The Battle of Britain.

Discussions on WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic.
Post Reply
Dunserving
Member
Posts: 757
Joined: 14 Sep 2009, 12:43
Location: UK, not far north of Dungeness

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#121

Post by Dunserving » 28 Mar 2010, 17:52

Gooner1 wrote:
phylo_roadking wrote:[The one (two???) airfield seizure ops and the two now-more-specific drops on Langdon and Aycliff as named objectives.
Any reason as to why just the Langdon and Aycliffe batteries?
dov1.jpg
Still a suicide mission. :lol:
Precisely. I'd be interested in any sensible ideas as to how to plonk enough gliders down on the Aycliff area in order to seize the installations there. The nature of the ground, with steep slopes, wide ditches and moats etc, would combine to make it a nigh on impossible task. The Citadel and the Drop Redoubt on the Western Heights contain some pretty serious fortifications, as any of you who have scrambled around on those slopes will undoubtedly agree...

I'm not saying it could not be done, but I'd rather be leading the defence of the place than leading an assault on it...

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#122

Post by phylo_roadking » 28 Mar 2010, 20:33

Wouldn't seem like much of an invasion when Hood and company caught up with what 3 light cruisers and some liners ....
Home Fleet plannned to sortie into the North Sea - to engage the KM there and clear them out, then IF required attack the sea bridge from the North; It would take X-amount of time to clear the North Sea of "risk"....then clear the german mine barrage at the NORTH end of the Narrows. Only after that could the influence the outcome of the actual invasion.

IF the entered the Channel - they would encounter several dozen assorted T-boats, s-boats and e-boats, and whatever surviving KM destroyers they had. IIRC the number varied somewhat during the summer...along with the LW and ALL the problems of capital ships manouvering in the Narrow. They're limited to night dashes into the sea bridge, it's really the RN's "small ships" that practicably can try to break into the Channel. The Channel needs to be cleared THEN the navy's capital ships can bombard the bridgehead from inshore.

TImewise that's quite a lot to do before their influence really comes to bear.
Any reason as to why just the Langdon and Aycliffe batteries?
I presume they wouldn't just be sitting on their thumbs breaking open the iron rations for a picnic after that! :lol: they'd be inside the perimter able to threaten other guns, pretty much like how they could spend the rest of the morning at Eben Emael lopping up individual strongpoints.
I'm not saying it could not be done, but I'd rather be leading the defence of the place than leading an assault on it...
But on the other hand - they would know that there was a very small chance of survival. Eben Emael wasn't supposed to be QUITE the sucess it turned out to be, German casualties should have been higher...but the defenders were busy celebrating or suffering the effects of celebtrating (depending on duty roster!) getting an extra day's leave per week! The FJ didn't know that...but it didn't stop the attack going in with full fervour...
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...


User avatar
LWD
Member
Posts: 8618
Joined: 21 Sep 2005, 22:46
Location: Michigan

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#123

Post by LWD » 29 Mar 2010, 02:39

phylo_roadking wrote:
Wouldn't seem like much of an invasion when Hood and company caught up with what 3 light cruisers and some liners ....
Home Fleet plannned to sortie into the North Sea - to engage the KM there and clear them out, then IF required attack the sea bridge from the North; It would take X-amount of time to clear the North Sea of "risk"....then clear the german mine barrage at the NORTH end of the Narrows. Only after that could the influence the outcome of the actual invasion.r...
I was referring to the Northern feint.
Don't forget there is a serious problem with those mine barrages by the way. The Germans lacked the mines to lay them and probably the assets to lay them in any sort of reasonable time frame especially with British opposition.

