V Corps was allotted 16 M4 dozer tanks to assist the engineers."

Now there are no footnotes, so is this true?


Mike

[RichTO90]

Now there are no footnotes, so is this true?

Mike

Hi Mike,

Yes.

Seriously though, I'm actually working on an article I would like to get published about the 1st Assault Brigade, RE, on D-Day and have pretty much reached the conclusion that the story that a serious "offer" of British AVRE was made or accepted is essentially a myth foisted upon history by Percy Hobart and Chester Wilmot.

[Delta Tank]

RichTO90,

I hope I did not steal your thunder, but why would Hobart and Wilmont say something that was not in fact true?

Mike

[RichTO90]

RichTO90,

I hope I did not steal your thunder, but why would Hobart and Wilmont say something that was not in fact true?

Mike

Because it sounded better?

Again, seriously, as best I have been able to piece together the sequence, the US Army Ordnance was doing a lot of parallel research and development of vehicles similar to the AVRE and Crab in 1942 and 1943, but based entirely on American vehicles (albeit the Crab was based on the Sherman M4A4, it was actually the developed version of the flail tank, dating to fall 1942, developed in North Africa for the Matilda and Valentine).

Then in January 1944 one of Eisenhower's first outings as SCAEF was to see the prototype AVRE and other Funnies go through their paces (at the time there were probably about a dozen of them in the hands of 43 RTR which had become the "experimental" wing of 79th AD). His reaction was "cool, we're interested", which led to the February request from ETOUSA to CONUS for similar vehicles.

The problem was that the US Ordnance development had been desultory at best, until the request from ETOUSA there had been little interested displayed by AGF and, as of March Ordnance had effectively a single prototype ready, which meant that there simply was no way to get any to England in time for the projected 5 June invasion. Nonetheless the testing of the M4-based US armored engineer vehicle went on through July, with two prototypes built, but the project was then cancelled because AGF was unwilling to sanction creation of a specilized unit to use them.

So Plan B of course was to use the British AVRE, except that none of those were available for US forces either. Only about 180 had been produced by D-Day and only 121 had been delivered and were in the hands of the troops and they spent the last few days prior to D-Day just installing the Petards in the ones they did have so had no time to even train anyone else in their use (AFAIK few, if any, of the crews who landed on D-Day had actually fired the Petard before 6 June).

Plan C then became the tankdozers (also last minute, the conversion kits arrived in April), combined with the T17 7.2" Rocket Launcher, which was an armored box version of the "Whizzbang" capable of direct fire and highly destructive....except they found that when loaded in the assault LCT, which had been modified with armor and a raised deck ramp, it made the vessel so unstable that it threatened to capsize, so the launchers had to be removed (the mountings are visible on photos of some of the D-Day tank battalions, btw, a couple of the modified LCT capsized anyway). Which reduced things to the Tankdozers.

Something similar happened with the US-developed mineclearing tanks, the equipment was shipped just too late and their weren't sufficient British reserves of Crabs to really make an offer viable. And balancing everthing was the landing craft question, more assault vehicles meant more assault craft were required.

Anyway, Hobart inserted the remark into the postwar 79th AD History to the effect that the US had problems on D-Day because they didn't have AVRE (essentially ignoring reality, but then he was a bit of a prickly character at best). Then postwar in 1947, when the first real wrangling over events between the British and American generals had begun, Hobart was interviewed by Wilmot who was writing The Struggle for Europe and Hobart apparently decided to supply some ammunition to Monty (his brother in law) by stating categorically that an offer was made and refused.

Then there is the not so minor question of just how effective the AVRE really were on the Commonwealth beaches and how effective they would have been on the American beaches.

[JonS]

So Plan B of course was to use the British AVRE, except that none of those were available for US forces either. Only about 180 had been produced by D-Day and only 121 had been delivered and were in the hands of the troops and they spent the last few days prior to D-Day just installing the Petards in the ones they did have so had no time to even train anyone else in their use (AFAIK few, if any, of the crews who landed on D-Day had actually fired the Petard before 6 June).

