British logistic support to 12 US Army Group - Aug 44

[Tom from Cornwall]

I came across this description of one of the transport details carried out by No3 (General Transport) Company RASC on behalf of 12 US Army Group in Aug 44 (Source: WO171/2345):

15 August 1944 ECOGUENEAUVILLE T 3895
0100 WARNING ORDER 60x3 ton vehicles to ‘stand by’ at half an hours notice for amn detail from 0530 hrs 15 Aug 44.
0900 60x3 ton vehicles under command Capt FINCH, R.A.S.C. left camp to load supplies at CLASS 1 UTAH DUMP MR 395948.
1300 Rations loaded and convoy left for LUCKY SUPPLY DUMP No 12 of TRESSE MR 233952 and off-loaded next morning.
1400 27x3 ton vehicles under command Lieut. M. DAVIS, R.A.S.C. reported as for 60x3 ton vehicles above and carried out similar detail.

Could someone confirm whether the 'LUCKY' tag for the Supply Dump refers to Third US Army?

BTW this company was equipped with BEDFORD OY 3-ton task vehicles. I have still not found a General Transport company of RASC for this period equipped with the notorious Austin K-5!

Thanks,
Tom

[Delta Tank]

Tom,

http://www.pattonhq.com/textfiles/thirdhst.html

Lucky was the 3d Army's tactical code name during World War II.

Divisions also had tactical code names, for example 25th ID code name was "Lighting" which is why General Joseph Collins was called "Lighting" Joe Collins because he commanded the 25th ID on Guadalcanal before being transferred to the ETO to command VIIth Corps.

Mike

[Tom from Cornwall]

Mike,

Thanks for the link - this part of the document made me smile:

In September 1944, General Eisenhower decided to let British General Montgomery put together a massive attack called Operation Market Garden. Because of this, a large part of all available supplies were diverted to the British Second Army. This included supplies that should have gone to the Third Army.

Eisenhower's decision created a shortage of gasoline and other necessary supplies that were badly needed by the Third Army to keep up its fast-paced advance. Without these supplies the Third Army was forced to slow down and finally to halt its rapid advance.

A fine piece of research, and balanced reporting...

The fact that 3rd US Army had ground to a halt right at the beginning of September must have been very well disguised for the Patton Research Society not to notice it!!

Good to hear from you again,

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Further evidence of British logisitic support to Third US Army from the war diary of 3 GT Coy RASC:

18 August 1944 FLEURIGNE Y 4477
0600 Further WARNING ORDER to move received.
0900 “A” Platoon left for Report Centre at MARTIGNE to [load] supplies from 55 Supply Depot U.S. Army in that area and transport them to No. 16 Supply Depot U.S. Army at SARGE near LE MANS and returned to camp (ROUILLON) 1400 hrs 18 Aug 44.
1200 “B” Platoon left for Report Centre as for “A” Platoon above, and returned to camp (ROUILLON) 1600 hrs 18 Aug 44.
1330 Coy H.Q. and W/S Platoon left location FLEURIGNE and arrived new location in area ROUILLON near LE MANS at 2000 hrs. C.R.A.S.C. H.Q. opened same area same time.
1500 “C” Platoon left for Report Centre as for “A” Platoon above, and returned to camp (ROUILLON) after loading P.O.L. 1600 hrs 18 August.
1800 “D” Platoon left for Report Centre as for “A” Platoon above, and returned to camp (ROUILLON) 1600 hrs 18 Aug 44.
2200 Message received to “stand by” for work in LE MANS area.
C.R.A.S.C. Advanced H.Q. established LE MANS Station.

I've found quite a bit of evidence about this British logistic support now in the archives; but not where the idea came from. Can anyone help me with that? Was it requested by Bradley? Was it insisted on by Eisenhower? Was it a pragmatic decision by the 21 Army Group logistics section?

