The British Response To Operation Sealion

[Kitchener]

You are clearly becoming stressed and somewhat irrational.

Leave out the personal and adhominem attacks right now. They are not acceptable on this forum, whatever you're used to elsewhere.

The first rule of the forum is: "No insults are tolerated (that includes serious national and religious insults)." Personal remarks in posts are strongly discouraged, and personal insults are forbidden here.

You have not been able to come up with any of the quotes you promised, merely claiming some sort of assumption which exists only in your own mind.

I have provided two, of which the interpretation is more than clear, thank you.

As to your comment with regard to the destroyers and T-Boats, your original post referred simply to destroyers, but let that pass.

I was actually answering your insistance that the KM wouldn't have the forces available to escort/screen minelayers. Yet they had destroyers to allocate to mining operations...

However, why exactly should German destroyers wish to engage British destroyers with no obvious benefit on offer. Each destroyer represented 10% of the total German destroyer force; why risk them to little purpose?

Why exactly should KM destroyers NOT wish to protect minelayers they were operating with?

The above two statements make very little sense at all - surely what the Germans choose to do with their destroyers or not depends on THEIR view of how much "purpose" and value the pre-invasion minefield laying had? :roll:

Given the preparations made for the minelaying, and as early as the 16th of July Göring's informing his Luftwaffe commanders by radio (and read by Bletchley Park, see Newbold) that laying minefields to protect the flanks of the invasion was one of the essential activities related to the upcoming invasion, just ordered by Hitler in Directive No.16 (IIRC the first time the British had heard a reference to Directive No. 16)....do you REALLY want to say that the protecting of the KM minelaying capability had "little purpose" in German eyes?

Why, by the way, are you suddenly becoming so anxious about shore bombardment?

Can I suggest you read the thread again? I've mentioned this several times since it began.

When you say 'Mountbatten was predicting what would have happened' what exactly do you mean? What would have happened if what?

You're loosing track of YOUR own arguments...

...and yet, this is EXACTLY what was being planned in Berlin under the Fall Grun Ireland diversion plan....

As you say you've just read Newbold, so I'm sure you're aware that the summer of 1940 was a significant low point in Anglo-Irish relations...and that if the Bitish in Northern Ireland had crossed the border - as prepared for in the "W Plan" - to meet the Germans if they actioned Fall Grun as part of Sealion...the Irish Army and various local defence forces would indeed have been fighting BOTH the Germans and the British. It was De Valera's intention at that point in time to order them to do EXACTLY that...as Mountbatten said. This is also confirmed in Robert Fisk's In Time Of War.

I never referred to nightly destroyer patrols trying to find German minelaying operations.

Nor was I; but we HAVE spent several pages now discussing among other things the various destroyer commands' nightly patrolling across the Channel and North Sea haven't we??? Remember? - as part of the discussion on the various conflicting calls on the destroyers as a resource?

I was making the point that despite ALL these nightly patrols to and from a number of locations off the French, Dutch and Belgian coasts...exactly HOW many minelayers did those RN destroyers encounter at work and sink in this period?

Actually, you are wrong again on the subject of the September minelaying operations. There were seven operations.

I was wrong? Perhaps you'd care to show us exactly where I specified HOW many minelaying operations there were? As opposed to referring you to the Seekrieg resource, that is...

But -

There were seven operations. The first two utilised minelayers escorted by 3 destroyers, 4 Wolf/Mowes, and 4 T Boats in the first case, and by 4 T boats in the second.

The third lay involved 5 Wolf/Mowes and 3 T Boats.
The fourth was by 4 T Boats.
The fifth was by 4 T Boats.
The sixth was by seven destroyers,
The seventh was by 4 Wolf/Mowes.

...perhaps I can now be MORE specific in my question to you -

Exactly HOW many of those seven particular operations did those various RN destroyer patrols crossing back and forth across the Channel each night find and interrupt at their work?

By the way, and for information...

For what it is worth, I could provide you with details of every German minelaying operation, and the vessels involved, until July 1942, and I could also given you details of the planned Sealion operations, again with the vessels intended to be used. I was waiting to see what sort of reply you came up with.

The research sections of the forum are meant for persons who are fairly well-informed on the topics being discussed, and our discussions are not directed at the lowest common denominator of readership. Rural customs of discourse, such as feigned ignorance, pettifogging, playing at peek-a-boo, or "stonewalling" denials of facts well-known to most informed persons, are strongly disfavored here.

If you have such information, this is where it should be posted up for the information of others...http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=121850

..you seem to be assuming that ONLY the t-boats would be laying mines??? Even historically, in what little mining WAS done in the Channel in September 1940, this wasn't the case...

The highlighted section above is your original quote. I made no such assumption, and as I said before the implication is entirely in your own mind.

