State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

[phylo_roadking]

Angus - quite right, serves me right for working from memory! It's been five years or more since I had to look at the topic...and has taken me a while to dig up the dusty notes

It was 12th (Eastern) Division that was deactivated; its constituent 36th Brigade was mauled in France where it was overrun and dispersed, and rebuilt in England was eventually transferred to 78th Div when it was formed for TORCH...and 35th Bde was transferred out to 56th (London) Division {the old 1st London} and renamed 169th Bde. Its third constituent brigade, the 37th, was a nearly total write-off during the Battle of France, and doesn't seem to have been reformed until 8th December 1941 when it became 7th Infantry Brigade (Guards)

I don't suppose you know when the 169th was transferred to the 56th Div? The two putative dates are when 1st London was reorganised as an infantry division (previously it was a "motorised" division) in June 1940....or when it was redesignated as 56th (London) later in November.

I also have it in my notes that the 23rd (Northumbrian) Division slot was deactivated after Dunkirk...? And also the 66th (2nd East Lancashire) - but it was just disbanded and its constituent units shared around, it had never left the UK.

[amcl]

Angus - quite right, serves me right for working from memory! It's been five years or more since I had to look at the topic...and has taken me a while to dig up the dusty notes

I was reading "disbanded" excessively literally then. I'd have said "broken up" rather "disbanded", but that's a quibble. Then yes, 12, 23 and 66 got broken up, as well as 9 being renamed/disbanded/merged/blended with the remnants of 51 to produce a new 51. I'll come back to this later as I have some concerns with your interpretation (but no actual evidence ...).

.It was 12th (Eastern) Division that was deactivated; its constituent 36th Brigade was mauled in France where it was overrun and dispersed, and rebuilt in England was eventually transferred to 78th Div when it was formed for TORCH...and 35th Bde was transferred out to 56th (London) Division {the old 1st London} and renamed 169th Bde. Its third constituent brigade, the 37th, was a nearly total write-off during the Battle of France, and doesn't seem to have been reformed until 8th December 1941 when it became 7th Infantry Brigade (Guards)

Poor 37 Brigade seems to have had a continuous existence. The September 1940 deployment map in The Defence of the United Kingdom shows it in East Anglia (inland in Norfolk). On the May 1941 map it has moved a little, to the coast somewhat to the south of Yarmouth.

I don't suppose you know when the 169th was transferred to the 56th Div? The two putative dates are when 1st London was reorganised as an infantry division (previously it was a "motorised" division) in June 1940....or when it was redesignated as 56th (London) later in November.

I have seen July mentioned, which is a fair fit with the claim that 1 London Division was officially "de-motorified" in June. My only problem with this is that Nafziger (presumably quoting Joslen) says 3 London Infantry Brigade existed until November 1940 when it was renumbered 71. (And on that note, 6 London Brigade wasn't disbanded until May 1940). So was 1 London Division ever a "standard" (but MT-and-other-equipment-less) motor division? Hmm. The detailed Sealion-period OOBs posted last year show 1 London Division with both 35 Brigade and 198 Brigade from the disbanded 66 Division under command, but no 3 London Brigade. But when did 3 London Brigade leave 1 London Division?

I also have it in my notes that the 23rd (Northumbrian) Division slot was deactivated after Dunkirk...? And also the 66th (2nd East Lancashire) - but it was just disbanded and its constituent units shared around, it had never left the UK.

Indeed, but the infantry brigades - which made up a huge fraction of the so-called divisions which deployed to France under the names 12 and 23 Divisions - continued to exist, as did the artillery, which had never been in France. The saving in personnel from disbanding the remnants of the division HQ & supporting elements must have been rather minimal and didn't impact the overwhelming requirement for (infantry) replacements. Equally odd, if the motive for breaking up divisions was the heavy losses suffered by the labour units, why did the smashed-up 46 Division survive the cull and the virgin 66 Division not? And what, if anything, might the fate of 9 Division add to the picture?

As the mad panic which was keeping me out of bed has ended, I shall come back to this question ...

Nighty night,

Angus

[RichTO90]

I have seen July mentioned, which is a fair fit with the claim that 1 London Division was officially "de-motorified" in June. My only problem with this is that Nafziger (presumably quoting Joslen) says 3 London Infantry Brigade existed until November 1940 when it was renumbered 71. (And on that note, 6 London Brigade wasn't disbanded until May 1940). So was 1 London Division ever a "standard" (but MT-and-other-equipment-less) motor division? Hmm. The detailed Sealion-period OOBs posted last year show 1 London Division with both 35 Brigade and 198 Brigade from the disbanded 66 Division under command, but no 3 London Brigade. But when did 3 London Brigade leave 1 London Division?

