The Normandy campaign.

[Attrition]

Interesting. Significant that most of the narrative describes crisis management rather than operational or strategic concerns.

[RichTO90]

Monty was only the ground Commander and was anwerable to Einhower who was supreme commander.

Did anyone argue the contrary?

During the landings on D Day the British and later Canadians were confronted with the only German Panzer Division in Normandy. The Veteran 21st Panzer who in fact split the landing forces by fighting its way to the sea, fortunately not for long. But it did prevent the British reaching Caen on the first day and allowed time for German reinforcements..

No, sorry, but it was nothing of the sort. 21. Panzer did include a few veterans of North Africa, as well as some veterans from the east, but describing it as "veteran" is stretching the meaning of the term, not to mention credulity.

Nor did 21. Panzer do much to prevent the British from reaching Caen on D-Day and never "split" anything; the resisted landing at SWORD, casualties among leaders, slow unloading, and the neccesity of landing in column of brigades was quite sufficient to do that by itself. Further, given the immediate German reinforcements were directed further west against the Canadians and across the Douve versus 6 Airborne, I don't see that much else got in the way of 3 Division for a while. Fundamentally Caen was possible only if everything worked exactly as expected.

According to Gen Bradley’s Diary, Monty was running a dangerous deception to take and hold all the German armour on the British (and Canadians of course), until Bradley’s Americans could break out an action , which wasdelayed several times

That would be the postwar "diary"?

After the war the Americans seemed to forget Monty’s ‘Decoy Mission and used the slowness to denigrate him

Not exactly. Postwar they were simply following the lead of Tedder that he had taken during the events. He stirred the pot, but I have yet to see much evidence that at the time the senior leadership was having any real problem with Montgomery - Eisenhower's conflicts with him came to a head after the breakout. Certainly Bradley and his commanders were not since they were fully occupied in trying to acheive their part of the plan, which was going slowly as well.

During the battle ‘Operation Blue Coat’, the British had a concentration of Panzers facing them that was only second to the Battle of Kursk seven and a half divisions inc 3x SS and the Panzer Lehr. The Americans had half a Panzer division no Tigers or any other Heavy Panzers.

And was about as meaningful as the concentration at Kursk. Funny though that 17. SS never gets counted. Or the fact that early on the Americans faced the bulk of the infantry opposition and had the rather complicated task of attacking away from the main German line and defending against potential counterattacks from that direction.

Why is it that such a complicated subject always comes down to the least common denominator?

Tanks and Guns: The Sherman tank was horrendous. Called the ‘Tommy Cooker’ by the Germans, ‘Ronson’ By the British/Canadians, because like the cigarette lighter of the same name it always lit first time, ‘The Flaming Coffin’ by the Poles and ‘the death Trap by the Americans. The problem was that the ammunition and fuel had a tendency to burst into flame immediately it was hit not allowing times for the crews to escape leaving them to the most horrible death imaginable. This caused a phobia among the crews against Tiger tanks and of course burning to death. A factor why Sherman tank of all nations were sometime hesitant in attack and an issue thought to have affected the Poles and Canadians hesitancy in closing the Falaise gap.

Nonsense. Certainly there is little evidence of the phobia early on. Best evidence is that it took a while to mature and was only widespread later. There wasn't much hesitation by 11th Armoured in their second action on 18 July, nor most of the other divisions, British, Canadian, or American...or Polish. I think the greater issue at Chambois was probably the German resistance than any hesitation by the Poles, Canadians, or Americans.

See; Belton Cooper’s book ‘Death Trap’

Please do not. It is an excellent memoir of his activities as a maintenance officer with 3rd AD. However, as a developmental or even technical history of American tanks it is mostly fantasy.

Gen MacNair and Gen Patton were against the Sherman being fitted with the 17pdr gun., but Patton soon changed his mind after the Battles of Normandy. The greatest weapon against the Panzers were the Anti tank guns which unfortunately the Americans had only the puny 37mm The British had a surfeit of 17pdrs and 6pdrs with addition of the sabot round made them deadly against tanks. It isarguably whether it was aircraft or anti tank guns that destroyed the most Panzers. But certainly the British 49th Division A/T guns destroyed 51 mostly Tigers in a day.