I did not say that the Kriegsmarine would not be able to escort the minelayers, I said that they wouldn't be able to provide much of an escort.

I did not say that the destroyers would not wish to escort minelayers. You referred to destroyers laying mines and then protecting T boats still carrying them. My point was that there was no need to do this when both classes of vessels had the speed to escape without the need to give battle.

I did not say that protecting the Kriegsmarine's minelaying capability had little purpose. The reference was to a hit & run raid by destroyers & possibly T boats, when I said that risking 10% of the Kriegsmarine's total destroyer force was not a wise course of action.

The nightly destroyer patrols were not a conflicting call on the anti-invasion destroyers, they were an essential part of the their anti-invasion duties.

You posted a comment which said that the minelays in September were mainly by unescorted T Boats. I simply provided the list of the seven operations to show you that they weren't. It is hardly a big deal, simply a statement of fact. Please don't worry about it.

None were detected, largely because the only big lay was inout in the North Sea, the others were small hit & run raids similar to those of the previous winter. Nuisance lays, but tiny compared to what would have been required, but of course never attempted, for Sealion.

I wish you would get out of this habit of attributing to me things I haven't said, or wilfully misinterpreting things I have said. It is rather tedious and I suspect I am not the only one to have noticed it, although obviously as the victim I am the most amused.

By the way, as I asked before, and you ignored, is there anything, anything at all, that you think the RN was good at, or even competent at, in 1940?

[Kitchener]

I hope that this last entry is incorrect. If it isn't than my respect for Mr. Lavery has gone down a notch or two.

Actually, Clan Monroe & Moidart (not Clan Moidart) were indeed sunk by mines, but on 29 July not 29 June.

As the minefield in question was laid by an 'S' boat, capable of 40 knots, and as MTB 28, an early Vosper boat, was also capable of 40 knots perhaps her failure to intercept should not be seen as all that significant, especially since her total gun armament was 2 pairs of 0.5 inch machine guns.

Doubtless, had the layer been a mercantile conversion, capable of half her speed, she could have found a profitable use for her two 21 inch fish.

I do hope this is a misquotation, not simply an error in the book, as I expected better of Brian Lavery than this!

P.234...

In late June in Nore Command area,

"A large new minefield was revealed when "Clan Monroe" and "Clan Moidart" were mined on the 29th and it is significant that suspected minelayer was sighted by MTB 28 in the early hours of the 30th...26 mines were swept in this area between 27th and 31st. Some of these mines were of a smaller type weighing approaximately 1,000lbs which might have been laid by E-boat. Twenty-eight magnetic mines were exploded during the period, nine in the Humber area, eight in the harwich area and ten in the Sheerness area."

The reference the the paragraph extract is ADM 199/375. The June reference is as printed. It could of course be an editorial flub.

Equally - the "during the period" comment may indicate that this was a log, diary, or reporting period running from late June to late July...

Whatever. A quick look in HMSO Publication 'British vessels lost at Sea' or John Young's 'Britain's Sea War - A diary of Ship losses, 1939-1945' would have been a good idea.

And the second ship still wasn't called 'CLAN' Moidart.

[phylo_roadking]

You posted a comment which said that the minelays in September were mainly by unescorted T Boats. I simply provided the list of the seven operations to show you that they weren't. It is hardly a big deal, simply a statement of fact. Please don't worry about it.

If you care to check back, you'll find I posted up someone else's comment from earlier in the thread. Which is why I put it in italics and in quotations...AND gave you a link to the earlier post :roll:

Whatever. A quick look in HMSO Publication 'British vessels lost at Sea' or John Young's 'Britain's Sea War - A diary of Ship losses, 1939-1945' would have been a good idea

Perhaps checking ADM 199/375 would be better, to see where/what the paragraph was extracted from?

By the way, as I asked before, and you ignored, is there anything, anything at all, that you think the RN was good at, or even competent at, in 1940?

Yes.

None were detected, largely because the only big lay was inout in the North Sea, the others were small hit & run raids similar to those of the previous winter. Nuisance lays, but tiny compared to what would have been required, but of course never attempted, for Sealion.

The first two utilised minelayers escorted by 3 destroyers, 4 Wolf/Mowes, and 4 T Boats in the first case, and by 4 T boats in the second.

The third lay involved 5 Wolf/Mowes and 3 T Boats.
The fourth was by 4 T Boats.
The fifth was by 4 T Boats.
The sixth was by seven destroyers,
The seventh was by 4 Wolf/Mowes.

The point however was they DID happen without detection I take it? Let alone loss? And yet, unlike the previous autumn/winter - there were a number of nightly RN destroyer patrols out looking for enemy shipping that managed not to encounter them...

I did not say that the Kriegsmarine would not be able to escort the minelayers, I said that they wouldn't be able to provide much of an escort.