3 London Brigade was detached from the division and attached to HQ London Area on 13 March 1940, not sure why. So it was long gone.

That left 1 London Division with just the two brigades. When the MT was lost making it an effective infantry rather than motorised division is unclear, but it gained 67 AT Regiment RA on 1 July, 35 Infantry Brigade on 2 July, 221 Field Co RE on 3 July, and 113 Field Regiment RA on 4 July, so by the end of that it effectively was fully organized as an infantry division (198 Independent Infantry Brigade was attached on 25 June as a reinforcement for the beach defense). I have seen 30 June mentioned as when the order for the reorganization went out, so the process may be said to have extended from 30 June to 4 July.

The division was retitled 56 (London) Division on 18 November 1940, with the three infantry brigades renumbered on 28 November, 35 Infantry Brigade became 169, 1 London became 167, and 2 London became 168.

Cheers!

[Knouterer]

These men were not and could not have been the exta men we see in units in SEPTEMBER 1940, because noone enlisted in June, July, or August would have completed their 16 weeks' Basic Training by September.

You're (once again) belabouring the obvious until it hurts. The "first reinforcements" sent to battalions after Dunkirk, bringing them up to a strength of 950 or so, must of course have been men who had joined 4, 5 or 6 months before and had passed their basic training by then. Nobody has suggested otherwise.

[Knouterer]

.It was 12th (Eastern) Division that was deactivated; its constituent 36th Brigade was mauled in France where it was overrun and dispersed, and rebuilt in England was eventually transferred to 78th Div when it was formed for TORCH...and 35th Bde was transferred out to 56th (London) Division {the old 1st London} and renamed 169th Bde. Its third constituent brigade, the 37th, was a nearly total write-off during the Battle of France, and doesn't seem to have been reformed until 8th December 1941 when it became 7th Infantry Brigade (Guards)

Poor 37 Brigade seems to have had a continuous existence. The September 1940 deployment map in The Defence of the United Kingdom shows it in East Anglia (inland in Norfolk). On the May 1941 map it has moved a little, to the coast somewhat to the south of Yarmouth.

The 37th Brigade - now an "independent" brigade - seems to have been alive and well and under command of the 18th Inf Division on 30.9.1940, according to Philson's Order of Battle for that date (see below), and still with the same three battalions as on 10.5.1940.

Regarding the 36th Brigade, the History of the Royal West Kent Regiment (Queen's Own) by H.D. Chaplin provides some info on what happened after Dunkirk (p. 160):

"On their return from France the remnants of the 6th and 7th Battalions assembled with 36th Brigade Headquarters and the 5th Buffs at Gunnerton Camp, Wark-on-Tyne. Reinforcements soon began to arrive to bring them up to establishment; for the 6th they came from the 50th Holding Battalion; for the 7th from the 50th Holding Battalion and from the Royal Norfolk Regiment."

In general, it seems it wouldn't have made much sense to disband infantry battalions, however much depleted, when there were enough men available to bring them back up to strength, and when at the same time new battalions were being raised at a fast rate.
There might have been a case for disbandment if morale was bad and internal cohesion and mutual confidence were lost for one reason or another, but I'm not aware of any such cases. Does anyone have any (factual) examples of inf battalions being disbanded (or "broken up" as Phylo puts it) after Dunkirk?



,

[Knouterer]

To return to Yangtze's original question, pour mémoire, an infantry battalion had a total (establishment) strength of around 800 organised in battalion headquarters, headquarters company and four rifle companies. Numbers varied a bit over time, for instance the (official) strength of the infantry section was increased from 8 to 11 and then reduced again to 10. Armament was 50 light machine guns, two 3-inch mortars, twelve 2-inch mortars and twenty-two anti-tank rifles. It had ten carriers. The plan was to increase the number of 3-inch mortars to six but few if any battalions had more than two in Sept. 1940, and even these were delivered relatively late (August in the case of the 2nd/4th South Lancs on the Suffolk coast) in some cases. Armament was more or less up to establishment by the end of Sept. for infantry battalions in divisions and independent brigades, although some other items of equipment continued to be in (very) short supply (wireless transmission sets, various types of vehicles, etc.)
Thompson submachine guns from the US were coming into service but Commandos and armoured units had priority, some infantry battalions had received a dozen or so if they were lucky.
Ammunition: sufficient for rifles, LMGs and A/Tk rifles, but mortar ammunition was very limited and hand/rifle grenades too apparently.
All this did not apply to the many "Holding", "Home Defence" and "Young Soldier" battalions, who generally had only rifles (including obsolete types like the Lee-Metford) and a (very) light sprinkling of Lewis or Hotchkiss LMGs.

