The British Response To Operation Sealion

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phylo_roadking
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#751

Post by phylo_roadking » 01 Jul 2013, 23:22

1) I'm not making any "assertions", since I wasn't there. I state what I believe to have been the case, based on the available evidence. Perhaps you would care to explain how mines could move
But you haven't given us any evidence for laying mines below the water line intentionally. I've asked...but instead you kept talking about unmarked fields or misplaced markers, or shifted mines, or corroded mines, or possible suicides etc., etc...

Whereas we've at least two references saying no.
2) You and Dunserving, by contrast, have been making a number of unsubstantiated assertions, such as that Lympne, the one airfield the Germans were actually planning to take in the initial assault, was by some incredible and unexplained coincidence the only undefended RAF airfield in the Kingdom.
Er....no; we've been noting that noone seems to KNOW or has bothered finding out yet what the July-September 1940 defences were or what units were assigned to protect it - only that with only a small RAF work party there mid-month, there wouldn't have been many RAF personnel to man the defences, if any...
"Digest of conversation that took place over the 'phone when Captain Denaro rang me up on Sunday the 22nd of September 1940 at 9.45 a.m.

Hullo. Is that Mr Cleave. Yes, who is that speaking? I am Captain Denaro of the Royal Engineers. Oh yes. About your letter. He said he would not remove the mines. I replied, surely they could be removed to a safer position? He said, he would have the position surveyed. I told him the matter was most urgent, and had counted 13 strewn over the foreshore immediately opposite my house, laying loose and washed about by the tide, and further said, when his men were laying the mines, I pointed out the position in which they were being set would prove a menace, as the battering they would receive from a high tide, and a strong wind, coupled with the further risk of any flotsam and jetsam striking them, would explode them. He said I did not understand the position, and he intended to guard the whole coast. I replied I quite agreed and understood about taking every precaution against an enemy, but he surely did not seriously anticipate, out of the hundreds of miles surrounding the British Isles, the enemy would pick on my 200 feet of foreshore for his invasion plan, and even if he did, the mines would be no deterrent, as they would have already exploded and have done their damage, not to Jerry, but to me. He laughed, and said, they may land anywhere. I replied, yes, but surely the end you are endeavouring to attain, could be so attained without having my property periodically damaged. He asked if I was nervous. I said no, and had yet to learn that objecting to one's house and home being blown up was a symptom of nervousness, but was apprehensive of having my home blown to blazes. I told him on two seperate occasions mines had explided, and it was not altogether enjoyable expecting at every high tide for more to go off, and I did most strongly object to being blown up by my own people. He suggested I should let the matter drop, and say no more about it, to which I replied, I most certainly did not intend to let the matter drop. He said my letter had threatened him, and although he did not like turning people out of their homes, if I persisted, he would ask for a compulsory evacuation. I replied we had been asked to stick it, and we were going to stick it, and the leaving of the premises would in no way prevent more damage as the matter was at present. I again urged that the mines be removed from the immediate vicinity, and failing this, could they not be properly secured to prevent accidental explosion, but because I lodged a legitimate complaint, to threaten me with expulsion, was only bucking the question, and to adopt such an attitude was quite untenable. He again said he would have the position surveyed."
Er....that's not proof that the Army intentionally laid mines below the storm high water mark - that's an anecdote showing that A LOCAL knew where the storm high water mark was....and the Army DIDN'T :lol: That they did it accidently....and ended up with their mines bared and rolling loose in the surf... :P
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#752

Post by Gooner1 » 02 Jul 2013, 11:16

phylo_roadking wrote: If you look back - I've already said that.
You clearly did not understand what you were typing. :roll:
But HE wasn't in command, he worked to the Duty Controller.
The Group Captain worked to his Duty Controller subordinate? :lol: That has to be one of the maddest things you have written yet :lol:


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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#753

Post by phylo_roadking » 02 Jul 2013, 19:26

You clearly did not understand what you were typing.
I see where the confusion came in; if you actually look back you'll note I said that Lavery's account was that the senior RAF officer...not the senior officer, just the senior RAF officer...was the Air Staff Officer, who was C-in-C Bomber Command's repesentative...and was indeed a Group Captain at the Central Combined Ops Room...but it was the Duty Controller(s) who ran the Ops Room, and HE worked to Control Combined Ops Room, not the ASO.
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#754

Post by Gooner1 » 03 Jul 2013, 14:29

phylo_roadking wrote: I wouldn't have expected anything else than an infantry attack clearing any dugouts/post on the slope :wink: But don't forget - the Germans can put whatever they have ashore against it in order to open the way to Folkestone...while the defenders don't have any real way to reinforce it...unless any of the counterattacking forces should break through right to the coast.
?! You think a few dugouts are all there is defending Folkestone? Have a look at Knouterer's posts on the likely garrison defending the area.

Why can the British not reinforce the area, and what do you think they have to breakthrough?

