The British Response To Operation Sealion

[phylo_roadking]

Phylo ... I'm not aware of any "unsubstantiated claims". I have carefully explained, I think, that the numbers of men supplied from the RASC depots at Dover and Shorncliffe do not coincide with the strengths of the garrisons (Sub-areas) there, because said depots were also supplying units which were not part of those garrisons. Apart from that, the situation at the end of July was of course different from the situation two months later. What's so terribly difficult to understand about that?

As far as I'm concerned, a "feeding strength" of 9,500 for the wider Dover area at the end of July tallies very nicely with my personal estimate - based on the units we know were there - of a garrison strength of 8,000 two months later.

Given that you're NOW admitting that there is indeed little sign of any direct link between feeding strengths and number of troops present, I'm somewhat suprised that you can't see that it's ridiculous to claim a link between the numbers YOU are estimating were present in the eastern half of Kent on July 30th....and the forces YOU claim were present there in mid-September 1940...without FIRST proving that there WAS indeed a direct link between "feeding strength" and numbers present, no matter where or what they were.

Without providing any proof that your original claim is correct - it's a bit ridiculous to claim that it shows your LATER estimates are correct because they tally so closely!

P.S. the "wider" Dover area??? Well I've heard of widening the goalposts, but...!

I see no sign in

"Feeding Strength of District:
Shorncliffe 10 850
Dover 9 250
Canterbury 12 200
Lenham 3 500
Tenterden 19 727...

....of the "Dover" figure being supposed to apply to a "wider Dover area"...

[phylo_roadking]

Moving along - but by NO means least....

In the meantime, I'm stil waiting for any definite info on the "huge number of females" allegedly serving at Dover in September 1940 ...

...whereas I'M still waiting for the number of female ATS drivers at Shorncliffe...and perhaps an explanation as to WHY you didn't realise they were there at all???

This latter is NOT me being obtuse As will become evident...

[Dunserving]

I’ve been going through the WD of the 134th Brigade defending the coast between Rye and Pevensey (WO 166/989). Re: our little discussion about Lympne airfield, I note that Operation Instruction No. 1 (14 May 1940) of this brigade contains the phrase: “The protection of aerodromes, and especially of unoccupied aerodromes, is to take priorities over all other tasks.”

I take it you HAVE checked a map again to find out where Rye <-> Pevensey is in relation to Lympne? As in....not the 134th Infantry Brigade's responsibility?

But I'm sure you're aware of chapter 5 of Fleming...

You're ABSOLUTELY right Phylo, Lympne was the responsiblity of the 2nd London Brigade, HQ in Postling. So I take it you have an Operational Instruction of that Brigade saying: "Contrary to what everyone else thinks, the protection of unoccupied aerodromes can safely be neglected"?

And that's the last time I react to a post that is no more than empty, senseless heckling.

If you actually take a walk around the former RAF Lympne it is not hard to see why, from a military point of view, the airfield was at the time in question not so much unoccupied as abandoned. The RAF didn't put any effort into guarding it - merely a small working party on site, so why be surprised if the Army at a local level deployed their resources where they could be of the greatest value. Regardless of existing orders, which were of course written in general terms, why should one empty field be heavily guarded when there are so many fields in the area? Remember it was just a grass field not an airfield like Manson, Kenley, Biggin Hill, and so many others.

[David Thompson]

It's time to wind up this unpleasant, now-uninformative and repetitious discussion. I'll give each of the participating posters one post to summarize their position and give the evidence for it; then I'm going to lock it. Please accomplish your mission in a single post, because after the first one, successive posts from the same poster will be deleted.

[Dunserving]

Phylo ... I'm not aware of any "unsubstantiated claims". I have carefully explained, I think, that the numbers of men supplied from the RASC depots at Dover and Shorncliffe do not coincide with the strengths of the garrisons (Sub-areas) there, because said depots were also supplying units which were not part of those garrisons. Apart from that, the situation at the end of July was of course different from the situation two months later. What's so terribly difficult to understand about that?

As far as I'm concerned, a "feeding strength" of 9,500 for the wider Dover area at the end of July tallies very nicely with my personal estimate - based on the units we know were there - of a garrison strength of 8,000 two months later.

Given that you're NOW admitting that there is indeed little sign of any direct link between feeding strengths and number of troops present, I'm somewhat suprised that you can't see that it's ridiculous to claim a link between the numbers YOU are estimating were present in the eastern half of Kent on July 30th....and the forces YOU claim were present there in mid-September 1940...without FIRST proving that there WAS indeed a direct link between "feeding strength" and numbers present, no matter where or what they were.

Without providing any proof that your original claim is correct - it's a bit ridiculous to claim that it shows your LATER estimates are correct because they tally so closely!

