Invasion of Norway
-
Scott Smith
- Member
- Posts: 5602
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 22:17
- Location: Arizona
- Contact:
RAF Bomber Command
In addition to that, the RAF would have set-up bomber bases in Norway to menace Baltic shipping and bomb German cities, thus widening the ingress points and shortening the range to some targets in the Reich, and thereby complicating German air-defense. That might have also subjected Norway to German reprisal bombing attacks as well.Ovidius wrote:They couldn't.Dan wrote:One could wish that both the British and Germans would have respected Norway's neutrality.........
The Brits wanted to seal the German fleet in the Baltic, and to cut out the supply of iron ore from Sweden.
The Germans wanted to keep the flow of iron ore, to gain free access in the Atlantic, and to host their ships in the fjords, where even the largest battleship was safe from any kind of attack.
Secondly, the Germans needed access to Norwegian markets, particularly agriculture, which could have been choked off by the Royal Navy and Air Force, even if Norway had managed to stay neutral. And failing this, Norway and all neutral countries would have been put on an Allied ration system vis-a-vis foreign markets so that no "contraband" could get past the blockade and thereby be sold to Germany, and so that as little agricultural surplus and raw materials as possible could be sold to Germany through neutrals.
This meant that if Germany was going to fight a long war it was imperative that a cordon sanitaire be conquered, even of friendly neutrals, if the strategic situation so warranted it.
It is fair to say, in addition, that constitutional monarchies may have been friendlier neutrals to the Windsor crown than to the Germans in trade relations (or economic sanctions) and even the quartering of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied bases; or, in other words, neutrals in name only. Even before World War I, Great Britain had historically been able to exert a lot of economic and strategic cooperation/coercion on the continent in isolating and containing its potential enemies, such as Russia and France in the 19th century.
Of course, once Poland had been vanquished by the Blitzkrieg, Great Britain and France's reasons for staying in the war were moot other than to liquidate German sovereignty again, as per Versailles. So the decision to make the war a long one of attrition was theirs. The Allies had that advantage.
After the French campaign, there was no reason whatsoever for Albion to stay in the war and not come to terms with Germany. They knew that the USA would become involved if Germany attempted invasion and that they could not be blockaded effectively so long as England had access to American and world markets. The British naval and air fleets were strong.
After the fall of France, the best option for Germany would have been to concentrate a naval and air buildup, including a crash U-Boat program, against Allied shipping and try to sink as many expensive Allied freighters as possible without drawing the USA into the war. Then the Germans could have focused energies on seizing Gibraltar and Alexandria to seal off the Mediterranean from the Allies, before deploying the bulk of the German Army defensively against the Russians to protect access to Romanian oil, chromium from Turkey and nickel from Finland.
Germany had a golden opportunity to improve relations with France in 1940 after the British attacked the French fleet, no Allied nabob having been hung in a warcrimes trial for that, btw. However, friendly but opportunistic neutrals and fascist Allies immensely complicated Hitler's foreign policy.
Thanks for the links – great article on the deployment of Panzerabteilung z.b.V. 40 to Norway! Of interest, the commander of that unit was Oberstleutnant Ernst Volckheim (not mentioned in the article I don’t believe). Born on 11 April 1898 in Bornheim, Volckheim joined the Army in 1914 with assignment to Infanterie-Regiment von Alvensleben (6. Brandenburgisches) Nr. 52. After service in MG-Scharschützen-Abteilung 66, he volunteered for the new German tank arm. He commanded A7V tank #560 in Sturm-Panzerkraftwagen-Abteilung 1. He was badly wounded on 11 October 1918 during the tank action at Iwuy and ordered his crew to abandon the tank after artillery fire knocked off a track. Vockheim was awarded both classes of the Iron Cross, the Wound Badge in Silver and the very rarely seen WWI Tank Assault Badge (Sepp Dietrich held this award). After the war, Volckheim wrote a number of works on the deployment of German tanks in WWI – works later studied by Guderian. Volckheim later commanded Panzer Regiment 3, served on the staffs of Army Group Center and the 20th Mountain Army and attained the final rank of Oberst. He was captured by the British in 1945 after being wounded during a low-level aircraft attack. He died on 1 September 1962.
