The Normandy campaign.

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Attrition
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#301

Post by Attrition » 12 Mar 2010, 16:52

~~~~~I was being hasty and too abbreviated.~~~~~

In the sense of 'tired and emotional'? :lol: :lol: :lol:

~~~~~There simply were no provisions to take advantage of opportunities.~~~~~

Presumably Allied intentions were determined by supply constraints as well as terrain, weather and the Germans. Exploiting opportunities had been the undoing of many a promising Allied operation so concentrating on getting ashore and staying there and keeping the initiative doesn't seem so bad, particularly with Anzio as an example of what could happen by not matching ambition with resources.

I have the impression that as far as the westenders were concerned, once Cobra and Bluecoat succeeded they took the bird in the hand each time there was a choice to be made (as did the eastenders) so got to the Rhineland and Holland by default. As missed opportunities go, that's not that bad.

Having read on this subject on and off since the 70s it makes a refreshing change to see so much material on what really happened rather than Generals' post-war yah boo and nationalistic pose striking by writers eager for sales ("Beevor! I'm watching you, you 'orrible little man"). If the pendulum has swung a bit too far for your taste then you have my empathy (not that I'm a hippy mind) and despite the occasional irascible comment I think you're taking it rather well. :D

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The_Enigma
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#302

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Mar 2010, 16:58

So yes indeedy, the Allies also had something to do with it. But it wasn't through defending a shield or drawing the Germans onto the British at Caen, since the British were still advancing to the D+20 line, beyond which was where the "shielding" was expected to take place.
One could argue the toss that generally throughout the campaign that the British were always advancing and that the Germans did no hold the initiative; it may be the wrong choice of words to use shield as this creates the picture of sitting twiddling our thumbs fending off German counterattacks. How about the jabs keeping someone occupied before the right hook comes in? ;)

Although as i have read many times throughout my studies one should NEVER EVER used metaphors; they may describe a situation but they don’t explain it.


RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#303

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 17:34

Attrition wrote:In the sense of 'tired and emotional'? :lol: :lol: :lol:
More like tired and stinky...I had just gotten back from the gym at that point, was cooling down, and looking forward to a shower. :lol:
Presumably Allied intentions were determined by supply constraints as well as terrain, weather and the Germans. Exploiting opportunities had been the undoing of many a promising Allied operation so concentrating on getting ashore and staying there and keeping the initiative doesn't seem so bad, particularly with Anzio as an example of what could happen by not matching ambition with resources.
Supply constraints in this regard is a very complex subject. For one thing the Allies had yet to attempt an operation of that scale. But for another, they were fighting a worldwide war. For another the Americans got about three-quarters of the transport resources they requested, based upon the conservative (in this case meaning slow) advance postulated.

And Anzio rather showed that a three-division corps could be maintained in a beachhead with minimal port facilities, so was an important example of what could be done.
I have the impression that as far as the westenders were concerned, once Cobra and Bluecoat succeeded they took the bird in the hand each time there was a choice to be made (as did the eastenders) so got to the Rhineland and Holland by default. As missed opportunities go, that's not that bad.
Gee, I thought that was what I argued endlessly on the other thread until the courses of pooh-poohing "thet ain't royt...they shudda been in Berlin by Christmas!" wore me out... :lol:
Having read on this subject on and off since the 70s it makes a refreshing change to see so much material on what really happened rather than Generals' post-war yah boo and nationalistic pose striking by writers eager for sales ("Beevor! I'm watching you, you 'orrible little man"). If the pendulum has swung a bit too far for your taste then you have my empathy (not that I'm a hippy mind) and despite the occasional irascible comment I think you're taking it rather well. :D
Dear me, you must be almost as much of a fuddy-duddy as me. :lol: BTW, is it irascible to "not suffer fools gladly"? Or is it irascible to remark on another posters inability to back up claims with evidence, dodging of questions, and continuous jousting with strawmen? Not to forget misquoting others, putting words in anothers mouth, and make declarations about what they're thinking? Irascible? Pissed off is more like it! :lol:
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#304

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Mar 2010, 17:38

Rich,
So in revenge he [Montgomery] wrote and even more distorted account
Anything in particular that he wrote that I should be looking at - not interested in Belchem's account - wasn't that much later?