P.S. the "wider" Dover area??? Well I've heard of widening the goalposts, but...!

I see no sign in

"Feeding Strength of District:
Shorncliffe 10 850
Dover 9 250
Canterbury 12 200
Lenham 3 500
Tenterden 19 727...

....of the "Dover" figure being supposed to apply to a "wider Dover area"...

Oh come on Phylo!

You can't expect him to realise just how close together some of those places are!



My point is that it is most unwise to presume that your own interpretation of terms is also that which applied in the UK 70 years ago. It leads to misunderstanding the actual situation as has clearly happened here. It is also wrong to presume that military officers would stick slavishly to standing orders when the local tactical situation clearly demanded that officers lead rather than officers follow orders that are not entirely appropriate. The "Serve to Lead" motto of Sandhurst is a little bit of a clue.

As to females at Dover, I would suggest that any of you that might be interested should visit Dover Castle. You cannot miss it, big thing on one of the hills overlooking the town. The tunnels under it were part of the command structure and were mostly staffed by females (as was the underground hospital) and you will be told all about it while you are there. The were not keen on being cooped up underground for very long periods of time, and so went to the lavatory as often as they could get away with it. The lavatory was at the end of a little tunnel branching off a main tunnel that almost broke though the cliff face of the White Cliffs of Dover. It had a small window that gave the required ventilation, and which allowed the females to see the sky and breathe clean air. The called it "The loo with a view with a queue". Visit to find out the facts of just that one location in the town.

[phylo_roadking]

You're ABSOLUTELY right Phylo, Lympne was the responsiblity of the 2nd London Brigade, HQ in Postling. So I take it you have an Operational Instruction of that Brigade saying: "Contrary to what everyone else thinks, the protection of unoccupied aerodromes can safely be neglected"?

And that's the last time I react to a post that is no more than empty, senseless heckling.

I note that Operation Instruction No. 1 (14 May 1940) of this brigade contains the phrase: “The protection of aerodromes, and especially of unoccupied aerodromes, is to take priorities over all other tasks.”

As anyone who's read Fleming will know - as of events in Holland on the 10th of May, and earlier in Norway, the British went absolutely potty about the "threat from the air" and that within hours tens of thousands of parachutists would be dropping all over the UK. For a time that paranoia was rammed right up to the top of the Army's priorities.

Fleming discusses this period of paranoia regarding airborne attack in Chapter 5 of Operation Sealion - The Threat From ABOVE And The Threat From Within"...together with the period paranoia about fifth columnists. As we now know, a series of factors had greatly diminished the threat from the FJ...

But I would like Knouterer to illustrate if he can that...

I’ve been going through the WD of the 134th Brigade defending the coast between Rye and Pevensey (WO 166/989). Re: our little discussion about Lympne airfield, I note that Operation Instruction No. 1 (14 May 1940) of this brigade contains the phrase: “The protection of aerodromes, and especially of unoccupied aerodromes, is to take priorities over all other tasks.”

...that the 1st Batt. Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 6th and 8th Batts. the Devonshires did indeed cary out this particular task to the detriment neglect of all other tasks...

Equally - he still has to prove that the Royal Engineers did deliberately lay mines below the storm high water mark on threatened invasion beaches; as shown a few posts above and some many pages ago now - Knouterer presented one (1) anecdote even mentioning the high water mark issue - an anecdote that illustrated how badly the Royal Engineers did their job!

Knouterer has repeatedly claimed a "direct" link between the RASC's "feeding strength" in the eastern half of Kent" as of July 30th 1940; nothing he has presented to date as "proof" has shown this claim to be true - in fact, the on;y two "proofs" he presented showed the RASC planning forward for particular feeding strengths, NOT accounting for given numbers on a given day as he claimed.

He NOW claims that any difference between his "feeding strength" and the reality on the ground is because we don't know how many or what units were eating out of the RASC depot system in the eastern half of Kent - garrison or field units. But the nature of any unit doesn't matter when he hasn't provided an actual manpower total from any other source to confirm this "direct" link.

NOW he's ALSO claiming that there's a very close tally between the July 30th figures and his mid-September estimates...without even managing to show that his July 30th RASC-derived manpower estimates are correct! :roll:

Here's a hint - if you can't reconcile your estimates with the RASC's "feeding strength" successfully in July...don't even try to reconcile your own estimates for SEPTEMBER backwards with them!!! It really IS just compounding the error you've been trying to backpeddle on now for a few posts.

And Knouterer has yet to explain how he didn't know about the ATS-manned 20 MD Coy was even at Shorncliffe before it was brought to his attention...

