Market-Garden White Washing History

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Ogorek
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#61

Post by Ogorek » 07 Jun 2008, 16:47

The_Enigma wrote:Did initial planning for Market-Garden - maybe Comet have Wessel as the final crossing instead of Arnhem?
Originally, both Wesel and Arnhem were on the table, but Wesel was quickly eliminated because of heavy Flak installations there.... as it turned out, there was even more flak in the area during the Airborne crossing of the Rhine in March, 1945 - where IX Troop Carrier Command suffered its heaviest losses of the war.

Cheers,

Ogorek

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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#62

Post by The_Enigma » 07 Jun 2008, 20:16

Makes one wonder why they "balls'ed" up for Varsity and didnt for Market?


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Ogorek
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#63

Post by Ogorek » 07 Jun 2008, 21:27

Well..... Monty (I know, I know!) wanted his Rhine crossing to be supported by an airborne op, but this time, they were dropped only a few miles behind the front line.

Another thing that people might forget, was the survivability of German AAA units.... after Normandy, there was a heck of a lot moved into Holland, which had plenty AAA all ready. With fuel problems grounding much of the Luftwaffe, the Germans continued to produce AAA (and remember, with the assistance of a slave labor empire, Germany's production during September, 1944, was the highest of the war) in large quantities.

JonFromPeoria
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#64

Post by JonFromPeoria » 16 Jun 2008, 19:50

Very interesting thread! Market-Garden is one of my favorite topics from WW2. I'll offer this up for speculation. After reading alot of material on the battle, I would say the reason for the break down and failure of the operation overall can best be attributed to the fact that the "air plan" was abysmal in most aspects. Consider these points:

What would have resulted had the Troop Carrier Command been firmly ordered to fly 2 lifts on the 17th? More men and more materials could have been landed on day 1, giving Urqhart, Gavin, and Taylor more combat power to secure their already over-tasked list of objectives. The first landings were around 2pm, right? What if the landings could have been made in the am, allowing time for the return and reloading of transport planes to return to Holland in the late pm, or even after dark on the 17th? From what I've read, it could have been done. Had they flown another lift in the evening of the 17th, even if would have just been strictly airborne infantry with no gliders or arty, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges probably could have been taken on day 1. Had Urqhuart and Gavin had one more battalion each available to them to go after the bridges on the 17th, most likely they would have succeeded in securing them. Furthermore, they could have taken advantage of the ideal weather conditions on day to deliver more men/material that subsequently became delayed over the next couple of days.

What would have resulted had the drop zones at Nijmegen and Arnhem been closer to the bridges? Again, terrible air planning! The commanders should have insisted that their drop zones be nearer to the bridges, especially at Arnhem. Drop zones should have been on both sides of the Waal, and on the south side of Arnhem bridge. Small coup-de-main detachments should have been landed either by parachute or glider on top of these key bridges...afterall, the whole point was to secure the bridges right? The Air Corps worries about flak should have been overidden by the importance of putting the troops down next to the bridges, especially at Arnhem. Had 1st Airborne landed south of Arnhem bridge, they would have taken it immediately upon landing while effectively blocking any German movements toward Nijmegen. Furthermore, had elements of 82nd landed north of Nijmegen, not only would the Waal bridge have been taken immediately, but 1st and 82nd could have linked up and eliminated the resulting battles that occured in the "Island". In summary, this part of the air plan was disastarous to the entire operation.

Whose to blame for all of this? Browning and his division commanders bear the primary blame for not insisting upon a better air plan and better drop zones. Settling for far away drop zones set the plan up for failure at it's onset. I also would blame Brereton and Williams for not being more aggressive about flying the 2 lifts on day one, and by worrying too much about flak. More planes might have been lost if two lifts had been flown, or the troops landed nearer to the bridges. However, the potential for losses should have been deemed acceptable if it meant delivering more men closer to their objectives on day 1.

Overall, IMO, Everyone in the Allied command structure totally underestimated the German's ability to resist the attack when they planned it. The plan was way too complex and ambitious to begin with. Still, even with the unexpectedly strong German resistance encountered; it may well have worked had the air plan allowed for the delivery of more men, closer to the objectives; on day 1.