Regards

Tom

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Attrition
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#305

Post by Attrition » 12 Mar 2010, 19:29

Perhaps Private Eye's faux euphemism for Members of Parliament being drunk and disorderly ('tired and emotional') isn't as well known as I thought? 8-)

~~~~~Anzio rather showed that a three-division corps could be maintained in a beachhead with minimal port facilities, so was an important example of what could be done.~~~~~

It wasn't what was supposed to have been done though was it? The course of the Italian Campaign had a lot more influence on Churchill et al putting on their paranoid pants about Overlord than I realised a couple of years ago.

RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#306

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 21:16

Tom from Cornwall wrote:Rich,
So in revenge he [Montgomery] wrote and even more distorted account
Anything in particular that he wrote that I should be looking at - not interested in Belchem's account - wasn't that much later?

Regards

Tom
Sorry, it was a joke...unless you count his two-volume fluff to be an accurate account? :D
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#307

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Mar 2010, 21:23

Attrition wrote:Perhaps Private Eye's faux euphemism for Members of Parliament being drunk and disorderly ('tired and emotional') isn't as well known as I thought? 8-)
Sorry, but I haven't paid attention to British telly since the days of Yes Prime Minister...
It wasn't what was supposed to have been done though was it? The course of the Italian Campaign had a lot more influence on Churchill et al putting on their paranoid pants about Overlord than I realised a couple of years ago.
Actually, in a way it was. The logisticians with Fifth Army solved the problem of the limited shipping and port resources they were granted for SHINGLE relative to the immediate requirements of VI Corps by experimenting with an early version of RO-RO shipping. Supplies were preloaded in standard 2.5-ton trucks and loaded on LST at Naples. When they arrived at Anzio they were run off to a staging area and "empties" were driven on for the return. It lessened the turnaround time. It was not a method that could be used entirely in Normandy due to the large number of trucks required, but it showed that in principle over the beach supply was practical for the large scale.

And yes, events in Italy skewed thinking quite a bit, not least when it came to expectations regarding the Panther.
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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Attrition
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#308

Post by Attrition » 13 Mar 2010, 13:31

Actually I meant the course of the Anzio gig not the way it was supplied. Methinks you're a bit of a prankster sometines. ;O)



~~~~~Gee, I thought that was what I argued endlessly on the other thread until the courses of pooh-poohing "thet ain't royt...they shudda been in Berlin by Christmas!" wore me out...~~~~~

I'm one of the people who thinks that a victory in 1944 depended on the unlikely prospect of a German collapse rather than the attacks of the Allies.That said, some of the debate gave me pause for thought. Now I think it might have been doable rather than it certainly wasn't but not enough to change my mind.

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#309

Post by Lightbob » 13 Mar 2010, 14:14

I would like to answer some of your general criticism.

The Burma comment was in reply to Rich’s remark that the east was not country that the eastern sector of Normandy was. That’s not quite true as tanks can fight in most places providing they have infantry and artillery support. I gave Burma as an example the remainder of my Burma comment were in reply to other members uiries which obviously missed. The internet article was in reply to a request and the latest entry regarding Burma is from some one else asking for Burma Book titles.

I never gave any strengths of the composition of the 21st panzer only that it was made up approximately of 30% Desert veterans 30% from Russia and the east and the rest recruits of various nationalities and suppose quality. However Rich as not produced any evidence to the contrary. By the way as an honoury member ( I arranged for them to use some of our facilities to hold social functions) of the Africa Korps association in the fifties in Germany. My greatest German friend was an officer in that division’s Panzer Grenadiers, commanding a Platoon that advanced between Sword and Juno beachheads, splitting (his words)the ground between them. He stopped just by a village on the coast I don’t know which one, but he did see the sea.
Rich says- Um, who said that? Do you often have mysterious voices telling you things that others don't hear? That's what's called schizophrenia...
Again another member said that why would the Germans move tanks east when they had Panzerfaust I pointed out that the panzerfaust could not replace A/Tank guns or Tanks.

