Market-Garden White Washing History

[Delta Tank]

Hi all, slowly working my way through the topic so i don’t know if this has been covered. I note from the timeline and discussion on page 8 that the Guards would appear to have crossed the Son, motored through the 101st's area, crossed the 6-10? mile gap (a guesstimate from google map ) and linked up with the 82nd pretty sharpish. Was there no Germans loitering in between the two airborne divisions, or did the Guards have to brush aside some opposition?

Enigma,

I don't recall without looking it up, but the road was cut several times over the course of the operation. IIRC the 101st ABN responsibility was approximately 15 miles of road!! So if that is so the division had a perimeter of 30 miles!!! Who is the genius that came up with this plan!!! There is no way in hell that a 1944 American airborne division should be expected to seize and defend numerous bridges and a 30 mile perimeter!! Obviously "Victor Disease" had infected the "High Command"! Now having said that, they did a remarkable job with British assistance once link-up occurred. There was one British tank crew that is mentioned in many accounts and the tank commander became some what of a celebrity with the 101st ABN.

Mike

[Aber]

Mike

You might be missing the fact that the plan had 2 other British Corps advancing on either flank of XXX Corps, so the the divisional perimeter of the 101st should have shrunk fairly quickly. Of course delays in getting started and slow progress mean it didn't quite work as planned.

[Delta Tank]

Mike

You might be missing the fact that the plan had 2 other British Corps advancing on either flank of XXX Corps, so the the divisional perimeter of the 101st should have shrunk fairly quickly. Of course delays in getting started and slow progress mean it didn't quite work as planned.

No, I am aware of the two British Corps that were suppose to advance on the flanks of the XXX Corps. But, you do understand that the road was cut numerous times or damn near cut in the 101st sector and the flank corps moved so damn slow that even Monty was frustrated with their progress. It was not until 25 September that contact between XXX Corps and VIII Corps occurred and the east flank of "Hell's Highway" was secure. Then to add insult to injury the British kept the two American Airborne division in the line for an extremely long time, 101st 69 days before relief and the 82d Airborne a little shorter at 55 days.

Mike

[The_Enigma]

I dont quite understand why that latter point gets so much flak? The airborne formations were kept in the line during Normandy. There was two airborne and one airlanding division in strategic reserve in the UK in case anything cropped up that needed airborne forces. Not to mention the regular forces had to stay in the line.

So, and i dont mean any of this to come across as belligerent, whats the big deal?

[Delta Tank]

I dont quite understand why that latter point gets so much flak? The airborne formations were kept in the line during Normandy. There was two airborne and one airlanding division in strategic reserve in the UK in case anything cropped up that needed airborne forces. Not to mention the regular forces had to stay in the line.

So, and i dont mean any of this to come across as belligerent, whats the big deal?

Engima,

From all of my reading, airborne divisions were never intended or built for prolong combat. You know they are quite small and the artillery complement is not what a "regular infantry" division possess and there are probably more reason which I can not recall. An airborne infantry regiment is about 2,000 men and a regular infantry regt is around 3200?? Guessing don't have any reference material. How long were they kept in Normandy?? I know we had them stay longer than planned, but I don't think it was this long.

Mike

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mike,

Also not wanting to chuck another factor into the equation, but IIRC after MG had ended Montgomery told Eisenhower he had to keep the airborne divisions so as to free units of 2nd Army for other operations; initially a thrust towards the western Ruhr to meet with the 1st US Army attack at the beginning of Oct 44, and then, when reality began to sink in about the struggles that 1st Cdn Army were having to open the Scheldt Estuary, with that mission.

IIRC the 101st ABN responsibility was approximately 15 miles of road!! So if that is so the division had a perimeter of 30 miles!!! Who is the genius that came up with this plan!!!

I suppose Eisenhower should bear some responsibility:

"The mission of Northern Group of Armies and of that part of Central Group of Armies operating north-west of the ARDENNES is to secure ANTWERP, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the RUHR and then seize the RUHR."

With how many divisions!! Certainly not "some 40"...

I guess some of the blame could also go to Brereton and the First Allied Airborne Army:

"Approval of landing and dropping zones
The zones selected above were approved by Commander First Allied Airborne Army."
[HS/21AG/TS/W/39/244 p.12] - CAB44-254

and, of course, the British should also accept their due responsibility. Montgomery could have cancelled the whole thing on 14-15 Sep when he saw the airborne plan. Although then we would all be writing threads about how bad old cautious Montgomery wrecked Eisenhower's genius plan to end the war in Sep 44...

Regards

Tom

[Delta Tank]

Mike,

Also not wanting to chuck another factor into the equation, but IIRC after MG had ended Montgomery told Eisenhower he had to keep the airborne divisions so as to free units of 2nd Army for other operations; initially a thrust towards the western Ruhr to meet with the 1st US Army attack at the beginning of Oct 44, and then, when reality began to sink in about the struggles that 1st Cdn Army were having to open the Scheldt Estuary, with that mission.

IIRC the 101st ABN responsibility was approximately 15 miles of road!! So if that is so the division had a perimeter of 30 miles!!! Who is the genius that came up with this plan!!!

I suppose Eisenhower should bear some responsibility:

"The mission of Northern Group of Armies and of that part of Central Group of Armies operating north-west of the ARDENNES is to secure ANTWERP, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the RUHR and then seize the RUHR."