Yep, reduce arguments down to the lowest common denominator, ignore all details, and especially complicating factors, and you can prove that black is white and up is down. The standard American antitank gun in Normandy was the 57mm - a 6-pounder. The 6-pdr sabot was newly issued and in limited supply and reportedly new range tables had not been issued to all units. The 17-pdr sabot only became available in very small quantities of defectively manufactured lots in August and was only generally becoming available in October. Neither had much impact in Normandy.

There is little or no evidence that Allied airpower destroyed many German tanks.

What day exactly did the 49th Division do that?

The question of Montgomery receiving the most supplies is again arguable, as it would ask questions about the American supply system. In addition, the efficiency and integrity of Gen JCH Lee USA commanding general of Services of Supply, who was responsible directly to Gen Marshal and was said to be the most incompetent General in the US. Army. Did Monty take more than his share of stores etc; well the British did most of the heavy fighting.

What does that have to do with Normandy and who ever argued it? Lee was insufferable and an inveterate empire builder with an overlarge headquarters, but I have yet to see anyone who said he was incompetent? Given that the troop structure that ETOUSA/COMZ requested for the US logistic infrastructure was about two-thirds of what was provided, its hard to fault just Lee for its poor performance when events showed that what had been requested was actually an underestimate of what was required?

Probably Normandy was a battle of attrition although after WW1 no British General dare utter the word attrition Although the Sherman was an inferior vehicle to all the Panzers in use in Normandy. The philosophy that if it takes five Shermans to knockout one Tiger. This was acceptable because the US could produce the Sherman ten times faster than the Germans Unfortunately the allies could not produce crews at that rate.

What "philosophy"? It's never been shown that has any basis in reality.

This shortage also affected the Patton’s 3rd Army. However, as Cooper’s disclosure of the critical tank crew shortages and identifying it as the leading cause of the U-turn of Patton's (a Southern general descended from a Confederate Officer) earlier decision to ban colored tank troops in his army. Given the state of race relations at that time, Patton's reversal on segregation and the integration of his army with African-American tank units underscored the failure of the Sherman and the crisis, which faced the U.S. Army.

"Cooper" disclosed it? Really? It was a constant theme in G-1 reports, along with the G-4 protests about slow material replacement, from about July onwards.

And, again, what do events in fall and winter have to do with the Normandy Campaign? What do Afriocan-American tank units have to do with supposed failures of the Sherman tank?

The British Infantry losses were between 25 and 45% with some battalions with losses equivalent to the worst battles of WW1

Do you think those were unique to the Commonwealth forces? In the first week of its committment the 90th Division experienced those losses to regiments...in a little more than a single day.

Cheers!

[John Hilly]

Interesting. Significant that most of the narrative describes crisis management rather than operational or strategic concerns.

How else could it be? Their situation was critical in the full meaning of the word.
BTW, I think this report was written when Stadler and the former CiC of 5. Pz.AOK., von Schweppenburg were still POW's?
I'm not familier with those Abbrivisons (too difficult word for my English skills) in the report.

With best and piece for all!
Johnny. B. Goode

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

Whilst again being in worryingly wide agreement with most of what you wrote , I do think that perhaps you underestimate the level of anti-Montgomeryness (great new word huh! ) at SHAEF throughout Normandy. You wrote:

I have yet to see much evidence that at the time the senior leadership was having any real problem with Montgomery - Eisenhower's conflicts with him came to a head after the breakout.

I'll dig out some quotes but if you have a copy of Hamilton's provactively titled "Monty: Master of the Battlefield" see pages 722-726 and 752. I'll try to find some time to post some of the quotes later. But they definitely hint at problems building up earlier, not helped of course by the fact that Tedder appears to have spent more time trying to get Ike to sack Monty than get the air support working.

Regards

Tom

[RichTO90]

I'll dig out some quotes but if you have a copy of Hamilton's provactively titled "Monty: Master of the Battlefield" see pages 722-726 and 752. I'll try to find some time to post some of the quotes later. But they definitely hint at problems building up earlier, not helped of course by the fact that Tedder appears to have spent more time trying to get Ike to sack Monty than get the air support working.

