The Normandy campaign.

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The_Enigma
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#286

Post by The_Enigma » 11 Mar 2010, 15:18

Would one understand it to act in a similar way as the skirts the Germans used on their tanks - for the weapon to blow up before it hit the tank proper?

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#287

Post by RichTO90 » 11 Mar 2010, 16:30

The_Enigma wrote:Would one understand it to act in a similar way as the skirts the Germans used on their tanks - for the weapon to blow up before it hit the tank proper?
Actually, no the spikes were literally intended to skewer the round before it impacted so that the fuze would not activate. It would be a rare instance that the fuze would actually impact the spike so as to set it off.

And, since the skirts were never actually designed to defeat hollow charges, their actual effectiveness may have been problematic. A major problem with early HC rounds was fuze delay and stand off distances, which combined to reduce effectiveness of the plasma penetrator formation. It is actually possible that in some circumstances the skirts could make the penetration more effective.
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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#288

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 11 Mar 2010, 22:47

Rich,

With reference to Montgomery's general policy:

I think I have shown that at least from 11 June onwards it was his "general policy [...] to pull the enemy on to Second Army so as to make it easier for First Army to expand and extend the quicker".

You replied:
Thanks for that Tom, but I do note that it is dated 11 June...so still doesn't qualify as a contmporary document that proves that was his plan of campaign prior to D-Day.
I have had a brief look through my copy of "Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy", edited by Stephen Brooks and published by the Army Records Society and have found an interesting document dated 7 Jan 44:

'Notes taken at a meeting of Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff, at HQ 21 Army Group'

Now this does not talk about "pulling" or "drawing" the enemy on to Second Army, but does give Second Army the task to "operate to the South to prevent any interference with the American Army from the East".

It seems to me that an argument could be made that here is a definitive statement of intent by Montgomery of a general policy that he was to follow on arrival in Normandy. Yes, the original intention as laid down was for Second Army to form a protective screen behind which First Army could operate. Due to a variety of factors, the screen could not be established by Second Army but Montgomery was flexible enough to modify his detailed plans to maintain the general policy.

Of course, this is not the same as saying "everything" went according to plan, obviously it didn't, but equally I do believe that Montgomery stuck to this "general policy" and this should be recognized; if Second Army did not quite "prevent any interference" from German forces to the East, it certainly prevented just about enough interference for the American army to achieve its objectives of capturing Cherbourg and subsequently developing operations to the south and west.

You may perhaps retort that it was German policy rather than Montgomery's that kept major German armoured forces at the east of the lodgement, and I will obviously have to do some more reseach into that subject. :D

Regards

Tom

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#289

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 00:12

Tom from Cornwall wrote:With reference to Montgomery's general policy:

I think I have shown that at least from 11 June onwards it was his "general policy [...] to pull the enemy on to Second Army so as to make it easier for First Army to expand and extend the quicker".
Exactly... :wink:
I have had a brief look through my copy of "Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy", edited by Stephen Brooks and published by the Army Records Society and have found an interesting document dated 7 Jan 44:

'Notes taken at a meeting of Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff, at HQ 21 Army Group'

Now this does not talk about "pulling" or "drawing" the enemy on to Second Army, but does give Second Army the task to "operate to the South to prevent any interference with the American Army from the East".
Excellent. That is actually the first real reference I have ever heard that does not quote the spurious "notes" from the St. Paul's School briefings of April and May. Spurious, since AIUI, notes were not allowed to be taken, no transcripts were allowed, and so the evidence of what was said rely on a skeletal outline and the various and conflicting later accounts of those who were there.

But, if taken in context with the other planning papers and especially the logistical phasing, doesn't that simply state the obvious? The requirement was for the American forces to immediately turn nearly 180 degrees away from the established beachhead front to seize Cherbourg, then turn back again to advance south, until they were to turn west and seize Brittany, and then come back into line with the Commonwealth forces as they approached the Seine-Loire line...around D+90. Given that the Commonwealth landed on the Allied left and the Americans on the right, for entirely non-operational reasons, it is difficult to imagine how such a plan could be executed unless the forces on the left were utilized as a shield to cover the operations of the other army?

And that gets back to the Allied expectations of what the Germans would do - always a mistake in planning operations, but then "Red Teaming" is a post-World War II planning concept. When it became very apparent by mid June that rather than trading space for time the Germans were going to fight for every inch of ground, the notion of the decisive battle occurring on either the Seine-Loire line or German frontier had to go out the window. It was going to be on the Orne in Normandy and west into Calvados. Which makes it a bit moot whether Second Army was "drawing" the Germans onto them or simply fighting the rising tide at that point. :D

In any case, "shielding" was the original concept that became "drawing", a subtle perhaps, but still existent distinction. Nor was Caen really the "key" as is sometimes expressed. Rather, it was the communications leading to Caen that were. With very few xceptions the approach of forces and, more importantly, the supply routes avaiable to the Germans was primarily from the east, southeast and south...their closest depots were around Falaise for one thing. So whether or not anyone did any "drawing" if the Germans elected to fight along the line they chose to, rather than the one the Allies expected them to, where the majority of them would initially appear was the vicinity of Caen.