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#124

Post by phylo_roadking » 29 Mar 2010, 02:59

Don't forget there is a serious problem with those mine barrages by the way. The Germans lacked the mines to lay them and probably the assets to lay them in any sort of reasonable time frame especially with British opposition.
Thye have one major start - the BRITISH mine barrages with their swept convoy channels :wink: They just need to clear where they want....and plug gaps between sections of the British barrages and the various banks and shallows where they want to re-orient them. Nor do they need to be in any way as thick or evenly spread as an anti-submarine barrage - they want to stop surface ships :wink: This was going to be especially advantageous in closing the nothern end of the Narrows IIRC - I've got a map SOMEWHERE I'll have to try and find again - which allows them to expend more effort on the southern end. Also, those necessary days of air superiority over the Channel also gives them an opportunity to lay a part of them by aircraft.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

User avatar
LWD
Member
Posts: 8618
Joined: 21 Sep 2005, 22:46
Location: Michigan

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#125

Post by LWD » 29 Mar 2010, 03:31

phylo_roadking wrote:
Don't forget there is a serious problem with those mine barrages by the way. The Germans lacked the mines to lay them and probably the assets to lay them in any sort of reasonable time frame especially with British opposition.
Thye have one major start - the BRITISH mine barrages with their swept convoy channels :wink: They just need to clear where they want....and plug gaps between sections of the British barrages and the various banks and shallows where they want to re-orient them.
The plans I saw didn't show any inclanation to do so. Indeed it's not clear how well they knew where they were. It's rather embarassing if your minelayer runs into a mine. Espesically at the start of an operation.
Nor do they need to be in any way as thick or evenly spread as an anti-submarine barrage - they want to stop surface ships.
ONe of the threads went over this. They had enough mines to basically lay a single line with the mines 20m apart or so.
... Also, those necessary days of air superiority over the Channel also gives them an opportunity to lay a part of them by aircraft.
That sounds like a disaster in the making. Trying to lay a line of mines when aircraft have dropped a bunch in the general vicinity of where you are sailing doesn't sound healthy to me.

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2792
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#126

Post by Gooner1 » 29 Mar 2010, 14:40

phylo_roadking wrote:
The question would be - what's left in Plymouth...given that the commands were stripped out to keep the three destroyer flotillas up to strength alongside convoy escort duties... 8O Thirty-six destroyers was a quarter of what the RN started the war with; that's a big chunk of its resources to have sitting off convoy escort duty...along with the losses since the war began.
As of 16th September 1940 what major vessels the RN had left in Plymouth were three Torpedo Boats, eleven Destroyers, the Cruisers Newcastle and Emerald and the battleship HMS Revenge. :D

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2792
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#127

Post by Gooner1 » 29 Mar 2010, 14:53

phylo_roadking wrote:
I presume they wouldn't just be sitting on their thumbs breaking open the iron rations for a picnic after that! :lol: they'd be inside the perimter able to threaten other guns, pretty much like how they could spend the rest of the morning at Eben Emael lopping up individual strongpoints.
While the Dover garrison continue snoring their heads off?

Anyway, despite however much success you think this raid might achieve (and the odds are long on achieving anything much), it would still be a suicide mission because the nearest friendly troops would be no closer than about 15 crow kilometres away and with thousands of British troops between them.

Dunserving
Member
Posts: 757
Joined: 14 Sep 2009, 12:43
Location: UK, not far north of Dungeness

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#128

Post by Dunserving » 29 Mar 2010, 17:10

...as I have tried to indicate, the Western Heights area has very little space to land gliders, and what open space is available is on steep slopes. Treating it as DZ for paratroopers is a non-starter too - the bit you'd need to land on is far too small. The very nature of the place makes it a nightmare for a land based assault - and there were a lot of British troops there. That is why the Aycliff area of Dover had the Drop Redoubt and the Citadel built there - pretty easy to defend, incredibly hard to attack, and very costly so to do.

Suicide mission is a reasonably good description - it would also have been a good way to tie up a large number of German troops that would have been far better used in other ways in the first crucial hours/days after an invasion.

