Fire Support Battle In Normandy

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Carl Schwamberger
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Re: DD Tanks

#31

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 Nov 2010, 06:09

Makes me wonder what size the thought a assualt would be??
RichTO90 wrote:Well, previous they had experienced multi-division invasions in North Africa, Sicily, and two in Italy. So I suspect they expected a multi-division attack of up to 8 divisions. But they only had so many resources to oppose them with.
Hmmm yes. they did reinforce the sector substantially during May. Consider the first hours on Omaha beach had the attack gone in in early may, before the 352 div settled in.


"61. Methods of fire.—German artillery makes extensive use of ricochet fire. In this type of fire the Germans set their shell fuzes so that the shells will strike the ground, and ricochet into the air and burst. 'They also employ time-fuze fire, which they try to regulate so that- their shells will burst about 40 to 50 feet above the ground."
RichTO90 wrote:They may have been trying the former. As you mention, timefire could have been problematic given the geometry and close proximity of the German defenses to the attackers.
Possiblly. I wonder if it would work very well on loose sand/gravel? It also requires the axis of the projectile be at very small angle to the ground, possibly less than 15 degrees. Too much range & you cant get the low angle at impact even at a high propellant charge. A large vertical interval discussed affects this as well.

One of the problems I'm wrestling with is lack of good info on German artillery norms for ammo allocations. There is some here for US, British, and Soviet. Extrapolating from those estimates of effects has all sorts of potiential for error, & my several years doing fire planning gave me enough experience to understand the degree of my ignorance. At this point it looks like those six artillery batterys & their 4,800 rounds were inadaquate for either suppressing or nuetralising much of the landing area. I'm a long way from finishing these numbers but it looks like a allout effort to nuetralize the mass of battlaions on the beach would have expended that ammo quantity in less than a hour.
RichTO90 wrote:The norm was the Erste Ausstattung, which corresponds, more or less, to the American unit of fire.
Probablly not what I am thinking of. This would be something that tells you 'Number of Projectiles' = "Estimated Casualties". A German version of the Soviet Nomogram or US Effects Table.
RichTO90 wrote: The most careful examination of the subject I am aware of is LTC Jakob Jung, Consumption of Ammunition by Land Forces Since 1939, Bergisch Gladbach, FRG, 1986. I don't know if it was ever generally published, although it was available in an English translation; we got it via BG Franz Uhle-Wettler, who was a close friend of Trevor, when we did the Ardennes Combat Simulation Database back in 1989.


Did you save me a copy?

From the Terminal Ballistcs docs linked are attached two charts, for the 105mm howitzer projectile. This is data for the US ammo & may or may not match the German projectile of the same caliber for their similar 10.5cm howitzer, or the Cezch cannon. The frag pattern chart looks identical to what I remember in the fireplanning docs we used back in the 1980s. The Frag Chart should give the reader a idea of the size & number of frags in he casualty zone. This is not the same as what I am calling a "effects" chart or table. The top illustration from the US FM-40 1940 is one of those.
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105 Frag chart.png
105 Frag chart.png (183.27 KiB) Viewed 1111 times
105 frag pattern.png
105 frag pattern.png (180.3 KiB) Viewed 1111 times

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: DD Tanks

#32

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 Nov 2010, 18:15

RichTO90 wrote:
I doubt they would have had that many problems. The batteries at Maisy certainly not, the 15cm battery at Longueville probably not (8.6 km to Les Moulins at about a 30-40 degree angle from parallel to the beach, Vierville is 5.5 km and closer to 60-70 degrees), the Houtteville battery is more problematic, 4.3 km to Les Moulins and about 80 degrees from the beach, but is easier versus Vierville, the Montigny battery is abouut the same as Longueville, but a bit closer to the beaches, while the Formigny battery is about in the same circumstances as the Houtteville one. Essentially the two Maisy batteries are in enar enfilade of the beaches, while the other four batteries are disposed so that at least two can easily fire on each half of the beach without a problem.

Cheers!
Are there exact locations for those? The maps I have are suspect, not a good scale, & have ambigouties. Cross checking them would be nice.


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Re: DD Tanks

#33

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 04 Nov 2010, 03:03

I’d hoped to carry this a bit further in ‘accuracy’ but am missing too much data/information. For the moment here are some rough thoughts on what the Germans might have done with their Cannon, Mortar, & Werfer ammo. These are ‘best guess’ as I lack any hard data for the German 10 or 15 cm ammo & am extrapolating from effects info from US, Soviet, & British sources. None of those are definative. Partly because I dont have a complete set of Effects Tables or Nomograms or what have you and partly as I dont have complete information how these tables of effects data were arrived at.