What about Plan B2: a mixed US-UK unit (somewhat similar to the 1stSSF), with AVsRE allocated proportionally. There'd be no requirement for addl LCTs, no requirement for a formal handover of eqpt to a seperate US fmn, and each beach would have had ... erm ... about 25 AVsRE, or say ~15 on the relatively narrow SWORD and UTAH beaches, and ~30 on JUNO, GOLD, and OMAHA, i.e., 15 per asslt bde/regt or 5 per bn in the asslt bdes/regts. Yes, that's a pretty skinny allocation.

Granted that would have required some very fast action to set up in Feb 1944, and would probably have met some political obstacles, and the US crews would have req trg on the Churchill before they even got round to trg on the spec engr eqpt. Also, trying to integrate such small numbers into a complex plan at a very late stage would have been fiddly - much like the CROCODILEs on GOLD.

Also, AIUI, there were a _reasonably_ large number of CRABs available - about three regiments? - which 'could' have also been allocated on the basis of one sqn per asslt bde/regt (with most of the same caveats as in the prev para). Again this would not require an increase in total LCTs available.

Then there is the not so minor question of just how effective the AVRE really were on the Commonwealth beaches and how effective they would have been on the American beaches.

True, but ... was there a positive morale effect? Also, granting that their actual combat value was slight, what about their engineering performance when not under fire - obstacle breaching, gap crossing, minefield breaching/clearance, etc?

[RichTO90]

What about Plan B2: a mixed US-UK unit (somewhat similar to the 1stSSF), with AVsRE allocated proportionally. There'd be no requirement for addl LCTs, no requirement for a formal handover of eqpt to a seperate US fmn, and each beach would have had ... erm ... about 25 AVsRE, or say ~15 on the relatively narrow SWORD and UTAH beaches, and ~30 on JUNO, GOLD, and OMAHA, i.e., 15 per asslt bde/regt or 5 per bn in the asslt bdes/regts. Yes, that's a pretty skinny allocation.

Hi Jon,

For various reasons that wasn't considered. For one thing, the assault battalions planned requirement was for a minimum of three lanes through the obstacles and each lane required - again as a planning minimum - three AVRE and two Crabs.

For another, even though 3 Division landed in column of brigades, it was planned that the maximum number of lanes be opened to facilitate that movement, so it was allocated essentially the same assets as GOLD and JUNO. The actual breakdown was:

SWORD - 34 AVRE and 26 Crabs
JUNO - 47 AVRE and 20 Crabs
GOLD - 40 AVRE and 20 Crabs
Total - 121 AVRE and 76 Crabs

Now, the next report of Crab strength I have for 30 Brigade is 23 June, when everyone was ashore (three regiments) and they had 78. The problem there was that nearly 50 percent of those landed on D-Day went tits up in various ways, it simply was a very vulnerable system. Which was well known, and so the intentional overkill on their deployment.

Granted that would have required some very fast action to set up in Feb 1944, and would probably have met some political obstacles, and the US crews would have req trg on the Churchill before they even got round to trg on the spec engr eqpt. Also, trying to integrate such small numbers into a complex plan at a very late stage would have been fiddly - much like the CROCODILEs on GOLD.

Like Firefly, actual AVRE issue - of unarmed vehicles - began in late April. Prior to that everyone in the six squadrons planned for the assault shared and shared alike the few Churchills (36 "clapped out" gun tanks) that had been issued for driver training and initial exercises with the RE personnel in late 1943. Otherwise it appears that all the "real" AVRE were the various prototypes and other test vehicles assembled to test the "devices", test tactical methods, and show off for the brass.

Also, AIUI, there were a _reasonably_ large number of CRABs available - about three regiments? - which 'could' have also been allocated on the basis of one sqn per asslt bde/regt (with most of the same caveats as in the prev para). Again this would not require an increase in total LCTs available.

Again, and I haven't pinned the exact number yet, the Crab was relatively new production and jsut three regiments had received any. Enough were available to equipp the 22nd and Westminster Dragoons on D-Day, and two-thirds of each of those regiments was actually in the assault, with the residue as follow-on.

It may be revealing that the residue of 1st Assault Brigade (42 Assault Regiment) was expected to arrive on D+27 and the residue of 5th and 6th Regiment on D+30, supposedly bringing in 216 more AVRE between them. Except that by 1 September the entire brigade strength, with all resiues landed, was till only 216 AVRE.