I did not say that protecting the Kriegsmarine's minelaying capability had little purpose. The reference was to a hit & run raid by destroyers & possibly T boats, when I said that risking 10% of the Kriegsmarine's total destroyer force was not a wise course of action.

And yet they DID provide seven of the KM's scarce destroyers as you note, and several T-boats....for such "lowlevel" operations. That would indicate that the KM's view of what was a wise course of action as of September 1940 is perhaps not the same as your opinion of the KM's wisdom.

You were the one who suggested that they would give battle, although heaven alone knows why they should want to. The point I was making was an obvious one, i.e., that using minelayers with maximum speeds of 20 -22 knots the Germans did not have the same luxury. In such circumstances, whatever escort was present, and it wouldn't have been much, they would have to give battle, and the mercantile conversions which made up most of the German minelaying force would have been horribly exposed. I appreciate that you are now in 'arguing for the sake of it' mode, but surely you cannot deny this?

Actually - that's been my point all along for the last several pages - the KM escorts would have to act as escorts....and HAVE to give battle. It just didn't seem for some time as if you agreed, that they wouldn't actually have the luxury of choice in the matter! :roll:

The nightly destroyer patrols were not a conflicting call on the anti-invasion destroyers, they were an essential part of the their anti-invasion duties.

I wasn't actually making another comment on all that - I was JUST referring you back to THAT part of the discussion, where the many and various nightly patrols were discussed :roll:

I wish you would get out of this habit of attributing to me things I haven't said, or wilfully misinterpreting things I have said.

I take from the the meaning as appears on the screen in front of me. I don't need or want to "wilfully" misinterpret what you say. If you actually mean something different from what your post content manages to put across when read by another person - perhaps YOU should review what you've typed a few times before posting it...remembering that you're posting for the information of other people, not just yourself.

[Kitchener]

And yet they DID provide seven of the KM's scarce destroyers as you note, and several T-boats....for such "lowlevel" operations. That would indicate that the KM's view of what was a wise course of action as of September 1940 is perhaps not the same as your opinion of the KM's wisdom.

Who said they were low level operations? Again, not me. They were the kind of hit & run raids that a small naval power has always made against a larger one. John Paul Jones' raids on the British homeland during the American War of Independence being a prime example.

The purpose of the minelaying operations in winter 1939/40 was to disrupt allied shipping, and sink a few ships. With some luck, the small fields might get a warship or two. They were decidedly not intended to bring about a naval engagement with RN destroyers, which is why the destroyers, T boats, and S boats used dropped their mines and then returned home as quickly as possible.

There is no similarity at all between these raids and the sustained effort which would have been required to lay the Sealion fields. There is even less similarity betweer a fast raid by a high quality force of regular warships, and a long drawn out operation involving slower vulnerable specialist layers.

Similarly, there is all the difference in the world between detecting such raids, generally involving four or five vessels with freedom to hit at any point around the British Isles, and detecting large numbers of barge units forming up into columns outside ports where the British already knew them to be.

All this is obvious, and were you not apparently intent upon picking a quarrel at every opportunity I think you would see it.

[Kitchener]

APOLOGIES GENTLEMEN

Having reviewed the posts on this thread over the last few days, it has become apparent that it has degenerated into an unedifying round of to and fro, in which Mr. Roadtrain appears to find it necessary to disagree with everything I post, or rather to disagree with everything he claims that I have posted, almost as a matter of principle or a knee jerk reaction.

If any of you have had the stamina to plod through this dross, I am sure you have already formed your own opinion, and I am happy to let you decide for yourselves the truth of it.

The inevitable conclusion, however, is that the thread is currently going round in circles. I (perhaps unwisely) point out to Mr. Roadking where he has misquoted me (whether deliberately or otherwise I know not) and he responds with a further series of misquotes. The nonsense about T boats and minelaying, and the things I have apparently 'implied' being the most obvious case in point.

Therefore, you will no doubt be ecstatic to discover that, after one more post, I intend to waste no more time upon him, but to leave him to his singular views on the events surrounded the events of the summer of 1940. Again, I have no doubt that you are all perfectly capable of determining whose arguments are the more valid.

[Kitchener]

Throughout this thread I must say how much I have enjoyed Mr. Roadking’s posts, and especially the recent reference to my ‘rose-tinted’ views. Perhaps I am, and I leave it to others to judge, but I find it particularly amusing, coming from someone whose own opinions are myopic in the extreme.

As best I can recall, there has been no reference at all to any problems that the German side of the Sealion scenario might have encountered. It appears that everything on the German side would have gone more or less like clockwork. Problems forming up outside the invasion ports – never mentioned. Towlines parting en route, or mechanical breakdown, both of which would potentially have disrupted the unwieldy barge trains – not a word. Rogue mines entering the invasion convoy lanes – nothing. Slow speed, unseaworthiness of the barges – not really. Chronic shortage of escorts – never mentioned. Problems laying the minefields – far from it, this would bring about a maritime Battle of Britain, in which the British would apparently lose valuable vessels, assuming that they even detected the minelayers at all.