Regards

Tom

Going by memory, but IIRC the kvetching began with Tedder immediately after the landing. That seems to be the Ur-source for the complaints that followed. That Eisenhower had a lot of respect for Tedder and that Tedder was usually immediately to hand to fill his ears probably had the salutary effect Tedder was expecting. By August Eisenhower was definitely falling into the "Montgomery has a problem" camp and it only got worse through the fall.

[Aber]

No, sorry, but it was nothing of the sort. 21. Panzer did include a few veterans of North Africa, as well as some veterans from the east, but describing it as "veteran" is stretching the meaning of the term, not to mention credulity.

Nor did 21. Panzer do much to prevent the British from reaching Caen on D-Day and never "split" anything; the resisted landing at SWORD, casualties among leaders, slow unloading, and the neccesity of landing in column of brigades was quite sufficient to do that by itself. Further, given the immediate German reinforcements were directed further west against the Canadians and across the Douve versus 6 Airborne, I don't see that much else got in the way of 3 Division for a while. Fundamentally Caen was possible only if everything worked exactly as expected.

Agree with most of your response, but 3rd Division did get hit with an (unsuccesful) armoured counterattack. IIRC from 'Assault Divsion' there was a warning at c4pm that an attack was expected, which diverted thoughts from advancing to digging-in.

[Aber]

Going by memory, but IIRC the kvetching began with Tedder immediately after the landing. That seems to be the Ur-source for the complaints that followed. That Eisenhower had a lot of respect for Tedder and that Tedder was usually immediately to hand to fill his ears probably had the salutary effect Tedder was expecting. By August Eisenhower was definitely falling into the "Montgomery has a problem" camp and it only got worse through the fall.

A lot of it came directly from previous encounters in the Mediterranean especially the views that Montgomery would not attack until his numerical superiority was such that his attack could not fail, and that he was too fond of his reputation to risk an attack failing - which was the core of Eisenhower's report to Marshall on his first meeting with Montgomery. Whether this came from Montgomery himself or Tedder/Conningham in Algiers is not clear.

There certainly were crises in the Eisenhower/ Montgomery relationship before August - particularly pre- and post- Goodwood but these were generally resolved by face to face meetings. What Eisenhower doesn't seem to get credit for is the amount of pressure he got from Marshall over various issues eg US press reports on relative US/British casualties, pressure to take direct command, and the way he resisted it in the cause of Allied unity.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Going by memory, but IIRC the kvetching began with Tedder immediately after the landing. That seems to be the Ur-source for the complaints that followed. That Eisenhower had a lot of respect for Tedder and that Tedder was usually immediately to hand to fill his ears probably had the salutary effect Tedder was expecting....

I only remember this vaguely from decades ago. Why did Tedder have such a problem with Monty?

thanks

[phylo_roadking]

I've seen "thin" hints of this before; whatever it was, it began during the planning for Overlord. Prior to that there doesn't seem to have been any problems between them in North Africa or the Med.

Certainly AFTER D-Day the causes of any greivance were clearer. From Britannia.com -

In the immediate aftermath of Overlord, additional operations were planned to keep the enemy off balance. One of these, which Montgomery had characterized as a major "break-out," resulted in the Allies' failure to take advantage of heavy enemy casualties. In an attempt to break through enemy lines and open the way to Paris, Eisenhower pushed Montgomery to take action and was assured that a "big show" would occur on July 9. Montgomery asked for and got air support from Tedder. However, Montgomery's attack failed and he called it off, angering both Eisenhower and Tedder. Two days later, Montgomery again promised an offensive he named Operation "Goodwood." Tedder arranged for a sensational show of support, bringing together 1,600 British and U.S. heavy bombers and 400 medium bombers, dropping a total of 7,800 tons of bombs on German defenses; 2,500 tons sited for the German fortifications at Caen; and 650 tons for Cagny. Tedder carefully coordinated the air attack with ground attacks in order to avoid any lulls that could give the enemy an opportunity to regroup.

The saturation bombing started the offensive, but it quickly failed. After sustaining heavy losses, Montgomery called it off. Tedder was furious at this second failure and demanded that Montgomery be fired, which did not come to pass.