True, but ... was there a positive morale effect? Also, granting that their actual combat value was slight, what about their engineering performance when not under fire - obstacle breaching, gap crossing, minefield breaching/clearance, etc?

In the circumstances of D-Day I'm unsure how much morale effect there was from an armored vehicle - on OMAHA. Considering that the AT defenses there were probably the best of any of the beaches. And the engineering capability of the vehicles may be slightly overrated, roghly half the devices taken over actually were emplaced, and fewer than that actually worked (the worst was the "Roly Poly" carpet layer mounted in the front of the LCT to be pushed onto the beach by a following AVRE (as distinct from the Bobbins and Log Carpet Layers actually mounted on the AVRE) - none of them apparently worked.

Anyway, I refuse to go into more details and jeopardize the sale of my article any further....I really need the money; I'd like to do Morocco this fall.

[Sewer King]

... the British Army had developed an assortment of specialized tanks, dubbed "funnies", to aid in amphibious assaults. The myth has developed over the years that the US Army spurned the use of these specialized tanks.

Not to take this interesting idea off-topic, but how similar is this to the telling that the US Army turned down the Sherman Firefly's 17pdr gun, the only Allied tank main gun in 1944 that could meet a Tiger square on? I know the US saw its own 90mm as a tank destroyer's gun, or at least a DP concept; that the standard Sherman's 76mm angered Eisenhower as a disappointment etc.

As best as I can remember, this comes from author Kenneth Macksey. It's merely that it sounds similar to the account of the "funnies," apart from the truth of either story.

-- Alan

[Delta Tank]

Sewer King,

It was my understanding that the British Army did not have all the FireFly tanks that they wanted or needed. So I would imagine that all of the production went to the British Army and there were no spares.

Another point is that the American Army doctrine was for tank destroyers to engage enemy tanks and for tanks to exploit penetrations in the enemy's defenses. It is also my understand tank the idea was for tanks not to engage enemy tanks. There is a great little pamphlet on Army tank destroyer doctrine, it is one of the Leavenworth Studies and the last paragraph of the book sums up the problem with US Army anti-tank doctrine at that time. A 1st Infantry Division officer stated; "We don't need tank killers, we need killer tanks." I am at work so that probably is not a direct quote but I am close.


Mike

[RichTO90]

Not to take this interesting idea off-topic, but how similar is this to the telling that the US Army turned down the Sherman Firefly's 17pdr gun, the only Allied tank main gun in 1944 that could meet a Tiger square on? I know the US saw its own 90mm as a tank destroyer's gun, or at least a DP concept; that the standard Sherman's 76mm angered Eisenhower as a disappointment etc.

As best as I can remember, this comes from author Kenneth Macksey. It's merely that it sounds similar to the account of the "funnies," apart from the truth of either story.

-- Alan

Alan, that story is even more complex and is way to complex to be reduced to a couple of one-liners. But it has been discussed in detail here, a quick search on firefly, 17-pdr and 76mm should pull up some hits.

[Sewer King]

There is a great little pamphlet on Army tank destroyer doctrine, it is one of the Leavenworth Studies...

I know that booklet, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, but haven't seen it in a long time. It is fairly easy to find, though.

... that story is even more complex and is way to complex to be reduced to a couple of one-liners. But it has been discussed in detail here, a quick search on firefly, 17-pdr and 76mm should pull up some hits.

More than enough and too many besides. And certainly complex. But I deliberately left it in "one-liners" because, strictly speaking, it was off-topic.

I was more at comparing the attitudes behind the two accounts. rather than the accounts themselves. Kenneth Macksey had put it that the Americans had declined the 17pdr because, in the end, it just wasn't American-made. Havind read it 25 years ago, I can't remember which of his general books it was in. But I did not believe him, all the more for his understanding of contemporary US armor doctrine.

It sounded much like Hobart and Wilmot regarding the funnies, as you put it, "because it sounded better." Macksey was an old RTR veteran, and one might expect crustiness like that of Hobart. Regarding the supposed pass-up of 17pdr, I remember his phrasing that "Patriotism is a fine thing, but not at the expense of your soldiers' lives."

Delta Tank's original inquiry asks after military-historical myth, which often stems from the sorts of attitudes that I was asking about. In one of the Jane's Military Year in Review books, another author had written that before WW1 Europe thought that there was nothing to be learned from the other side of the Atlantic. And that after WW2, America took over this attitude in the opposite direction.

