The Battle of Britain.

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LWD
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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#16

Post by LWD » 09 Mar 2010, 21:57

phylo_roadking wrote:
how can the LW win if their criteria for winning is destroy the RAF?
Because it wasn't :wink:

Directive No. 16, point 2(a) -
The English Air Force must be so reduced morally and physically that it is unable to deliver any significant attack against the German crossing
In other words - just local air superiority over the Channel and landing beaches.
....
Local air superiority over the Channel and landing beaches for the duration of the invasion amoutns to air supremacy. If the RAF can mass at a time of their choosing then even with significantly inferior numbers they can take away local air superiority for time enough to deliver a significant blow.

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#17

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Mar 2010, 22:53

Local air superiority over the Channel and landing beaches for the duration of the invasion amoutns to air supremacy. If the RAF can mass at a time of their choosing then even with significantly inferior numbers they can take away local air superiority for time enough to deliver a significant blow.
That's a non-sequitor - they can only deliver a significant blow IF they get into the airspace over the bridgehead.

TO deliver a significant low to the invasion itself - they have to both engage AND overwhelm the LW air defence and escort bombers into the area. It's been a while since I saw them, but IIRC this second role WAS one of the major RAF operational conditions in the event of an invasion...along with Operation BANQUET

So in effect Sealion taking place pre-supposes TWO air superiority battles -

1/ the one BEFORE the invasion can be ordered, what we know as the Battle of Britain -

2/ the one AFTER the invasion is actioned, with air superiority already achieved by the LW or else the Sealion order would never be given. This second air battle is the RAF atempting to get it back again to allow bombers to attack the beachead.

Action 1...requires Eleven Group to experience a higer degree of attrition by the revised (again) tactics of the LW in the few days before historically they turned on London; high enough to force Dowding to pull them back to Eleven Group's fields north of London or into Twelve Group. IIRC ops were historically halted out of Manston for some days.

NOTE - the LW can't not take major losses doing this :wink: This means they are significantly weaker going into -

Action 2...the air battle over the invasion bridgehead. The LW will be flying from France as per OTL....but instead of flying to London for their 8-10 mins on full war power they can linger longer over Kent and Sussex...and it was part of the second version of the Sealion plans that the FJ woul sieze Lympne, and it's not impossible that the invasion would give the Germans control of Manston too - so they would be able to fly in LW airfield operating units and base fighters there....just as they leapfrogged fighter units into Norway ASAP only a few months earlier.

Eleven Group will have taken very major losses and be almost useless for this second action - but historically Twelve and Ten Group were almost untouched at that point in time when Dowding began to consider Eleven Group's withdrawal. :wink:

But we're verging on WI territory here.

One thing IS worth noting too - Dowding's failure to rotate Eleven Group squadrons enough, and to bring Twelve Group far more into the fighting before that decision point, was (still is!) one of the things long held against him. For whatever reason - the brunt of the fighting and casualties were taken by Fighter Command's Eleven Group...

...but IF Sealion had been actioned - this would have left the REST of Fighter Command in far better shape than the LW in France and the Low Countries would have been :wink: I've never seen anything in print that this was Dowding's actual intent...but given how he protested about his fighters being sent to France, then about them being sent to cover Dunkirk - I personally can't believe he didn't plan to fight or at least foresee such an air battle, a "stepping back" air battle that "used up" Eleven Group in the first stage, leaving Twelve/Ten Groups for the second...remember - BEFORE he was OC Fighter Command he had been the Air Staff officer in charge of developing Fighter Command's new RDF-based dectection network and ground-vectoring command&control facilities :wink:
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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#18

Post by LWD » 10 Mar 2010, 16:20

phylo_roadking wrote: ...
TO deliver a significant low to the invasion itself - they have to both engage AND overwhelm the LW air defence and escort bombers into the area. It's been a while since I saw them, but IIRC this second role WAS one of the major RAF operational conditions in the event of an invasion...along with Operation BANQUET

So in effect Sealion taking place pre-supposes TWO air superiority battles -

1/ the one BEFORE the invasion can be ordered, what we know as the Battle of Britain -

