The Normandy "Masterplan"

[Delta Tank]

To All,

This is how I remember the delay, it is from Wikipedia.

“To gain good terrain for Operation Cobra, Bradley and Collins conceived a plan to push forward to the Saint-Lô–Periers road, along which VII and VIII Corps were securing jumping-off positions.[33] On 18 July, at a cost of 5,000 casualties, the American 29th and 35th Infantry Divisions managed to gain the vital heights of Saint-Lô, driving back General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugen Meindl's II Parachute Corps.[33] Meindl's paratroopers, together with the 352nd Infantry Division (which had been in action since its D-Day defense of Omaha Beach) were now in ruins, and the stage for the main offensive was set.[33] Due to poor weather conditions that had also been hampering Goodwood and Atlantic, Bradley decided to postpone Cobra for a few days—a decision that worried Montgomery, as the British and Canadian operations had been launched to support a breakout attempt that was failing to materialize.[77][78] By 24 July the skies had cleared enough for the start order to be given, and 1,600 Allied aircraft took off for Normandy.[77] However, the weather closed in again over the battlefield. Under poor visibility conditions, more than 25 Americans were killed and 130 wounded in the bombing before the air support operation was postponed until the following day.”

[Sheldrake]

Bradley decided to postpone Cobra for a few days—a decision that worried Montgomery, as the British and Canadian operations had been launched to support a breakout attempt that was failing to materialize.[77][78] By 24 July the skies had cleared enough for the start order to be given, and 1,600 Allied aircraft took off for Normandy.[77] However, the weather closed in again over the battlefield. Under poor visibility conditions, more than 25 Americans were killed and 130 wounded in the bombing before the air support operation was postponed until the following day.”

Op Goodwood and Atlantic were supposed to be concurrent with Op Cobra, but were called off in heavy rain on 20th July. A second attack was launched on 25th July called Op Spring which pitched the 2nd Canadian Corps and 7th Armoured Division down the Caen-Falaise road against the 1st SS Corps.

In the eleven days ending 26th July the 21st Army Group had fired 1,158,490 artillery rounds. 4th Canadian Field Regiment had fired 16,000 rounds in 48 hours and recorded “all counter-attacks were successfully broken up by artillery fire.” Offensive operations at battalion level continued over the following days with attacks to straighten the line, but the operation was over.

With over 1,000 Canadian casualties it had been a costly operation, indeed it was the most costly day for 2nd Canadian Infantry Division of the whole Campaign in North West Europe. The Evett’s rates – Quiet, Normal, Intense – for describing levels of combat and for forecasting casualties and the requirement for reinforcements, had to add Double Intense to describe the Canadian experience on Verrieres Ridge. Nevertheless, the attack had succeeded in continuing to pin the German armour in the west and diverting attention from events in the US sector.

[Tom from Cornwall]

And from the Supreme Commander's own point of view:

Eisenhower to Montgomery
Cable F12505 Top Secret
July 31, 1944
To 21 Army Group Tac personal for General Montgomery signed Eisenhower cite SHSAC:
From all reports your plan continues to develop beautifully. I learn you have a column in Avranches...

Interesting not just as it recognises that despite all the bickering and post-war historical blather, and despite all the delay and frustrations, this was still essentially Montgomery's overall masterplan being developed successfully but also as it confirms that Eisenhower recognised that the forces passing through Avranches were still under the command of Montgomery.

Regards

Tom

[Carl Schwamberger]

I strongly suspect there was a trigger for the separation into two AG in the current operating plan. Some specific criteria or event that would signal to issue the order for new establishment. In amphi ops this is a important command and control event, when the landing force becomes a separate entity from the amphib force. The trigger point is usually the establishment of the landing force HQ ashore.

In this case I'm guessing there were secondary triggers, based on geographic goals and commitment of newly arrived units to combat, for the activation of 3rd Army HQ. That would be the trigger for issuing the order activating 12 AG.

[Richard Anderson]

Interesting not just as it recognises that despite all the bickering and post-war historical blather, and despite all the delay and frustrations, this was still essentially Montgomery's overall masterplan being developed successfully but also as it confirms that Eisenhower recognised that the forces passing through Avranches were still under the command of Montgomery.

Why did you need that confirmation Tom? You know as well as I that Montgomery was designated Ground Forces Commander until Ike activated SHAEF HQ on the Continent and took over the role of GFC on 15 September.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Why did you need that confirmation Tom? You know as well as I that Montgomery was designated Ground Forces Commander until Ike activated SHAEF HQ on the Continent and took over the role of GFC on 15 September.

Hi Rich,

Well I know we know, but I just thought it might be a useful reminder for those who persist in talking about Monty's forces at Caen and Bradley's forces in the west. Bradley for a start...