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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#755

Post by Knouterer » 03 Jul 2013, 16:12

Re: the defences of Folkestone: the Shorncliffe Garrison was probably some 7,000-8,000 strong (rough estimate based on R.A.S.C. reports on the number of mouths to feed in the area plus the fact that Shorncliffe Camp, which normally should be able to hold 5,000 men at least, was overflowing and many troops were billeted in empty houses in Hythe and Folkestone). These were mostly traning units: RE, stevedores (Docks Operating Group), 6th Cavalry Training Regiment, and so on. These numbers do not include troops of 1st (London) Division in the vicinity.
Troops of the 17th I.D. landing on the right flank would first be confronted with staff and pupils of the Small Arms School defending their own ranges, perhaps 500-600 men (quite possibly more), all officers and NCOs, with shooting skills ranging from above average to phenomenal, and well supplied with light machine guns (including obsolete/obsolescent types).
Source: mainly Frederick Myatt's History of the Small Arms School Corps (SASC).
I would assume that the Martello Towers were occupied (as elsewhere) and I vaguely remember reading that there is a concrete wall with loopholes still standing there somewhere.
There was a number of pillboxes along the promenade towards Sandgate (some imaginatively camouflaged) which were quickly removed as "eyesores" after the war.
Of course the units mentioned above were not well equipped, but in terrain like this even relatively untrained troops only armed with rifles, if determined to stand their ground, would cause serious losses to an attacker.
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#756

Post by Dunserving » 03 Jul 2013, 20:09

Knouterer wrote:Re: the defences of Folkestone: the Shorncliffe Garrison was probably some 7,000-8,000 strong (rough estimate based on R.A.S.C. reports on the number of mouths to feed in the area plus the fact that Shorncliffe Camp, which normally should be able to hold 5,000 men at least, was overflowing and many troops were billeted in empty houses in Hythe and Folkestone).

5,000 in Shorncliffe? I'll admit it is all of 8 years since I was last inside Shorncliffe, but that number seems a bit of a stretch even including St Martins Plain (nice place) and Dibgate (not a nice place). Presumably a lot were living under canvas as while there is plenty of space there ain't that much accommodation.

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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#757

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Jul 2013, 20:12

I wouldn't have expected anything else than an infantry attack clearing any dugouts/post on the slope But don't forget - the Germans can put whatever they have ashore against it in order to open the way to Folkestone...while the defenders don't have any real way to reinforce it...unless any of the counterattacking forces should break through right to the coast.

?! You think a few dugouts are all there is defending Folkestone?
Straw man.
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#758

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Jul 2013, 20:18

Re: the defences of Folkestone: the Shorncliffe Garrison was probably some 7,000-8,000 strong (rough estimate based on R.A.S.C. reports on the number of mouths to feed in the area plus the fact that Shorncliffe Camp, which normally should be able to hold 5,000 men at least, was overflowing and many troops were billeted in empty houses in Hythe and Folkestone).
Yes - I meant to address those "estimates" earier - I take you realise what "estimate" means? That they could feed x-number of men....not that they WERE feeding them.
Troops of the 17th I.D. landing on the right flank would first be confronted with staff and pupils of the Small Arms School defending their own ranges, perhaps 500-600 men (quite possibly more), all officers and NCOs, with shooting skills ranging from above average to phenomenal, and well supplied with light machine guns (including obsolete/obsolescent types).
How big physically do you think the Small Arms school was?
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Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#759

Post by Urmel » 03 Jul 2013, 21:56

Dunserving wrote:
Knouterer wrote:Re: the defences of Folkestone: the Shorncliffe Garrison was probably some 7,000-8,000 strong (rough estimate based on R.A.S.C. reports on the number of mouths to feed in the area plus the fact that Shorncliffe Camp, which normally should be able to hold 5,000 men at least, was overflowing and many troops were billeted in empty houses in Hythe and Folkestone).

5,000 in Shorncliffe? I'll admit it is all of 8 years since I was last inside Shorncliffe, but that number seems a bit of a stretch even including St Martins Plain (nice place) and Dibgate (not a nice place). Presumably a lot were living under canvas as while there is plenty of space there ain't that much accommodation.
This link has a brigade minus one battalion, plus two coys of RE and one field regiment based at Shorncliffe in 1939/1940:

http://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk ... _1939_.pdf
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#760

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Jul 2013, 22:14

This link has a brigade minus one battalion...
I was reading THIS footnote...
This battalion left the brigade on 3rd May 1940, transferring to 132nd Brigade in 44th
Division. It was replaced on the 4th May 1940 by:
1st/6th Bn. The East Surrey Regiment
which transferred in from 132nd Brigade
.
...as meaning a change in the 3rd battalion assigned to 10th Brigade, rather than it being removed entirely? 8O
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 03 Jul 2013, 22:21, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#761

Post by Urmel » 03 Jul 2013, 22:18

Probably. I didn't read it that closely, since I fundamentally don't care. :)
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#762

