#64
Post
by JonFromPeoria » 16 Jun 2008, 19:50
Very interesting thread! Market-Garden is one of my favorite topics from WW2. I'll offer this up for speculation. After reading alot of material on the battle, I would say the reason for the break down and failure of the operation overall can best be attributed to the fact that the "air plan" was abysmal in most aspects. Consider these points:
What would have resulted had the Troop Carrier Command been firmly ordered to fly 2 lifts on the 17th? More men and more materials could have been landed on day 1, giving Urqhart, Gavin, and Taylor more combat power to secure their already over-tasked list of objectives. The first landings were around 2pm, right? What if the landings could have been made in the am, allowing time for the return and reloading of transport planes to return to Holland in the late pm, or even after dark on the 17th? From what I've read, it could have been done. Had they flown another lift in the evening of the 17th, even if would have just been strictly airborne infantry with no gliders or arty, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges probably could have been taken on day 1. Had Urqhuart and Gavin had one more battalion each available to them to go after the bridges on the 17th, most likely they would have succeeded in securing them. Furthermore, they could have taken advantage of the ideal weather conditions on day to deliver more men/material that subsequently became delayed over the next couple of days.
What would have resulted had the drop zones at Nijmegen and Arnhem been closer to the bridges? Again, terrible air planning! The commanders should have insisted that their drop zones be nearer to the bridges, especially at Arnhem. Drop zones should have been on both sides of the Waal, and on the south side of Arnhem bridge. Small coup-de-main detachments should have been landed either by parachute or glider on top of these key bridges...afterall, the whole point was to secure the bridges right? The Air Corps worries about flak should have been overidden by the importance of putting the troops down next to the bridges, especially at Arnhem. Had 1st Airborne landed south of Arnhem bridge, they would have taken it immediately upon landing while effectively blocking any German movements toward Nijmegen. Furthermore, had elements of 82nd landed north of Nijmegen, not only would the Waal bridge have been taken immediately, but 1st and 82nd could have linked up and eliminated the resulting battles that occured in the "Island". In summary, this part of the air plan was disastarous to the entire operation.
Whose to blame for all of this? Browning and his division commanders bear the primary blame for not insisting upon a better air plan and better drop zones. Settling for far away drop zones set the plan up for failure at it's onset. I also would blame Brereton and Williams for not being more aggressive about flying the 2 lifts on day one, and by worrying too much about flak. More planes might have been lost if two lifts had been flown, or the troops landed nearer to the bridges. However, the potential for losses should have been deemed acceptable if it meant delivering more men closer to their objectives on day 1.
Overall, IMO, Everyone in the Allied command structure totally underestimated the German's ability to resist the attack when they planned it. The plan was way too complex and ambitious to begin with. Still, even with the unexpectedly strong German resistance encountered; it may well have worked had the air plan allowed for the delivery of more men, closer to the objectives; on day 1.