I thought the timing of these further notes by Eisenhower to Marshall were also interesting:

To George Catlett Marshall
and Combined Chiefs of Staff
Cable S 56667 Top Secret.
2 August 1944
From Eisenhower to General Marshall for eyes only and CCS. Bigot:
[...]
...I should like to make it clear that when we found in the early days of the operation that the enemy was rushing the major portion of his mobile forces into the Caen area, I personally approved Montgomery's policy of taking up a firm defensive and containing action in that region while we secured Cherbourg in the west and then turned United States forces southward to roll up the enemy forces.
[...]
It is apparent that for the moment the enemy continues to regard his extreme eastern flank as his most sensitive one.

It's strange that Eisenhower has forgotten that what he described was in fact the pre-invasion plan.

I'm sure Montgomery would have preferred such ringing endorsement between operations Goodwood and Cobra and for Eisenhower to quash Tedder's plot to have Montgomery sacked rather than supporting it to the extent of bringing it up with Churchill at lunch on 26 July 1944.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

It's strange that Eisenhower has forgotten that what he described was in fact the pre-invasion plan.

But was it THE pre-invasion "Masterplan"? My impression is there were a number of contingency plans, rather than a single masterplan, and most of them were not written down as a formal plan, "master" or not?

The master plan was outlined by COSSAC the year before: get ashore, build up, defeat the Germans. What was anticipated if the first two bits were successful, was that the Germans would then initially enact their own plan, which was to attempt to hold the coastal crust, while counterattacking with the Panzers...after that what was believed would happen isn't so explicit, but a fighting withdrawal to Germany if the Allies could not be defeated on the beach was expected as the most likely outcome.

I'm sure Montgomery would have preferred such ringing endorsement between operations Goodwood and Cobra and for Eisenhower to quash Tedder's plot to have Montgomery sacked rather than supporting it to the extent of bringing it up with Churchill at lunch on 26 July 1944.

There wasn't much time for an endorsement, ringing or not, in the six days V and VII Corps struggled to reach the designated jumping off point, was there? And wasn't it Eisenhower's responsibility to confide in Churchill regarding his and his staffs reservations regarding Montgomery? While some of the reasons for that concern may have been both personal as well as an illusory understanding of what was going on, nevertheless there was a perception of possible stalemate, which Montgomery's personality defects did nothing to dispel.

[Aber]

I thought the timing of these further notes by Eisenhower to Marshall were also interesting:

To George Catlett Marshall
and Combined Chiefs of Staff
Cable S 56667 Top Secret.
2 August 1944
From Eisenhower to General Marshall for eyes only and CCS. Bigot:
[...]
...I should like to make it clear that when we found in the early days of the operation that the enemy was rushing the major portion of his mobile forces into the Caen area, I personally approved Montgomery's policy of taking up a firm defensive and containing action in that region while we secured Cherbourg in the west and then turned United States forces southward to roll up the enemy forces.
[...]
It is apparent that for the moment the enemy continues to regard his extreme eastern flank as his most sensitive one.

It often seems forgotten that Eisenhower has his own agenda as well, which included making it clear that he was in charge, and managing Marshall. Eisenhower was a very skilled wordsmith - IIRC his letter to MacArthur in the Philippines was a masterpiece in implying tremendous support but not actually committing to sending anything.

[Richard Anderson]

It often seems forgotten that Eisenhower has his own agenda as well, which included making it clear that he was in charge, and managing Marshall. Eisenhower was a very skilled wordsmith - IIRC his letter to MacArthur in the Philippines was a masterpiece in implying tremendous support but not actually committing to sending anything.

I haven't forgotten.

Eisenhower was "in charge" as CG, ETOUSA, and as SCAEF, but only so within the parameters of those jobs. He certainly was not "managing" Marshall since Marshall, as Army Chief of Staff, was "in charge" of Eisenhower rather than the other war round.

[Tom from Cornwall]

But was it THE pre-invasion "Masterplan"? My impression is there were a number of contingency plans, rather than a single masterplan, and most of them were not written down as a formal plan, "master" or not?

Rich,

See my post #13 on page 1 of this thread:

For example, if you wanted a very high level idea of the basic strategy for Normandy you would be well advised to look at the outline discussed at a meeting between Montgomery and his Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff on 7 Jan 44:

Task of the American Army will be the clearing of the CHERBOURG peninsula and the capture of the port of CHERBOURG. They will subsequently develop their operations to the South and West.

Task of the British Army will be to operate to the South to prevent any interference with the American Army from the East.

It is hoped eventually to get a firm lodgement from CAEN to NANTES with the British Army being built up through CHERBOURG and the American Army through BRITTANY.

The document is noted as being signed by Lt.Col. H. Mainwaring, MA to C-in-C 21 Army Group, and dated 10 Jan 44.

Although subsequent operations obviously didn't develop exactly in this way, that this basic framework was consistently borne is mind by Montgomery and his army generals is evident from much of what actually took place and what was said at the time.