This is just a very broad outline of the situation of course, I will happily supply more details and sources if anyone is interested. And artillery is quite another story.

[amcl]

Thanks Rich, info much appreciated. Likewise Knouterer.

To return to the divisions broken up, I don't think there is any argument over the fate of the infantry brigades of 12, 23 and 66 Divisions. The only thing that might be noted here is that with the motor division idea dropped, the army found itself with four divisions (not counting 23, broken up, or 50, which had had 25 Brigade under command) each short an infantry brigade, a field regiment RA, and a field compamy RE (1 London, 2 London, 55, 59). That's a sizable hole, and one not easily addressed by using holding battalion personnel.

The fate of the divisional engineers of the three broken-up divisions may be illuminating. I am using this handy (but not entirely accurate) listing from orbat.com: http://www.orbat.com/site/uk_orbats/fil ... r%20II.pdf. As we can see, there was a lot more going on than simply rebuilding the BEF after it got home. In summary:

1. The former 12 Division RE became XII Corps Troops RE.

• The former 66 Division RE became X Corps Troops RE.

• Although not normally considered as "broken up", 49 Division had left its divisional RE companies behind when the main body left for Iceland. These became XI Corps Troops RE.

• The merging of 9 and 51 Divisions to recreate 51 mk 2 left over three RE companies surplus to requirements. The two field companies went to 29 and 31 Brigade Groups while the surplus field park company was posted to Northern Ireland.

• That leaves 23 Division, which provided a field company to 50 Division along with 69 Brigade and a field regiment, and two companies to London Defence Troops RE.

While it would be interesting to see similar lists for RASC companies and the like. It probably crosses the line into stating the obvious to note that transport and signals units would also have been required by the new Corps HQs, Brigade Groups, et cetera.

So, given the background, and also what we know about the fate of the broken-up units and what sort of losses - infantry mostly - the replacement system was designed around, I am skeptical that a shortage of PBI was near the root of the decision to remove 12, 23 and 66 Divisions from the scene. The case of 9 and 51 Divisions may be different. I certainly have seen it written (but where?) that the decision to merge rather than rebuilding 51 Division was informed by concerns that the Highland Division's recruiting area would not sustain two divisions after such a heavy loss. (I'm not sure that is a relevant, even if accurate, but that's another matter.)

But perhaps, in hindsight, that was a poor choice. Within less than a year new divisions would start appearing, both county divisions and the 70-series ones. Even in the late summer of 1940, there were sufficient brigades and infantry training groups - soon to become infantry brigades (home) - scattered about Britain that another three divisional HQs, be they ever-so-skeletal, might have been useful to take up some of the burden from command and district HQs.

That's my opinion, and if you don't like it, well just wait a bit and I'll probably have a different one.

Cheers,

Angus

[phylo_roadking]

Angus...

So, given the background, and also what we know about the fate of the broken-up units and what sort of losses - infantry mostly - the replacement system was designed around, I am skeptical that a shortage of PBI was near the root of the decision to remove 12, 23....Divisions from the scene

I'm trying to get hold of an old British Army Review article that states exacty this. In desperation they had been sacrificed in a pointless effort to slow down the German tanks on the 20th May, and most of the men became POW. There was little on which to rebuild, not even a decent cadre of NCOS etc.. I don't know how old the article is, or whether it will stand up to scrutiny, but will be worth looking at if only to knock it down...

