Movement of German Divisions to the Lodgement Area

[ljadw]

Hey, the gangs all here!

Shall we go for 30 pages this time?

if the divisions that nor were sent,could make the difference,the answer is uncertain(we don't know),but all is indicating,that they could not :they were not better than the divisions that were sent ,and these could not make the difference .

What is your definition of 'make a difference'?
Prolong the campaign or push the allies into the sea?

Pushing the allies in the sea,of course .
Because,if the campaign was prolonged,it would result in a German defeat (as it happened in reality) and not in an Allied defeat .

[Kingfish]

What is your definition of 'make a difference'?
Prolong the campaign or push the allies into the sea?

Pushing the allies in the sea,of course .
Because,if the campaign was prolonged,it would result in a German defeat (as it happened in reality) and not in an Allied defeat .

You do (or maybe you don't) understand that there was nothing the Germans could have done to produce this result, even if they knew Normandy was the only show in town?

Even when the allies were at their most vunerable to counterattack, the Germans were simply not strong enough to bounce them back to Portsmouth.

[Aber]

Allied estimate of relative divisional buildup (from Wilmot: The Struggle for Europe)

D+3
Allied 13
Germans 15

D+7
Allied 16
Germans 22 (including 10 Panzer)

D+10
Allied 18
Germans 27 (including 10 Panzer)

If the Germans had been able to achieve this, then pushing the allies into the sea might not have been impossible.

Options for the Germans would include:
- driving in the bridgehead to the east of the Orne
- attacking the US forces while they were split before Cherbourg was captured
- attacking towards Bayeux or Carentan to split teh brideghead.

[paspartoo]

Allied estimate of relative divisional buildup (from Wilmot: The Struggle for Europe)

D+3
Allied 13
Germans 15

D+7
Allied 16
Germans 22 (including 10 Panzer)

D+10
Allied 18
Germans 27 (including 10 Panzer)

If the Germans had been able to achieve this, then pushing the allies into the sea might not have been impossible.

Options for the Germans would include:
- driving in the bridgehead to the east of the Orne
- attacking the US forces while they were split before Cherbourg was captured
- attacking towards Bayeux or Carentan to split teh brideghead.

Two problems (minor ones ) :
1).A German div and an Allied div were very different.When Allies say x number of German div they probably mean ones at full strength.If you check ''Normandy 1944'' for strengths and compare to British estimate from ''British intelligence vol3 part 2'' you'll see they seriously overestimated almost all infantry divisions.
2).On D-day they landed 778 tanks (Rich is not saying how many other AFV's) .It took the Germans until 18 June to send more than that despite dispatching Pz units as quickly as possible...

[ljadw]

What is your definition of 'make a difference'?
Prolong the campaign or push the allies into the sea?

Pushing the allies in the sea,of course .
Because,if the campaign was prolonged,it would result in a German defeat (as it happened in reality) and not in an Allied defeat .

You do (or maybe you don't) understand that there was nothing the Germans could have done to produce this result, even if they knew Normandy was the only show in town?

Even when the allies were at their most vunerable to counterattack, the Germans were simply not strong enough to bounce them back to Portsmouth.

Well,this is what I am arguing since X posts :roll: :there was nothing the Germans could have done to produce this result (=push the allies in the sea),and,yet ,this is was the Fortitude boys are pretending(and what you and R .Anderson are defending):the whole claim about the role of fortitude,is that the Germans could push back the allies to the sea,but did not do this,because of the desinformation role of Fortitude .
I am saying :the Germans could not push back the allies to the sea,thus the role of Fortitude is irrelevant .
I hope this is clear .

[ljadw]

Allied estimate of relative divisional buildup (from Wilmot: The Struggle for Europe)

D+3
Allied 13
Germans 15

D+7
Allied 16
Germans 22 (including 10 Panzer)

D+10
Allied 18
Germans 27 (including 10 Panzer)

If the Germans had been able to achieve this, then pushing the allies into the sea might not have been impossible.

Options for the Germans would include:
- driving in the bridgehead to the east of the Orne
- attacking the US forces while they were split before Cherbourg was captured
- attacking towards Bayeux or Carentan to split teh brideghead.

