Market-Garden White Washing History

[Aber]

And, given that the Lorraine Campaign alone takes about 600 pages to describe just the Third Army autumn operations, compared to about the same number of pages in the British "official history" (were no Briton does any wrong, least of all Monty), then again I have to ask where the absence you perceive is? :roll: It seems to be like the nonexistent tea drinking stories you keep attributing to "anyone"...

Cheers!

Well, on Amazon.com books on Arnhem seem to outnumber Metz/Lorraine campaign by c10:1

[Attrition]

~~~~~there simply were no solutions to the logistical problems bedeviling the Allies~~~~~

It's difficult to avoid this conclusion (even though it was a clear mistake to have Gavin played by Ryan O'Neil). Although the dispositions of the 82nd Airborne have been criticised of late I fear that other ones would have moved the problems rather than solved them. After all, the capture of the bridges with the GAD left both divisions dispersed all round Nijmegen. If there was not enough weight in the attack on the bridges to try to go throught to Arnhem immediately that can't be put down to GAD timidity if lots of the rest of the division was busy with the paras elsewhere because they were being stretched by German attempts to interfere.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich

Weell... I don't think the Guards Armoured had been onboard in rough seas for two days or been up since about 0400 when they decided not to advance on the evening of 20 September...and by the morning of 21 September they had quite a snooze. It does appear though that the general stricture against night advances worked in their favor. Otherwise by that time the decision was sensible, like I said before, they had little infantry available, especially given the tardiness of 43rd Division.

Weell...no rough seas but... the elements available to the Guards Armoured Division on the evening were only the Irish and the Grenadier Guards Groups. The Coldstream Group was in spt/or under command 82 US Airborne Division (I always get a bit lost as to the difference but every Op Order I read is careful to distinguish between the two, so I guess it must be important ). The Welsh Guards Group were defending the Grave bridge, they had relieved the 504 Para regt so that it could conduct its heroic crossing of the Waal River.

So, yes, the Guards "had [very] little infantry available".

Before suggesting that the Guard's had not "been up since about 0400", let's have a closer look at the 1st Bn (Motor) Grenadier Guards and what sort of day they had had in the run up to the capture of the Nijmegen road bridge on the evening of 20 Sep.

So the Grenadiers advanced over the Son bridge at between 0600 and 0630 on 19 Sep (alarm clocks set for perhaps 0400 to 0430 for tea and bacon sandwiches no doubt!). After advancing up to Nijmegen they were launched into a fierce, urban combat environment alongside US forces from 82 Airborne. The King's and No 4 Coys, which comprised the group's reserve and were detailed to be ready to pass across either bridge if captured, moved forward at 2300, 19 Sep, and the CO was at Bde HQ at midnight. Orders for the attack on 20 Sep were given out at 0500, which suggests that the troops were again up at around 0400 - 0430. Fighting in the town raged all day, and was still going on when the troop of Grenadier's tanks passed over the road bridge.

But, you are right, at least they did not have to face rough seas!

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich

Weell... I don't think the Guards Armoured had been onboard in rough seas for two days or been up since about 0400 when they decided not to advance on the evening of 20 September...and by the morning of 21 September they had quite a snooze. It does appear though that the general stricture against night advances worked in their favor. Otherwise by that time the decision was sensible, like I said before, they had little infantry available, especially given the tardiness of 43rd Division.

Weell...no rough seas but... the elements available to the Guards Armoured Division on the evening were only the Irish and the Grenadier Guards Groups. The Coldstream Group was in spt/or under command 82 US Airborne Division (I always get a bit lost as to the difference but every Op Order I read is careful to distinguish between the two, so I guess it must be important ). The Welsh Guards Group were defending the Grave bridge, they had relieved the 504 Para regt so that it could conduct its heroic crossing of the Waal River.

So, yes, the Guards "had [very] little infantry available".

Before suggesting that the Guard's had not "been up since about 0400", let's have a closer look at the 1st Bn (Motor) Grenadier Guards and what sort of day they had had in the run up to the capture of the Nijmegen road bridge on the evening of 20 Sep.

So the Grenadiers advanced over the Son bridge at between 0600 and 0630 on 19 Sep (alarm clocks set for perhaps 0400 to 0430 for tea and bacon sandwiches no doubt!). After advancing up to Nijmegen they were launched into a fierce, urban combat environment alongside US forces from 82 Airborne. The King's and No 4 Coys, which comprised the group's reserve and were detailed to be ready to pass across either bridge if captured, moved forward at 2300, 19 Sep, and the CO was at Bde HQ at midnight. Orders for the attack on 20 Sep were given out at 0500, which suggests that the troops were again up at around 0400 - 0430. Fighting in the town raged all day, and was still going on when the troop of Grenadier's tanks passed over the road bridge.

But, you are right, at least they did not have to face rough seas!

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