Rich says: Um, it was issued as a round of ammunition to virtually all German ground formations.

Throw away weapon actually and It was issued to Volksturm at the towards the end of the war instead of small arms a fact. So your remark was surplus to the point as usual.
Rich says: The panzerfaust had its problems for the operator.(snip yet more "no shit Sherlock" bafflegab)


This a rather stupid remark, are you saying that Firing the Panzerfaust did or did not have its problem and was in fact the perfect weapon.


By the way you seem to have a fascination for alcoholic drinks, sending a Spanish wine list, accusing me of slurring my typing, constantly telling me to go back to my drink etc Now it’s a popular Belgian Beer. Linking all this to your swings of mood, yelling abuse, picking written fights. It would seem you have the classic drink problem. I hope not it would spoil an other wise nice bloke

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bf109 emil
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#310

Post by bf109 emil » 13 Mar 2010, 20:47

. My greatest German friend was an officer in that division’s Panzer Grenadiers, commanding a Platoon that advanced between Sword and Juno beachheads, splitting (his words)the ground between them. He stopped just by a village on the coast I don’t know which one, but he did see the sea.
would probably have to be the either the town of Luc-sur-Mer or Lion-sur-Mer as this map shows the advance of the 21st panzer on June 6th Image
Map of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division landings on Juno Beach showing D-Day objectives and front line at midnight June 6.
and perhaps a better map detailing more areahttp://www.members.shaw.ca/junobeach/im ... %20Map.jpg

Both maps help illustrate the advance of the 21st panzer on June 6

maps and more information such as German defenses, etc, can be found herehttp://www.members.shaw.ca/junobeach/juno-3.htm...although this is a predominately site for Juno beach etc. it does have a little brief stint on the 21st Panzer stating this...The German army had become experts in defensive techniques on the Russian front. They were able to use the Normandy terrain to their advantage and inflict heavy losses on the Allies when they advanced. However when the Germans attempted offensive operations in Normandy they were faced with the same difficulties. The Allies superior artillery brought overwhelming firepower down on the Germans and decimated them. Starting with the 21st Division counter attack on June 6th and in subsequent attacks, the Germans suffered their heaviest losses when they left their defensive positions and attacked the Allies.

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#311

Post by RichTO90 » 13 Mar 2010, 21:42

Lightbob wrote:I would like to answer some of your general criticism.
Thank you.
The Burma comment was in reply to Rich’s remark that the east was not country that the eastern sector of Normandy was. That’s not quite true as tanks can fight in most places providing they have infantry and artillery support.
You completely misunderstood my comment then. The point was that the terrain to the west was relativly more confined than in the east, conditions that made it more suitable to the American tanks and less suitable to the German. And in any case, I think that rather than comparing part of France to Burman, you might do better comparing the one part of France to the other, and addressing what my argument was.
I never gave any strengths of the composition of the 21st panzer only that it was made up approximately of 30% Desert veterans 30% from Russia and the east and the rest recruits of various nationalities and suppose quality. However Rich as not produced any evidence to the contrary.
Sorry, but 60% of a known strength is a strength. Give the divisional strength was 16,297, your putative figures indicate that you believe that 4,889 were "Desert veterans" and 4,889 were "from Russia and the east [Manchuko?]". But you have never provided a single source to back up either those percentages or numbers that those percentages could be derived from. Furthermore, you consistantly have ignored that I have given you contrary figures and sources that you have chosen to ignore, along with the requests for your sources. Now you appear unaware that when I make a declaritive statement in this forum I am usually able to back it up - given that I have about a seven-year history now here of doing so I may get a bit more slack than some from the moderators when I do that, but you are fully free to question them about that if you wish.