With how many divisions!! Certainly not "some 40"...

I guess some of the blame could also go to Brereton and the First Allied Airborne Army:

"Approval of landing and dropping zones
The zones selected above were approved by Commander First Allied Airborne Army."
[HS/21AG/TS/W/39/244 p.12] - CAB44-254

and, of course, the British should also accept their due responsibility. Montgomery could have cancelled the whole thing on 14-15 Sep when he saw the airborne plan. Although then we would all be writing threads about how bad old cautious Montgomery wrecked Eisenhower's genius plan to end the war in Sep 44...

Regards

Tom

Tom,

Don't stop at blaming the amateur Eisenhower, after all the "Master of the Battlefield" dreamed up this abortion!! Shit blame MacArthur, blame FDR, blame anybody, but don't look at the "Master" oh no, no culpability there he was a professional from the top of head to the tip of his toes!! We were all amateurs, the "Master" said it could be done, how could the amateurs argue with the "Master"!! The "Master" believed he had enough forces to accomplish all missions so he dreamed up another mission, going the wrong direction, the amateurs should of stopped the "Master"!!

Mike

[Aber]

No, I am aware of the two British Corps that were suppose to advance on the flanks of the XXX Corps. But, you do understand that the road was cut numerous times or damn near cut in the 101st sector and the flank corps moved so damn slow that even Monty was frustrated with their progress. It was not until 25 September that contact between XXX Corps and VIII Corps occurred and the east flank of "Hell's Highway" was secure. Then to add insult to injury the British kept the two American Airborne division in the line for an extremely long time, 101st 69 days before relief and the 82d Airborne a little shorter at 55 days.

Mike

I was just pointing out that the PLAN didn't look too bad for 101st Airborne in terms of perimeter. The reality was somewhat different. IIRC the eastern flank was 3rd division, the leading brigade only arrived at the start line on the afternoon of the 17th and made an assault crossing of the canal that night. The rest of the divsion was strung back c150 miles to the Seine, but that is what happens when you try to cut preparation times.

[Delta Tank]

Is there a book on General Dempsey?

Mike

[JonS]

Is there a book on General Dempsey?

Not that I know of. He gets a bit of covereage in 'Colossal Cracks', but otherwise he's the original greyman.

[JonS]

From all of my reading, airborne divisions were never intended or built for prolong combat.

So? Tank destroyers weren't intended to be used as infantry support or indirect artillery, but they were. Once you but on the green skin, you cease to have much say over your fate.

You know they are quite small and the artillery complement is not what a "regular infantry" division possess

If only there were a pool of non-divisional artillery and units which could have been used to supplement these divisions.

An airborne infantry regiment is about 2,000 men and a regular infantry regt is around 3200?? Guessing don't have any reference material.

Guessing is always such an excellent basis for strong statements :roll:

How long were they kept in Normandy?? I know we had them stay longer than planned, but I don't think it was this long.

6th A/B were in the line in Normandy until Sept (about 90 days). 82nd and 101st were in the line till mid-late July (about 40 days).

Jon

[Aber]

Is there a book on General Dempsey?

Mike

Patton's Peers by John English has a chapter on him, and the other "forgotten"generals of the North-West Europe campaign.

[Steen Ammentorp]

Is there a book on General Dempsey?

Mike

Patton's Peers by John English has a chapter on him, and the other "forgotten"generals of the North-West Europe campaign.

Beside the book mentioned by Aber there is one biography on Dempsey: http://www.librarything.com/work/10302460/book/63534558

[The_Enigma]

Following up on Jon and Mike:

One has the understanding that he deployment of the 6th, 82nd and 101st AB to the bulge battlefield is hailed as a strategic move of genius that helped the battle tremendously. Granted it was on a shorter timeframe but it would appear infantry is infantry (in the case of staying in the line after M-G, did they not get support from AGRA and indy tank units to supplement their offensive and defensive abilities?)?

I may be remembering incorrectly, but I do seem to recall at some stage somewhere, someone (lol) mentioning that the German infantry never had the same level of artillery support American, British, and Canadian formations could call upon. They were able to stay in the line?

[gjkennedy]

From memory all the Allied airborne ops in Western Europe resulted in the Abn Divs undertaking a long stint in the line (less 1st Abn of course, whose remnants were withdrawn to the UK after MG). Abn Divs, Br and US, were both built around a core of infantry units that, while smaller than the Inf Div equivalents, was reasonably strong. They both though had relatively small organic artillery and engineer elements compared to Inf Divs proper, though US Abn Arty was beefed up with 105-mm howitzers to supplement the 75-mm packs.

From what I've read, my impression is that Abn commanders were concerned about sustaining their units in the field for extended periods. They needed bog standard details like sufficient signals stores and workshop facilities to keep functioning, and they had much slimmer MT resources to work with. That meant when they were in the line for prolonged spells, they had to plug into Corps and Army level for Admin as well as fire support. They certainly got the latter in terms of arty, but again it's the problem of having to order it from elsewhere because you don't have it yourself, and hoping it will arrive on time and be what you requested.

That guess of 3200 for a US Inf Regt compared to 2000 for a Para Inf Regt was damn near on by the by based on the 1943/44 T/Os.