And compare that with Eisenhower's remarks on 2 Aug 44:

I should like to make it clear that when we found in the early days of the operation that the enemy was rushing the major portion of his mobile forces into the Caen area, I personally approved Montgomery's policy of taking up a firm defensive and containing action in that region while we secured Cherbourg in the west and then turned United States forces southward to roll up the enemy forces.

And wasn't it Eisenhower's responsibility to confide in Churchill regarding his and his staffs reservations regarding Montgomery? While some of the reasons for that concern may have been both personal as well as an illusory understanding of what was going on, nevertheless there was a perception of possible stalemate, which Montgomery's personality defects did nothing to dispel.

I'm not sure, to be honest. Wouldn't it have been better to have discussed any issues he had with Brooke first? If Eisenhower personally approved Montgomery's overall strategy, why go 'bitching' to Winston?

Montgomery's personality defects were undoubtedly significant - but the extent of the RAF campaign against him led by Tedder was extraordinary even by British inter-service standards. I'm personally not entirely sure that Tedder was the right man to be Eisenhower's deputy commander in the first place, can you imagine Tedder taking over as Supreme Commander if Eisenhower had met a sticky end flying back and forth across the Channel for example.

Montgomery may well have been a complete S***, but he was only one amongst many.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

See my post #13 on page 1 of this thread:

Tom, that's all well and good, but I just can't seem to find where,

Montgomery's policy of taking up a firm defensive and containing action in that region...

Enters into that January discussion? Instead, that looks very much to be ex post facto rationalization and team playing.

For example, if you wanted a very high level idea of the basic strategy for Normandy you would be well advised to look at the outline discussed at a meeting between Montgomery and his Army Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff on 7 Jan 44:

Isn't that just a restatement of the COSSAC Outline Plan? And again, there is no hint that the British operations were intended to be,

taking up a firm defensive and containing action in that region...

Is there?

And compare that with Eisenhower's remarks on 2 Aug 44:

Well, yes, which are rather a few days after the fact aren't they?

I should like to make it clear that when we found in the early days of the operation that the enemy was rushing the major portion of his mobile forces into the Caen area, I personally approved Montgomery's policy of taking up a firm defensive and containing action in that region while we secured Cherbourg in the west and then turned United States forces southward to roll up the enemy forces.

Yes, indeedy, but that is not addressing planning prior to 6 June for that contingency, is it?

I'm not sure, to be honest. Wouldn't it have been better to have discussed any issues he had with Brooke first? If Eisenhower personally approved Montgomery's overall strategy, why go 'bitching' to Winston?

Quite possibly because Brooke was a bit of an ass and apparently could not keep it a secret that he was the sole "strategic mind" in the entire western world?

Montgomery's personality defects were undoubtedly significant

As were Brooke's, Eisenhower's, Tedder's, Churchill's, Roosevelt's, and et cetera, but they managed to work pretty well together most of the time.

- but the extent of the RAF campaign against him led by Tedder was extraordinary even by British inter-service standards. I'm personally not entirely sure that Tedder was the right man to be Eisenhower's deputy commander in the first place, can you imagine Tedder taking over as Supreme Commander if Eisenhower had met a sticky end flying back and forth across the Channel for example.

Oh, I agree, the British inter-service and intra-service standards, the Old Boy network, did remarkably little that I can see to facilitate winning the war, but did facilitate any number of disastrous and near disastrous bumblings.

Montgomery may well have been a complete S***, but he was only one amongst many.

Oh, indeed, Brooke if anything in private was an even bigger sh**e than Monty, but was simply more self aware and covered it up by venting to his diary.

[Pips]

Does anyone know the reasons behind Tedder's animosity towards Montgomery? Is it grounded in personal or professional causes?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Does anyone know the reasons behind Tedder's animosity towards Montgomery? Is it grounded in personal or professional causes?

A six hundred year old feud over a stray cow?

[Michael Kenny]

Does anyone know the reasons behind Tedder's animosity towards Montgomery? Is it grounded in personal or professional causes?

I believe it nothing more than a fight over who 'won the war'. The RAF was of the opinion it was the decisive arm in Normandy (and even WW2) and that 'the Army' was merely there to capture and then protect its airfields. Personality also comes into it and Conningham seems to have been more than slightly unhinged in his dealings with Monty. Imagine if Monty had been badgering Tedder and telling him how best to bomb Germany into submission or criticising the endless (false) claims that the German economy was on the verge of collapse.
This paper has a lot of the personal invective https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centr ... -normandy/

[Richard Anderson]

I vaguely recall there were tiffs early on over the RAF support of Eighth Army in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy that blew up in Normandy over the dealy in getting airfields operational. On the other hand, it may have been simply that Monty was more than a bit of an ass and few people could stand him...of course that Tedder remarried withing ten months of his first wife's death in an air crash may say something about Tedder's personality too.