In short, the German plan, it appears, would go like clockwork.

Now, let us consider his view of the British side. Apparently, the destroyers and cruisers etc., shown on the Pink List for 16 September as being in the area are in fact an exaggeration. Many would not have been there at all, having been sent away on nebulous unspecified other duties just as the threat became most acute. (Just a thought, perhaps my rose-tinted view comes from referring to the Pink List!). Even those which were there, and carried out regular nightly patrols, didn’t really matter, because they would probably not have spotted the invasion convoys anyway, and even if they did would not have realised what they were. Furthermore, it might have been foggy, a problem which would clearly have hampered the destroyer patrols, but obviously not the barge convoys.

During the ten nights of German minelaying, either the RN would not have detected this at all, or if they did would have been drawn into a maritime Battle of Britain in which both sides would have suffered heavy losses. Mr. Roadking had not at the time of writing vouchsafed his ideas of what escorts the Kriegsmarine would (or could) have provided, but clearly, should the losses have been equal, the British would have been badly hurt by the loss of, for example, two destroyers (out of 116 operational in Home Waters), whereas the Kriegsmarine would barely have noticed the loss of a similar number (out of 7 operational in 1940). The fact that in late September 1940 the RN had 698 minesweepers in commission appears to be sublimely irrelevant.

Similarly, the German sweepers clearing paths through the British fields would almost certainly pass wholly undetected.
Eventually, even after the British had failed to identify the barge trains for what they were, had ignored sigint traffic and reports from sympathisers in French & Belgian ports, and had disregarded air reconnaissance, it would finally dawn on them, presumably some time after the landings had taken place, that ‘something was up’ At that point, Admiral Drax at the Nore, despite the fact that his vessels had been carrying out nightly patrols along the French coast throughout September, would immediately despatch his entire command out into the North Sea!

Those British vessels which had, presumably, got lost and accidentally encountered German invasion forces before dawn would then immediately return to home ports, because obviously discretion is the better part of valour, and they certainly could not fire at any German surface vessel whilst the Luftwaffe is in the area! So what if the Germans are landing on the South coast, the RN captains would have been determined to get out of the way back to port. Clearly, during the eleven days during which the towing vessels were shuttling back and forth with a series of barges bringing the rest of the first wave, the weather would have been perfect for the Luftwaffe, and the sea would have been calm as a mill pond.

Please forgive the sarcasm, but I am finding Mr. Roadking’s insistence in British incompetence and stupidity in all things naval quite amusing, although the thread seems to be going round in a circle, in imminent danger of disappearing up its own .....

In short, as my old tutor, Professor M R D Foot, used to say when presented with a particularly bizarre presentation: ‘Are you really convinced that, on the basis of the available evidence, your theory is wholly tenable?’

Mr. Roadking, on the basis of the available evidence, are you really convinced that your theory is wholly tenable?

Needless to say, I won’t be asking my publishers to send you a copy of my recent book.

[LWD]

Cleared paths woud have to be marked for the destroyers to be able to use them at night. Buoys are going to be equally visible to the KM as to the RN...

If the KM looks. On the other hand even if they spot them will they necessarily know what they mean

They would for instance know they hadn't put them there...!

Indeed but what would a one mean? Any of the following are possible:
1) This is the center of a cleared channel.
2) This is one side of a cleared channel.
3) There may be mines around here.
4) Start sweeping here.
5) Stop sweeping here.
6) There's a navigational hazard here.
7) Adjust your course at this point.
8) This one is placed for disinformational purposes.

How exactly for entry at night? They can hardly for instance locate them by triagulating on various landmarks on either side of the Channel...by night!

Radio beacons or lights would be two ways. They need only be turned on when needed.

Mine laying by aircraft was not particularly accurate from what I've read.

As far as the Germans are concerned - it doesn't NEED to be. They aren't the ones going to be worried by random mining by air at night...

They aren't going to be very good at closing a gap in the fields though are they?

They don't actually need to SEE the British transiting any swept channel - if an RN destroyer actually manage to engage any element of the invasion flotillas...don't you think it's an easy assumption to make that they've got through the minefields???

Not really. The mine fields from what I recall didn't completely close off the channel. Even if they did a DD making it through the fields doesn't mean that an opening has been swept. Furthermore it gives no clue where the opening is. This is rather critical since mines were in short supply. As mentioned in the mining thread it's not even clear they had enough to lay a single thing line for the planned "fields".

As I've noted before - the issue isn't IF the British get through...it's how long it takes for them to do so vs. they having to clear the area by daylight.