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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#65

Post by Delta Tank » 29 Aug 2008, 14:53

To all,

Just bought the book entitled "Arnhem 1944" by William F. Buckingham, ISBN 0 7524 3187 0. Has anyone read this book? Opinions?

Mike

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#66

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 30 Aug 2008, 22:31

Personally I was pleased to see an author make the effort to carry out some of his own research into Market Garden and not just follow the well trodden path that so many other authors follow. He challenges some of the assumptions that have been made re Arnhem especially, and pulls no punches in suggesting that 1st Airborne Division was not well trained as a unit, ie at the level of Brigade and whole division manoeuvre. I would recommend this book to all interested in Arnhem.
Regards
Tom

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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#67

Post by The_Enigma » 01 Sep 2008, 14:09

Tom from Cornwall wrote:Personally I was pleased to see an author make the effort to carry out some of his own research into Market Garden and not just follow the well trodden path that so many other authors follow. He challenges some of the assumptions that have been made re Arnhem especially, and pulls no punches in suggesting that 1st Airborne Division was not well trained as a unit, ie at the level of Brigade and whole division manoeuvre. I would recommend this book to all interested in Arnhem.
Regards
Tom
At first looking at that i wanted to be appauled! However thinking about it, i dont think they had saw service throughout the entire war before Market-Garden as a single unit. Its structure also didnt remain the same as it had brigades attached and detached over the course of 42-44.

I may have to put that book on my to buy list.

As for opinions, two reviews for it on amazon.co.uk both give it 3/5 stars:
This book was very much a mixed bag in my view. The coverage of the complex relationships and rivalry between the various allied generals is excellent and fascinating, and the coverage on General Browning in particular is quite eye opening. I have read several books on this battle, and this is one of the more controversial. My main gripe with this book, in contrast to all the others i have read, is that it tends to underplay the sheer guts,tenacity, courage and fighting skill showed by 1st Airborne Div at Arnhem despite the failings of planning and leadership and their being outgunned, outmanned and undersupplied.The book even criticises the British Airborne for a lack of preparation as a fighting unit, which given the circumstances does not pay enough tribute to the soldiers who fought and died there,esspecially as the whole Division was only expected to hold the bridge for 48 hours,and there were, according to other authors reports that hardened SS soldiers were in awe of the paras and how they fought.The book does do a good job of explaining the german side, and their problems in defending the area concerned, and is a good fast flowing account of events, that doesn't get bogged down or side tracked. A good read, but for reasons pointed out I felt some areas were missed or underplayed and the book would have been even better but for this.
&
I agree with Mr Huth's [the above] comments about this book. After reading other books about this battle I was disappointed that the author compared the plight of 1st Airborne equally with that of the Americans. It should be obvious that holding a position for 3 days (4 nights) as frost did, is somewhat more difficult than holding a similar position for 24 - 48 hours. The author failed badly on this count. However, the author pointed out Browning's shameful role during the war and the fine work that the American airborne contributed to this battle.

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Attrition
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#68

Post by Attrition » 31 Oct 2008, 14:23

Interesting stuff.

The overconfidence thesis seems a little odd, considering that German resistance on the Belgian border had increased considerably and that airborned forces are supposed to manoeuvre over opposition rather than a rabble.

I think the dog's buried in the relationship between the Air Forces and the armies. Clearly Air concerns about the safety of their units led to decisions which had unfortunate consequnces for the ground operation. One flight on the first day, distant drop zones and restrictions on fighter-bomber operations seem to have neglected the greater purpose of the operation.The ground operation, particularly in the arrangements for Nijmegen also reflected a concern for safety which seems a little too parochial, particularly when you consider that airborne operations exploited speed to the exclusion of safety, numbers and heavy equipment.