Were there on D +10 10 Panzer on the Normandy front ? No.Why ? because there were no 10 operational Pz in France .
IN other words :why were the Germans not neen able to achieve this ? because there were no 10 operational Pz available .
And,I like this carefull sentence "then pushing the allies into the sea MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE" It seems that you are not sure that the Fortitude claim can be proved .

[Kingfish]

Well,this is what I am arguing since X posts :roll: :there was nothing the Germans could have done to produce this result (=push the allies in the sea),

The problem with your argument is that it is being made nearly 70 years later. How on June 6th are the Germans to know that everything they will do in Normandy is for naught and will end in disaster 2 months later?

and,yet ,this is was the Fortitude boys are pretending(and what you and R .Anderson are defending):the whole claim about the role of fortitude,is that the Germans could push back the allies to the sea,but did not do this,because of the desinformation role of Fortitude .

I love the way you make stuff up just to argue your point. Please provide a quote where I said the Germans could push the allies back into the sea.

[RichTO90]

Well for me it's very simple ,gather data that i find interesting.Like the info on tanks landed.BTW will you tell us about tank destroyers? i assume the number must be significant ?

Okay, but data without serious analysis is just numbers. Like 42 they may be the key to Life, the Universe, and Everything, but otherwise they are just random figures.

A single SP TD battalion each was assigned to be landed on UTAH and OMAHA on D-Day, but IIRC both were dealyed and landed on 7 June. On the Commonwealth beaches the assault divisions were organized with an SP Battery in the RA AT Regiment and in addition the Corps AT Regiments were to land SP I can get you numbers later, but the total on 6 June for both American and Commonwealth was at most about 144.

Could be they had no transport ,could be they were not ordered to move ,could be they were not ordered to move because they had no transport

So stating the obvious is the same as analysis? Sorry, doesn't impress me. Try starting from the beginning. What are you trying to find out? What evidence supports that view? What causes you to modify that view? What is your new theory? It's called the scientific method.

Weren't 84,85,326,331 covering the forward units ? 19 LW left so no backup for 48,712.I also assume that 18LW, 47,49 would be kept whole.

What mobile divisions? Pz units were moved are you refering to KG or the second line of divisions behind coastal ?
I'm also confused

Yeah, you're intending for this to go circular again. Try to pay attention. Or should I give you the German designations so its more obvious? Wait, no I did that in the first post. Sigh...

Those that did move to Normandy:
326. Infanterie (beh-bew) – Although designated a static (bodenstandiges) division, it was being reorganized as an improvised mobile division (behilfesmässiges bewegung) using confiscated French vehicles. As of 1 May the division strength was 11,819 (probably including HiWi), but by 20 June it had fallen to 11,533, possibly due to sending drafts of replacements to the forces fighting in Normandy. It appears that it was intended to fill the places of I./Gren.-Regt. 751 and 753 with Ost-Batallionen, but it is unclear which were meant to be used. It was ordered to Normandy in mid July and had crossed the Seine by 22 July.
331. Infanterie (bew) – Remnants of the division arrived in France on 16 March 1944 from the Ostfront to reorganize. As of 1 June the strength was 10,543 and 1,366 HiWi and it appears to have been considered ready for action by the middle of July. It was ordered to Normandy on 28 July and began to arrive in the vicinity of L’Aigle-Gacé on 11 August, attached to LXXXI A.K.
85. Infanterie (bew) – The division was raised on 2 February 1944 and although considered ready for action in May, was still organizing on 6 June. By 20 June the division strength was 8,393 (authorized strength 8,126) and 332 HiWi, while a Füsilier Btl. and Feld-Ers.-Btl. had been formed. It was ordered to Normandy on 29 July and elements were west of the Seine in the vicinity of Cleres and extending east of Neufchatel by 4 August. By 10 August the division was in action against First Canadian Army north of Falaise.
84. Infanterie (bew) – The division was raised 2 February 1944 but did not reach full strength until April and on 6 June was still considered to be organizing. By 20 June the division strength was 8,437 (authorized strength was 8,126) and 1,378 HiWi. On 12 June a Füsilier Btl. was formed. The division was ordered to Normandy on 29 July, with the first elements arriving 3 August.
346. Infanterie (bo) – The division had been in Brittany as a bodenstädiges unit until December 1943, when it was decided to increase its mobility, although its designation was unchanged, and it was moved to the vicinity of Le Havre. By 1 May the division strength was 9,534 and an unknown number of HiWi. It was ordered to Normandy on 6 June and was in action by 7 June.