Three definitions: these are my translation of the terms we used back in the 1980s in our fire planning. They differ a bit from the Brit & Soviet terminology.

Suppresion - Fire sufficient to keep a ‘unit’ from effectivily firing or manuvering while the incoming fire continues. Suppresion ceases shortly after the fire ceases. losses as low as 1-2% can result in suppresion of a company or larger unit. Green units might be suppresed without any losses. Veteran/elite/fanatic units may require a far larger loss to suppress.

Nuetralization - target unit is unable to effectively fire or manuver for a time after fire ceases. This after effect should be long enough for a comparable size unit to assualt or manuver past the target unit wthout effective interfereance. Casualties in the US view would vary from a very low end of 5%+ to around 15%. Obviously a battalion will require a lot more ammo to be nuetralized than a squad. A rapid volley of a dozen mortar rounds might nuetralize a squad & be wholly inadaquate for a platoon or company. Again this depends on the level of motivation of the men in the target area.

Destruction - the target unit suffers substantial casualties & is ineffective for a extended time after the attack ceases. The nominal casualty levels for this in US & Soviet tables range from 30% to over 70%. For a long time US doctrine has been Destruction missions require excessive ammounts of ammo and are only to be fired where the value of the target justifies it. Soviet doctrine was a bit more spendthrift but recognized a point where the effect was not worth the cost.

At this point consider the target on Omaha Beach between 06:30 & 08:30. Intially it was in effect infantry. The various effects tables dont differentiate between rifle squads, engineer teams, beach control partys, communications sections or commanders groups.... All ammount to clusters of men on a entirely exposed expanse of sand & gravel. The small number of tanks & other assualt vehicals present can be considered seperately.

Looking over the tables & some descriptions of artillery operations It is clear such a target - “Infantry in the open” can be Suppressed with a small ammount of ammo, for a while. Over time Suppression fires can drive men out of the target area. This is part of a ‘casualty reduction effect’, where over time losses in a target area fall off, due to survivors departing, taking cover, or becoming casualties. The size of a target AREA reflects on the number of cannon or the technque used to shift the aim points in the target area. The rate of fire to maintain suppression on a target would range from one round every thirty seconds to one per two minutes per cannon. For maximum effect you want the cannon to fire at seperate intervals rather than in volleys, but that is not always practical due to training or the need to make frequent shifts in targets.

At this point knowledge of the German artillery engagement SOP, or ‘Fire Standards’, or rules of engagement or whatever would be extremely valuable. That is specifically for the artillery defending the Omaha sector. I have no information on any ‘set’ number of rounds for a battery or battalion to engage a type of target with. There are remarks about German artillery OP or infantry commanders intitating “Concentration Dora” or ordering up fire against some target or other, but nothing about how much ammo might have been allocated to each fire mission ect... In any case 1-4 rounds per cannon over two minutes would cause the US infantry to go to ground & after time to disperse out of the target area. That is they would be Suppresed. My assumption here is a four gun battery would be aiming to cover a target area of 50 to 100 meters radius. So over two minutes you would have 16 rds from a battery on a 200 meter dia target area (= 49,000 sq meters) or one round per 3,100 sq meters. Of course Omaha beach is something like 2,400,000 square meters so the six cannon batterys (24 cannon) Rich gives can only hit 12.5% of the beach area for any two minutes of Suppression. At four rounds per gun/minute average the combined four 10.5 cm batterys will expend 64 rounds in one minute & 7680 rounds in two hours. In theory that is entirely possible for sustained fire. However the fire of a battery stops when it is shifted from one target to another, so the total theoretical rounds could be nominally halved. Now go back to the remark about 1-2% casualties being suffcient to incur suppression. That & the estimated suppresion coverage suggests that up to 2% losses could be inflicted by the artillery on 12% of the Omaha beach area in any two minute period.