Good luck with your article publication. I visited Morocco almost 30 years ago. BTW, you and I live almost within artillery range of each other (I am in Alexandria city).

-- Alan

[RichTO90]

There is a great little pamphlet on Army tank destroyer doctrine, it is one of the Leavenworth Studies...

I know that booklet, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, but haven't seen it in a long time. It is fairly easy to find, though.

Yes, Gabel is one of the better lights at Leavenworth, his monograph on the prewar US Army maneuvers is brilliant (actually better than the TD study, which is somewhat superficial. The Tank Killers by an aquiantance - and another neighbor of ours - Harry Yeide, is much better as a history of the Tank Destroyers.

More than enough and too many besides. And certainly complex. But I deliberately left it in "one-liners" because, strictly speaking, it was off-topic.

Yes, we've kind of talked that one to death, you can also go to TankNet and do some searches to find some more good discussions on the subject. And I never worry about straying off topic, I just hesitated at recovering old ground.

I was more at comparing the attitudes behind the two accounts. rather than the accounts themselves. Kenneth Macksey had put it that the Americans had declined the 17pdr because, in the end, it just wasn't American-made. Havind read it 25 years ago, I can't remember which of his general books it was in. But I did not believe him, all the more for his understanding of contemporary US armor doctrine.

It seems there may be some things that the Brits will never understand about the Yanks and vice versa. Being a Yank I hope I don't offend too many sensibilities in my article about a British Army unit, but we'll see?

It sounded much like Hobart and Wilmot regarding the funnies, as you put it, "because it sounded better." Macksey was an old RTR veteran, and one might expect crustiness like that of Hobart. Regarding the supposed pass-up of 17pdr, I remember his phrasing that "Patriotism is a fine thing, but not at the expense of your soldiers' lives."

True, and it's much the same as most "one-liners" be it that "British tanks were crap because they had to fit on existing rail carriages" or that "American guns were crap because they refused anything not made in the USA" or "German tanks were world-beaters", they may have a small grain of truth, but the "one-liner' so oversimplifies complex issues as to make it all meaningless. It becomes the same sort of pre-digested, uncomplicated pap that passes as "facts" on the Mythtry Channel (I'm still trying to figure out when UFO's and card-counting in Las Vegas became part of "history")

Delta Tank's original inquiry asks after military-historical myth, which often stems from the sorts of attitudes that I was asking about. In one of the Jane's Military Year in Review books, another author had written that before WW1 Europe thought that there was nothing to be learned from the other side of the Atlantic. And that after WW2, America took over this attitude in the opposite direction.

Yes, quite true.

Good luck with your article publication. I visited Morocco almost 30 years ago. BTW, you and I live almost within artillery range of each other (I am in Alexandria city).

-- Alan

Many years ago I lived in Alexandria, near Landmark, and went to Thomas Jefferson when it was a real high school. Now I live in Centreville but work near Annandale....and my girlfirend and I love the Old Town eateries, Las Tapas and Taverna Cretekou are two old favorites.

[Aber]

Post WW2 report from the ETO

http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/armor ... pment/#ch9

THE GENERAL BOARD
United States Forces, European Theater
 
ARMORED SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
 
MISSION: Prepare Report and Recommendations on Development, Procurement and Employment of special Armored Equipment.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
67. Conclusions.
a. Combat experience in the European Theater substantiated the requirement for the following types of armored special equipment:
(1) Mine Exploders.
(2) Amphibious tanks and tractors.
(3) Mechanized flame throwers.
(4) CDL Tanks and similar and allied night fighting equipment.
(5) Engineer armored vehicles, including bridge laying vehicles.
(6) Tank dozers.
b. The requirement for the following types of armored special equipment was not substantiated by the combat experience of the European Theater:
(1) The DD device.
(2) Multiple anti-personnel rocket launchers mounted on standard tanks.
c. The lack of units especially trained in the use of armored special equipment hampered the employment of this equipment by United States Forces.
d. The 79th Armored Division (Br) provided the 21st Army Group with properly trained personnel accompanying armored special equipment, and also served to assist in the development of new special equipment and tactical doctrine pertaining to its employment.