But from Montefiore -

The 23rd...69th Bde - 5th Bn East Yorkshire Regt, and 6th & 7th Bns Green Howards...and 70th Bde - 10th and 11th Bns Durham Light Infantry, and 1st Bn Tyneside Scottish...had been sent to France as LoC troops due to a lack of training and equipment. Maj-Gen Roddy Petre, commander of 12th Div and based at Arras, was asked to command an ad hoc force to stop the Germans crossing the British LoC; this was when 23rd Div was put under his command, and a battalion of the Welsh Guards, together with his own 36th Bde from the 12th Div - incidently, did this get a "FORCE" name?...part of which was to be positioned SOUTH of the 23rd Div on the Canal du Nord, the 36th taking their positions along the road from Doullens to Arras. This was for them a six-mile front - and they had no artillery and no anti-tank guns...and only 14 Boyes A/T rifles in all of the 5th Buffs. Their right flank was secured by the 6th Bn the Queen's Own Royal West kents...but their LEFT flank was left hanging...

They SHOULD have been reinforced by the 23rd's 1st Bn Tyneside Scottish - but they didn't make it, they ran into their OWN problems; in the subsequent fighting - against tanks that they were assured were NOT there and when they questioned it they were assured were FRENCH tanks that had made a mistake when the tanks fired on them!...1st Bn Tyneside Scottish lost c.370 killed, wounded or POW of their 450 roster as of 20th May, only c.80 men escaping.

36 Bde's 7th Bn Queens Own Royal West Kents, were supposed to deploy east of Albert south-east of Doullens...and THEY had been told too that German tanks were miles away - pity noone told Von Kleist that he wasn't supposed to be there! Anyway - the Germans hit them and the same thing happened to them as to the Tyneside Scottish. Two officers made it from Albert back to warn the remaining 36 Bde battalions, so the 6th Royal West Kents and 5th Buffs had SOME limited warning of the approach of tanks from 2nd and 6th Panzer Division! But after several hours HARD fighting, only 75 of the 6th Royal West Kents eventually returned to Engand; 503 were posted as missing; if the 5th Buffs, only 80 out of 605 men eventually made it home.

The 12th Div's 7th Bn, Royal Sussex Regiment actually suffered worse! Two days before all this, a air attack on the train carrying them to Amiens as it passed through St. Roch resulted in at least sixty casualties before they even got into combat. They eventually made it into the line along the road between Amiens and Poix on the same day as the Tyneside Scottish and 36 Bde battalions were overrun elsewhere...and tanks which once again they had been assured were nowhere nearby hit them at 4 in the afternoon with no warning - and overran them completely.

Anyway - back in England the 23rd's 69th Bde was transferred to the 50th (Northumbrian) Division on 1st July 1940 to bring the latter back up to strength as a three-brigade Infantry Division, and the 70th Bde being transferred to 49th (West Riding) Division to do likewise - including the decimated 1st Bn Tyneside Scottish IIRC. When did this transfer take place, do you know? As in - before or after the Tyneside Scottish was rebuilt?

Was it just a case that the various constituent units were moved about very shortly after Dunkirk to deal with the "motorised division concept failure"....and then the various units were rebuilt/brought back up to strength? From what I've read over the years, a lot of the units back from Dunkirk didn't even begin formating again until towards the end of June anyway...

That leaves 23 Division, which provided a field company to 50 Division along with 69 Brigade and a field regiment...

Just checking we have matching details - 124th Field Regiment, RA and the 233rd Field Coy, RE?

[amcl]

Angus...

So, given the background, and also what we know about the fate of the broken-up units and what sort of losses - infantry mostly - the replacement system was designed around, I am skeptical that a shortage of PBI was near the root of the decision to remove 12, 23....Divisions from the scene

I'm trying to get hold of an old British Army Review article that states exacty this. In desperation they had been sacrificed in a pointless effort to slow down the German tanks on the 20th May, and most of the men became POW. There was little on which to rebuild, not even a decent cadre of NCOS etc.. I don't know how old the article is, or whether it will stand up to scrutiny, but will be worth looking at if only to knock it down...

This is where I miss having an equivalent of The Paladins covering the army. Unlike with the RAF, where we have no end of great published work on how the RAF grew, and what sort of losses its training system was designed to meet, the army is Cinderella, just like in 1940 ... French and others have done fascinating work, but their efforts really only get going after the periods when the army was massively expanded. I'm sure a month or two in the PRO would help, but the reality is I'll never have time for that. So I'll just need to keep hoping for a book on the subject.

I haven't come across a breakdown of losses by division in France & Flanders, but if we take the total of 36,000-odd infantry casualties - http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/educ ... nlarge.htm - then that works out a bit under 300 infantry casualties per battalion, including pioneer, motorcycle and machinegun battalions. As you previously mentioned, the monthly intake for the army was around 70,000. I don't know what proportion of those 70,000 were destined for the infantry, but between first replacements, holding battalions and the regular monthly output of personnel completing basic training, it does not seem unreasonable to think that the gaps could have been filled within a month or two at most.

And 70 Brigade, which we'll come to shortly, is interesting in this respect.

Anyway - back in England the 23rd's 69th Bde was transferred to the 50th (Northumbrian) Division on 1st July 1940 to bring the latter back up to strength as a three-brigade Infantry Division, and the 70th Bde being transferred to 49th (West Riding) Division to do likewise - including the decimated 1st Bn Tyneside Scottish IIRC. When did this transfer take place, do you know? As in - before or after the Tyneside Scottish was rebuilt?

Neither before nor after but while ... the Tyneside Scottish didn't even get a new CO until 26 June and 11 DLI waited even longer. 70 Brigade was sent to sunny Devon in June, which beats either Iceland or Egypt. The NE War Memorials Project has the brigade's war diary put up on website: http://70brigade.newmp.org.uk/wiki/70th ... Diary_1940 The entry for 26 June is interesting. Just in case the website should disappear in the next ten minutes, here it is:

Brigade HQ moved to TAVISTOCK by Motor Transport and were established at the Drill Hall. 11th DLI and 1st TS moved to TAVISTOCK and YELVERTON respectively by train. 11th DLI were accommodated in Abbotsfield Camp TAVISTOCK and 1st TS were in billets at YELVERTON. Each of the Brigade’s Battalions received reinforcement drafts as follows:- 150 men of King’s Shropshire Light Infantry and 124 men of the South Lancashire Regiment to 10th DLI. 261 men from the Black Watch to 1st TS. 225 men from the Royal Scots Fusiliers to 11th DLI

Those 760 replacements represent over a third of the brigade's strength at the start of May 1940. So much for the sacred regimental system.

That leaves 23 Division, which provided a field company to 50 Division along with 69 Brigade and a field regiment...

Just checking we have matching details - 124th Field Regiment, RA and the 233rd Field Coy, RE?

Yep.

The 70 Brigade War Diary says it got 125 Field Regiment RA and 507 Field Company RE on 20 June. The diary (plaintively) notes that it didn't yet have an artillery signals section or a brigade signals section either, so 69 Brigade was most likely in the same boat.

Cheers,

Angus

[phylo_roadking]

...Each of the Brigade’s Battalions received reinforcement drafts as follows:- 150 men of King’s Shropshire Light Infantry and 124 men of the South Lancashire Regiment to 10th DLI. 261 men from the Black Watch to 1st TS. 225 men from the Royal Scots Fusiliers to 11th DLI

Is it just me - or does that read as big tranches of transfers-in of serving troops rather than "first reinforcements" from the holding units? I wish we had a break-down of those -

Those 760 replacements represent over a third of the brigade's strength at the start of May 1940. So much for the sacred regimental system.

...remembering that some of the battalion numbers in France were pretty low, like the 1st Tyneside Scottish' 450. To me it hints at transfers-in of NCOs and old hands as a cadre...?

1st Tyneside Scottish began the tumultuous events of May 20th 1940 with only that c.450 men...any idea when (or if they ever did) it grew to anywhere near the "ideal" 800?

This is where I miss having an equivalent of The Paladins covering the army. Unlike with the RAF, where we have no end of great published work on how the RAF grew, and what sort of losses its training system was designed to meet, the army is Cinderella, just like in 1940 ... French and others have done fascinating work, but their efforts really only get going after the periods when the army was massively expanded. I'm sure a month or two in the PRO would help, but the reality is I'll never have time for that. So I'll just need to keep hoping for a book on the subject.

Someone will, eventually - but probably in the form of a uni dissertation or thesis IIRC that's how John James' classic started (I'm old-fashioned enough to wish there was a nice, bookbound version of David Newbold's thesis...) Apart from anything else, looking at the few paragraphs in Postan's British War Production referring to the growing of the Army from 1939 to May 1940....and later, another section immediately after Dunkirk...there seems to be a nice leavening of domestic and international politics to spice up the subject!

[sitalkes]

If you add up the number of regular army units in Britain in September 1940, how many men were there in total? Also, although half the British units were said to be without transport, is it possible to work out which units - could it be said that the further a unit was located from the South-East, the more likely it was to have less transport, or were the coastal units also especially short of transport so the mobile counter-attack force could be equipped?

[phylo_roadking]

or were the coastal units also especially short of transport so the mobile counter-attack force could be equipped?

Well, if you look at Lavery, and the earlier discussions re hired coaches....and the details of MILFORCE - you'll see that the mobile counterattacking forces were using hired civilian transport

[amcl]

...Each of the Brigade’s Battalions received reinforcement drafts as follows:- 150 men of King’s Shropshire Light Infantry and 124 men of the South Lancashire Regiment to 10th DLI. 261 men from the Black Watch to 1st TS. 225 men from the Royal Scots Fusiliers to 11th DLI

Those 760 replacements represent over a third of the brigade's strength at the start of May 1940. So much for the sacred regimental system.

Is it just me - or does that read as big tranches of transfers-in of serving troops rather than "first reinforcements" from the holding units? I wish we had a break-down of those - but to me it hints at transfers-in of NCOs and old hands as a cadre...?

I am not sure. I think it means they came from the depot (or holding battalion) of KSLI, et al. If they'd come from a battalion, wouldn't you expect to see which battalion mentioned? Given the general sketchiness of the War Diary, perhaps that's unrealistic, but 4 Ox & Bucks' War Diary is clearer as we shall see.

1st Tyneside Scottish began the tumultuous events of May 20th 1940 with only c.450 men...any idea when (or if they ever did) it grew to anywhere near the "ideal" 800?

It had 26 officers and 641 men on 24 April and 5 officers and 120 men on its return to the UK. On 21 October it had 39 officers and 895 men. And in between times? The last mention of a draft appearing to come from outside the regiments is in August, but I think all that shows is that the answer is of the "on or after 12 August" variety. I think this confirms - as we might reasonably expect - that 70 Brigade wasn't anywhere near the top of the list for reconstruction. But their neighbours, 48 Division, were favoured indeed.

For example, 4 Ox & Bucks were in worse state than the Tyneside Scottish when they returned from France with 5 officers and just over 100 men present as late as 20 June. By the time they arrived on Dartmoor in the first week of July they had received a draft of 360 recruits from the DCLI depot (but "the only soldiers above the rank of private were two serjeants. An official complaint only brought the reply that N.C.O.s did not exist", but see below re 6 Ox & Bucks) and a party of 300 wandering souls from regimental depot, via France, and they were well-found for numbers and rifles. They had even received sixteen Bren guns, 8 Boyes and a Thompson before June was out, and some carriers and mortars arrived in July.

This is where I miss having an equivalent of The Paladins covering the army. Unlike with the RAF, where we have no end of great published work on how the RAF grew, and what sort of losses its training system was designed to meet, the army is Cinderella, just like in 1940 ... French and others have done fascinating work, but their efforts really only get going after the periods when the army was massively expanded. I'm sure a month or two in the PRO would help, but the reality is I'll never have time for that. So I'll just need to keep hoping for a book on the subject.

Someone will, eventually - but probably in the form of a uni dissertation or thesis IIRC that's how John James' classic started (I'm old-fashioned enough to wish there was a nice, bookbound version of David Newbold's thesis...) Apart from anything else, looking at the few paragraphs in Postan's British War Production referring to the growing of the Army from 1939 to May 1940....and later, another section immediately after Dunkirk...there seems to be a nice leavening of domestic and international politics to spice up the subject!

Even the Reichswehr, with more than a decade of planning and the vaunted 100,000 man army to build on, seems to have found it hard to get expansion started. By comparison, British expansion seems to have been unplanned and very rapid, i.e. TA duplication ordered in late March 1939 and mostly complete on paper by the end of August. How did the army find officers for all these units? To what extent, if any, was the experience of triplicating the TA and creating the New Armies in WW1 considered and/or reapplied? What plans (none probably) were made to equip these units, especially for things like wireless signals equipment where digging 1918 vintage left-overs out of stock wasn't much of an option? How did the army find drill halls and training areas for all these units? And that's before we think about the increase in regular army strength announced in April 1939 (10% overall I believe, but rather more in practice if it was concentrated in Home Forces) or the Military Training Act which came into effect in June.

Let's return to the Ox & Bucks. 6 Ox & Bucks sprang into life on 4 July 1940 at Cowley Barracks with 18 officers, 5 W.O.s, 53 N.C.O.s - now that's weird, what were 4 Ox & Bucks told about N.C.O.s? - and 65 O.R.s. It was attached to 14 Infantry Training Group (the future 214 Brigade) and sent off into the wilds of Cheshire. Drafts for A Coy arrived on 17 July, those for B Coy on 24 July and finally C and D Coys on 26 July, but it was October before personnel were assigned to the HQ Coy platoons and even then there were no signals equipment, carriers, mortars or M.T. to equip them. So when was 6 Ox & Bucks "formed", and how many grains of sand make a heap?

Cheers,

Angus

[phylo_roadking]

But their neighbours, 48 Division, were favoured indeed.

Angus - when you say neighbours - where were they physically posted at the time?

I am not sure. I think it means they came from the depot (or holding battalion) of KSLI, et al. If they'd come from a battalion, wouldn't you expect to see which battalion mentioned? Given the general sketchiness of the War Diary, perhaps that's unrealistic, but 4 Ox & Bucks' War Diary is clearer as we shall see.

Pity we don't know more - because THEN we could at least check for a matching transfer out of any regular battalions....or not, of course

Even the Reichswehr, with more than a decade of planning and the vaunted 100,000 man army to build on, seems to have found it hard to get expansion started.

Which is indeed odd - haven't we read on AHF that the Reichswehr was planning/rostering for two times the number of any constituent units battalions I.E. they surrepticiously had the paper organsiation for a 300,000-strong force?

By comparison, British expansion seems to have been unplanned and very rapid, i.e. TA duplication ordered in late March 1939 and mostly complete on paper by the end of August. How did the army find officers for all these units? To what extent, if any, was the experience of triplicating the TA and creating the New Armies in WW1 considered and/or reapplied?

How, physically, was this achieved in 1939? Did the War Office just reactivate a panel of WWI battalion numbers to pair off with each currently-existing Territorial battalion in a regiment?

What plans (none probably) were made to equip these units, especially for things like wireless signals equipment where digging 1918 vintage left-overs out of stock wasn't much of an option?

Well... to an extent we KNOW that there were large stocks of WWI arms and personal equipment available; there are pics of Terries with WWI webbing and four-pocket jackets departing for France in the winter of 1939/40...and in some cases coming back with it later! And despite all the extra units that had to be equiped with the SMLE from early 1939 through to Dunkirk...some of them as we know going abroad with ONLY their SMLEs - after Dunkirk there were still SMLEs available in store, some of which went out to the LDV for a time...though in many places eventually recalled for regular Army units as they formated and they could be replaced with the newly-arriving .300 American rifles. As incidently were a lot of the .303 American rifles first issued to the Home Guard, the Wincheseter/ Eddystone/ Remington rifles in .303 grouped unter the P14 monicker; these were pulled too and given to Commonwealth forces, I've seen footage of Commonwealth troops in the Western Desert carrying them.

For information on these, and the Lewis Gun...and the quantities of each available - see David Clark's thesis on arming the Home Guard.

Let's return to the Ox & Bucks. 6 Ox & Bucks sprang into life on 4 July 1940 at Cowley Barracks with 18 officers, 5 W.O.s, 53 N.C.O.s - now that's weird, what were 4 Ox & Bucks told about N.C.O.s? - and 65 O.R.s.

For example, 4 Ox & Bucks were in worse state than the Tyneside Scottish when they returned from France with 5 officers and just over 100 men present as late as 20 June. By the time they arrived on Dartmoor in the first week of July they had received a draft of 360 recruits from the DCLI depot (but "the only soldiers above the rank of private were two serjeants. An official complaint only brought the reply that N.C.O.s did not exist", but see below re 6 Ox & Bucks)

It could just refer to there being no other DCLI NCOs to send from their depot...

I don't suppose the 6 Ox&Bucks war diary says anything more about where those NCOs they got came from?

[amcl]

But their neighbours, 48 Division, were favoured indeed.

Angus - when you say neighbours - where were they physically posted at the time?

48 Division and 70 Brigade were the main elements of VIII Corps, responsible for the defence of Devon and Cornwall. As of mid-July, 4 Ox & Bucks was at Tiverton (maybe 20 miles n. of Exeter) and 1 Tyneside Scottish at Yelverton (about 10 miles north of Plymouth). That's about 40 miles apart as the crow flies, but more like 75 by road according to Google.

Even the Reichswehr, with more than a decade of planning and the vaunted 100,000 man army to build on, seems to have found it hard to get expansion started.

Which is indeed odd - haven't we read on AHF that the Reichswehr was planning/rostering for two times the number of any constituent units battalions I.E. they surrepticiously had the paper organsiation for a 300,000-strong force?

On paper they were; Tooze mentions the plans in passing in Wages of Destruction. The degree to which those plans had any impact on the actually existing Reichsheer of 1933 is unclear to me. To the extent that the recorded expansion in from 7 to 21 divisions matches the Umbauplan and its predecessors we can say that the 100,000 man Reichsheer was not organized as a "just add conscripts" force, unless perhaps in an emergency. The end result was about as close to "make every company into a battalion, every battalion into a regiment and every regiment into a division" as the Reichsheer's establishment would allow, but that's not at all how they actually got from A to B. The expansion was complicated and involved multiple stages and cross-transfers. If I had to guess (and that's all it would be), I would hazard the suggestion that a Big Bang was considered too provocative, and hence too risky.

By comparison, British expansion seems to have been unplanned and very rapid, i.e. TA duplication ordered in late March 1939 and mostly complete on paper by the end of August. How did the army find officers for all these units? To what extent, if any, was the experience of triplicating the TA and creating the New Armies in WW1 considered and/or reapplied?

How, physically, was this achieved in 1939? Did the War Office just reactivate a panel of WWI battalion numbers to pair off with each currently-existing Territorial battalion in a regiment?

The War Office didn't do much at all. [Joke goes here.] The Territorial Associations did the work, but they didn't all do it in the same way. Battalions/regiments/companies were simple enough: where there was one, let there be two. Some regimental/county associations used WW1 practice, so that instead of 5th Sherwood Foresters there was 1/5th Sherwood Foresters and 2/5th Sherwood Foresters. Others used an unused number for the new unit, so that 4th Ox & Bucks produced 5th Ox & Bucks. And finally, some who had merged battalions demerged them, so that 6th/7th Cameronians produced 6th and 7th battalions. There was a clear distinction in equipment, training, etc, between 1st and 2nd line battalions.

Brigades and divisions weren't so simple. Most divisions were simply duplicated. All the new battalions formed a new brigade, the new brigades formed a new division. Nice and neat. But there's always one, or in this case three, to do things differently. Instead of a splitting off new units into new divisions, the powers that be decided that in the case of the 43rd (Wessex), 54th (E. Anglian) and 55th (W. Lancs) Divisions, the recruiting area should be split in two and the units assigned to divisions on that basis, so that there were two partly new divisions rather than one new one. None of the divisions so treated was ready to be posted overseas before France fell, which rather suggests it was not just different but worse too as a plan.

What plans (none probably) were made to equip these units, especially for things like wireless signals equipment where digging 1918 vintage left-overs out of stock wasn't much of an option?

Well... to an extent we KNOW that there were large stocks of WWI arms and personal equipment available; there are pics of Terries with WWI webbing and four-pocket jackets departing for France in the winter of 1939/40...and in some cases coming back with it later!
<snip>
For information on these, and the Lewis Gun...and the quantities of each available - see David Clark's thesis on arming the Home Guard.

Clarke's thesis is a wonderful resource and a damn good read into the bargain. In a pre-internet age it would most likely have been published, if at all, as a hugely expensive, limited edition. But it's available free of charge right here: https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/6164 (I don't get paid for advertising it, it's a public service.)

Let's return to the Ox & Bucks. 6 Ox & Bucks sprang into life on 4 July 1940 at Cowley Barracks with 18 officers, 5 W.O.s, 53 N.C.O.s - now that's weird, what were 4 Ox & Bucks told about N.C.O.s? - and 65 O.R.s.

For example, 4 Ox & Bucks were in worse state than the Tyneside Scottish when they returned from France with 5 officers and just over 100 men present as late as 20 June. By the time they arrived on Dartmoor in the first week of July they had received a draft of 360 recruits from the DCLI depot (but "the only soldiers above the rank of private were two serjeants. An official complaint only brought the reply that N.C.O.s did not exist", but see below re 6 Ox & Bucks)

It could just refer to there being no other DCLI NCOs to send from their depot...

I don't suppose the 6 Ox&Bucks war diary says anything more about where those NCOs they got came from?

On the first point, I think you are right. On the second, they simply appear like manna from heaven. I need to read further.

Cheers,

Angus