2/ the one AFTER the invasion is actioned, with air superiority already achieved by the LW or else the Sealion order would never be given. This second air battle is the RAF atempting to get it back again to allow bombers to attack the beachead.
...
Action 2...the air battle over the invasion bridgehead. The LW will be flying from France as per OTL....but instead of flying to London for their 8-10 mins on full war power they can linger longer over Kent and Sussex...and it was part of the second version of the Sealion plans that the FJ woul sieze Lympne, and it's not impossible that the invasion would give the Germans control of Manston too - so they would be able to fly in LW airfield operating units and base fighters there....just as they leapfrogged fighter units into Norway ASAP only a few months earlier.
...
The problem with this is that the RAF doesn't have to overwhelm the LW over the invasion fleet they mearly have to tie up the fighers while the bombers go in. Furthermore the LW won't get the word in time to launch more fighters vs the RAF attack. This means that the RAF only has to overcome the LW CAP over the invasion force. When you start figuring time on station the LW is going to be lucky to keep 1/3 of their fighters on CAP at any one time and it's probably going to be less, especially if fighters are also escorting bombers and participating in any ground attack missions. The implication is if the RAF has 1/3 of the fighters that the LW has they have a pretty good chance of landing a solid blow vs the invasion. IE the LW had to pretty much destroy the RAF in order to insure they were unable to land a substantial blow on the invasion force.

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#19

Post by Dunserving » 10 Mar 2010, 18:28

The short answer is Phylo is just about completely right and LWD is wrong.

There's only one aspect that needs adding to Phylo's accurate assessment.

It was not so much the number of aircraft as the number of pilots available to fly them.

In theory the RAF had a large number of pilots, but many were in senior command positions - you had to be a pilot to get to higher ranks. Many more were relatively newly qualified and were still in training, and many more were doing the training.

By the summer of 1940 the RAF was receiving new aircraft at a rate of about 300 each week, but new operationally ready pilots were arriving at only about 200 per week. Lack of pilots was the real concern. Of course, when ours were shot down over south east England there was a decent chance that the pilot would be able to get in another aircraft and fight again...

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#20

Post by phylo_roadking » 10 Mar 2010, 19:52

It was not so much the number of aircraft as the number of pilots available to fly them.
Quite right - when I'm talking about about the losses to Eleven group in Action One, and the far better position of Twelve and Ten Group compared to the LW going into Action TWO....I'm referring to pilots rather than aircraft. For this is where the 750-mangement limit cuts in; given that we're talking about monoplane single seat fighters, which would still be rolling off the production line as the Action Two battle was being fought - the vital attrition rate is on pilots. The RAF actually had Satellite Landing Grounds filled with aircraft they simply couldn't use for want of pilots!
(The RAF would ALSO have an increasing number of American types to fill blank files in rosters as time goes by. They won't have much time to convert to type...but one useful adjunct for Action Two would be the re-forming Army Co-op squadrons :wink: )

1/ the majority of RAF pilots shot down but bailing and surviving to fight again...will be bailing out (or will have bailED out in Action One) over friendly territory...whereas the majority of LW pilots shot down will be "lost" to the LW - for bailing and surviving over Britain is them lost to their units for the duration. Von Werra doesn't really disturb any statistical trends :wink: Thus the attrition rate spirals up faster for the LW in Action One and probably most of Action Two.

2/ Dowding firmly kept his Blenheim IF-equiped "fighter squadrons on the ground during the BoB; when he requested more monoplane fighters in 1939....the Air Ministry replied by strongarming him into taking the ventral gunpack-equiped Belnheims as a sort of RAF" bomber destroyer", the same ideal role as the Bf110! 8O IIRC he had six squadrons' of these in Fighter Command by the start of August. Eventually the numbers of IF-equiped units went up, bcause they proved useful to Coastal Command for a time, but eventually they were all relegated to nightfighting. BUT - they were still on his DAY roster in the BoB! 8O :P If he had let them off the ground they would have severely skewed RAF casualty figures - for obviously the inferior Blenheim IFs, WHEN they were shot down....would take THREE aircrew with them! :(

3/ here's something to think about - and it was only brought home to me in detail recently by Bishop's BoB:Day by Day - BOTH sides' ASR provisions weren't actually that good! 8O There are a LOT of anecdotes in Bishop about RAF pilots bailing over the Channel not being rescued in time and drowning...while there's two anecdotes about LW pilots and "Channel Sickness", particularly when flying deeper into England; an all-pervading fear that they wouldn't make it home, they would have to ditch in the Channel short of the French coast! 8O Not as many pilots returned to their units to fly again from sea landings as you might expect...