Er, Tom, what failures were those? Did they fail to advance eastwards? Was the Brittany Peninsula not captured...given that it was a fortified position, in good time and for minimal casualties to boot? No Rhine crossings, but that was kind of a general failure on the part of the Allies at that time, not a particular one.

By 10 September hadn't the Brittany peninsula already been captured? If you mean the capture of Brest, I'm not sure that "in good time and with minimal casualties" is how I'd describe it - when was Brest opened to shipping?

As for failures - well Bradley's orders were to secure crossings over the Rhine in both 3rd and 1st US Army zones - neither were achieved, so that's not failure then? Or perhaps it was what Bennett kept calling "qualified successes" in his book, as in the way he describes the American airborne divisions achieving qualified successes on the first day of Op Market Garden, which surely is just another way of saying they failed to achieve all their objectives. Using that form of logic, one could argue that Op Market Garden as a whole was a qualified success - perhaps 90% successful as I seem to remember someone calling it.

BTW it would be great if you could find that information from Bedell Smith's diary, thanks.

Regards

Tom

[RichTO90]

By 10 September hadn't the Brittany peninsula already been captured? If you mean the capture of Brest, I'm not sure that "in good time and with minimal casualties" is how I'd describe it - when was Brest opened to shipping?

Brittany without Brest was useless as far as the Allied planning was concerned, which was correct. Of course it was also useless because by the time it was captured the plans were out of date, but that isn't what I thought you were criticizing?

So what does "open for shipping" have to do with the VIII Corps capturing it in good time and with minimal casualties? The main assault on the fortified zone of the city lasted about ten days and the three divisions engaged suffered minimal casualties when compared to almost any other city fight - except Aachen. That it was a wreck by the time it was captured didn't matter anyway, see above, nor do I see any indication that capturing it sooner would have made the job any easier...unless it was captured on 6 June.

As for failures - well Bradley's orders were to secure crossings over the Rhine in both 3rd and 1st US Army zones - neither were achieved, so that's not failure then?

Advance east and secure crossings...timeframe not specified.

Or perhaps it was what Bennett kept calling "qualified successes" in his book, as in the way he describes the American airborne divisions achieving qualified successes on the first day of Op Market Garden, which surely is just another way of saying they failed to achieve all their objectives. Using that form of logic, one could argue that Op Market Garden as a whole was a qualified success - perhaps 90% successful as I seem to remember someone calling it.

Sure, but then "success" in war is rarely anything other than qualified. The 101st had the Son bridge blown up in their face and the 82nd also had problems, but they acheived most of their objectives, whereas the 1st Airborne didn't achieve any. So some successes are more qualified than others. Metz was captured and Aachen was too, with minimal casualties and essentially as soon as could be expected given the logistical situation.

BTW it would be great if you could find that information from Bedell Smith's diary, thanks.

I'll see, but it will be a while...move, new job, school, etc have priority.

[Delta Tank]

Weell... I don't think the Guards Armoured had been onboard in rough seas for two days or been up since about 0400 when they decided not to advance on the evening of 20 September...and by the morning of 21 September they had quite a snooze. It does appear though that the general stricture against night advances worked in their favor.

!ANECDOTE ALERT!

Some years ago I was chatting with a then-recent ex-member of the Irish Guards. He was telling me about a St Patrick's Day regimental shindig he'd been at a few years previouslym, which had been graced by the prescence of several members of the Regiment who'd fought in NWE. The old Mick he was talking to related an exchange he'd had during Market Garden, which went something like
Para: Where the bloody hell have you been? We've been fighting for three fvcking days!
Irish Guardsman: Quit flapping yer gums. We've been fighting for three months.

JonS,
That is a good one! I will try to remember it!

Mike

[Delta Tank]

And, given that the Lorraine Campaign alone takes about 600 pages to describe just the Third Army autumn operations, compared to about the same number of pages in the British "official history" (were no Briton does any wrong, least of all Monty), then again I have to ask where the absence you perceive is? :roll: It seems to be like the nonexistent tea drinking stories you keep attributing to "anyone"...

Cheers!

Well, on Amazon.com books on Arnhem seem to outnumber Metz/Lorraine campaign by c10:1

Aber and all,

Now bear with me here, a story. I was at the Gettysburg Battlefield for a guided tour with a historian named Jeffry D. Wert. He asked the group a question, "which battle in American history has the most books written about it?" Answer: The Little Big Horn and Gettysburg is number two, why? So many what ifs. What if the commander did this, or that, and Arnhem has all those what ifs, probably more so than any other battle on the Western Front in World War II. Just a thought.

Mike

[Delta Tank]

this leaves me to ask if there were other plans proposed from the American side which were considered at the time. Respectfully,
Willi Klingel (ex 1st Bn Parachute Regt 1954-61)

Bradley's instructions to 12th Army Group on 10th September (date that Market Garden was approved) were:
First Army.
(1) Continue to advance to the East to secure crossings over the RHINE River in the vicinity of KOBLENZ, BONN and KOLN.