Of these five nominally mobile divisions, only one was sent across the Somme prior to mid-July.

Simply noticed it and remembered your comment.

Fair that. Remember FORTITUDE was a part of the larger BODYGUARD and was also impacted by the Transportation Campaigns effects, along with events elsewhere - II. SS Panzerkorps did not move in April because of FORTITUDE, it moved because of events in the East.

No one has bothered to tell us if the quote is really from his book ,even people who said they have read it.

Sorry, but I thought I had in my first post? The quote is slightly paraphrased from Hesketh. Of course, I should say "which quote" first, since a number were slung about. The chief error I saw in the on I think you mean is that whereas Hesketh refers to 1. SS Panzer Division and the Grossdeutaschland Panzer Regiment (i.e. the Panther Battalion attached to 116. Panzer Division), the post referred to the 116. Panzer Division.

BTW, in case you are unaware, the post I made regarding what the Allies knew of the German divisions is taken from the Secret Intelligence History, which is part of what Hesketh sourced.

Ehm yes it does.

It does? I thought your rule was that only 15. Army counts? Even though transfers did occur from W.B.N. to Normandy. Could you please either make up your mind or simply state from the outset that you are only interested in circular arguments and stretching threads out to the greatest length you find amusing.

I didn't count 3 div near Calais or the units in Belgium and Holland.I explained the reasons above.

You explained? Where? What is the reason that divisions or parts of divisions "near Calais" or "in Belgium and Holland" can't move? When in fact they did? Or is this a new corollary to the "15. Armee and Holland" rule?

I also checked for 265,266 the % of KG is 0.36 and 0.32 or 0.43 (avg 0.37).Do you have the number for 343 ?

I don't recall but will try to remember to check.

That with this kind of reasoning Fortitude would always be always be a success since for it to be a failure something impossible would need to happen

Sorry, but I think your habit of cicular reasoning and stretching out thread length is beginning to confuse you. The definition of success with regrads to FORTITUDE has been stated a number of times. And the definition does not depend on cicular reasoning. That you missed it isn't neccessarily my problem.

I have no idea what you're saying,maybe you need to talk to your friend again ?

Yes, it's pretty clear that your real agenda is time wasting.

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

Why don't you check the previous thread ,use the search function people posted comments of Germans saying a powerful reserve was held up by stupid Hitler.

No, here's a thought for you hotshot - you made the claim that "everyone" said it - now it's your responsibility to prove it, not mine. And, if as i suspect you can't, then "everyone" here by the rules of this forum are allowed to assume that you are talking through your hat. Oh, and while you're at it, please provide the evidence that "people posted comments of Germans saying a powerful reserve was held up by stupid Hitler". I won't hold my breath.

Meantime, instead of arguing with fictitious "everyone" and "people" arguing nonexistant points, perhaps you could argue with me about the substantive statements, facts, and analysis on this subject that I've provided you? :roll:

2 div of 8.500 ,one reforming ,one of 11.500. As for KG i told you that only if we look at each div can we be sure that they could send one and estimate a size.You say 11 div i say 5-6 .Also you assume that the Germans could handle more troops in Normandy ,from the article i posted logistics was a huge problem esp in the section of US forces.

Try again. You are attempting to measure the success of FORTITUDE by what you think couldn't be moved rather than by what the Allies thought the threat was. Further, whatever gave you the idea that because divisions were small or reforming that they couldn't be committed? Especially considering that most of the divisions that were committed were small and/or were reforming?