To verge into WI territory again - IF events had got to the Action Two air superiority fight OVER the invasion beachead - there are some more factors that need to be looked at -

1/ RAF pilot availability in the short term would have been hit by BANQUET - the transfer of flying cadets, pilot trainees and pilots on conversion to type to flying hastily-converted and vulnerable gaslayers for low-level attacks on the beaches would have knocked a GREAT big hole in the RAF's training roster! 8O But if Sealion had been actioned - it would have been an "all or nothing" engagement anyway...

2/....and the flipside of that is - how can the RAF continue its training in the medium and long term with the majority of its trainer aircraft brought down over Kent??? 8O

2/ The LW is is no better shape; having taken much higher than OTL loses to win air superiority in the first place - the ONLY way they can segue IMMEDIATELY into Sealion is by transferring more fighter squadrons to the West from Germany and elsewhere; so the RAF is having to suddenly face second-line units - Bf109D-equiped! :wink: Twevle Group and Ten Group are going to be handed a speed/technological advantage over the LW in Action Two!!!
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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#21

Post by phylo_roadking » 10 Mar 2010, 20:14

The problem with this is that the RAF doesn't have to overwhelm the LW over the invasion fleet they mearly have to tie up the fighers while the bombers go in.
It's not that simple - think again of the Albert bridges....they are going to face a LOT of groundbased AA...and in exactly the same types that proved useless in France for ground attacking at low level into heavy AA fire!
and it's probably going to be less, especially if fighters are also escorting bombers and participating in any ground attack missions
This wasn't necessarily the plan; they were going to restrict their roles - they actually DID so during the BoB. fron Directive No.17 -
2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.
Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations
3. On the other hand, air attacks on enemy warships and merchant ships may be reduced except where some particularly favourable target happens to present itself,...
...and you have to remember that a large percentage of LW bombing attacks, tactical as well as divebombing, went in in France and the Low Countries without fighter cover. And the LW actually DID do this during the BoB at times; partiocularly Dornier-equiped units did this, there are at least two anecdotes in Bishop of Hurricanes getting caught in Dorniers' "box formation" overlapping fields of fire and getting chewed up badly - DESPITE being ordered never to fly into a box formation 8O
Furthermore the LW won't get the word in time to launch more fighters vs the RAF attack. This means that the RAF only has to overcome the LW CAP over the invasion force.
They can fly CAP....and as soon as they get airfields working inside the bridgehead can get more into the air ASAP. And if their plans "survived contact with the enemy" this was to be as early as the second day of the landings!

One thing to remember...ONCE the Germans land in Kent and Sussex - every mile they advance inland rolls up the RAF's ground-based air detection capacity, the Royal Observer Corps - who OTL provided a large part of the detection and warning AFTER LW aircraft had passed through Chain Home/Chain Home Low. Group control rooms collated this information with the out-to-sea RDF returns to give them a view of the airspace in front of and behind the radar picket line on the coast :wink:

Except - in Action Two, the "depth of field" view available to Fighter Command is going to be slowly getting less and less...while the Germans' "depth of field" detection capacity improves the further Wehrmacht ground forces penetrate inland...

By the time the Germans might reach Sevenoaks or Ashford - they have as much overland "depth of field" air detection as the RAF does! 8O

At THIS point Action Two becomes a straight slogging match with the same warning times of incoming raids/sorties available to both sides - and no miraculous technological "force multiplier" available to the RAF...this is something else Bishop's collation of day-to-day events shows; ground vectoring was good, it gave the RAF a significant advantage - but it had drawbacks...and foremost among these was that fighter squadrons and flights needed TIME to get height - and without that "depth of field", time was something the RAF was not going to have on their side. In fact - with the benefit of VHF radio for better communications - Fighter Command is as likely to have to fly CAP simply to make sure their aircraft are in the air and able to react in time.
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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#22

Post by Gooner1 » 11 Mar 2010, 13:45

phylo_roadking wrote: The RAF actually had Satellite Landing Grounds filled with aircraft they simply couldn't use for want of pilots!
Eh? The RAF had landing grounds 'filled with aircraft' because their philosophy was to maintain large reserves so they could fight a sustained attritional campaign with no diminishing of first-line strength.
Fighter squadron establishment was twenty-six pilots. Even at their most stretched Fighter Command had enough operational reserves in Spitfires and Hurricanes to create another ten squadrons.