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#129

Post by phylo_roadking » 29 Mar 2010, 17:22

Nor do they need to be in any way as thick or evenly spread as an anti-submarine barrage - they want to stop surface ships.
ONe of the threads went over this. They had enough mines to basically lay a single line with the mines 20m apart or so.
... Also, those necessary days of air superiority over the Channel also gives them an opportunity to lay a part of them by aircraft.
That sounds like a disaster in the making. Trying to lay a line of mines when aircraft have dropped a bunch in the general vicinity of where you are sailing doesn't sound healthy to me.
They don't have to lay their own barrier all the way across the Channel - they only need to plug the approximate gaps between the British fields AND the various shallows and sand bars in the area :wink: After all - that's what the BRITISH did - used the presence of shallows and sand bars and simply plugged a part of what was left....and the rest was kept as the regularly swept "war channels".
The plans I saw didn't show any inclanation to do so. Indeed it's not clear how well they knew where they were.
If you remember the various threads touching on KM mining operations, they knew where the war channels were well enough to try and lay mines in them by destroyer, submarine AND aircraft through late 1939 well into 1940 :wink: So if they knew those, and knew where the shallows and bars were (admittedly the latter do shift just a little by the week/month, but the shallows have been marked on charts for centuries)...by default they know what's blocked already... :wink: I.E. everything BUT the "swept war channels".
As of 16th September 1940 what major vessels the RN had left in Plymouth were three Torpedo Boats, eleven Destroyers, the Cruisers Newcastle and Emerald and the battleship HMS Revenge.
Yes - assigned to Plymouth :wink: ....but were they there...as in - all moored up ready to sortie into the Channel - or all over the shop as convoy escorts etc. working out of Plymouth?
it would still be a suicide mission because the nearest friendly troops would be no closer than about 15 crow kilometres away and with thousands of British troops between them.
As near as the FJ drops behind Folkestone, two minutes after dawn - only five miles :o With those drops immediately threatening Hawkinge and later Lympne, which operation is the defenders going to react to? :wink: Which one are they going to KNOW to react to - the gliders landing silently, confusion on the ground , lots of shooting and several large bangs...or the MANY reports of hundreds of Ju52s dropping overhead and scattering paratroopers all over the landscape?...in at least TWO waves>...which problem is the RAF going to be screaming down the phone about?
Suicide mission is a reasonably good description - it would also have been a good way to tie up a large number of German troops that would have been far better used in other ways in the first crucial hours/days after an invasion
As far as I've seen they didn't intend to use up more than a small percentage of their airborne forces there - given that the operations to the west required at least four battalions of what was available AND the number of DFS 230s available for the entire operation was very limited. The Dover operation wasn't intended as anything other than an attempt on the the two batteries; as far as the Germans are concerned, if they managed to cause any additional problems for the defenders...great!...but if they only take out the batteries, that's all that was planned for there.

If anything - it's a ratcheting-DOWN of that was originally planned for the FJ around Dover, in the first version of the Sealion plans; in THAT they were to venture two 82nd-101st/D-Day-style blocking actions on either side of Dover - now however that's been reduced to combat engineer attempts on the batteries, with the main operations now being the airfield seizure.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#130

Post by phylo_roadking » 30 Mar 2010, 03:06

It's worth noting that the Royal Navy didn't exactly sit on its thumbs waiting for the onslaught during the period - it proactively patrolled for the invasion....AND monitored French ports from submarine pickets 8O From the War Cabinet Report for the week ending 19th September 1940 - http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 381-11.pdf
Home Waters.
2. Special anti-invasion patrols by destroyers have been carried out at night
off our southern coast and in the Straits of Dover. Two submarines have also
been on patrol between Havre and Cherbourg.
On the night of the 12th/13th sweeps by destroyers were carried out along
the coast of Brittany, between Boulogne and Cape Gris Nez and between Cape
Barflem and Le Havre. The force off Cape Gris Nez came under fire from enemy
shore batteries but was not hit. No contact was made with enemy ships
.