Either way, when people go on about the "diversion of supplies to Montgomery" in September 1944 they never seem to mention this somewhat under-reported "diversion of supplies to Patton" in August 1944!

Regards

Tom

[Aber]

IIRC there is a comment in Wilmot about UK supply companies being lent for a short period, but not being returned as planned.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Further details of logistic support provided by 3 Coy GT for 12 US Army Group in Aug 44:

From 1700 hrs 6 Aug to 1800 hrs 31 Aug 44, the company moved 4,021 tons of supplies over a grand total of 255,713 miles. So I make that 4,021 tons/255,713 miles/25 days and noting that the coy used 120 3-ton Bedford vehicles as task vehicles:

4,021 tons/25 days = 160.8 tons a day for whole company
255,713/120 = 2130 miles per vehicle
2130/25 = 85 miles per vehicle per day

160.8 tons / 85 miles / per company per day.

Does that sound right?

Interesting comparison with Creveld's calculations which were "50 miles forward lift a day" - 3 Coy only managed 42.5 miles "fwd lift" during this period. It's also interesting that rather than 120 x 3 tons = 360 tons a day, 3 Coy only managed 160 tons a day. The war diary also contains a few reports of this period which mention long periods waiting to load and off-load at various Supply Depots and, of course, all the tea breaks!

Hopefully more to follow in way of comparison when the company returns to the British sector, if they kept similar details.

Regards

Tom

[Aber]

How on earth did they get tea from those US depots?

[Tom from Cornwall]

They still managed to get their tea!!

From the war diary for 19 Aug 44 of 21 Transport Column, RASC which controlled the British GT companies supporting 12 US Group:

DR from 21 Army Gp reported to Rear HQ at 1200 hrs with Mail, and a supply of tea from DDST 21 Army Gp. CRASC had previously made representations to higher authority that American rations did not include tea and this was one commodity which Drivers required in view of their long hours on details. DDST 21 Army Gp informed CRASC that tea would be supplied on indent, but coffee must not be drawn with American rations.

"The Tommy and his Tea"...I think that's an interesting book title.

Regards

Tom

[Aber]

Sounds like you're finding out more about tea supplies than engine problems - good to know the priorities of the diary writers

[Carl Schwamberger]

Further details of logistic support provided by 3 Coy GT for 12 US Army Group in Aug 44:

From 1700 hrs 6 Aug to 1800 hrs 31 Aug 44, the company moved 4,021 tons of supplies over a grand total of 255,713 miles. So I make that 4,021 tons/255,713 miles/25 days and noting that the coy used 120 3-ton Bedford vehicles as task vehicles:

4,021 tons/25 days = 160.8 tons a day for whole company
255,713/120 = 2130 miles per vehicle
2130/25 = 85 miles per vehicle per day

160.8 tons / 85 miles / per company per day.

161 tons = About half what a US or British infantry division needed for movement & light combat. Or, perhaps 20% of what a complete 'division slice' of a army needed for sustained advance and average combat per day?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Carl,

161 tons = About half what a US or British infantry division needed for movement & light combat. Or, perhaps 20% of what a complete 'division slice' of a army needed for sustained advance and average combat per day?

Yes, I guess so, and when you consider that there were three RASC Coys involved (3, 711 and 713 Coys) I suppose we are talking about somewhere in the region of 500 tons per day [3 Coy had 3 ton Bedford task vehicles, 713 Coy had 7 ton Studebakers] for the 3 US Army support missions in the LE MANS area. In this period I would guess that 3 US Army would have mainly been doing "movement (and lots of it ) and light combat".