BTW, the logistics argument is rather different...could we argue one thing at a time? Mind you, it did benefit the Germans to use the southern approaches to Normandy facing the Americans, it helped relieve the logistical bottleneck at Caen for one thing and made greater use of the surviving rail system. In any case, arguing that because the Germans may have been incapable of supporting as many units in Normandy as the Allies expected they could send there, and that thus FORTITUDE was a failure, is a fast ride on the crazy train.

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

2).On D-day they landed 778 tanks (Rich is not saying how many other AFV's) .

Guess what hotshot, you get more bees with honey than vinegar... Thanks for making it easier to tell you to find it out yourself if you think it is such vital information.

It took the Germans until 18 June to send more than that despite dispatching Pz units as quickly as possible...

So, then there were ten Panzer divisions arrayed against Normandy by then? Along with 10. Panzerbrigade? So what proportion of the Panzers the Germans had available were dispatched as quickly as possible? Hmmm?

Cheers!

[paspartoo]

Well for me it's very simple ,gather data that i find interesting.Like the info on tanks landed.BTW will you tell us about tank destroyers? i assume the number must be significant ?

Okay, but data without serious analysis is just numbers. Like 42 they may be the key to Life, the Universe, and Everything, but otherwise they are just random figures.

Agreed ... by the way 42 IS the meaning of life

A single SP TD battalion each was assigned to be landed on UTAH and OMAHA on D-Day, but IIRC both were dealyed and landed on 7 June. On the Commonwealth beaches the assault divisions were organized with an SP Battery in the RA AT Regiment and in addition the Corps AT Regiments were to land SP I can get you numbers later, but the total on 6 June for both American and Commonwealth was at most about 144.

Thanks ,so that would put total AFV's up to 922 versus 122 German ?

Could be they had no transport ,could be they were not ordered to move ,could be they were not ordered to move because they had no transport

So stating the obvious is the same as analysis? Sorry, doesn't impress me. Try starting from the beginning. What are you trying to find out? What evidence supports that view? What causes you to modify that view? What is your new theory? It's called the scientific method.

Pfff.... yes that's why i asked you .I'm not someone who will go to the archives to research each unit ,that's why i asked if you knew more about them.

Weren't 84,85,326,331 covering the forward units ? 19 LW left so no backup for 48,712.I also assume that 18LW, 47,49 would be kept whole.

What mobile divisions? Pz units were moved are you refering to KG or the second line of divisions behind coastal ?
I'm also confused

Yeah, you're intending for this to go circular again. Try to pay attention. Or should I give you the German designations so its more obvious? Wait, no I did that in the first post. Sigh...

Those that did move to Normandy:
326. Infanterie (beh-bew) – Although designated a static (bodenstandiges) division, it was being reorganized as an improvised mobile division (behilfesmässiges bewegung) using confiscated French vehicles. As of 1 May the division strength was 11,819 (probably including HiWi), but by 20 June it had fallen to 11,533, possibly due to sending drafts of replacements to the forces fighting in Normandy. It appears that it was intended to fill the places of I./Gren.-Regt. 751 and 753 with Ost-Batallionen, but it is unclear which were meant to be used. It was ordered to Normandy in mid July and had crossed the Seine by 22 July.
331. Infanterie (bew) – Remnants of the division arrived in France on 16 March 1944 from the Ostfront to reorganize. As of 1 June the strength was 10,543 and 1,366 HiWi and it appears to have been considered ready for action by the middle of July. It was ordered to Normandy on 28 July and began to arrive in the vicinity of L’Aigle-Gacé on 11 August, attached to LXXXI A.K.
85. Infanterie (bew) – The division was raised on 2 February 1944 and although considered ready for action in May, was still organizing on 6 June. By 20 June the division strength was 8,393 (authorized strength 8,126) and 332 HiWi, while a Füsilier Btl. and Feld-Ers.-Btl. had been formed. It was ordered to Normandy on 29 July and elements were west of the Seine in the vicinity of Cleres and extending east of Neufchatel by 4 August. By 10 August the division was in action against First Canadian Army north of Falaise.
84. Infanterie (bew) – The division was raised 2 February 1944 but did not reach full strength until April and on 6 June was still considered to be organizing. By 20 June the division strength was 8,437 (authorized strength was 8,126) and 1,378 HiWi. On 12 June a Füsilier Btl. was formed. The division was ordered to Normandy on 29 July, with the first elements arriving 3 August.
346. Infanterie (bo) – The division had been in Brittany as a bodenstädiges unit until December 1943, when it was decided to increase its mobility, although its designation was unchanged, and it was moved to the vicinity of Le Havre. By 1 May the division strength was 9,534 and an unknown number of HiWi. It was ordered to Normandy on 6 June and was in action by 7 June.