(2) Make contact with 21 Army Group and protect the left (north)flank.
Third Army.
(1) Continue the advance to the East in zone and secure crossings of the RHINE River in the vicinity of MANNHEIM and MAINZ. If sufficient forces become available to Third Army, it will also seize a bridgehead in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE.
(2) Protect the south flank East of ORLEANS inclusive.
Ninth Army.
(1) Reduce the BRITTANY Peninsula and protect the south flank along the LOIRE River from its mouth to ORLEANS inclusive.

[/quote]

1st and 3d Army were still in a Pursuit or at least they still believed they were in a Pursuit Operation or they did not want to admit that the Pursuit was over! All discussed before in the "Mega-thread" on the Broad Front. When do you know a Pursuit is over? How many days does it take for you, the commander, to understand that the Pursuit Operation is over? One hour, one day, one week? When do you admit to yourself that one more push is not going to change the situation?

I posted this on the other thread:http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... start=1005

I found this in the book entitled" "Strategy" by B. H. Liddell Hart, Second Revised Edition, 1968. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-23638. page 327-328.
(time frame is the end of March 1945)
Even then the end was postponed for more than a month. That was due not to serious opposition from the splintered German army-except at a few points in the extreme north and south-but to the Allied armies' own supply problem as their advance extended beyond the Rhine, to the obstruction created by their air forces' way of blocking the roads with heaps of rubble, and to the complication of political factors.
RichTO90 brought this up in the thread, but since I was thumbing through this book, I thought I would add it to this monster thread.

Mike

[Tolga Alkan]

World War II magazine published an article dealing with Jim Gavin, titled: "The General Who Jumped First" can be reached and read at:

http://www.historynet.com/jim-gavin-the ... -first.htm

[Delta Tank]

Tom,

You ask about General Walter Bedell Smith's diary, well I found this in the book entitled: "The Siegfried Line Campaign" by Charles B. MacDonald, you can find it here on line :http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... ied-6.html

Page 122.

News of these two German armored divisions near Arnhem caused particular concern to General Eisenhower's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith. Believing strongly that the Allies would have to employ not one but two airborne divisions at Arnhem if they were to counter the German armor, General Smith obtained the Supreme Commander's permission to go to Field Marshal Montgomery with a warning. Either they should "drop the equivalent of a second division in the Arnhem area" or change the plan and move one of the American divisions, scheduled to drop farther south, up to Arnhem. But, General Smith recalled after the war, "Montgomery 'ridiculed the idea' and 'waved my objections airily aside.'"11

I am reading the chapter now on Operation Market Garden, seems interesting.

Mike

[Delta Tank]

Tom,

The diary entry where LTG Bedell Smith met Monty, that visit should be in various documents I would think. Monty had a staff and that should be in his daily planner or a visitors log or in a staff log book, and it should be reflected in Bedell Smith's daily planner and personal diary, if he kept one and in a SHAEF log somewhere. I don't know what all these documents were called back then, but it should be reflected in numerous places not just in Smith's dairy/personal diary. Long time ago I was an aide (ADC in British) to a two star general who was a division commander. The secretary was a civilian and had been the commanding general's secretary for about 11 generals. She had everyone of their schedules in a yearly daily planner in a locked filing cabinet. So, I asked her why? And she said that she had always kept those planners and over the years governmental agencies had called to check a specific date to see where the general was and what they were doing or who they had a meeting with. I don't know if that is in an Army regulation, but it might be. I know there are regulations regarding documents and how they are to be kept, etc. And I also know that these procedures are not always followed and sometimes they are followed and the documents are still lost, yes I have a story on that also!

Mike

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mike,

Yeah, I've seen the Bedell Smith "visit" mentioned in the MacDonald book and also in "A Bridge too far" - but I've not been able to track down any primary sources to reflect the visit. Monty mentions his visit on 12 or 13 Sep in his nightly brief to Brooke but there is nothing about a second visit on 16 Sep, and I have not yet found any other reference to it in 21 Army Group documents, although there are plenty left for me to check!

I've always felt that Smith might have got the two visits mixed up - the first one was about logistics and seems to have gone well. Anyway, if SHAEF were so concerned with the presence of the Panzer divisions at Arnhem why did Eisenhower remain so supportive of the operation?

Regards

Tom

[Delta Tank]

Mike,
if SHAEF were so concerned with the presence of the Panzer divisions at Arnhem why did Eisenhower remain so supportive of the operation?
Regards
Tom

Tom,

I don't know.

Mike

[Aber]

Mike,

Yeah, I've seen the Bedell Smith "visit" mentioned in the MacDonald book and also in "A Bridge too far" - but I've not been able to track down any primary sources to reflect the visit.
Tom

Crosswell's latest biography of Bedell Smith is quite clear that Smith did not make a second visit to discuss the intelligence reports.