Nuetralization requires considerablly more rounds. It is also a peculiarity that few rounds from more guns have a greater effect than many rounds from a few guns on the same target. That is one gun firing 36 rounds is not nearly as effective as 12 cannon firing three rounds each. Most of the information I am working with here start from a basis of a four cannon battery, tho the Soviet guide is less tied to specific sized units. There is a wide variation depending on range, accuracy of the firing data (Adjusted fire vs chart & weather corrections). For the US to nuetralize infantry with a low level of protection a battery should shoot between 80 & 112 10.5cm HE projectiles. That is expected to nuetralize (by US standards) a target area of 200 meters diameter. Call that a large platoon or small company by the conditions of Omaha Beach. The Brits seem to think 80 rounds from a 25lbr battery (of eight guns) suffcient for this, the Soviet Nomograms indicate a much higher number of 7.6 cm rounds or fewer 12.2 cm rounds for the same task.

Going with the lower number of 80 projectiles to stun a 200 meter area of 50 to 100 men & inflict 8% to 12% casualties, then the 4,800 10.5 cm rounds available to the Germans give up 60 such attacks before the well runs dry. However there is a time constraint. A four gun 10.5 cm battery can in theory hose out fourty rounds in a minute. That cannot be sustained. The US 1940 book allowance for firing a nuetralization mission is five minutes maximum for eighty rounds with the 10.5 cm howitzer. Add in two to three more minutes for for shifting between targets & a theoretical rate of one target attacked per battery every seven to eight minutes is potientially there. At that relatively furious rate of fire is is possible to hit the entire length of Omaha Beach with a round of ‘Nuetralization’ attacks from all six 10 & 15 cm batterys inside one hour, tho not probable. Aside from the problems of fatigue of the gun crews, or deteriorating communications, & potiential counter battery fires the German artillery commander is faced with the question of expending most of his ammo in that hour.

My best guess at this point is there was either a concious effort to ration the cannon ammo, or the Germans were estimating the effect on target diffiernetly from the several techniques I’m working with.

The question of time fuzes is very much open. Either they were not available in suffcient quantity, or for some other reason less effective than what I’d expect. Maybe I had been expecting too much?

The rockets dont seem to have been fired in massed attacks. If true that would degrade their effect significantly. Like cannon ammo the best casualty result is when they are massed in space & time. Dribbling them out in small lots is ok for harrassing or suppressing areas temporarily, but wont produce decisive results over the longer haul.

The mortars are difficult to mass due to short range & limited comunications. Their usual tactical use is to support local company/platoon size fights. My best guess is they were effective at that in the fight on the bluffs and beyond, but could only harrass the US infantry on the beach or infiltrating the dunes. Maybe if German infantry had come down from the bluffs to counter attack in the dunes or on the beach the mortars would have been of more effect, the combined arms synergy as it were.

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#34

Post by Aber » 05 Nov 2010, 09:54

Very interesting, but surely the target area on the beach would only be 2 narrow strips where the landing forces were concentrated- behind the sea wall, and at the waters edge, which moves your 12% up to 100%+?

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#35

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 Nov 2010, 16:41

Aber wrote:Very interesting, but surely the target area on the beach would only be 2 narrow strips where the landing forces were concentrated- behind the sea wall, and at the waters edge, which moves your 12% up to 100%+?
If I'm not committing math errors, applying a 200 meter coverage area for a nuetralization mission to a battery gives 1,200 meters for the six artillery batterys. The beach area used by the assault was between 7,500 & 8,000 meters, which does not look like 100%.

It is possible to plan out the fires for linear distribution of the individual cannon aim points. I have no idea what the Germans estimated the effective casualty radius for their 10 & 15 cm ammo. A generous calcualtion would be a 50 meter radius, or a distribution of 100 meters per shot, so 32 cannon = 3,200 meters coverage. With some trick, but practical preperations the cannon can shift individual aim points methodically along the target line. Shifting the aim every few shots reduces the rate of fire. While a rapid short term RoF of a shot every six seconds is practical with 10cm howitzers traversing & adjusting range eats up time so the RoF maximum is pushed up to ten to twelve seconds, which is fallng towards a Suppression rather than Nuetralization density of fire. That can be offset by reducing the distance between aimpoints along the target line, which of course reduces the overall length of the beach covered per cannon per shot.

Beyond that there is the underlying problem of crew fatigue and ammo supply. Even at a slow but constant Suppresive RoF the artillery commander is going to see his ammo pits empty by midday. At a maximum practical RoF that could occur in less than two hours after time to shift targets & 'decision' making time by the commanders is allowed for.

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#36

Post by oneshooter » 06 Nov 2010, 04:15

Does anybody know what effect the counter-battery fire from the BB's of the offshore squadrons had. The same for the inshore support BB's, USS Texas (BB35) and USS Arkansas (BB-33).