Do they? Why? For instance they could arrange to meet the mine sweepers at the field and follow them through. Or if the sweepers sweep a broad enough channel they could just rely on navigational aids to make it through. Then there's a very good chance that the Germans won't be able to lay all the fields as planned. I'm also not sure about British SONAR or ASDIC if you prefer at the time but I remember reading that during the invasion of Sicily US vessels used theirs to navigate through mine fields.

I don't imagine we'd even see minesweeper vs T-boat engagments or if we did it wouldn't be very often. We would see British destroyers vs T-boats and other German vessels however.

Although as noted above - they're as likely to have encountered German destryers as T-boats or converted minelayers...

And what do they do if engaged? If they still have mines on board to they jettison them? or do they head back to harbor with them? Considering that some of the mine layers in particular the big ones can't out run the RN DDs I would expect the warships to at least try and cover thier retreat. Just one action and you are likely to see at least a few of the German minelayers out of action for several critical days.

Or not. If they trade even on destroyers the Germans run out of destroyers long before the British. The British may not be exactly happy with the result at least at the time but it's impact on the invasion is definitely a plus for the British.

Not Really. See Mountbatten's comment again - the issue isn't whether the RN engages the invasion flotillas or not...it's how much damage they can do. Fewer destroyers means quite literally a smaller capacity to impact (sic) the invasion fleets.

If German combat vessels are lost on an equal tonnage basis I'm not sure it's the case. Again look to Crete where in one case a single Italian warship managed to save several cargo/troop ships. If he wasn't there then the absence of one RN destroyer in the attacking force wouldn't have saved any of those vessels.

But were those critical to the success of an operation? And they weren't opposed by the RN either were they?

But given the importance of the minelaying operations to Sealion....vs. the importance of Sealion as a whole - do you really see the loss of one or two...or three or four...as halting the mining operations OR the invasion???

The loss of of several might well mean that the already ambitious mine laying operation simply couldn't meet it's goals. Whether or not Sea Lion goes ahead is hard to say since historically it didn't even get this far. Note that the loss of those vessels may well impact some of the mine sweeping also deemed necessary for Sea Lion and it will as noted reduce the number of escorts for the invasion convoys. When you some it all up it doesn't look good for the Germans.

The Sea Lion mining thread indicates that the minelaying for Sea Lion would have been considerably more extensive than the Germans were used to in such a short period.

Actually - I don't recall that particular aspect being discussed; and the September/October 1939 mining of the Baltic channels showed that the KM could lay mines at a HUGE rate and number.[/qutoe]
For those interested here's the thread:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=121850
The mineing capacity is discussed in the first few pages. As for the Baltic fields what was the opposition like? I remember reading up on the North Sea Barrage of WWI. Mine layers went out in convoy and one layed until empty and another took over. They mined in daylight with no opposition. Hardly comparable to the Sea Lion fields.

Personally speaking I find it vastly more significant that MTB spotted but could not intercept the minelayer in question!

But a single fast mine layer laying a few mines is a very different matter to laying large fields on consecutive nights isn't it?

[Gooner1]

Doesn't matter; whatever ships at sea are firing on whatever unobserved targets indirectly REQUIRE fire direction onshore...and this is what Forbes refused to do, exercise this with the Army...

Thus the defenders in the case of Sealion are as likely to be hit by the RN's "random" shore bombardment as the Germans on shore....

Oh, I see. The Royal Navy, in your view, will steam into the invasion area, ignore all the German ships, barges and tugs milling about and proceed to unleash their armament on the English countryside

Read Lavery.
(And as a P.S. - as well as ALL the issues that Lavery discusses with regards to this...the RAF wasn't actually particularly GOOD at hitting ground targets in the period, after all...)

Read Lavery in preference to actual historical documents?

As for the RAFs performance I think they contributed most to the destruction of 2 German Torpedo boats, 12 transports and 51 barges in September 1940 as well as damaging another 9 transports and 163 barges.

[Gooner1]

[q
I'm not sure who is seriously proposing the RN attack the invasion fleet during the day. Subs might have a good chance though and if promised sufficient CAP it might be useful.

Hmmm it might be better if you found someone who opposed the RN attacking the invasion fleet during the day.

I've never come across such a suggestion from the British side. Fighter Commands 'Invasion tasks', for instance, clearly state that their primary role in the event of a seaborne invasion was the protection of the navy.

[Kitchener]

Cleared paths woud have to be marked for the destroyers to be able to use them at night. Buoys are going to be equally visible to the KM as to the RN...

If the KM looks. On the other hand even if they spot them will they necessarily know what they mean

They would for instance know they hadn't put them there...!