Of these five nominally mobile divisions, only one was sent across the Somme prior to mid-July.


Thanks but i have also said the same thing over and over in the last thread.I admit those units could be sent earlier.My problem isn't the 4 div but the KG's you mentioned

Simply noticed it and remembered your comment.

Fair that. Remember FORTITUDE was a part of the larger BODYGUARD and was also impacted by the Transportation Campaigns effects, along with events elsewhere - II. SS Panzerkorps did not move in April because of FORTITUDE, it moved because of events in the East.

No one has bothered to tell us if the quote is really from his book ,even people who said they have read it.

Sorry, but I thought I had in my first post? The quote is slightly paraphrased from Hesketh. Of course, I should say "which quote" first, since a number were slung about. The chief error I saw in the on I think you mean is that whereas Hesketh refers to 1. SS Panzer Division and the Grossdeutaschland Panzer Regiment (i.e. the Panther Battalion attached to 116. Panzer Division), the post referred to the 116. Panzer Division.

BTW, in case you are unaware, the post I made regarding what the Allies knew of the German divisions is taken from the Secret Intelligence History, which is part of what Hesketh sourced.

No the quote says ''Fifteenth Army strength on 6th June: 13 static, 6 field infantry and 3 armoured divisions; strength on 8th July 11 static, 11 field infantry and 2 armoured divisions'' 24 units on 8 July?

Ehm yes it does.

It does? I thought your rule was that only 15. Army counts? Even though transfers did occur from W.B.N. to Normandy. Could you please either make up your mind or simply state from the outset that you are only interested in circular arguments and stretching threads out to the greatest length you find amusing.

Sorry that was just to annoy you.

I didn't count 3 div near Calais or the units in Belgium and Holland.I explained the reasons above.

You explained? Where? What is the reason that divisions or parts of divisions "near Calais" or "in Belgium and Holland" can't move? When in fact they did? Or is this a new corollary to the "15. Armee and Holland" rule?

I consider that with the information available the germans would not send all their forces emptying areas that had important harbours .Again you might think differently no problem with that.

I also checked for 265,266 the % of KG is 0.36 and 0.32 or 0.43 (avg 0.37).Do you have the number for 343 ?

I don't recall but will try to remember to check.

That with this kind of reasoning Fortitude would always be always be a success since for it to be a failure something impossible would need to happen

Sorry, but I think your habit of cicular reasoning and stretching out thread length is beginning to confuse you. The definition of success with regrads to FORTITUDE has been stated a number of times. And the definition does not depend on cicular reasoning. That you missed it isn't neccessarily my problem.

I don't understand what you mean but no problem.

I have no idea what you're saying,maybe you need to talk to your friend again ?

Yes, it's pretty clear that your real agenda is time wasting.

Sorry you feel that way

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

Well,this is what I am arguing since X posts :roll: :there was nothing the Germans could have done to produce this result (=push the allies in the sea),and,yet ,this is was the Fortitude boys are pretending(and what you and R .Anderson are defending):the whole claim about the role of fortitude,is that the Germans could push back the allies to the sea,but did not do this,because of the desinformation role of Fortitude .
I am saying :the Germans could not push back the allies to the sea,thus the role of Fortitude is irrelevant .
I hope this is clear .

Maybe this needs to be clear to you...I take a very dim view of anyone telling me what I am thinking or what I am defending, especially when it is pretty evident they don't have a clue about either.