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#37

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Nov 2010, 04:54

oneshooter wrote:Does anybody know what effect the counter-battery fire from the BB's of the offshore squadrons had. The same for the inshore support BB's, USS Texas (BB35) and USS Arkansas (BB-33).

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I dont know for sure. Over the day there was some, but what actuall reduction occured during the critical first two hours is not clear. If any unit diarys, AARs, or eyewitness accounts from the German side exist I'd like to find them. Also Rich pointed out the gunnery logs from the gunfire support ships would be nice to see.

It is logical to assume counter battery fires were part of the program, that battery positions were identified from pre D Day air recon & French spies, or suspected locations were targeted, & that the air observation was directed at counter battery missions. However I've only third or fourth hand evidence for any of that. My take is counter battery with observed fires from the 5" 6" or 8" naval rifles would be very effective, CB on unobserved or suspected locations would be far less so.

Beyond that there is the effect of the NGF on the observation posts and command posts. Around 08:30 the German regimental commander complained to the Div CP that his commnications were breaking down & he had lost comm with several company CP. That suggests the artillery communications were degrading too.

A key component of effective CB fires between 05:45 & 08:30 would be air observation. solid documentation of that in operations would be a important clue. Ellesberg (the Far Shore) claims the observation aircraft destined for Omaha beach that morning were scattered & aborted by AA fire from the Allied ships.

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#38

Post by oneshooter » 07 Nov 2010, 20:50


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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#39

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Nov 2010, 05:21

"I don't know if this will help." He says...

Thanks, sincerely

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#40

Post by Michate » 08 Nov 2010, 05:42

The norm was the Erste Ausstattung, which corresponds, more or less, to the American unit of fire.
Probablly not what I am thinking of. This would be something that tells you 'Number of Projectiles' = "Estimated Casualties". A German version of the Soviet Nomogram or US Effects Table.
Some norms are given in HDv 200/6 (the newer version of 1943) and, in particular, Merkblatt 27b/55.

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#41

Post by Michate » 08 Nov 2010, 06:31

At this point knowledge of the German artillery engagement SOP, or ‘Fire Standards’, or rules of engagement or whatever would be extremely valuable. That is specifically for the artillery defending the Omaha sector. I have no information on any ‘set’ number of rounds for a battery or battalion to engage a type of target with. There are remarks about German artillery OP or infantry commanders intitating “Concentration Dora” or ordering up fire against some target or other, but nothing about how much ammo might have been allocated to each fire mission ect... In any case 1-4 rounds per cannon over two minutes would cause the US infantry to go to ground & after time to disperse out of the target area. That is they would be Suppresed. My assumption here is a four gun battery would be aiming to cover a target area of 50 to 100 meters radius. So over two minutes you would have 16 rds from a battery on a 200 meter dia target area (= 49,000 sq meters) or one round per 3,100 sq meters. Of course Omaha beach is something like 2,400,000 square meters so the six cannon batterys (24 cannon) Rich gives can only hit 12.5% of the beach area for any two minutes of Suppression. At four rounds per gun/minute average the combined four 10.5 cm batterys will expend 64 rounds in one minute & 7680 rounds in two hours. In theory that is entirely possible for sustained fire. However the fire of a battery stops when it is shifted from one target to another, so the total theoretical rounds could be nominally halved. Now go back to the remark about 1-2% casualties being suffcient to incur suppression. That & the estimated suppresion coverage suggests that up to 2% losses could be inflicted by the artillery on 12% of the Omaha beach area in any two minute period.
There were two types of preplanned defensive fires directed against an enemy attack, which actually both date back to WW1, with some modifications:

Sperrfeuer (defensive barrage): aimed to hinder an enemy to pass a certain line of territory by setting a "curtain of fire", so fire was spread linear. Normally each battery is given one Hauptsperrfeuerraum (main target area, to which its guns are pointed during quiet periods) and two additional target areas to reinforce other batteries.
Duration normally 2 minutes, guns fire as fast as they can. Repition may be ordered.

front width per battery (each gun aimed at individual point, so that fire of battery is spread accordingly) and number of shots per gun and minute:
10.5 cm howitzer: 100 (or sometimes 120, IIRC, depending on ths ource) meters, 6 shots per gun and minute
15 cm howitzer: 150 meters, 4 shots per gun and minute
10.5 gun: 120 meters (IIRC), 5 shots per guns and minute
Larger guns do not participate in Sperrfeuer
Sperrfeuer is the most simple form of fire, and the quickest to execute as emergency fire, ordered by light signals, but it is also least effective.