Apparently the decision for Arnhem instead of Wesel was determined by London (see 'Colossal Cracks' SA Hart). On the whole I think there were too many cooks and Monty didn't hoodwink the Air the way he did in Normandy. The failings of the plan show the flawed nature of the Allied Supreme Command at the time. As for the Nijmegen and Arnhem parts of the gig, I tend to the view that it would have been better to go for both ends of the bridges first, the Groesbeek heights second. I think that the Air popinjays should have had their heads banged together as soon as they began to hamper the prospects of the ground operation. Sadly that would have taken Eisenhower who was busy with other things. I find this rather reminiscent of the RN at Gallipoli being overly concerned with risk to its ships during the naval operation to force the narrows.

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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#69

Post by Michael Emrys » 01 Nov 2008, 00:40

Attrition wrote:Apparently the decision for Arnhem instead of Wesel was determined by London (see 'Colossal Cracks' SA Hart).
I have this on order, but could you tell me briefly what he has to say about this. I read somewhere a year or two ago (might have been in Weighly) that it was Montgomery who nixed moving on Wesel when Dempsey suggested it.

Michael
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#70

Post by Attrition » 01 Nov 2008, 00:56

There's a description of Dempsey visiting Monty to discuss details and Monty met him with a telegram in his hand from Winston. Dempsey says that he had thought it would be Wesel but that the telegram was the thing that put Arnhem in the frame. Apparently the V-weapon launch sites still in range of London were closer to the Arnhem axis.

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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#71

Post by Michael Emrys » 01 Nov 2008, 01:06

Hmmm. In that case, I have to wonder how strenuously M. argued for Wesel. I'll read the book.

Michael
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Attrition
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#72

Post by Attrition » 01 Nov 2008, 02:01

~~~~~"Dempsey arrived 'convinced we should go to Wesel.'...'Montgomery was standing at the door with a telegram from the War Office in his hand about the V2 rocket threat.' Dempsey believed that this message 'decided the question' because Montgomery had not 'really made up his mind on Arnhem before he got this telegram.'" ~~~~~

pp.129-130, Colossal Cracks; SA Hart, 2000.

I wrote this on another board. The book is highly interesting in content but Hart's prose style is lamentable and the copy editing very poor indeed (if there was any). It goes well with Buckley: 'British Armour in the Normandy Campaign' another excellent monograph sadly marred by an indifference to sentence construction. The copy editing isn't quite as bad though.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#73

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 02 Nov 2008, 20:49

Monty received the following signal on the afternoon of 9 Sept 44 from Brooke's deputy, the VCIGS, General Nye, not from Churchill or Brooke, who were in Canada at the time:

"Two rockets so-called V2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you pleae report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared."

But the decision to go to Arnhem was made earlier, on the 3rd Sept IIRC, because the RAF would not take their transport aircraft any where near the AA defences of the Ruhr.

Regards

Tom

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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#74

Post by nl11279 » 29 Apr 2011, 19:33

Hello,

For me, it started with a question and it resulted in a revealing and detailed manuscript about the American 82nd Airborne Division, during Operation Market Garden in September 1944. This division should have captured the important Nijmegen Bridge in time, but it failed to do so. World War II could have ended before Christmas 1944, but sadly, it lasted until May 1945.

Until now the British are blamed for the failure and the role of the Americans minimized and never really investigated, not even in the book "A Bridge too far" by Cornelius Ryan.

My argument is (based on a lot of declassified documents, new archive material and analyzing/combining information) that General Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne, is responsible for the failure of Operation Market Garden. During the operation the general was preoccupied with the defence of the landing zones, complacent and lacked initiative. After the war the general claimed (and intended this as an excuse) that he issued verbal pre-jump orders, instructing a colonel "to capture the Nijmegen Bridge immediately" and that the colonel "misunderstood" these orders. But, he did not issue such orders. I have a lot of new material that supports my argument.

In view of this, Montgomery's Operation Market Garden and the British ground forces cannot seriously be blamed anymore. But until now, history still puts the blame on both of them.

But - supprisingly - I cannot find a publisher, not even in the UK.

Any thoughts on my argument?

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Market-Garden White Washing History

#75

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 29 Apr 2011, 21:42

Well I can only say that your evidence better be very strong as the "Montgomery was a cautious plodder" school will not like you trying to blame anyone else!!

Regards

Tom

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