As you can see from that Report, Bomber Command was indeed busy...
4. During the week a number of attacks on enemy shipping and barges
moving along the coasts of Holland, Belgium and Northern France have been
carried out by aircraft, further details of which are included in the Air Section
of this Summary. In the course of these attacks a number of merchant ships
were sunk or damaged, an enemy destroyer was hit by torpedo-carrying aircraft
during an attack on Cherbourg, and an enemy warship, possibly a cruiser, was
successfully bombed off Ameland. Later in the week a further successful bombing
attack was made on an enemy destroyer off Borkum, in which 1 direct hit was
made and there were 2 very near misses. A successful attack was also carried
out by H.M. Submarine H. 49 on a large enemy convoy north of the Texel, two
hits being made.
The RAF was also keeping a nightly eye on the buildup...
15. There is no change in the situation of the German Main Units since last'
week. Results of photographic reconnaissance showed the following at Cherbourg
on the 15th : 15 merchant vessels, 5 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, 9 mine-sweepers
and 4 E-Boats. Movements of shipping and barges, chiefly in a Westerly
direction, have continued and on the 16th reconnaissance showed activity at
Ymuiden, The Scheldt, Zeebrugge, Dunkirk and Calais. There is as yet no sign of
loading or unloading activity on the part of the numerous barges which are still
kept moored in large groups in various harbours. Air reconnaissance on the
18th showed a reduction in the number of barges at Flushing, Ostend and Dunkirk,
while at Boulogne there was an increase of 80 barges.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2792
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#131

Post by Gooner1 » 30 Mar 2010, 14:54

phylo_roadking wrote:
Yes - assigned to Plymouth :wink: ....but were they there...as in - all moored up ready to sortie into the Channel - or all over the shop as convoy escorts etc. working out of Plymouth?
At Plymouth as of 1600hrs 16th September.
As near as the FJ drops behind Folkestone, two minutes after dawn - only five miles :o
Nearest about 9 crow miles from Aycliffe by my reckoning, further to the Langdon battery which is the east side of Dover. Not that it matters.
With those drops immediately threatening Hawkinge and later Lympne, which operation is the defenders going to react to? :wink:
Which defenders? You know full well the Operational Instructions of New Zealand divsions. 2nd London Infantry Brigade reserve have it easy - the Germans will be landing right on top of them. The reserve force of 1st the London Rifles will probably enjoy the same prospect as will the reserve battalion of 31 Inf. Bde. Gp. The brigade in reserve of 1st London Division would certainly have Dover in its primary role ..
Which one are they going to KNOW to react to - the gliders landing silently, confusion on the ground , lots of shooting and several large bangs
If the gliders are coming in at dawn the defenders can blooming well see them. :D
...or the MANY reports of hundreds of Ju52s dropping overhead and scattering paratroopers all over the landscape?...in at least TWO waves>.
Uh, the defenders will react how they have been organising, preparing and training for.

From 45 Div. defence scheme
'(b) as regards action from the air - to defeat
any enemy air borne tps and parachutists
landing in the Div. area.

If the scale of these landings is so great as to
make it impossible to defeat the enemy unaided, the task
of the Division is to restrict his movements and limit his
activities until reinforcements can arrive to complete
his defeat.'

'In order to prevent small dets scattered throughout
the area from being quickly overrun by greatly superior
numbers of the enemy which may be dropped or landed from the
air, such strength as is available inland is to be concentrated
as far as possible to hold either nodal 'towns' or "fortresses"
or certain natural Stop Lines.'
..which problem is the RAF going to be screaming down the phone about?
You mean politely and calmly enquiring which targets the army would most like them to bomb?