On the 750 aircraft management thing - I take that as the maximum that could be controlled in the air at any one time?
The highest number of sorties flown by Fighter Command in the battle in one day was 1,254 on 15th August.

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#23

Post by LWD » 11 Mar 2010, 15:30

phylo_roadking wrote:
The problem with this is that the RAF doesn't have to overwhelm the LW over the invasion fleet they mearly have to tie up the fighers while the bombers go in.
It's not that simple - think again of the Albert bridges....they are going to face a LOT of groundbased AA...and in exactly the same types that proved useless in France for ground attacking at low level into heavy AA fire!
Are you refering to ship born AA? Most of it crewed by army personel?
and it's probably going to be less, especially if fighters are also escorting bombers and participating in any ground attack missions
This wasn't necessarily the plan; they were going to restrict their roles - they actually DID so during the BoB. fron
Even so it's still a problem. They can still only fly at most 1/3 of their figher aircraft as CAP and if the weather is bad they may have a difficult time even spotting the raid in time to intercept it.
...and you have to remember that a large percentage of LW bombing attacks, tactical as well as divebombing, went in in France and the Low Countries without fighter cover.
Didn't these raids suffer fairly high attrition however if intercepted. Of course it's not clear the RAF would be intercepting these when the main battle is over the invasion fleet. And of course the LW stil has to prevent the RN from intervening. Attacking warships operating at speed with AA ready is not a trivial task and will require considerable resources and involve a fair amount of damage to the attacking force.
Furthermore the LW won't get the word in time to launch more fighters vs the RAF attack. This means that the RAF only has to overcome the LW CAP over the invasion force.
They can fly CAP....and as soon as they get airfields working inside the bridgehead can get more into the air ASAP. And if their plans "survived contact with the enemy" this was to be as early as the second day of the landings!
Indeed they can but they can only have a fraction of their fighters doing so at any one time. Getting airfields functioning is going to take days if not weeks. By then the battle will be over in all likelyhood. Remember there isn't going to be a very rapid initial advance. Indeed didn't they plan on taking several days to unload the first echelon? And it was very much lacking in any sort of mechanization. That depended on capturing ports intact, another unlikely event.
... Except - in Action Two, the "depth of field" view available to Fighter Command is going to be slowly getting less and less...while the Germans' "depth of field" detection capacity improves the further Wehrmacht ground forces penetrate inland...
I doubt it would ever reach this stage. If it did the Germans might have some chance.

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#24

Post by LWD » 11 Mar 2010, 15:48

Dunserving wrote:The short answer is Phylo is just about completely right and LWD is wrong.
Thanks for stating your opinion. Do you have anything to back it up?

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#25

Post by Dunserving » 11 Mar 2010, 18:55

LWD wrote:
Dunserving wrote:The short answer is Phylo is just about completely right and LWD is wrong.
Thanks for stating your opinion. Do you have anything to back it up?
I've supported Phylo - I note you have not asked him to back his original assertions.

Some things are worth noting though.