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Jul 2013, 22:34

However, I see what you mean -
The was a regular brigade and was based at Shorncliffe. The battalions comprising the
brigade were also based at Shorncliffe, with the exception of the 2nd Beds and Herts
which was based at Gravesend.
So two plus the various ancillaries mentioned - IF the 1st/6th Bn.The East Surrey Regiment that replaced the 2nd Beds and Herts in May 1940 was also physically based at Gravesend.
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#763

Post by Knouterer » 04 Jul 2013, 12:59

Interesting as all this info may be in itself, it's not very relevant for the situation by the end of September 1940, because all the units mentioned, with the entire 4th Division, were long gone from the Shorncliffe area by that time.
They were somewhere in Southern Command, i.e. west of Portsmouth, if I'm not mistaken.
Last edited by Knouterer on 04 Jul 2013, 19:46, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#764

Post by Knouterer » 04 Jul 2013, 13:23

phylo_roadking wrote:
Re: the defences of Folkestone: the Shorncliffe Garrison was probably some 7,000-8,000 strong (rough estimate based on R.A.S.C. reports on the number of mouths to feed in the area plus the fact that Shorncliffe Camp, which normally should be able to hold 5,000 men at least, was overflowing and many troops were billeted in empty houses in Hythe and Folkestone).
Yes - I meant to address those "estimates" earier - I take you realise what "estimate" means? That they could feed x-number of men....not that they WERE feeding them.
Troops of the 17th I.D. landing on the right flank would first be confronted with staff and pupils of the Small Arms School defending their own ranges, perhaps 500-600 men (quite possibly more), all officers and NCOs, with shooting skills ranging from above average to phenomenal, and well supplied with light machine guns (including obsolete/obsolescent types).
How big physically do you think the Small Arms school was?
I can see we're off again for five pages' worth of endless nitpicking about meaningless details, deliberate obfuscation, wilful misunderstandings, etc. etc.

My ESTIMATES are based on the FEEDING STRENGTHS reported by the R.A.S.C. Are you seriously suggesting that those numbers had nothing to do with the numbers of men they were actually providing for ??? Sounds like you have uncovered a major corruption scandal. Maybe you should open a new thread about that?

How big do I think the SAS "physically" was ??? What sort of question is that ??? How big do YOU think it was in 1940?

I KNOW that it was big enough to run courses for at least 250 officers and NCO's simultaneously in the 1930s;
I KNOW that "„The strength of the SASC (that is, Instructors) at Hythe in September 1939 was thirty-nine, but this was increased fairly rapidly, partly by the recall of reservists and partly by the compulsory transfer of the best of the Infantry students.” (Myatt)
I MUST ASSUME that on the outbreak of war the number of students increased fairly rapidly as well;
I KNOW that in later anti-invasion plans (Cinderella) the strength of the SAS was put at 800;
And on the basis of all that 500-600 (including support staff) seems a reasonable, indeed modest, assumption.

Since as we know the archives are far from complete, we'll have to make reasonable assumptions here and there, if we want to get anywhere.

Last quote on the SAS:

„After the fall of France in 1940 Hythe was very much in the front line; hit and run raids by German bombers became more and more frequent, and students and staff found themselves spending far too much time in manning the defences, many of these being the original ones built against Napoleon nearly a century and a half before. All this extra-curricular activity had a serious effect on training, so towards the end of 1940 (November - Knouterer) the School was moved to Bisley.”
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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Re: The British Response To Operation Sealion

#765

Post by Knouterer » 04 Jul 2013, 20:17

Dunserving wrote:
Knouterer wrote:Re: the defences of Folkestone: the Shorncliffe Garrison was probably some 7,000-8,000 strong (rough estimate based on R.A.S.C. reports on the number of mouths to feed in the area plus the fact that Shorncliffe Camp, which normally should be able to hold 5,000 men at least, was overflowing and many troops were billeted in empty houses in Hythe and Folkestone).

5,000 in Shorncliffe? I'll admit it is all of 8 years since I was last inside Shorncliffe, but that number seems a bit of a stretch even including St Martins Plain (nice place) and Dibgate (not a nice place). Presumably a lot were living under canvas as while there is plenty of space there ain't that much accommodation.
I freely admit I've never been there but it seems a safe bet that 8 years ago Shorncliffe Camp looked a bit different from 1940. I believe the MoD has sold off quite a bit of land over the years. I have a travel guide (Ward Lock's) of South-East Kent dating from the 1950s (not a cast-iron source of course ...) which states that there were "permanent barracks, which will afford accomodation for 5,000 men, but during the summer the forces at the Camp number many more, a large portion being under canvas."
Anyway, here's a Luftwaffe photo of Shorncliffe, allegedly taken in 1940, in which all structures supposed to be of military interest are carefully marked by the German photo interpreter.
Attachments
Shorncliffe 001.jpg
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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