Regards,
Shawn
SOURCE: Maxwell Hundleby & Rainer Strasheim, “The German A7V Tank and the Captured British Mark IV Tanks of World War I,” Haynes Publishing Group, 1990. (Note: There’s a great photo in this book of Volckheim in black panzer uniform aboard a transport ship en route to Norway in 1940. He is prominently displaying his WWI Tank Assault Badge.)
Regards,
Shawn
SOURCE: Maxwell Hundleby & Rainer Strasheim, “The German A7V Tank and the Captured British Mark IV Tanks of World War I,” Haynes Publishing Group, 1990. (Note: There’s a great photo in this book of Volckheim in black panzer uniform aboard a transport ship en route to Norway in 1940. He is prominently displaying his WWI Tank Assault Badge.)
Hi Scott
In the midst of several good points, I was a little mystified by this one:
" Secondly, the Germans needed access to Norwegian markets, particularly agriculture, "
Norway wasn't - and isn't - anywhere close to feeding its own population, and it seems hard to imagine a more insignificant factor than the Norwegian agricultural market...
"After the French campaign, there was no reason whatsoever for Albion to stay in the war and not come to terms with Germany. "
Well, this is familiar territory - IMO there was every reason for Britain to stay in the war, as peace would have meant sanctioning German hegemony on the continent and allowing that hegemony to be consolidated. Which would have created the most critical long-term threat to British sovereignty since William the Conqueror, and been in violent contradiction to the fundamental principles of British foreign policy through centuries. It would also have entailed acknowledging the unjust occupation and continuing oppression of Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia (for starters). To accept a Europe dominated by Germany through forced subjugation of the majority of European nations would have been neither wise, reasonable or just.
cheers
In the midst of several good points, I was a little mystified by this one:
" Secondly, the Germans needed access to Norwegian markets, particularly agriculture, "
Norway wasn't - and isn't - anywhere close to feeding its own population, and it seems hard to imagine a more insignificant factor than the Norwegian agricultural market...
"After the French campaign, there was no reason whatsoever for Albion to stay in the war and not come to terms with Germany. "
Well, this is familiar territory - IMO there was every reason for Britain to stay in the war, as peace would have meant sanctioning German hegemony on the continent and allowing that hegemony to be consolidated. Which would have created the most critical long-term threat to British sovereignty since William the Conqueror, and been in violent contradiction to the fundamental principles of British foreign policy through centuries. It would also have entailed acknowledging the unjust occupation and continuing oppression of Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia (for starters). To accept a Europe dominated by Germany through forced subjugation of the majority of European nations would have been neither wise, reasonable or just.
cheers
-
Bjørn from Norway
- In memoriam
- Posts: 1091
- Joined: 29 Apr 2002, 21:38
- Location: Bodø¸, Northern Norway
- Contact:
A brilliant piece of work on Norway!
By the historian Thompson (Ohio University)
5. How significant and effective was the resistance put up by the Norwegian armed forces in the 1940 campaign?
Inevitably, any reasonable answer to this question must address the severe disadvantages under which the Norwegians had to fight, factors that resulted from both the long-term neglect of the armed forces over the preceding twenty years and the more immediate circumstances leading up to 9 April 1940. After taking these things into account, one cannot help but admire the skill and determination that many Norwegians displayed in their struggle to repel the invaders.
In giving credit where credit is due, however, many accounts have tended to gloss over the unpleasant fact that, regardless of the underlying reasons, the Norwegian forces failed. In the Norwegian historiography of the campaign, a relative handful of heroic episodes have provided welcome distractions from the more numerous, deeply humiliating defeats and catastrophes that led to the country's occupation. Thus, at the risk of seeming unfair or disrespectful of the many brave and loyal people who did their best in a terrible situation, one must look beyond the pre-war neglect of the armed forces and ask, what else went wrong?
First and foremost, the army never was able to mobilize properly. This was primarily the fault of the government and the service chiefs, but the inherent nature of the mobilization system also complicated the problem. Many personnel were slated to join units far from their homes, which often proved impossible amid the chaos of April 1940. As a result, most of the units that did assemble were ad hoc collections of individuals who had never trained together before; and unit cohesion suffered accordingly.
Rumors of treachery probably were aggravated in many cases by the fact that men had to serve under unfamiliar officers. In fact, the post-war courts never convicted a single Norwegian officer (unless one counts Quisling) of treason in connection with the 1940 campaign. However, several senior officers did receive prison sentences on lesser charges such as neglect of duty; and many other questionable cases never received full investigation.
In retrospect, it seems highly unlikely that the Germans alerted Quisling or any of his followers to the invasion beforehand. Once it became clear that the country was under attack by an outside power, the great majority of officers who had belonged to the NS ignored Quisling's appeal and fought loyally (if not always enthusiastically) on the side of the king and cabinet. It remains open to speculation whether prior sympathy for Germany and the NS caused some officers to surrender prematurely or to remain passive when they could have acted more vigorously. There are, however, enough examples of former Quisling sympathizers who distinguished themselves in action against the Germans to demonstrate that one cannot draw any sweeping conclusions of this nature.
Contrary to popular myth, the Norwegians often demonstrated less understanding of local terrain and conditions than did the Germans. Although the individual skills of the average Norwegian soldier (especially skiing and marksmanship) offered great potential, the training, organization, and doctrine of the army generally failed to exploit these advantages. Apart from the 6th Division, few units were prepared to take the field under winter conditions. Although there were occasional exceptions, most Norwegian forces remained road-bound and vulnerable to flanking maneuvers, at which the Germans proved remarkably adept.
Norwegian operational doctrine failed to address the problem of tempo, which demands a delicate balance between maintaining security and providing soldiers with adequate rest. As a result, many units found themselves physically exhausted at decisive moments, while others allowed the Germans to exploit devastating tactical surprise.
General Otto Ruge's leadership also played a role in the failure to mount a more active, determined defense in central Norway. As traditional accounts have emphasized, Ruge deserves great credit for rallying the spirit of the nation in the immediate aftermath of April 9, when it seemed likely that the government would forego further resistance and accept the occupation as a fait accompli . In his specific conduct of the campaign, however, Ruge failed to appreciate the need to seize and retain the initiative at the local level wherever possible, and to achieve at least minor tactical victories, even at the cost of some casualties, simply for the sake of maintaining morale. Instead, his directives essentially called upon commanders to avoid losses at almost any cost and authorized them to retreat at the first sign of a determined attack. Consequently, on the decisive front in central Norway, the German advance quickly achieved a momentum that proved unstoppable; and many Norwegian units suffered a fatal loss of confidence even in the absence of any serious casualties.
One additional factor that badly damaged the Norwegian will to resist was the appalling disorganization and ineffectiveness of the Allied forces that tried to intervene. Ruge's strategy from the beginning was designed merely to delay the enemy until Allied reinforcements arrived in sufficient strength to turn the tide. The simple fact that the Germans had evaded the Royal Navy on April 9 already represented a major disappointment, since Norwegians had long assumed that British power would shield them from sea-borne invasion; but a considerable store of faith and confidence in British assistance remained. When the first British troops arrived in central Norway on April 19-21, however, they quickly proved inferior not only to the Germans, but also to the Norwegians themselves, exhausted and ill-equipped as the latter were. The successive Allied withdrawals from Åndalsnes, Namsos, and Narvik, conducted in a manner that showed no concern for Norwegian interests, proved the final blow.
Overall, the performance of the Norwegian forces was mixed at best. Given the severe constraints under which they fought, many specific units and individuals achieved far more than anyone had a right to expect of them. Clearly, the Norwegian military was not "rotten to the core"; but it did have a great deal of dead wood.
B.
5. How significant and effective was the resistance put up by the Norwegian armed forces in the 1940 campaign?
Inevitably, any reasonable answer to this question must address the severe disadvantages under which the Norwegians had to fight, factors that resulted from both the long-term neglect of the armed forces over the preceding twenty years and the more immediate circumstances leading up to 9 April 1940. After taking these things into account, one cannot help but admire the skill and determination that many Norwegians displayed in their struggle to repel the invaders.
In giving credit where credit is due, however, many accounts have tended to gloss over the unpleasant fact that, regardless of the underlying reasons, the Norwegian forces failed. In the Norwegian historiography of the campaign, a relative handful of heroic episodes have provided welcome distractions from the more numerous, deeply humiliating defeats and catastrophes that led to the country's occupation. Thus, at the risk of seeming unfair or disrespectful of the many brave and loyal people who did their best in a terrible situation, one must look beyond the pre-war neglect of the armed forces and ask, what else went wrong?
First and foremost, the army never was able to mobilize properly. This was primarily the fault of the government and the service chiefs, but the inherent nature of the mobilization system also complicated the problem. Many personnel were slated to join units far from their homes, which often proved impossible amid the chaos of April 1940. As a result, most of the units that did assemble were ad hoc collections of individuals who had never trained together before; and unit cohesion suffered accordingly.
Rumors of treachery probably were aggravated in many cases by the fact that men had to serve under unfamiliar officers. In fact, the post-war courts never convicted a single Norwegian officer (unless one counts Quisling) of treason in connection with the 1940 campaign. However, several senior officers did receive prison sentences on lesser charges such as neglect of duty; and many other questionable cases never received full investigation.
In retrospect, it seems highly unlikely that the Germans alerted Quisling or any of his followers to the invasion beforehand. Once it became clear that the country was under attack by an outside power, the great majority of officers who had belonged to the NS ignored Quisling's appeal and fought loyally (if not always enthusiastically) on the side of the king and cabinet. It remains open to speculation whether prior sympathy for Germany and the NS caused some officers to surrender prematurely or to remain passive when they could have acted more vigorously. There are, however, enough examples of former Quisling sympathizers who distinguished themselves in action against the Germans to demonstrate that one cannot draw any sweeping conclusions of this nature.
Contrary to popular myth, the Norwegians often demonstrated less understanding of local terrain and conditions than did the Germans. Although the individual skills of the average Norwegian soldier (especially skiing and marksmanship) offered great potential, the training, organization, and doctrine of the army generally failed to exploit these advantages. Apart from the 6th Division, few units were prepared to take the field under winter conditions. Although there were occasional exceptions, most Norwegian forces remained road-bound and vulnerable to flanking maneuvers, at which the Germans proved remarkably adept.
Norwegian operational doctrine failed to address the problem of tempo, which demands a delicate balance between maintaining security and providing soldiers with adequate rest. As a result, many units found themselves physically exhausted at decisive moments, while others allowed the Germans to exploit devastating tactical surprise.
General Otto Ruge's leadership also played a role in the failure to mount a more active, determined defense in central Norway. As traditional accounts have emphasized, Ruge deserves great credit for rallying the spirit of the nation in the immediate aftermath of April 9, when it seemed likely that the government would forego further resistance and accept the occupation as a fait accompli . In his specific conduct of the campaign, however, Ruge failed to appreciate the need to seize and retain the initiative at the local level wherever possible, and to achieve at least minor tactical victories, even at the cost of some casualties, simply for the sake of maintaining morale. Instead, his directives essentially called upon commanders to avoid losses at almost any cost and authorized them to retreat at the first sign of a determined attack. Consequently, on the decisive front in central Norway, the German advance quickly achieved a momentum that proved unstoppable; and many Norwegian units suffered a fatal loss of confidence even in the absence of any serious casualties.
One additional factor that badly damaged the Norwegian will to resist was the appalling disorganization and ineffectiveness of the Allied forces that tried to intervene. Ruge's strategy from the beginning was designed merely to delay the enemy until Allied reinforcements arrived in sufficient strength to turn the tide. The simple fact that the Germans had evaded the Royal Navy on April 9 already represented a major disappointment, since Norwegians had long assumed that British power would shield them from sea-borne invasion; but a considerable store of faith and confidence in British assistance remained. When the first British troops arrived in central Norway on April 19-21, however, they quickly proved inferior not only to the Germans, but also to the Norwegians themselves, exhausted and ill-equipped as the latter were. The successive Allied withdrawals from Åndalsnes, Namsos, and Narvik, conducted in a manner that showed no concern for Norwegian interests, proved the final blow.
Overall, the performance of the Norwegian forces was mixed at best. Given the severe constraints under which they fought, many specific units and individuals achieved far more than anyone had a right to expect of them. Clearly, the Norwegian military was not "rotten to the core"; but it did have a great deal of dead wood.
B.
-
GrossDeutschland
- Member
- Posts: 21
- Joined: 30 Apr 2002, 21:46
- Location: Plymouth
-
Scott Smith
- Member
- Posts: 5602
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 22:17
- Location: Arizona
- Contact:
NORWAY
Then what do Norwegians do for a living?Qvist wrote:Hi Scott
In the midst of several good points, I was a little mystified by this one:
Norway wasn't - and isn't - anywhere close to feeding its own population, and it seems hard to imagine a more insignificant factor than the Norwegian agricultural market...Scott wrote:Secondly, the Germans needed access to Norwegian markets, particularly agriculture,
I'm guessing it was the four F's: Furs, Fish, Forestry, Farming. With the Axis as the new market, Norway would have had to put more labor into agriculture or resource-based industry like mining, with some light manufacture. If Norway was a food-importer before the war, she would have been put on a more severe ration-system by the British blockade so that there could be no lucrative exports to Germany. For example, with Germans all mostly at war or in war-industry, the Danish were producing foodstuffs to feed a hungry Axis empire.
When the Americans bombed the heavy-water high-concentration plant at Vemork in 1943 they also took-out the ammonia plant, which was a grave crisis because Germany was using nitrogen for explosives and not fertilizer. Norwegian agriculture was threatened and the Americans were obligated to pay for collateral-damages not related to the war. But they did not.
Neutral Sweden, however, provided the funding and assistance to get the ammonia (fertilizer) plant back into operation, and the Germans dispersed the D2O concentration process. (As a side-note, this did not prevent the Germans from getting the atomic bomb because Heisenberg was barking up the wrong tree anyway, but the delay in acquiring sufficient heavy-water prevented him from achieving a chain-reaction, which he nearly did in 1945.)
That was a mess that the English Empire got itself into trying to keep Germany down, and they even had to cash-out their own empire to do it. Plus, if the USA had not entered the war, which was something that Churchill counted on, the outcome would have been very different. Great Britain's leaders would be seen as incomparable fools. German hegemony in Europe was inevitable, as it is today with the EU. And Britain's future lies WITH the continent and not against it, her traditional foreign policy.Qvist wrote:Well, this is familiar territory - IMO there was every reason for Britain to stay in the war, as peace would have meant sanctioning German hegemony on the continent and allowing that hegemony to be consolidated. Which would have created the most critical long-term threat to British sovereignty since William the Conqueror, and been in violent contradiction to the fundamental principles of British foreign policy through centuries. It would also have entailed acknowledging the unjust occupation and continuing oppression of Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia (for starters). To accept a Europe dominated by Germany through forced subjugation of the majority of European nations would have been neither wise, reasonable or just.Scott wrote:After the French campaign, there was no reason whatsoever for Albion to stay in the war and not come to terms with Germany.
Cant and hypocrisy are the core elements of English imperial diplomacy. The key to the Anglo-Saxon mentality and secret of their success in globalization even today is getting everyone (including enemies) to adopt their moral philosophies and definitions. England went to war in 1939 to save Poland: That was a bald-faced lie! England went to war in 1939 to liquidate Germany--as Westphalia had succeeded in 1648, and Versailles in 1919 ultimately failed.
In my opinion, Hitler was far too soft with the English and entertained romantic notions about their "White Man's Burden" of an global empire, which they could have kept (longer) if they had ceased to interfere on the continent. Balkanization was Britain's traditional foreign policy. First it was control of the seas, then Germany was liquidated in 1648 with Richelieu's help; then France and Russia were contained by England in the 19th century. In 1871, with partial German reunification, the balance-of-power changed again and a show-down with Albion became all but inevitable.
Instead of trying to force a decision in 1940 with the Luftwaffe attacks, Hitler should have put his efforts into taking Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria to seal up the Mediterranean and buoy Axis confidence. Then, develop long-range naval air-support to assist a crash-program with the U-boats, keeping careful not to get drawn into war with the USA, or entangling alliances elsewhere.
At some point Albion would not be able to afford to buy more merchant vessels and would have to put its labor force into agriculture or go hungry. Without a strong surface navy the blockade would never have starved-out the island, but it would have separated the British from their Empire and caused hardship, which, had it been handled properly and diplomatically by the Germans, could have effected a change in English administration favorable to Germany and peace.
With the war ending voluntarily, lasting peace treaties with France and England could have been negotiated, with the Allied encirclement and balkanization policy completely abandoned. Stalin, Roosevelt and Hirohito would be left in the cold.
And that would have been a good thing for Europe.
I'm interested why you think it was a warcrime.
Try to forget everthing that you have read and transport yourself back to that time. Could you honestly say thay you had every confidence that the French Fleet wouldn't have fallen it German hands and if so why, what is your source of this confidence.
Why take a chance when you have an opportunity to quash it before it becomes a reality.
From the Shire
Try to forget everthing that you have read and transport yourself back to that time. Could you honestly say thay you had every confidence that the French Fleet wouldn't have fallen it German hands and if so why, what is your source of this confidence.
Why take a chance when you have an opportunity to quash it before it becomes a reality.
From the Shire-
Scott Smith
- Member
- Posts: 5602
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 22:17
- Location: Arizona
- Contact:
WARCRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS...
Although I'm extremely reluctant to put things into categories of "warcrimes," because sovereign powers have (and always have-had) the sovereign right to kill anybody they want to, I will say that had they been Germans, key Royal plutons certainly would have faced the noose for the coldblooded and slimy attack on the French fleet at anchor in 1940.Cheshire Yeomanry wrote:Hi Scott
A very interesting post, did I read this right, that you think that the attack on the French Fleet was a warcrime and that somebody should have hung for it?
France did not switch sides with the Armistice; the French fleet was not at war with Perfidious Albion.
This should have been a golden diplomatic opportunity for Germany to mend fences with France, but entangling alliances with other powers like the Italians infinitely complicated matters. Hitler should have made some assurances to the French and then moved on Gibraltar, with or without Franco's help. You snooze, you lose.
Royal Navy operations against French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, 3-6 July 1940:
-
Scott Smith
- Member
- Posts: 5602
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 22:17
- Location: Arizona
- Contact:
PERFIDIOUS USA
That's especially true these days.Cheshire Yeomanry wrote:Hi Scott
Every country (Even the USA) has the ability to be perfidious when it suits them.
It was churlish if not slimy.How could the attack be slimy when Somerville gave an ultimatum to Gensoul and engaged in some 9 hours of negotiation?
You are guessing wrong. Today, it is the four O's: Oil, Oil, Oil and Oil. Back then it was fishing, foresting, possible some mining and whales.Scott Smith wrote: Then what do Norwegians do for a living?
I'm guessing it was the four F's: Furs, Fish, Forestry, Farming
Norway is not now, and certainly not back then, able to supply it's own population with the agicultural products needed. Back in the days of the double monarchy Denmark/Norway, Denmark was the corn-chamber while Norway supplied raw-materials.
Norway has very little farmable land, and until they became rich, a very poor infrastructure.
I must conclude that the reason why Germany occupied Norway, must have been strategic. In -40 there was not a lot else to come after.
Regards --- Lars EP