You refer to the RAF flying combat air patrols. In fact aircraft were kept on the ground as much as possible. They were launched when radar indicated they were required. That kept fuel and maintenance demands minimised - a very wise idea as it turned out. As an example of this consider 4th September - a formation of Dornier bombers with Me109 cover was reported heading straight for Biggin Hill. "B" Flight of 79 Squadron was ordered up to attack them. Six Spitfires against about 100 Luftwaffe bombers and fighters. None of the Dorniers were shot down but a number of crews chose capture over risking the flight across the Channel back to their own airfield. Bombing accuracy was hugely reduced, and they only managed to demolish some telegraph poles. The point is, a major raid was dealt with by scrambling the absolute minimum number of fighters needed to disrupt the raid, not by a CAP. The aircraft flying time was minimised by not scrambling till the last minute - when the decision to scramble "B" Flight was made the enemy were already over Maidstone. That is just 21 miles from Biggin Hill - and in the time taken for the Luftwaffe to cover that distance the scramble order had to get to the Squadrons pilots, they had to get to the aircraft, get started, take off, and climb to 15,000 feet. That sort of thing was typical.
A source for that particular raid can be found on pages 136-137 of RAF Biggin Hill by Graham Wallace, published by Putnam & Co in 1957.

Then there's this: "The problem with this is that the RAF doesn't have to overwhelm the LW over the invasion fleet they mearly have to tie up the fighers while the bombers go in. Furthermore the LW won't get the word in time to launch more fighters vs the RAF attack. " Well, for a start, the bombers were usually the target for attack... You should try standing in among the German defences at somewhere like Cap Blanc Nez and look towards the nearest invasion beaches. On an admittedly clear day you can see well inland over England - and the nearest Luftwaffe fighter airfields are only about six minutes flying time from the beaches. Did it matter that the sky is not always clear - not really, as there was a Freya radar site at Cap Blanc Nez in 1940.

Apart from that, I'll leave Phylo to defend himself, I don't think he'll need any help.

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#26

Post by LWD » 11 Mar 2010, 19:17

Dunserving wrote:
LWD wrote:
Dunserving wrote:The short answer is Phylo is just about completely right and LWD is wrong.
Thanks for stating your opinion. Do you have anything to back it up?
I've supported Phylo - I note you have not asked him to back his original assertions.

Some things are worth noting though.

You refer to the RAF flying combat air patrols.
where? I certainly don't remember it. It's the LW that will have to be flying CAP in this scenario.
Then there's this: "The problem with this is that the RAF doesn't have to overwhelm the LW over the invasion fleet they mearly have to tie up the fighers while the bombers go in. Furthermore the LW won't get the word in time to launch more fighters vs the RAF attack. " Well, for a start, the bombers were usually the target for attack...
[/qutoe]
I'm not sure what you are driving at here.
You should try standing in among the German defences at somewhere like Cap Blanc Nez and look towards the nearest invasion beaches. On an admittedly clear day you can see well inland over England - and the nearest Luftwaffe fighter airfields are only about six minutes flying time from the beaches. Did it matter that the sky is not always clear - not really, as there was a Freya radar site at Cap Blanc Nez in 1940.
When in 1940? And how good was it's coverage? When were these fighter fields operational and for how many planes? Furthermore how long does it take them to scramble and intercept a raid over the invasion fleet? Then there's the question about the further beaches.

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#27

Post by phylo_roadking » 11 Mar 2010, 21:25

You refer to the RAF flying combat air patrols. In fact aircraft were kept on the ground as much as possible. They were launched when radar indicated they were required. That kept fuel and maintenance demands minimised - a very wise idea as it turned out.
Maintenance levels for period combat aircraft were actually very high IIRC - that's why every three-man dedicated ground crew per aircraft had a fitter as one of the essential skills...plus frequent engine strips per type; one of the reasons a twelve-aircraft-on-roster squadron had 2-4 spare aircraft on strength - to allow for rotation of aircraft into hangared maintenance.

CAP is also VERY exhausting on aircrew; means EITHER -

1/ keeping at least one flight of a squadron in the air at any given time, and hope that the others can get airborne in time; and rotating them through the day. It means in a flap x-number of aircraft in a squadron WILL be on the ground being refueled/rearmed/pilots eating or making a pitstop :lol:

2/ Keep an entire squadron in the air patrolling - but THIS means you have to have a system of one on the ground/one in the air at a multi-squadron field to allow for refueling etc. It also means each squadron needs to be fully rested every second or third day after spending hours in the air. Means you have strength in the air all the time...but only 1/2 to 1/3 strength :wink:
It's the LW that will have to be flying CAP in this scenario.
No - both will. By Action Two....the RAF has lost Chain Home/Chain Home Low - which means no depth of field out over France - 10-20 miles inland into France depending on atmospherics IIRC. They will also have lost a large part of their groundbased early warning organisation in Kent and Sussex...therefore NO early warning of raids forming up over France OR crossing the Channel, no warning at all on land UNTIL they cross over the front line on land 8O The RAF will have lost EVERY force multiplier that early warning and tracking raids crosscountry by ground observers gave them.
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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#28