...when 20 MD Coy was an RASC unit "manned" by the ATS! I'm somewhat amazed that he didn't pick up the existence of this unit and its posting at Shorncliffe from the RASC HQ war diary supposedly in his possession...


David, I was intending for some time to return to the strange issue of the RN's destroyer patrols and their apparent inability to spot German offensive mining operations...AND shipping movements!...despite the fact that they were actively patrolling the areas the Germans were mining, were patrolling in front of the ports they sorties from, were listening by ASDIC for the type of fast s-boats they used on several occasions, and that they missed the sailings into and back out of those "watched" ports by the SLOW minelayers the Germans would have used for the pre-Sealion minelaying operations...but I can do THAT on the seperate and still-open Sealion mining operations thread There's some VERY interesting facts that have come to light since that was discussed in THIS thread...

[RichTO90]

It's time to wind up this unpleasant, now-uninformative and repetitious discussion. I'll give each of the participating posters one post to summarize their position and give the evidence for it; then I'm going to lock it. Please accomplish your mission in a single post, because after the first one, successive posts from the same poster will be deleted.

Thank you David.

[Knouterer]

Infantry (Pioneer) Battalions: The term “Pioneer” at the time generally referred to unskilled labour, as distinct from trained Royal Engineers. The War Establishment provided for four rifle companies and a slimmed down HQ company with only HQ, signals, AA, pioneer and admin platoons, i.e. no carrier or mortar platoons. The rifle companies had 3 platoons of four sections with an officer or WO, a NCO and total of 45 or 46 other ranks. There were in total of 18 AT rifles and 16 LMGs (4 in the AA platoon). So 1 LMG and 1 ATR per platoon. These battalions generally were numbered in the 15-20 range.
There was also an “Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps”, a title later (Nov 1940) shortened to “Pioneer Corps”, consisting of older reservists and new recruits (militia) of lower medical categories. Eastern Command had about 30 Pioneer Companies (about 280 men each) in September 1940. These units were only partially armed (25% or so) and therefore of minimal to zero combat value, although of course they could have made themselves useful building field fortifications, repairing bomb damage to roads, and so on.

Pity about closing down the thread, I was just going to write something about the integration of Regular and Territorial units in 1939/40 that might conceivably have been of interest to one or two readers. But I have to agree that a civilized exchange of information (and perhaps even opinions ...) has become impossible in this thread. I seems that no matter what I write, certain people immediately start frothing at the mouth and keep it up for two pages (see above).

Oh and by the way, for those who are still confused about what "feeding strength" really means, here's a couple of extracts from the relevant British Army regulations now in force:

"CHAPTER 19 - ARMY CATERING ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
1905. AF F7751–Food & Accommodation Charges/Refunds-Nominal Roll & State. Each unit and mess (except TA who use pay sheets) is to maintain an AF F7751 in accordance with the instructions laid down in the Personnel Administration Manual. The AF F7751 identifies those entitled to be fed and for whom the caterer may claim. Units on OPS may use the daily PersRep in lieu of AF F7751. Units utilising the JPA system should have the HR manager provide to the unit caterer with the number of personnel paying the SFC or MUFC – this figure should be entered onto the AF F7764 as the basis of the feeding strength state JPA Bulletin 0705-020 dated 25 May 07 refers.
1906. AF F7764–Feeding Strength State. The purpose of AF F7764-Feeding Strength State is to provide the holder of the appropriate AF F7765-Food Income and Expenditure Account and the unit food account holder with feeding strengths, in order to calculate income from the DMR and also entitlements/abatements to supplements. The AF F7764 is the first document the unit caterer receives in the food accounting chain of events. It is compiled from the data recorded on the AF7751 or provided by the unit JPA HR Administrator and contains feeding strengths and entitlements/abatements to claims. The AF F7764 is to be completed by those responsible for maintaining an AF F7751 and sent daily to the holder(s) of the AF F7765. Instructions for completing the AF F7764 are shown below whilst a copy of the form is at Annex B.
1908. Feeding Strength. In column b of AF F7764 the entitlement is to be related to messes within the unit. Column c is to show the numbers to be fed that day, including those in the various messes receiving operational rations."

No mention anywhere in that form of "troops that could theoretically be fed" or "troops that may have to be fed at some future date".
So, in short, feeding strength does in fact mean what most reasonable persons, including me, would suppose that it means. I'm glad we got that out of the way at least.

[David Thompson]

A successive post from phylo_roadking was removed by the moderator pursuant to the thread closing warning posted at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1806079 - DT.

[David Thompson]

A "rah-rah" post from Gooner1, which added nothing of informational value to the discussion, was removed by this moderator - DT.

Having given 48 hours for one summation each from the active participants, the thread is now locked.