Indeed but what would a one mean? Any of the following are possible:
1) This is the center of a cleared channel.
2) This is one side of a cleared channel.
3) There may be mines around here.
4) Start sweeping here.
5) Stop sweeping here.
6) There's a navigational hazard here.
7) Adjust your course at this point.
8) This one is placed for disinformational purposes.

How exactly for entry at night? They can hardly for instance locate them by triagulating on various landmarks on either side of the Channel...by night!

Radio beacons or lights would be two ways. They need only be turned on when needed.

Mine laying by aircraft was not particularly accurate from what I've read.

As far as the Germans are concerned - it doesn't NEED to be. They aren't the ones going to be worried by random mining by air at night...

They aren't going to be very good at closing a gap in the fields though are they?

They don't actually need to SEE the British transiting any swept channel - if an RN destroyer actually manage to engage any element of the invasion flotillas...don't you think it's an easy assumption to make that they've got through the minefields???

Not really. The mine fields from what I recall didn't completely close off the channel. Even if they did a DD making it through the fields doesn't mean that an opening has been swept. Furthermore it gives no clue where the opening is. This is rather critical since mines were in short supply. As mentioned in the mining thread it's not even clear they had enough to lay a single thing line for the planned "fields".

As I've noted before - the issue isn't IF the British get through...it's how long it takes for them to do so vs. they having to clear the area by daylight.

Do they? Why? For instance they could arrange to meet the mine sweepers at the field and follow them through. Or if the sweepers sweep a broad enough channel they could just rely on navigational aids to make it through. Then there's a very good chance that the Germans won't be able to lay all the fields as planned. I'm also not sure about British SONAR or ASDIC if you prefer at the time but I remember reading that during the invasion of Sicily US vessels used theirs to navigate through mine fields.

I don't imagine we'd even see minesweeper vs T-boat engagments or if we did it wouldn't be very often. We would see British destroyers vs T-boats and other German vessels however.

Although as noted above - they're as likely to have encountered German destryers as T-boats or converted minelayers...

And what do they do if engaged? If they still have mines on board to they jettison them? or do they head back to harbor with them? Considering that some of the mine layers in particular the big ones can't out run the RN DDs I would expect the warships to at least try and cover thier retreat. Just one action and you are likely to see at least a few of the German minelayers out of action for several critical days.

Or not. If they trade even on destroyers the Germans run out of destroyers long before the British. The British may not be exactly happy with the result at least at the time but it's impact on the invasion is definitely a plus for the British.

Not Really. See Mountbatten's comment again - the issue isn't whether the RN engages the invasion flotillas or not...it's how much damage they can do. Fewer destroyers means quite literally a smaller capacity to impact (sic) the invasion fleets.

If German combat vessels are lost on an equal tonnage basis I'm not sure it's the case. Again look to Crete where in one case a single Italian warship managed to save several cargo/troop ships. If he wasn't there then the absence of one RN destroyer in the attacking force wouldn't have saved any of those vessels.

But were those critical to the success of an operation? And they weren't opposed by the RN either were they?

But given the importance of the minelaying operations to Sealion....vs. the importance of Sealion as a whole - do you really see the loss of one or two...or three or four...as halting the mining operations OR the invasion???

The loss of of several might well mean that the already ambitious mine laying operation simply couldn't meet it's goals. Whether or not Sea Lion goes ahead is hard to say since historically it didn't even get this far. Note that the loss of those vessels may well impact some of the mine sweeping also deemed necessary for Sea Lion and it will as noted reduce the number of escorts for the invasion convoys. When you some it all up it doesn't look good for the Germans.

The Sea Lion mining thread indicates that the minelaying for Sea Lion would have been considerably more extensive than the Germans were used to in such a short period.

Actually - I don't recall that particular aspect being discussed; and the September/October 1939 mining of the Baltic channels showed that the KM could lay mines at a HUGE rate and number.[/qutoe]
For those interested here's the thread:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=121850
The mineing capacity is discussed in the first few pages. As for the Baltic fields what was the opposition like? I remember reading up on the North Sea Barrage of WWI. Mine layers went out in convoy and one layed until empty and another took over. They mined in daylight with no opposition. Hardly comparable to the Sea Lion fields.

Personally speaking I find it vastly more significant that MTB spotted but could not intercept the minelayer in question!

But a single fast mine layer laying a few mines is a very different matter to laying large fields on consecutive nights isn't it?

Good afternoon LWD,

Just to put things in perspective, by the time the field which sank Clan Monroe & Moidart had been swept, a process completed by 31 July, a total of 26 mines had been detected. It was a typical nuisance field, similar to those that German destroyers laid on eleven occasions in the winter of 1939-40. Hardly relevant to what the Sealion plans would have required!

[Kitchener]

Doesn't matter; whatever ships at sea are firing on whatever unobserved targets indirectly REQUIRE fire direction onshore...and this is what Forbes refused to do, exercise this with the Army...