Post by phylo_roadking » 11 Mar 2010, 21:46

On the 750 aircraft management thing - I take that as the maximum that could be controlled in the air at any one time?
The highest number of sorties flown by Fighter Command in the battle in one day was 1,254 on 15th August.
Yes - the maximum number of aircraft that could be managed at any one time by ALL of Fighter Command's four mainland UK Groups. Totalled. I've never seen separate figures per group.
Are you refering to ship born AA? Most of it crewed by army personel?
No - obviously groundbased AA inside the bridgehead would be Army.
Even so it's still a problem. They can still only fly at most 1/3 of their figher aircraft as CAP and if the weather is bad they may have a difficult time even spotting the raid in time to intercept it.
1/ if the weather is bad - the invasion won't be mounted. The majority of its vessels would have had marginal sea manners, being flatbottomed riverbarges - the fact that they were speedily ballasted with concrete notwithstanding.

2/ if visibility was bad - noone would be flying, but especially not anyone trying to do any bombing.
Of course it's not clear the RAF would be intercepting these when the main battle is over the invasion fleet.
My point does apply to the RAF too - THEY can't do three or four things at once either.
Attacking warships operating at speed with AA ready is not a trivial task and will require considerable resources and involve a fair amount of damage to the attacking force
- which is one of the lessons of Norway and Crete; learned BY the LW :wink: It won't take a significant part of the LW's strength to protect the shipping of the fleet, it can be used to maintain local air superiority over the length of the route and over Kent and Sussex.
Indeed they can but they can only have a fraction of their fighters doing so at any one time. Getting airfields functioning is going to take days if not weeks.
Actually - no. This was one of the specialities of the LW - how do you think Ju87s etc. could keep up with the front in May 1940? :wink: They flew forward operating units into available sites, complete with personnel, stores and spares kits by Ju52s. They could have minimal grass fields operating within hours.
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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#29

Post by LWD » 11 Mar 2010, 23:22

phylo_roadking wrote: ...
CAP is also VERY exhausting on aircrew; means EITHER -
Indeed that was my point. Especially over any signficant duration you simply aren't going to be able to keep more than a third and probably significantly less on CAP and a signficant portion of those not on CAP will not be able to get into the air very quickly
It's the LW that will have to be flying CAP in this scenario.
No - both will. By Action Two....the RAF has lost Chain Home/Chain Home Low - ....
This seems to be assuming that the invasion has already succeeded. It's at it's most vulnerable during the crossing and landing. If the RAF strikes then they still have their radar stations .
phylo_roadking wrote: ...
Are you refering to ship born AA? Most of it crewed by army personel?
No - obviously groundbased AA inside the bridgehead would be Army.
From what I remember reading of the Sea Lion OB there wasn't a huge amount of AA in the first wave and there also was n't a huge amount of ammo for what was there. I don't see ground based AA being that much of a fator unless the invasion force survives for several days or weeks.
Even so it's still a problem. They can still only fly at most 1/3 of their figher aircraft as CAP and if the weather is bad they may have a difficult time even spotting the raid in time to intercept it.
1/ if the weather is bad - the invasion won't be mounted. The majority of its vessels would have had marginal sea manners, being flatbottomed riverbarges - the fact that they were speedily ballasted with concrete notwithstanding.
2/ if visibility was bad - noone would be flying, but especially not anyone trying to do any bombing.
Bad in terms of spotting an incoming raid is not the same thing as bad interms of sea state. Broken clouds can be enough to cause problems. Look at Midway.
Of course it's not clear the RAF would be intercepting these when the main battle is over the invasion fleet.
My point does apply to the RAF too - THEY can't do three or four things at once either.
But they don't need to. If they can deliver a telling blow to the invasion force the invasion is almost sure to fail. If they can prevent the LW from stopping the RN delivering said blow it will also fail. Indeed a concerted attack near dusk my tend to do both.
Attacking warships operating at speed with AA ready is not a trivial task and will require considerable resources and involve a fair amount of damage to the attacking force
- which is one of the lessons of Norway and Crete; learned BY the LW :wink: It won't take a significant part of the LW's strength to protect the shipping of the fleet, it can be used to maintain local air superiority over the length of the route and over Kent and Sussex.
You seem to be argueing against yourself here. I'm not sure exactly what your point is.
Indeed they can but they can only have a fraction of their fighters doing so at any one time. Getting airfields functioning is going to take days if not weeks.
Actually - no. This was one of the specialities of the LW - how do you think Ju87s etc. could keep up with the front in May 1940? :wink: They flew forward operating units into available sites, complete with personnel, stores and spares kits by Ju52s. They could have minimal grass fields operating within hours.
How much fuel can you fly in with Ju52's? How many do they have after the losses over Holland and Norway? Then there's the problem of landing them in range of opposing artillery. In France they could move a lot of material by road. Can't get it to Britain that way.