User avatar
LWD
Member
Posts: 8618
Joined: 21 Sep 2005, 22:46
Location: Michigan

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#132

Post by LWD » 30 Mar 2010, 15:04

phylo_roadking wrote: ...
They don't have to lay their own barrier all the way across the Channel - they only need to plug the approximate gaps between the British fields AND the various shallows and sand bars in the area
Again from what I saw that wasn't the plan. One of the resasons may well be the danger inherent in trying to plug the gaps. Again if they do so then the British can sweep a hole through their own mine fields which being known should be much easier to do. It still doesn't solve the problem that the Germans didn't have enough mines to do what their plan called for.
The plans I saw didn't show any inclanation to do so. Indeed it's not clear how well they knew where they were.
If you remember the various threads touching on KM mining operations, they knew where the war channels were well enough to try and lay mines in them by destroyer, submarine AND aircraft through late 1939 well into 1940
There's a difference between laying a few mines in a channel to get an occasional merchant and laying enough to block the RN from coming through.

As an asside I'm beginning to find the "winking" rather annoying.
...As near as the FJ drops behind Folkestone, two minutes after dawn ...
So much for your them having warning about ground fog. If the invasion is dependent on this what happens if there is fog or even low clouds?

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#133

Post by phylo_roadking » 30 Mar 2010, 17:00

..which problem is the RAF going to be screaming down the phone about?
You mean politely and calmly enquiring which targets the army would most like them to bomb?
No, as in "have the reaction forces (Milforce) moved out in our direction on their sweep yet? Have they even left Tunbridge Wells to get into position? Or do we start ploughing up a perfectly good runway now?"

Which leads on to
From 45 Div. defence scheme
'(b) as regards action from the air - to defeat
any enemy air borne tps and parachutists
landing in the Div. area.

If the scale of these landings is so great as to
make it impossible to defeat the enemy unaided, the task
of the Division is to restrict his movements and limit his
activities until reinforcements can arrive to complete
his defeat.'

'In order to prevent small dets scattered throughout
the area from being quickly overrun by greatly superior
numbers of the enemy which may be dropped or landed from the
air, such strength as is available inland is to be concentrated
as far as possible to hold either nodal 'towns' or "fortresses"
or certain natural Stop Lines.'
Down at the unit level, each particular formation had its OWN orders - 7th Brigade for instance were not to leave the Chatham/Maidstone area but react to airborne atttacks there (if they happened) Units with specific orders/objectives to hold weren't to go wandering over the landscape in reaction to panicked phonecalls from farmers -it was Milforce/5th Brigade that specifically were to sweep east to clear the hinterland behind Folkestone and Dover of parachutists...
The order from GHQ Home Forces ran as follows: ‘Emergency Move. NZ Force and 8 R Tanks under command General Freyberg will move to area EAST of TUNBRIDGE WELLS to be selected by Commander 12 Corps. On arrival this area FORCE will come under command of 12 Corps and will be held in reserve for counter offensive role.’ For further information the General went to GHQ Home Forces, where he learnt what the commander had not been willing to say over the telephone—that after the heavy bombardment of Dover from Gris Nez, Mr Churchill had ordered that if an invasion took place and Dover was captured it must be retaken at all costs. To take part in this all-important counter-attack the New Zealand brigades were being transferred to the outskirts of the Dover-Folkestone area. The signals strength for this role was increased by 100 British signallers who had served in France or Norway, 8 Royal Tank Regiment came under command and, after 12 September, 157 Anti-Aircraft Battery.

The brigades left Aldershot late on 5 September, stopping and starting all through the night, listening to the drone of aircraft on their way to bomb London and eventually settling down under cover in the woods before first light. East of Maidstone there was 5 Brigade, north of the Maidstone-Charing road was 7 Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier Falconer, and at Charing there was Milforce, an armoured group, commanded by Brigadier Miles and formally constituted the following morning.
On T-Tag, they would have to reach their start line for the sweep...then move off. If you remember when discussed before this would take them several hours at best (though faster than the FJ could turn-round in France to drop their Second Wave :lol: ) to cross-country to Lympne, THEN several more (NOT taking into account opposition) to reach the outskirts of Dover - that's IF they don't meet concentrated resistance by any of the FJ battalions. If this happens, that that actual contact slows up their sweep, the more time they take...and the more chance they eventually run into the amphibious assault coming the other way from the coast.