(As an aside - AFTER the war, when Monty replaced Brooke as CIGS, and Tedder was Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff...the hair and fur really flew In the words of Hew Strachan in The Politics Of The British Army -

"He hated Tedder..."

This came to a head in 1947 over major questions over future spending, and the division of budgeting between the Army, and Tedder's plan for a 375-aircraft strategic atomic bombing force. Only the Berlin Crisis and the spiking threat of land warfare prevented a really major row...and Monty was replaced by Viscount Slim in 1948 anyway.)

Anthony Beevor put part of the POST-invasion antipathy between Monty and the two Senior RAF officers, Tedder and Coningham, down to this -

Eisenhower was becoming so exasperated that Montgomery's enemies in the RAF, Tedder and Air Marshal Coningham who commanded the Tactical Air Force for the invasion, hoped that he would be sacked. Coningham especially was enraged by Montgomery's claims that everything was going according to plan when he had failed to take the ground needed to build advance airfields.

Because of Monty's "failure", Tedder was perhaps under pressure to deliver results/forces that he couldn't...from fields in England?

As to events BEFORE the invasion - here's a personal guess....and it comes from this from Beevor -

The Allied pre-invasion plan was to cut off Normandy and Brittany by smashing rail communications and destroying all the bridges along the river Seine to the east and the Loire to the south. But "Transportation", as the operation became known, proved very hard to launch because of personal and inter-service rivalries.

Eisenhower's deputy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was its main proponent. In February, Air Marshal Harris of Bomber Command, and General Spaatz of the US Eighth Air Force, received warning that preparations for Overlord would require their heavy squadrons to be diverted from the strategic offensive against Germany. Harris, who believed obsessively that his bomber force was on the point of bringing Germany to its knees, objected strenuously. He wanted his aircraft to continue smashing German cities to rubble. There should be only "minimum diversions" from the task of "reducing the enemy's material power to resist invasion", he wrote to his direct superior, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff.

Above all, Harris fiercely resisted the idea that he should be told what to bomb. Spaatz also showed great reluctance to change targets. He wanted to continue attacking oil refineries and German fighter production. Their objections were over-ruled by Eisenhower at a major meeting on March 25, but they still tried to get their own way.

Tedder, however, still faced considerable opposition from the antagonistic Harris. Bomber Harris was at odds with the Air Ministry, he loathed Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the commander of Allied air forces for the invasion, and he had become increasingly difficult with Portal. "The RAF was a house divided," observed a senior American staff officer afterwards. "The air side stank beyond belief."

I wonder how much of his bad feeling towards Monty came from the pressures he and Ike put him under to deliver the "Transportation Plan"....in the face of, and putting him up against, so much opposition from Harris and Spaatz?

[RichTO90]

Agree with most of your response, but 3rd Division did get hit with an (unsuccesful) armoured counterattack. IIRC from 'Assault Divsion' there was a warning at c4pm that an attack was expected, which diverted thoughts from advancing to digging-in.

The original problem started at 1030 when Brigadier Smith waffled over bypassing HILLMAN. Then at 1300 when 9th Brigade landed they were diverted to assist 6th Airborne against pressure from KG von Luck. The race to Caen never even started.

But I was referring to the "splitting" the divison remark - it never happened. Elements of 21. Panzer did reach the cost, but only because they met no resistance. The actual counterattack was between 1615 and 1800 and was soundly defeated by the Staffordshire Yeomanry.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Phylo...thanks for that and the refrences. Last year I read Dolittles biography and compared his remarks on the heavy bomber in support of Op. Cobra to those of Bradley's. Tedder & Dolittle may have a similar opinion of this technique. I also noted from the cross checking between Bradley and Dolittle was they & their staffs had a serious communications failure. That this was not the first time the heavy bombers had been used this way, by the same commanders & staff, suggests just how bad the communications failure was. Perhaps related to this was the replacement, in July, of Bereton by Quesada as commander of the US 5th AF. Bradley hints at 'problems' in that direction as well.

The remark about the Transportation Plan rings a bell or two. It is evident that some aspects of this were very sucessfull, but like Operation Strangle in Italy during the same months there were aspects that were less than perfect. A close look at that might lead to a better understanding of Tedders opinion.