Thus the defenders in the case of Sealion are as likely to be hit by the RN's "random" shore bombardment as the Germans on shore....

Oh, I see. The Royal Navy, in your view, will steam into the invasion area, ignore all the German ships, barges and tugs milling about and proceed to unleash their armament on the English countryside

Read Lavery.
(And as a P.S. - as well as ALL the issues that Lavery discusses with regards to this...the RAF wasn't actually particularly GOOD at hitting ground targets in the period, after all...)

Read Lavery in preference to actual historical documents?

As for the RAFs performance I think they contributed most to the destruction of 2 German Torpedo boats, 12 transports and 51 barges in September 1940 as well as damaging another 9 transports and 163 barges.

Afternoon Gooner1,

RAF light bombers began night raids on invasion ports on 5 September, and heavy bombers on 7 September. By the end of September they had destroyed 21 transports, 5 tugs, 3 motor boats, and 214 barges. Not enough to prevent Sealion, but enough to clarify Hitler's thinking somewhat. Continuing raids would mean increasing losses, and the invasion fleet must in consequence be used or largely lost. This factor, together with bigger ones ( the RN supremacy in the channel area, the inability of the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority, the deterioration in the weather, and the adverse effect on the European economy as a result of the missing barges ) led to the dispersal of the invasion fleet commencing early in October.

It also explains why any renewed threat from Spring 1941 would have been detected in good time by, among other sources, air reconnaissance, giving the RN ample time to recall their destroyers and cruisers from other duties and reconstitute the anti-invasion force.

[Kitchener]

As minefields and minelaying seem to be the in thing at present, I thought this might be of interest, as it is a list of the minelayers assembled for Sealion, together with their maximum speeds:

Western Group (Cherbourg)

Schiff 23 (ex Cairo) 14 knots.
Tannenberg 20 knots.
Cobra 16 knots.
Schwerin 15 knots.
Togo 12 knots.

Western Group (Le Havre)

Skaggerak 17 knots.
Stralsund 16 knots.

Eastern Group ( Ostend )

Konigin Luise 17 knots.
Preussen 15 knots.
Roland 17 knots.
Grille 26 knots.

Eastern Group (Antwerp)

Hansestadt Danzig 17 knots.
Brummer 22 knots.
Kaiser 16 knots.

Many were quite elderly, dating from WW1, so the maximum speeds may be optimistic.

Interestingly, the mines for the Ostend group were stored on railway wagons some distance south of the port, and would have been called forward in daylight, under air cover, when/if needed, rather than risk exposing laden minelayers to the risk of a bomb hit.

[LWD]

[q
I'm not sure who is seriously proposing the RN attack the invasion fleet during the day. Subs might have a good chance though and if promised sufficient CAP it might be useful.

Hmmm it might be better if you found someone who opposed the RN attacking the invasion fleet during the day. ...

Good point. I think I've been so blinded by the discussion of the night attacks I lost perspective on the daylight part. I do think that night attacks had a lot of promise perhaps even derailing the invasion on the shortly after the convoyes start out but you are correct with a decent CAP they could have had significant impact on the invasion force during dayligh hours as well.

[phylo_roadking]

LWD...

How exactly for entry at night? They can hardly for instance locate them by triagulating on various landmarks on either side of the Channel...by night!

Radio beacons or lights would be two ways. They need only be turned on when needed

An interesting thought, radio beacons....but did this technology exist in buoy form in the UK in 1940? And regarding BOTH types..."remote-switchable"??? Did THAT exist in a durable form?

Indeed but what would a one mean? Any of the following are possible:
1) This is the center of a cleared channel.
2) This is one side of a cleared channel.
3) There may be mines around here.
4) Start sweeping here.
5) Stop sweeping here.
6) There's a navigational hazard here.
7) Adjust your course at this point.
8) This one is placed for disinformational purposes.

Quite correct - but...

How DID the British mark the "Swept War Channels" in their minefields anyway?

The RN laid "marked" minefields...both real and fake...with marked channels through them for themselves...off Northern Norway in April 1940. How were THESE delineated?

I'm sure those two questions will be regarded by Kitchener as me being obtuse - but just for information, they're real questions I wouldn't mind finding out the answers to!

Mine laying by aircraft was not particularly accurate from what I've read.

As far as the Germans are concerned - it doesn't NEED to be. They aren't the ones going to be worried by random mining by air at night...

They aren't going to be very good at closing a gap in the fields though are they?

Actually they are, in a "psi-war ops" sort of way! Inasmuch as German aircraft flying low over minefields at night would be assumed at the time to the be laying mines, and the RN would have to re-sweep accordingly even if there was nothing there! They'd have to make sure there was nothing there...doing which, as I've noted before, takes time...