But if you require more... “The division was reorganized after the African campaign with undesirable personnel from a large number of divisions. Even very thorough and experienced training could never overcome this basic fault.” (General der Panzertruppen Leo, Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, commanding Panzergruppe West, Foreign Military Studies B-466, Panzer Group West, Headquarters USAEUR, 1947)

In regards to the personnel from the Panzerartilleriebrigade and Schnellbrigade West “The commanders and battery commanders were good, but the junior officers, NCOs, and enlisted men were not so suitable. The NCOs and Ems were taken from static batteries on the coast and on the Atlantic islands [i.e., the Channel Islands garrisons]. They were old and useless for and armored command… The original allocation of NCOs and men to the division was simi9alr to the formation of the brigade. The first elements came from surplus personnel from other divisions . Obviously the replacements were not always satisfactory in those circumstances. Only in the course of many months did the division succeed in obtaining better personnel through the replacement and training units of its Ersatzwehrkreis VI (Günster) and getting rid of part of the unsuitable materiel. The order calling for the formation of the division stated that all members of the former 21st Africa Armored Division now in Germany were to be transferred to the division. In this way the division got a small but good cadre of experienced veterans (about 2,000 men). Naturally these men, many of whom only joined the division at a late date, were no full compensation. If, despite all this, a bearable standard of training had been reached by the time the invasion started, it is only thanks to the willingness of the division, its good spirit, the fairly good officers and there in particular the commanders.” (Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger, Foreign Military Studies, B-441, History of the 21st Panzer Division from the Time of its Formation until the Beginning of the Invasion, Headquarters, USAEUR, 1947)

By my calculations according to the divisional commander and the director of training and organization for all Panzer units in the west, about 12% of the division were what could be described as veteran cadre, not 60%, which is your unsupported claim. Whether 12% or 60% results in a "veteran elite" Panzer division is yet another bit that remains unsupported, although the evidence for a number of similarly rebuilt Stalingrad divisions is uneven, certainly 3. Panzergrenadier Division in Italy isn't a poster child for the process.

BTW, earlier you also argued that 21. Panzerdivision was also built up from survivors of 15. Panzerdivision, which is also incorrect. They went to Division Sizilian, which became 15. Panzergrenadier Division.

By the way as an honoury member ( I arranged for them to use some of our facilities to hold social functions) of the Africa Korps association in the fifties in Germany. My greatest German friend was an officer in that division’s Panzer Grenadiers, commanding a Platoon that advanced between Sword and Juno beachheads, splitting (his words)the ground between them. He stopped just by a village on the coast I don’t know which one, but he did see the sea.


Then you were very lucky to have the opportunity, but, yet again, you seem confused about what and who you are arguing with. Waaaay back when I first questioned the "splitting bit" it was because another poster, Rifleman2113, had claimed that they had "fought" their way in, which is incorrect. KG Rauch did not fighting when they drove to Luc sur Mer since their approach route was via Mathieu and west of Plumetot and Cresserons...quite simply their were no British or Canadian troops there for them to split. 3 BID and the Commandos were fully engaged trying to take Lion sur Mer further east. They were engaged in a skirmish, probably by the East Riding Yeomanry, when they withdrew that night when Feuchtinger got the wind up over the the gliders of Operation MALLARD coming in, but that is rather a different thing.

Again another member said that why would the Germans move tanks east when they had Panzerfaust I pointed out that the panzerfaust could not replace A/Tank guns or Tanks.


I don't think that anyone, least of all me, ever actually argued that. What was argued was that the close confines of the bocage made the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck relatively more effective, which again is a different thing.

Throw away weapon actually and It was issued to Volksturm at the towards the end of the war instead of small arms a fact. So your remark was surplus to the point as usual.


Why yes, a disposable weapon, which was issued as a round of ammunition, just as the LAW was. And not just to Volsturm "at the towards the end of the war" as you imply above. The standard Erstes Muni Ausstattung (initial ammunition issue) for German divisional formations was 2,000 Schuss (rounds) per division, as opposed to the Panzerschreck, which was issued as 250 Waffen (weapons) with 2,000 Schuss. (see BAMA, RH3/V135, 255, 259, and 368)

This a rather stupid remark, are you saying that Firing the Panzerfaust did or did not have its problem and was in fact the perfect weapon.