[Tom from Cornwall]

I have seen much comment on heavy bomber support in Normandy but very little reference to the use of heavy bombers during the November 1944 offensive north of Aachen by US First and Ninth Armies, which seems to have been conducted despite Bradley insisting after Cobra that he would never use heavy bombers again. IIRC this support too suffered from the excessive "safety zone" much criticised in the 8/9 Jul "Op Charnwood" and about which so much criticism is often made. One thing to remember from a ground force point of view is the constant shortage of artillery and ammunition that plagued Allied operations in Normandy - given unlimited artillery support I would imagine that both British and American generals would have avoided all the issues with acquiring heavy bomber support and used their own, much more flexible and controllable fire support.

That Tedder and Coningham conspired against Montgomery is a fact - possible motives include: a feeling that they were not praised enough at the end of the North African campaign, equally huge ego's , total ignorance of the difficulties of fighting the Germans on the ground, huge exaggeration of the influence of RAF operations and a huge RAF "chip" against the more senior UK services. For leaders so vain and arrogant as these two, it must also have rankled hugely that on his return to the UK, Montgomery was treated as a "celebrity" by both the British press and public - for a RAF that was used to all the headlines in the British press this was a massive step down in prestige and all the more so for those who had also just returned from abroad to a less than heroic welcome.

IIRC within the first week after landing in Normandy, the air commanders were trying to stir up a controversy on the "crisis" in Normandy caused by a lack of progress, as if they expected all operations to go exactly to plan. As for extra airfields in Normandy, well of course that would have simplified matters for the RAF, but equally every extra RAF unit in Normandy would need supplying by sea, and as previously discussed the logistic build-up was already behind schedule without even more RAF mouths to feed, bombs to ship, etc.

Regards

Tom

[RichTO90]

Perhaps related to this was the replacement, in July, of Bereton by Quesada as commander of the US 5th AF. Bradley hints at 'problems' in that direction as well.

Minor point Carl, Quesad never replaced Brereton and certainly not in Fifth Air Force, which was in the Pacific. Quesada commanded IX FC under Brebrton, who was CG Ninth Air Force. For NEPTUNE IX FC was re-rolled as IX TAC, supporting First Army, but still under Ninth Air Force and Brereton. When 12th Army Group was activated Ninth Air Force became it's tactical air asset, split into IX, XIX, and XXIX TAC, each supporting an army, and IX BC in general support.

The remark about the Transportation Plan rings a bell or two. It is evident that some aspects of this were very sucessfull, but like Operation Strangle in Italy during the same months there were aspects that were less than perfect. A close look at that might lead to a better understanding of Tedders opinion.

The dispute was over the means, not the end. Solly Zuckerman of British OR believed in hitting railyards, while Quesada and USAF OR believed that bridges and rail cuts were more effective and would result in fewer civilian casualties. In the end it appears it was actually the synergy of the two concepts that worked and it is likely that neither would have worked in isolation.

[RichTO90]

As for extra airfields in Normandy, well of course that would have simplified matters for the RAF, but equally every extra RAF unit in Normandy would need supplying by sea, and as previously discussed the logistic build-up was already behind schedule without even more RAF mouths to feed, bombs to ship, etc.

Wait a minute...I thought you were the one arging that logistical problems were just a smokescreen for poor decisionmaking by Eisenhower...

BTW, have you ever read the Second Army post mortem of MARKET GARDEN? It's kind of illuminating on the subject. Something about the diffiuclties of being 400 miles from their main source of supply, establishing forward dumps and pushing supllies forward over a single road, and with limited transportation assets. Also good stuff on the emergency conversion of units to augment transport. And the snafus, including the four American truck compainies with supplies for the 82nd and 101st arriving late and then having been loaded with the wrong 105mm ammunition. OTOH they also remarked on the ability of American truck convoys to move faster.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

Different logistic problem - and I don't believe Eisenhower had much influence over events in the bridgehead until things began to loosen up in the last week of July/first week of August; but I do get your point - and very much understand that the implication of logistics is often overlooked by commentators on all war, let alone the bits we discuss on this forum. Even me sometimes.

As for the 2nd Army M-G post mortem - sounds interesting, have you a PRO reference for that so I can get a copy next time I'm up there.

Cheers

Tom