I'm sure once again Kitchener will regard that as an obtuse comment...but if he cares to check out Paul Lund and harry Ludlam's classic The Trawlers Go To War regarding the Royal Naval Patrol Service, on many an occasion the RNPS' mineclearing trawlers were sent out to sweep after lowflying aircraft that could have been dropping mines were heard near various ports overnight...

Not really. The mine fields from what I recall didn't completely close off the channel. Even if they did a DD making it through the fields doesn't mean that an opening has been swept. Furthermore it gives no clue where the opening is. This is rather critical since mines were in short supply. As mentioned in the mining thread it's not even clear they had enough to lay a single thing line for the planned "fields".

See the above comment. Also - look again at the map from Schenk I reproduced in that thread; in several places the planned small German minefields seem to have blocked vital sortie routes like the swept channels out through both sides of the Solent...which is rather inconvenient for Portsmouth's destroyers...

Do they? Why? For instance they could arrange to meet the mine sweepers at the field and follow them through.

Actually, I've always assumed they'd do that! I would doubt they'd sit in harbour waiting for the minesweepers to report "all clear"! However...

Or if the sweepers sweep a broad enough channel they could just rely on navigational aids to make it through.

...sweeping a channel THAT wide would take time.

Then there's a very good chance that the Germans won't be able to lay all the fields as planned.

IIRC there's a table in Schenk that lists the minefileds that "definitely" would be laid, and those the Germans regarded as "optional"...and the numbers and types of mines in each. However I don't recall that it contained ANY information regarding the order they'd be laid in! Though logic would say that fields like those blocking the Solent might have been right at the top of the priority list?

If German combat vessels are lost on an equal tonnage basis I'm not sure it's the case. Again look to Crete where in one case a single Italian warship managed to save several cargo/troop ships.

The issue of "combat loss ratio" brings up again something that was discussed very briefly many pages ago now, regarding the likely succes of RN coastal forces. Lavery notes that MTBs (on the East Coast, those under Nore Command?) made contact with German e-boats ten times during the second half of 1940; but while the RN coastal forcs in these clashes claimed six small enemy transport vessels sunk...they LOST four MTBs and two MLs in the process to both enemy action and accident! (ADM 1/18897)

As I've mentioned before - personally, I don't regard the issue of "equal tonnage" lost" as anywhere near as important as combat vessels and their capability for the defence being lost - be it RN vessels for the defence against invasion, or KM vessels for the defence of the invasion flotillas.

The loss of of several might well mean that the already ambitious mine laying operation simply couldn't meet it's goals. Whether or not Sea Lion goes ahead is hard to say since historically it didn't even get this far. Note that the loss of those vessels may well impact some of the mine sweeping also deemed necessary for Sea Lion and it will as noted reduce the number of escorts for the invasion convoys.

Here we come back to my answer above; exactly how did the Germans prioritise their minefield laying for Sealion??? I PRESUME they had a plan...perhaps if we ask Kitchener nicely he'll be able to answer this from his information on planned KM mining operations?

But a single fast mine layer laying a few mines is a very different matter to laying large fields on consecutive nights isn't it?

Logic would say that if two ships hit mines in that new field on the 29th....and the S-boat concerned was spotted on the 30th...that was AT LEAST the second time/night it had laid in that field!

[phylo_roadking]

Gooner...

Oh, I see. The Royal Navy, in your view, will steam into the invasion area, ignore all the German ships, barges and tugs milling about and proceed to unleash their armament on the English countryside

If, as per the Sandhurst simulation, the Germans DO manage to establish a large beachhead, no matter how badly supplied, in Kent and Sussex...and the RN does after several nights of action manage to break the "sea bridge" reinforcing and supplying that beachhead...

Are you seriously suggesting that the RN's destroyers, cruisers etc. wouldn't???

As a P.S....

Don't forget that Forbes' refusal in this dates to the July/August period...when it wasn't yet clear at all that the invasion wouldn't come in East Anglia! When he refused, it wasn't a case of getting the ships of Home Fleet trapped in the Channel Narrows and vulnerable to air attack etc., etc....it was ALSO a case of not being prepared to exercise in this for supporting the land forces ashore from the North Sea!

Read Lavery.
(And as a P.S. - as well as ALL the issues that Lavery discusses with regards to this...the RAF wasn't actually particularly GOOD at hitting ground targets in the period, after all...)

Read Lavery in preference to actual historical documents?

The "actual historical document" you posted up was the Army's orders for the RAF; Lavery discusses the issues and problems with carrying out those orders. There are some, you know!

As for the RAFs performance I think they contributed most to the destruction of 2 German Torpedo boats, 12 transports and 51 barges in September 1940 as well as damaging another 9 transports and 163 barges.

There's a difference between trying to bomb THIS from 5,000 feet...




...and THIS...