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Re: The Battle of Britain.

#30

Post by phylo_roadking » 11 Mar 2010, 23:50

Indeed that was my point. Especially over any signficant duration you simply aren't going to be able to keep more than a third and probably significantly less on CAP and a signficant portion of those not on CAP will not be able to get into the air very quickly
And that penalty affects both sides :wink:
This seems to be assuming that the invasion has already succeeded. It's at it's most vulnerable during the crossing and landing.
Not really - for if the LW is maintaining local air superiority OVER kent and Sussex to allow landings, then Fighter COmmand has to get THAT back before it can get as physically far as the Channel.
If the RAF strikes then they still have their radar stations .
The LW knew what radar was, and made frequent attempts to hit radar sies - AND succeeded. they just didn't realise how the RAF related the returns to asset management :wink: The local air superiority requirement before ordering Sealion means that CH/CHL sites along the Kent and Sussex coasts are wide open and vulnerable to being mopped up at leisure.
From what I remember reading of the Sea Lion OB there wasn't a huge amount of AA in the first wave and there also was n't a huge amount of ammo for what was there.
Given what the invasion fleet was doing - what it was transporting - there would be a huge amount of light AA...which was what the Germans were relying on.
Bad in terms of spotting an incoming raid is not the same thing as bad interms of sea state.
OIn this case BOTH affect the ATL; bad sea state simply means no invasion....and in 1940 the RAF doesn't have any low-level shipping attack capacity - EXCEPT the crappy Blenheim IFs! :wink: Which is why Coastal started using them...
Which means any other attacks on the invasion force would be by RAF bombers at medium level. And those barge targets are NOT big when they are just individual ships again; Bomber Command was successful against them at night because they were
1/ stationary; and
2/ moored side by side in quantity!
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they don't need to. If they can deliver a telling blow to the invasion force the invasion is almost sure to fail.
Yes they do - they have to win back air superiority over the buffer zone between Fighter Command and the invasion force that air supremacy over Kent/Sussex represents...THEN escort bombers through the fighter defences over the invasion force.
You seem to be argueing against yourself here. I'm not sure exactly what your point is
My point is - they LW on the day of the invasion doesn't need to keep local air superiority over Kent /Sussex OR defend the invasion force; they don;t have to make a choice, they can do both, for the fleet defence doesn't need that much, it's only an assist to the invasion fleet's own defensive capacity. And in the event of loosing local air superiority over England again, where does the LW recoil TO? OVER the invasion fleet :wink:
How much fuel can you fly in with Ju52's? How many do they have after the losses over Holland and Norway?
There's a thread somewhere on AHF with the crunched numbers - they have something like 320+ for September 1940. A significant part of these would be used as planned, using the FJ to secure Lympne airfield in the early hours and morning of the invasion - and take losses doing it; but once ground forces from the invasion three miles away make it to Lympne, they can be turned over totally to flying in stores. By that stage anyway, as early as the afternoon of T-Tag ( :lol: ), the plan was for the Royal Military Canal, the only real line of defence between the coast and Lympne, to be in German hands - seizing it was the other job of the FJ in the area that day.
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