Vernichtungsfeuer (annihilation fire), had been developed as a form of counterpreparation during WW1, but had a somewhat modified meaning in WW2:
In WW2 Vernichtungsfeuer normally refers to a fire concentration of at least one battalion, or more, up to several artillery regiments (or a corps' worth of artillery), on a target area. Normal target area size for one battalion 200x300 meters. If several battalions participate, target areas may be adjacent/neighbouring, or may be superimposed to reinforce fire effect. Within such a 200x300 meters target area normally all guns fire on the same point.
Duration of fire normally 1 minute (repetition may be ordered). Again, after the first shot, each gun fires as fast as possible. After 1 minute, fire is to be stopped however, even if guns have not fired all their designated shots. Number of shots per gun and minute as above, additionally 21 cm mortars may participate, 3 shots per gun and minute.

Normally a number of such annihilation fore target areas were arrayed in advance to cover most likely enemy concentration and advance areas (as well as identified battery positions). The main idea was to catch enemy troops while they were still preparing for attack, rather than being on fully deployed (and somewhat more dispersed) during the attack itself, and before they would own lines. However, as enemy breakins were anticipated, normally such target areas were designated behind own lines as well, covering likely advance routes.

Each fire area was given a code word (not a number, because that might lead to errors, being mistaken to aiming points, a slightly different concept), often the names of flowers or animals and birds, or whatever. Larger such areas were subdivided into smaller areas (adding a number then). Fire would then be ordered by commanders to battery positions with a code word and a time set. Fire was normally to be delivered as time on target, so batteries would subtract projective flight times from the time set to determine time to start fire.

Normally, it was anticipated, that after some time, artillery would shift to observed fire (observers report detailed targets and their positions and request fire, commanders than order fire on them). However, as during later phases normally enemy troops had large degree of fire superiority during their attacks, own fire system was often suppressed, mainly by blinding (or taking out) observers and cutting their communication lines (wire normally was destroyed with the first shots, radios made it somewhat longer, but also suffered from shell blasts and dust thrown up), so it was progressively more relied on such prescheduled annihilation fires.

Generally, as has been mentioned it was tried to achieve ricochets. My impression is that time fuzes were in somewhat short supply often and in most cases restricted to adjustment (or signalling) fire.

As a cautionary remark, what I have written is derived from the relevant manuals and from some additional reports, books, memoirs, unit histories, which mostly cover Eastern front. Also, from what i have read, artillery commanders who had been on Eastern front commented that many artillery units on 1944's Western front were not in a good shape.

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#42

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Nov 2010, 06:49

Michate wrote:
The norm was the Erste Ausstattung, which corresponds, more or less, to the American unit of fire.
Probablly not what I am thinking of. This would be something that tells you 'Number of Projectiles' = "Estimated Casualties". A German version of the Soviet Nomogram or US Effects Table.
Some norms are given in HDv 200/6 (the newer version of 1943) and, in particular, Merkblatt 27b/55.
& Merkblatt are discussed a bit here: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=44267 Yes?

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#43

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Nov 2010, 07:21

Michate wrote:As a cautionary remark, what I have written is derived from the relevant manuals and from some additional reports, books, memoirs, unit histories, which mostly cover Eastern front. Also, from what i have read, artillery commanders who had been on Eastern front commented that many artillery units on 1944's Western front were not in a good shape.
It will do for now. I am not counting on turning up the detailed fire plans of the 352 Division's artillery staff.

Michate wrote: There were two types of preplanned defensive fires directed against an enemy attack, which actually both date back to WW1, with some modifications:

Sperrfeuer (defensive barrage): aimed to hinder an enemy to pass a certain line of territory by setting a "curtain of fire", so fire was spread linear. Normally each battery is given one Hauptsperrfeuerraum (main target area, to which its guns are pointed during quiet periods) and two additional target areas to reinforce other batteries.
Duration normally 2 minutes, guns fire as fast as they can. Repition may be ordered.