Stupid? Yet you need me to parse that sentence for you? The Panzerfaust had its problems for the operator. That could just as easily be: The Bazooka had its problems for the operator or The LAW had its problems for the operator or the RPG had its problems for the operator. They are all relatively short-ranged, have distinctive firing signatures, require some skill and practice, and are not always that accurate, all which combine to create some problems for its operators. But, oddly enough, somehow they still managed to inflict a significant fraction of the losses incurred by Allied armor in Northwest Europe...yet something else you seem incapable of focusing on.

By the way you seem to have a fascination for alcoholic drinks, sending a Spanish wine list, accusing me of slurring my typing, constantly telling me to go back to my drink etc Now it’s a popular Belgian Beer. Linking all this to your swings of mood, yelling abuse, picking written fights. It would seem you have the classic drink problem. I hope not it would spoil an other wise nice bloke


Yes, you found out my secret vice, I'm an Internet Alky. Please don't tell my employers. :roll:

And you might be an otherwise nice bloke too if you focused a bit more on what you were trying to say, used some logic and coherence to your arguments, and provided some proof for your rather more outrageous claims, rather than spending your time trying to tell other posters what they think or what other posters are saying and arguing strawmen. It might make things a bit more interesting and less rambunctious.

Cheers! :lol:
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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The_Enigma
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#312

Post by The_Enigma » 13 Mar 2010, 21:45

[quote="bf109 emil"][/quote]
Nice map; a first glance though i was wondering why you were showing a map of the frontlines south of Caen until i read the description and looked again. Surprising how many maps are out there flipped the other way round - you become adjusted i guess to seeing them all like that. Wierd :?

RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#313

Post by RichTO90 » 13 Mar 2010, 21:47

The_Enigma wrote: Nice map; a first glance though i was wondering why you were showing a map of the frontlines south of Caen until i read the description and looked again. Surprising how many maps are out there flipped the other way round - you become adjusted i guess to seeing them all like that. Wierd :?
Me too. Note that in my experience infantry officers all apparently think that north is at the top of the page... :lol:
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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bf109 emil
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#314

Post by bf109 emil » 13 Mar 2010, 22:02

deleted and revised sorry
Last edited by bf109 emil on 13 Mar 2010, 22:18, edited 3 times in total.

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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#315

Post by The_Enigma » 13 Mar 2010, 22:05

Rich,
I couldn’t trouble you for some translations? Google searching and http://www.freetranslations.com isn’t helping for some of the terms am unfamiliar with:

Schnellbrigade – “Fast Brigade” apparently, but what exactly is that? One couple search mentioned bicycles; a bike portable infantry brigade?

Ersatzwehrkreis VI – no ideas but would assume something to do with training per the rest of the sentence?
With that done, going off Lt-Gen Feuchtinger comments and your own analysis would it be fair to say that the 21st Panzer was in fact a relatively green formation i.e. mostly new trainees?
The standard Erstes Muni Ausstattung (initial ammunition issue) for German divisional formations was 2,000 Schuss (rounds) per division, as opposed to the Panzerschreck, which was issued as 250 Waffen (weapons) with 2,000 Schuss. (see BAMA, RH3/V135, 255, 259, and 368)
That does seem awfully low considering the popular image of these weapons; although obviously one should not too much weight into popular opinion. Do we know if there was sort of rules and regs permitting the number that could be used or was it simply as needed?

John Buckley using various American, British and German records suggests that between 6-15 per cent of Allied tanks in Normandy were taken out by these weapon systems and that is a figure that raises to 25-30 per cent by late 1944 as German tanks and anti tank guns became less available.(Buckley, British tanks in Normandy, p. 123) I think it’s safe to say that’s probably a few hundred tanks worth in Normandy?

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