The reason they were identified as a reaction force was because at dawn everyone else might be a bit preoccupied by what's sweeping (okay chugging slowly) towards the beaches to be able to detach forces and send them rearwards...
Nearest about 9 crow miles from Aycliffe by my reckoning, further to the Langdon battery which is the east side of Dover. Not that it matters.
Apparently from a selection of distance calculators 9 miles by road - but 7 in a straight line...plus or minus misdrops on the day. But their instructions weren't to come to the rescue of the Dover assault.
If the gliders are coming in at dawn the defenders can blooming well see them.
There isn't actually that much light AT dawn....as some time after when the sun is fully risen. Yes they MIGHT be backlit...but who says they'll be coming straight out of the dawn over the Channel? They'll approach their run-in from whatever direction the wind and LZ dictate, not the sun.
If you remember the various threads touching on KM mining operations, they knew where the war channels were well enough to try and lay mines in them by destroyer, submarine AND aircraft through late 1939 well into 1940
There's a difference between laying a few mines in a channel to get an occasional merchant and laying enough to block the RN from coming through.
It still doesn't solve the problem that the Germans didn't have enough mines to do what their plan called for.
If you have to block a few square miles in total with random pattern rather than an anti-submarine pattern, yes there's a difference - it's a lot easier. The Germans weren't interested in laying out a nice grid pattern at various depths to block the Channel for transiting uboats - which is what the BRITISH did, same as in WWI...they want to block it from surface traffic. Plus they don't have to actually use a huge number - the point however is the BRITISH have to sweep their route of approach daily and certainly before any surface units attempt to run the blockade, given that the LW can drop mines by night into channels (small "c") that have already been cleared.
Again if they do so then the British can sweep a hole through their own mine fields which being known should be much easier to do
...which is where the LW come in; minesweepers sailing in nice straight lines??? 8O
(P.S. having charts of the minefields wasn't fullproof; yes, after the war the British did "clear" their mine barriers...but not completely/perfectly. As a kid, fishingboats catching stray floaters wasn't uncommon 20-30 years later...)
So much for your them having warning about ground fog. If the invasion is dependent on this what happens if there is fog or even low clouds?
There won't be low clouds, or at least enough as to be a problem. If there was - no invasion, for no air support. Remember Goering's demand?
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2792
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#134

Post by Gooner1 » 30 Mar 2010, 18:15

phylo_roadking wrote: No, as in "have the reaction forces (Milforce) moved out in our direction on their sweep yet? Have they even left Tunbridge Wells to get into position? Or do we start ploughing up a perfectly good runway now?"
Milforce is not in Tunbridge Wells but around Ashford. 'C' Sqn Divisonal Cavalry billetted in Westwell village, 8 RTR in Charing fe. How quickly they get moving rather depends on what state of alert there is.
Down at the unit level, each particular formation had its OWN orders - 7th Brigade for instance were not to leave the Chatham/Maidstone area but react to airborne atttacks there (if they happened) Units with specific orders/objectives to hold weren't to go wandering over the landscape in reaction to panicked phonecalls from farmers -it was Milforce/5th Brigade that specifically were to sweep east to clear the hinterland behind Folkestone and Dover of parachutists...
No, New Zealand divisions:
6. Tasks in particular.

(a) N.Z. Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to counter-
attack enemy in area:
(i) North and N.W. of DOVER south of the line SANDWICH (7776)-
WINGHAM (6875) from the direction of CANTERBURY. This will
be known as plan "A".
(ii) N.W. of FOLKESTONE from the direction of SELLINGE (5356)
Plan "B".
(iii) POSTLING GREEN (5153) LYMINGE (6059) - Plan "C"
(b) 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to:
(i) Attack enemy air-borne landings in the area
SITTINGBOURNE - FAVERSHAM - CHARING - MAIDSTONE.
(ii) From petions [sic] on high ground immediately North of
road HARRIETSHAM (3171) - CHARING - to provide A.A. L.M.G.
defence for move of 5 Inf. Bde. Gp. on that road.
(iii) Support remainder of Div. in Plans "A" "B" OR "C".