Cheers!
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Attrition
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#290

Post by Attrition » 12 Mar 2010, 01:21

~~~~~In any case, "shielding" was the original concept that became "drawing", a subtle perhaps, but still existent distinction. Nor was Caen really the "key" as is sometimes expressed. Rather, it was the communications leading to Caen that were. With very few xceptions the approach of forces and, more importantly, the supply routes avaiable to the Germans was primarily from the east, southeast and south...their closest depots were around Falaise for one thing. So whether or not anyone did any "drawing" if the Germans elected to fight along the line they chose to, rather than the one the Allies expected them to, where the majority of them would initially appear was the vicinity of Caen.~~~~~

Was any of this unknown to the Overlord planners? The mooted German counter-offensive towards Bayeux was forestalled by Epsom which looks like an offensive shield to me, nonetheless German tank reinforcements went disproportionately to the east end (or in your terms didn't get further east until August). As far as Allied expectations of the Germans went, well the possibilities wouldn't be difficult to infer from a map. Not having any seems to me to be as reckless as assuming that the Germans would conform in the event. I doubt Monty, Bradley and Dempsey were under any illusions about the reality having a few surprises. As it turned out they can be accused of much but not I think that of underestimating the enemy. It also seems to me that the methods the Allies used were as well thought out as those of late 1917 which only allowed the Germans to respond in ways which only varied the speed with which they were undone by attrition.

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#291

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 02:39

Attrition wrote:Was any of this unknown to the Overlord planners? The mooted German counter-offensive towards Bayeux was forestalled by Epsom which looks like an offensive shield to me, nonetheless German tank reinforcements went disproportionately to the east end (or in your terms didn't get further east until August).
Sorry, but no, the "mooted" (odd word usage?) German counterattack was forestalled by Geyr's Panzergruppe West headquarters being bombed to smithereens. :D EPSOM then was forestalled by the counterattack by II. SS-Panzerkorps - not the other way round.

But it was the Allies expectation that if they defeated the initial counterattack then the Germans would began a slow withdrawal from the coast, which didn't happen.
As far as Allied expectations of the Germans went, well the possibilities wouldn't be difficult to infer from a map.
Er, right? Except the possibility inferred didn't actually occur...except for the initial attempt at a counterattack.
Not having any seems to me to be as reckless as assuming that the Germans would conform in the event.
Sure, but it had multiple ramifications. The entire logistical plan was geared to a much different advance pace and, in the American case, proved to be undersupported in terms of troops and equipment for the pace that was actually expected. It governed the expected intensity levels and thus the supply planned for replacements in men and equipment.
I doubt Monty, Bradley and Dempsey were under any illusions about the reality having a few surprises. As it turned out they can be accused of much but not I think that of underestimating the enemy. It also seems to me that the methods the Allies used were as well thought out as those of late 1917 which only allowed the Germans to respond in ways which only varied the speed with which they were undone by attrition.
Nor do I, nor do I argue much with that. In fact, I think there is a good case for saying they Allies did about four times better than they did in World War I in terms of casualties and time, and immeasurably better in terms of outcome. :D
Last edited by RichTO90 on 12 Mar 2010, 05:24, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#292

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Mar 2010, 02:48

RichTO90 wrote: Sorry, but no, the "mooted" (odd word usage?) German counterattack was forestalled by Geyr's Panzergruppe West headquarters being bombed to smithereens. :D EPSOM then was forestalled by the counterattack by II. SS-Panzerkorps - not the other way round.
What counterattack by II SS Panzerkorps; Epsom hit elements of the 12th SS and Panzer Lehr :? There was a planned counterattack; some idoitic attempt to waste the German youth in splitting the British from the Americans but it never took place.

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#293

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 05:33

The_Enigma wrote:What counterattack by II SS Panzerkorps;
Um, the one that ULTRA picked up intended to pinch off the British salient on Hill 112 that resulted in the leading British elements being pulled back. You know, the one we talked about in this thread just a few days ago. The one that was the coda to EPSOM.
Epsom hit elements of the 12th SS and Panzer Lehr :?
Why yes, it did, among others. Do you think I said something different? Or do you think that somehow changes the events that capped the engagement...the committment of the II. SS-Panzerkorps?
There was a planned counterattack; some idoitic attempt to waste the German youth in splitting the British from the Americans but it never took place.
Um, no, it was intended to cut off the elements of VIII Corps that had crossed the Odon and reached Hill 112. And it wasn't only planned, it was executed.

Geez! It's getting surreal again around here. Weren't you just one of the ones that was yammering on about EPSOM and the II. SS-Panzerkorps counterattack? Or was it someone else that just sounds like you? :lol: Edit: Sorry, my apologies, it was Aber and Kingfish going on about EPSOM, the Odon, and Hill 112, way back on page 6 of this magnum 'opless...you must have missed it?
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#294

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Mar 2010, 10:35

I only tuned in a few pages back; i will take a look further in though for the Epsom discussion.

Right sorry i confused what you wrote for the II SS Panzerkorps counterattack delayed the launching of Epsom on 26? June; not the counterattack on 1 July that resulted in the op being closed down; i prob shouldnt read forums late at night!

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#295

Post by Attrition » 12 Mar 2010, 11:05

~~~~~EPSOM then was forestalled by the counterattack by II. SS-Panzerkorps - not the other way round.~~~~~

The mooted counter-offensive I referred to was the one that II SS PzK was intended to spearhead to Bayeux and which was forestalled by Epsom, not the earlier one whose failure to get going upset German expectations far more than they upset those of the Allies.


~~~~~Er, right? Except the possibility inferred didn't actually occur...except for the initial attempt at a counterattack.~~~~~

So they did and they didn't? How much of the expected German riposte didn't come off because the Allies didn't let it? Quite a lot I'd say. It seems to me that the 'slow withdrawal into the hinterland' was defeated before it started which is why the Germans clung on in Normandy until they couldn't. The 'pessimistic' assumptions you refer to (about supply) seem in retrospect to err on the side of caution but as mistakes go (particularly against the German army) it was one of the smaller ones of the 1941-1945 war.
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#296

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Mar 2010, 14:48

Just to note the counterattack at the beginning of July is what put me really off Beevor's new book; he suggested it was a really bad mistake and that 11th Armour should have been thrown over Hill 112 and carried on the offensive. Its like erm ... II SS Panzerkorps!!!

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#297

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Mar 2010, 15:10

Rich,

You wrote:
Excellent. That is actually the first real reference I have ever heard that does not quote the spurious "notes" from the St. Paul's School briefings of April and May. Spurious, since AIUI, notes were not allowed to be taken, no transcripts were allowed, and so the evidence of what was said rely on a skeletal outline and the various and conflicting later accounts of those who were there.
AIUI??

Well, I suppose we could quote Montgomery's notes for his address!! Taken from the same source: Brooks admirable collection of lettters, signals and directives:

Montygomery Notes for address to General Officers of the Four Field Armies, 7 April 1944:

"Op Thunderclap"

"Second British Army
To assault to the west of the R. Orne and to develop operations to the south and south east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First U.S. Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg.
In its subsequent operations the army will pivot on its left and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement areas from the east."

IMHO an argument could be made (and certainly was by Montgomery!!) that his "general policy" as first laid out within a week of returning to the UK and taking over planning for Op Overlord, and as shown above stated clearly at conferences and as laid down in actual operational orders (to be posted later :) ) can be picked out as a constant thread (and one of Montgomery's favoured communications techniques was to repeat important points - sometimes to the point where we can feel sorry for Eisenhower :D ) all the way through the Normandy campaign. Is it perhaps not understandable then, that when the history of the Normandy campaign was so distorted in some contemporary and post-war accounts Montgomery got rather cross. :lol:

BTW I don't think that the original COSSAC plan laid a similar emphasis on a "shield" on the eastern flank, but we would have to go back to the sources to confirm that.

Regards

Tom

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#298

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 16:15

Attrition wrote:The mooted counter-offensive I referred to was the one that II SS PzK was intended to spearhead to bayeux and which was forestalled by Epsom, not the earlier one whose failure to get going upset German expectations far more than they upset those of the Allies.

Oh, sorry, I see what you meant. The first German counterattack was to be that by Panzergruppe West using the resources immediately available (Lehr, 12. SS, 2., and 21. Panzer) circa 12 June, the potential D+5 attack that Montgomery speculated about on 7 April. It was forestalled by the bombing of Geyr's headquarters on 10 June and, of course, by the simple fact that the German forces were too busily engaged to assemble for such a counterattack because of the ongoing Allied offensive. IOW the "shielding" or "drawing" bit hadn't started yet.

The second German counterattack was intended to be closer to a counteroffensive and was to be by I and II SS, and XXXXVII Panzerkorps with 1., 2., 9., 10., and 12. SS, Lehr, 2., and 21. Panzer, so was essentially twice as large. It was intended for around 25 June and corresponds to the speculated D+20 point when it was anticipated the Germans would have committed the bulk of their available Panzer forces.

But that affair was forestalled by the inability of the Germans to get sufficent infantry divisions forward to relieve the divisions that were to execute the attack, the limited readiness of 1. and 2. SS, and the continuing Allied pressure by US VII Corps on the Cotentin, the fighting east of the Orne, the partial success of PERCH, ...and EPSOM. It wasn't EPSOM alone.
So they did and they didn't? How much of the expected German riposte didn't come off because the Allies didn't let it? Quite a lot I'd say. It seems to me that the 'slow withdrawal into the hinterland' was defeated before it started which is why the Germans clung on in Normandy until they couldn't. The 'pessimistic' assumptions you refer to (about supply) seem in retrospect to err on the side of caution but as mistakes go (particularly against the German army) it was one of the smaller ones of the 1941-1945 war.
Sorry again, I was being hasty and too abbreviated. The "possibility inferred" was that the Germans would execute a strong counterattack by possibly as many as five Panzer divisions by as early as D+5. The "initial attempt at a counterattack" was that planned for circa 12 June. But it "didn't actually occur" because of the bombing of Gey's headquarters, the slow approach of the German forces, the confusion caused by the initial success of PERCH, the overhasty commitment of 12. SS and Lehr that prevented them from being reassembled for a counterattack, and so on.

So yes indeedy, the Allies also had something to do with it. But it wasn't through defending a shield or drawing the Germans onto the British at Caen, since the British were still advancing to the D+20 line, beyond which was where the "shielding" was expected to take place.

The problem with the pessimistic assumptions re supply erring on the side of caution was that they limited most possibilities for actions other than what was permitted by that pessimism. There simply were no provisions to take advantage of opportunities. Worse, since, as far as the American preparations were concerned, the pessimistic plans were undersupported in terms of mobile transportation assets, even the ability to fulfill the pessimistic expectations fully was limited, especially as the unanticpated logistics problems started to mount.

Nevertheless, yes, it was one of the more minor mistakes made by the Allies during the war.
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#299

Post by Delta Tank » 12 Mar 2010, 16:25

Tom wrote: Second British Army
"To assault to the west of the R. Orne and to develop operations to the south and south east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First U.S. Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg.
In its subsequent operations the army will pivot on its left and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement areas from the east."
This reads just like a mission statement, I would expect that the orders to Second British Army would look almost exactly like this. Why wasn't there an official recorder at this briefing? Security?

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#300

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 16:32

Tom from Cornwall wrote:AIUI??
As I Understand It.
Well, I suppose we could quote Montgomery's notes for his address!!
Sure, his outline notes for what he intended to say. But no notes or transcript of what he actually said was taken at the time since it was not allowed. Various attendees wrote up what they remembered him saying and doing, but they are not exact records. Probably the closest, since it is the most complete and contemporary, are those by Tedder's AEAF secretary.
"Op Thunderclap"

"Second British Army
To assault to the west of the R. Orne and to develop operations to the south and south east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First U.S. Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg.
In its subsequent operations the army will pivot on its left and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement areas from the east."
AIUI :D THUNDERCLAP was an exercise, a TEWT, that was discussed as part of the 7 April meeting. The first phase was offensive and was to continue to the D+20-D+30 line IIRC and was then to revert to essentially a defensive operation while the US Army Group cleared Brittany. After that, when the supplies were neatly in place, the two army groups would advance to the Seine and beyond.
IMHO an argument could be made (and certainly was by Montgomery!!) that his "general policy" as first laid out within a week of returning to the UK and taking over planning for Op Overlord, and as shown above stated clearly at conferences and as laid down in actual operational orders (to be posted later :) ) can be picked out as a constant thread (and one of Montgomery's favoured communications techniques was to repeat important points - sometimes to the point where we can feel sorry for Eisenhower :D ) all the way through the Normandy campaign.
Yes it can, and that is that his general policy was to follow the strictures laid down in the NEPTUNE Outline Plan:

Srep 1 Secure a lodgement area
Step 2 Capture ports
Step 3 Build up
Step 4 Advance on Germany and liberate France and the Low Countries

Everything else is post hoc ergo propter hoc. :D
Is it perhaps not understandable then, that when the history of the Normandy campaign was so distorted in some contemporary and post-war accounts Montgomery got rather cross. :lol:
So in revenge he wrote and even more distorted account and goaded his toady Belchem into writing an even more eggregious one? :P :lol:
BTW I don't think that the original COSSAC plan laid a similar emphasis on a "shield" on the eastern flank, but we would have to go back to the sources to confirm that.
No, it didn't, because it was solely concerned with mounting the invasion, gaining the lodgement, and the ports problem. Remember, COSSAC was actually COSSAC-D...it's pretty apparent that Morgan and company were assuming throughout that they would all be replaced by the "real" CoS Supreme Allied Commander when that player to be designated at a later date took command and brought hi own team in. :lol: And then it would be their problem to figure out what to do after steps one and two. :lol:
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