front width per battery (each gun aimed at individual point, so that fire of battery is spread accordingly) and number of shots per gun and minute:
10.5 cm howitzer: 100 (or sometimes 120, IIRC, depending on ths ource) meters, 6 shots per gun and minute
15 cm howitzer: 150 meters, 4 shots per gun and minute
10.5 gun: 120 meters (IIRC), 5 shots per guns and minute
Larger guns do not participate in Sperrfeuer
Sperrfeuer is the most simple form of fire, and the quickest to execute as emergency fire, ordered by light signals, but it is also least effective.
These rates of fire & density are roughly comparable to the US Army estimates for Nuetralization fires. For the 10cm gun & howitzer they are at a sustainable pace. Four shots per minute for the 15cm ammo is a bit more demanding. Its also clear to me that if the ammunition at hand is the 4,800 rounds Rich indicated this sort of fire will exhaust it in less than two hours if the attacks are constant for all six batterys

Vernichtungsfeuer (annihilation fire) would require intact communications. The communication must have been adaquate for this type of attack during the first hour or perhaps two hours. However with only six cannon batterys in range only one or two of these attacks could be executed at any particular moment.

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#44

Post by Michate » 08 Nov 2010, 08:53

& Merkblatt are discussed a bit here: viewtopic.php?t=44267 Yes?
Generally, yes, but the list is not complete.

For artillery operations and tactics, the most important manuals are:

HDv 200/5 "Die Führung der Artillery", issued in early 1937, general instructions on artillery organisation, command and control, fire types, tactics. Supposedly covers artillery units up to artillery regiment.

Dv 201 + (geheim) "Studie über Gliederung und Feuerleitung starker Artillery", issued in early 1938, specifics of command and control of larger than regiment artillery units (artillery of a division in the old pre war two regiment divisional composition, or corps or army) by higher artillery commanders (Arko and higher) and staff officers.
(So far I have been unable to locate this one, so I am left to the few excerpts mentioned in Engelmann's book; if anyone knows where to find a copy, please contact me!)

Merkblatt 27b/55 "Führung großer Artillerieverbände", issued in summer 1943, replaces Dv 201 + (geheim). "Merkblatt" is a bit of a misnomer for this one, it is actually a normal manual booklet of more than 100 pages.
Vernichtungsfeuer (annihilation fire) would require intact communications. The communication must have been adaquate for this type of attack during the first hour or perhaps two hours. However with only six cannon batterys in range only one or two of these attacks could be executed at any particular moment.
Actually it requires just partially intact communications, namely those between artillery commanders (regiment commanders= divisional Artillerieführer, or Arko= corps artillery commander) ordering the fire missions and battery positions executing them. Both these were normally stationed more to the rear of the infantry positions, and their communication lines, at leats radios, were much less affected by enemy fire. So it does not require communications with main observation posts or forward observers situated in the infantry area, which takes the brunt of enemy fire and whose communication lines, including radios, are most vulnerable.
So command posts had a so called Befehlssender, which is, if I have understood that correctly, a 40 Watt radio used for broadcasting fire orders, normally consisting just of a c ouple of code words, to all subordinated batteries, or all batteries in range. Battery positions had a so called T-Empfänger, which, again, if I understand that correctly, was a simple portable radio receiver listening for such fire commands (as well as for the so called Barbara-Meldungen, meteorologic telegrams on corrections for weather conditions aired several times a day). As the radio system was always fragile, repetition was obligatory, with battalion command posts ordered to repeat messages to their subordinated bateries, batteries to repeat to their closest neighbours, and so on.

If I have understood it correctly, the reduced requirements on communications with forward observers was one of the reasons why this type of fire was given higher priority in later phases of the war.
But, of course, also these communications between higher commanders and battery positions were prone to failure as well. For that reason the so called "Starrer Feuerplan" was to be prepared. Literally this means "rigid fireplan", and this is actually a completely pre scheduled list of targets with instructions for each battery, when to fire at them, how many shots, and so on. Similar to a list of targets set for an artillery batery in a WW1 style preparation. Of course, this does not really allow to bring coordinated concentrations, or to react on diversions of real enemy attacks from prior assumptions. So in practice, a compromise was probably followed, with the more communication lines remained intact, the better commanders could influence fire by ordering missions to override the prescheduled fire plan, if necessary. The sepcifics being dependant on local conditions, of course.

I have one or two descriptions how this was done in practice (referring to Eastern front in 1943/44), but as usually, they are too short to answer most questions in detail. Well beggars can't be chosers, in particular not for such an underresearched topic.

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Re: Fire Support Battle In Normandy

#45

Post by Michate » 08 Nov 2010, 09:47

Generally, yes, but the list is not complete.
May I modestly point to an older post of mine, where I collected some links on sources where you can find German combat manuals:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1375804

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