21 Tpt Coln War Diary - Aug 44 (WO171/2232)

On arrival I contacted Col. McKinnon 470 QM Gp and was advised of the change of location as originally given to you. The present position is that trains are coming into four points in the LE MANS area and we are required to off-load all types of stores for fwd delivery to the 3rd U.S.A. Army Dumps. I am advised that it may be necessary to even do 2nd line lifts if operations require it.
In order to ‘tie up’ as closely as possible I have established an Advance H.Q. at LE MANS station which is also the H.Q. of 470 QM Gp. I understand it is likely to be a 24 hr job and in order to ensure that rest periods and maintenance are properly carried out I have given Vehicle Availability figures as 300 task vehs instead of 360. I have, however, advised Col. McKinnon that should it, for any reason, become operationally necessary to use all of them then this will be done.

711 Coy (with articulated Bedfords - of unknown capacity to me as yet) seems to have operated at OMAHA Beach with 101 Coy RASC (DUKWs) - hopefully I will find a bit more about their tasks when I get to the archives next time, as the 360 vehicle maximum stated in the 21 Tpt Column document quoted suggests that their vehicles had initially been intended for the LE MANS area.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Finally got round to looking at this again.

From their war diary (WO171/2381), it seems that 101 Coy RASC (G.T.) began operating 75 DUKWs 24 hours a day on OMAHA Beach from 11 August 44 onwards.

Interestingly they mentioned that the beach was dangerous to work on, due to wreckage!

I'll post up how long they worked on the U.S. sector for.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

101 Company continued to operate DUKWs on Omaha Beach until 22 September, moving back to the British sector on the 26th. They remained near Port-en-Bessin until mid-October, then transferred 240 DUKWs forward to British Vehicle Parks in Belgium where they swapped them for 3-ton lorries (132 in all). Good to see that the British had spare 3-ton lorries in the forward areas in mid-October - 20-22 Oct to be exact.

So, for example, during the infamous Montgomery - Eisenhower meeting on 10 Sep 44 and the later meetings between Montgomery and Bedell Smith and Gale about US logistical support for 21 Army Group, I guess Montgomery could have referred his SHAEF colleagues to details such as:

10 September 1944
0500 38 DUKWs working. Remainder VOR mainly due to minor faults & water in Petrol.
0900 Steady flow; 3 ships working 34 DUKWs. 6 having Dvr’s attention.
1400 50 DUKWs now in operation. Weather fair. Working 3 ships.
1600 DUKW B20 sank. On tow; loaded with amn. Not recovered. Drivers safe.
1900 Ceased work owing to rough sea.
2030 All DUKWs ashore.

14 September 1944
0900 Still working normally. 216 trips during night period.
1000 45 DUKWs working, 1 in reserve. Remainder V.O.Rs.
1200 Capt. C. Clapham attached to H.Q. L of C wef 11 Sep.
1900 50 DUKWs working to 2 ships – 10 hatches.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

I stumbled across another reference to British logistic support for 12 US Army Group in August 1944 in the war diary of 22 Transport Column RASC (WO171/2233):

22 August 1944
CRASC visits RA Second Army (Main) and ascertains that our Coys and Pls are to be disposed over a big area – some Pls moving West to American Sector and others to R SEINE. 324 Coy to control three pls in an AA role on the R SEINE. Hy Pl used in ground role.

I'll post more if further details appear.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

A little more on the provision of British logistic support to the U.S. forces in N.W. Europe this time a little later in the campaign - early November 1944:

Brig. BOND reported that the main U.S. pipe route between LA HAYE DU PUITS and ST. LO had been washed away by flood water and this occurrence might have repercussions on intake into CHERBOURG owing to congestion from lack of clearance. He understood that two of the three lines were repaired and that traffic would be resumed immediately.

Lt. Gen. LEE expressed his gratitude for the timely assistance afforded Communications Zone by HQ 21 Army Group in making supplies of petrol available for U.S. Forces at the time of this breakage to their main pipe system.

This from the 34th Weekly Meeting of Chief Administrative Officers held at SHAEF on 10 November 1944. This kind of inter-Allied support going a long way in demonstrating that, despite the historiography concentrating on their disagreements, the Allies actually co-operated to an extraordinary degree during the campaign in NW Europe.

Regards

Tom