What the Germans could or couldn't have done regarding pushing the Allies into the sea has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not FORTITUDE was a success. You and paspartoo have done nothing to actually approach the question on its merits and have instead run off on flights of fancy, illogic, and disinformation. Your pretence is that you have made an intelligent argument to the contrary.

The ONLY CLAIMS made about FORTITUDE should be based upon what it was meant to acheive and what it actually acheived. Why you and p are so wrapped about the axle regarding exaggerations about those accomplishments made by others is beyond me. Argue the merits of the case and my facts and interpretation - not your whiny mistaken ideas about what the case should be about or what you think I said.

Cheers!

[paspartoo]

2).On D-day they landed 778 tanks (Rich is not saying how many other AFV's) .

Guess what hotshot, you get more bees with honey than vinegar... Thanks for making it easier to tell you to find it out yourself if you think it is such vital information.

Sorry for that i thought you weren't going to answer the question.After all i asked you yesterday and you didn't mention anything in your previous posts.

It took the Germans until 18 June to send more than that despite dispatching Pz units as quickly as possible...

So, then there were ten Panzer divisions arrayed against Normandy by then? Along with 10. Panzerbrigade? So what proportion of the Panzers the Germans had available were dispatched as quickly as possible? Hmmm?

I don't get your argument didn't they order practically all their mobile units as fast as possible ?

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

Agreed ... by the way 42 IS the meaning of life

Don't forget the Universe and Everything.

Thanks ,so that would put total AFV's up to 922 versus 122 German ?

Possibly...mind you the losses on the beaches prior to the committment of any German armor changed that a bit...oh, wait, sorry, I forgot that was due to those incapable static German pretend divisions so don't count... :roll:

]Pfff.... yes that's why i asked you .I'm not someone who will go to the archives to research each unit ,that's why i asked if you knew more about them.

Fine, I'm happy to supply the information...for those who are willing to argue honestly about ther meaning.

Thanks but i have also said the same thing over and over in the last thread.I admit those units could be sent earlier.My problem isn't the 4 div but the KG's you mentioned

Okay, I'll try to explain this slowly...if FORTITUDE had no effect, and the mobile divisions and KG existed, then why were they not committed to Normandy at the same rate as the committemnt of the similar forces available to 7. Armee?

No the quote says ''Fifteenth Army strength on 6th June: 13 static, 6 field infantry and 3 armoured divisions; strength on 8th July 11 static, 11 field infantry and 2 armoured divisions'' 24 units on 8 July?

Oh, that quote? See, it helps when you clarify which one you mean. I doubt that is anything more than a paraphrase, but it should be remembered that the Allies were uncertain of the exact command relationships in some cases. They were unaware that 19. Panzer (counted above) was only deployed for reconstitution and was scheduled to go directly back to the East, but I hardly think they believed that "24 units" were there on 8 July. I'll try to find the relevent reference in Hesketh.

Sorry that was just to annoy you

So you're playing like you actually want information and discussion when you're really just playing silly buggers? Frankly that's not much of a revelation for me, but thanks for the confirmation, it saves me wasting much time giving thought to your shenanigans.

I consider that with the information available the germans would not send all their forces emptying areas that had important harbours .Again you might think differently no problem with that.

That's good of you. Of course, instead you might look to what the Germans actually did to defend "important harbours". Just a thought.

I don't understand what you mean but no problem.

Try to define what the terms of "success" were under FORTITUDE. If that success isn't acheived then its a failure. Is that simple enough for you?

Sorry you feel that way.

Well if you spend well onto 34+ pages of circular arguments on a single subject you perhaps shouldn't be surprised if that is the reaction you elicit.

[RichTO90]

Sorry for that i thought you weren't going to answer the question.After all i asked you yesterday and you didn't mention anything in your previous posts

Apology accepted, but again, how many times do I need to ask you "are you writing my paycheck"?

I don't get your argument didn't they order practically all their mobile units as fast as possible ?

Its kind of simple really. How many "mobile" elements did Ob. West have access to? Who moved? When? Which were those assumed by FORTITUDE to be "15. Armee"?

Is that too complicated a question for you?