Plans "A" "B" OR "C" being:-
The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are:
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, especially in the area North and N.W. of DOVER
and FOLKESTONE.
(b) To re-establish the line of ROYAL MILITARY CANAL eastwards
of HAM STREET.
(c) Concurrently with the above, to deal with any hostile air
borne landings in the area SITTINBOURNE - FAVERSHAM -
CHARING - MAIDSTONE.

I'd be very surprised if many farmers had the phonenumber of the New Zealand Division. :lol:

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: The Battle of Britain.

#135

Post by phylo_roadking » 30 Mar 2010, 18:44

No, New Zealand divisions:
6. Tasks in particular.

(a) N.Z. Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to counter-
attack enemy in area:
(i) North and N.W. of DOVER south of the line SANDWICH (7776)-
WINGHAM (6875) from the direction of CANTERBURY. This will
be known as plan "A".
In other words, a slice of country NORTH of Dover....but SOUTH of Sandwich/Canterbury I.E. out towards the coast at Deal. Their operational area remains north of Dover...or more importantly takes some considerable time to get there.
(ii) N.W. of FOLKESTONE from the direction of SELLINGE (5356)
Plan "B".
(iii) POSTLING GREEN (5153) LYMINGE (6059) - Plan "C"
That's taking them AWAY from Folkestone/Dover and towards Maidstone at an angle to the north-east I.E. to clear the "open" country behind (north of) the Postling-Elham crest line .
(b) 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to:
(i) Attack enemy air-borne landings in the area
SITTINGBOURNE - FAVERSHAM - CHARING - MAIDSTONE
.
(ii) From petions [sic] on high ground immediately North of
road HARRIETSHAM (3171) - CHARING - to provide A.A. L.M.G.
defence for move of 5 Inf. Bde. Gp. on that road.
Exactly - 7th Brigade Group protect the heart of the county...it's 5th Brigade Group and Milforce that are to sweep east from Sellinge/Postling towards the immediate rear of Folkestone and then on to Dover I.E along the SOUTH side of the Postling-Elham hill crestline. It doesn't show up well, but that must be more of a landmark/terrain barrier in real life than shows up on GoogleEarth.
Plans "A" "B" OR "C" being:-
The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are:
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, especially in the area North and N.W. of DOVER
and FOLKESTONE.
THAT reads as if they expected 1st London Div. not to be able to react themselves...I.E. were dashing out to the coast in reaction to the landings - east, south-east or south to Dover....I.E. in 1st London's own counterattack responsibility?
(b) To re-establish the line of ROYAL MILITARY CANAL eastwards
of HAM STREET.
Looks like they firmly expected the relatively light defnces there - pointing across the RMC southwards only! - to be overrun by airborne forces...that's one they guessed right!
(c) Concurrently with the above, to deal with any hostile air
borne landings in the area SITTINBOURNE - FAVERSHAM -
CHARING - MAIDSTONE.
Problem is - there weren't going to BE any :lol: The British were absolutely and completely paranoid about airborne landings after events in Holland and Norway...but hadn't learned how costly they proved to be in men and materiel, and that the Germans weren't intending such a widespread air assault...

But as with so many OTHER factors they had to juggle, the British had to plan to sweep the entire Kent area THEY considered likely to be descended upon; and more imporantly position and order the forces to do so accordingly.
I'd be very surprised if many farmers had the phonenumber of the New Zealand Division. :lol:


Isn't that the whole problem??? The TIME it takes for landings to be verified and accurate reports to make their way UP the reporting chain? Civilians on the groud ->LDV/Police->local Army command :wink: Either they wait on accurate intel....or 7th Brigade Group spends time wandering across the countryside "SITTINGBOURNE - FAVERSHAM - CHARING - MAIDSTONE" looking for paratroopers that have actually landed outside their operational area miles away to the south...
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 30 Mar 2010, 19:13, edited 1 time in total.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic”