Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

[sandeepmukherjee196]

This 'dig in and beat off all attacks' method ...

... was exactly what planning for BARBAROSSA intended.

... depends on the claim the German could kill Soviets at a rate that meant the Russians would run out of soldiers before the Germans.

I suspect the assumptions were that:
1) they would have already defeated the Red Army before digging in and
2) the remaining Soviets would not have the will to put up any further fight.

I do not believe it had anything to do with kill ratios or depth of battlefield.

Can you please show where the Barbarossa plan said that they would dig in and defend in 42?

[Cult Icon]

The Red Army did not have problems breaking through weak points in 41/42. They had issues exploiting the breakthrough and making the most of it. These issues were resolved by late 42.

[Guaporense]

Actually, the 1942 offensive can be understood to be a mistake now, it would be more rational for Germany to simply dig up in 1942 and try to fortify and stabilize the frontlines, enabling maximum exchange ratio with the Red Army to not consume much manpower. Well, that was what Guderian advocated but only after Stalingrad.

Handing back the initiative and reverting to attrition warfare against an enemy that would very much welcome a respite to build up a land army the likes of which history has never seen would have been the epitome of military suicide.

Hi Kingfish...

I agree with you and am surprised with the line of thought of Guaporense. I don't recollect ever coming across this paradigm i.e., no one has ever said that it would have been the correct strategy for the Wehrmacht to dig their heels in circa 1942 and let the Soviets take the initiative.

Heinz Guderian said that that it what they should have done but he said that in mid 1943: the Eastern front should be fortified to reduce it's manpower requirements, to free manpower up to defend the West. Have you heard of him? After Barbarossa failed it was clear that they wouldn't be able to just finish the USSR off in a large battle of annihilation. So instead they should have tried to maximize their attrition rate to wear down the Red Army up to the point it would give up attacking. In 1942-1943 they were exchanging about 5-6 soldiers to 1, in Soviet offensives against fortified positions they were losing upwards to 10 men to 1 casualty inflicted.

Anyway, that's essentially what the Wehrmacht did during the last 2.5 years of WW2 and it didn't turn out well, but it was the best response strategy given what was happening: the were fighting with numerical inferiority everywhere so defend-defend-defend was the appropriate strategy to maximize the probability of survival of the Nazi regime. However there were many ways in which efficiency of this strategy could have been improved from history.

If ever there was a Nation and its military that couldn't afford a dug in war of attrition, it was Germany and Wehrmacht in WWII. And that too in the east. I read above that this poster alludes to the Russian mobilisation of 35 million personnel. But was that surprising or unexpected? Surely Hitler knew about the manpower pool of USSR? He knew about the trans Ural industrial base? He knew that a single tank factory in the Urals could outproduce the entire German tank manufacturing setup?

First, German industrial resources were enormously superior to Soviet industrial resources, in terms of coal and coke, it was ca. 450 million tons for Germany's Grossraum in 1942-1943 compared to ca. 65 million tons in the USSR in 1942-1943. The number of tanks produced is not a relevant statistic since the Soviets just allocated a larger fraction of their military expenditures on tanks than the Germans did. If you measure by volume of heavy ammunition rounds produced (ver 75 mm), during the war German output was triple of the Soviet output and by mid 1944 they were spending 4 times more steel on production of ammunition:



This is "rolled steel" figures which I took from the USSBS report on the ordinance industry.

The USSR's advantage was manpower, Germany's advantage in the Eastern front was firepower.

For a military whose primary war strategy in the east was to wrap things up in a few weeks, the very thought of digging in after a year and prepare for a long war of attrition, was like a fish looking for a bicycle!

Historically, they didn't have the manpower strength to execute a large scale Barbarossa style offensive after Barbarossa failed.

Instead they tried a limited scale offensive in 1942 and went deep inside the USSR just to be cut off and encircled and annihilated. If they didn't do that the German army would lose fewer men and the Red Army would lose more men, than what happened historically.

[MarkN]

Can you please show where the Barbarossa plan said that they would dig in and defend in 42?

Fuhrer Directives 21 and 32. No date was stated. Nor did I claim one was.

[Cult Icon]

Once again, the other pillar of your house of cards are your use of exaggerated casualty ratios and the use of the stupid idea of attrition.

The soviets were breaking through and encircling armies, army groups, etc. by the summer of 1944. Axis pow counts grew in both the east/west in 43 and skyrocketed in 44' and 45'.

[Guaporense]

By the way, I was reading the USSBS report on the German war economy. Here is Kesselring's opinion on the state of his ammunition supply: "Kesselring has said that his ammunition supplies both in quantity and quality were good." - USSBS, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Germany's War Economy page 189.

What appears to happen to me is a cultural difference between German logistical doctrine and Anglo-American doctrine. The German doctrine is "have as much ammunition as you need, not more", the Anglo-American doctrine "have at least as much ammunition as you might need in any conceivable situation and even more if possible". In WW2, the Wehrmacht never accumulated large ammunition stocks, one might say it's because they didn't have the "resources" but, well, in mid 1944 they managed to increase ammunition production to much higher levels than before mainly by reallocating steel while ammunition production was always a small fraction of total expenditures, which means that if they wanted to accumulate stocks of ammunition they could, just reallocate a bit more than current consumption (specially in the 1940-1941 years). In view of Anglo-American cultural perceptions, it appears that German logistical supply was inadequate but that's due to cultural differences, for German commanders their supply was in general adequate.

However, that doesn't mean that logistical difficulties played an important role in the war, it just means that in terms of German organization, their logistical supply was adequate considering their expectations regarding it.

Instead, the most important logistical issues were caused by Allied interdiction efforts on railroads supplying the Wehrmacht troops. I was reading the paper "Feeding Mars" and it states indeed that interdiction efforts played a key role in denying German troops the supplies they needed for combat in decisive moments of the battle; they bombed French railroads so that they couldn't supply the troops at the front. Overall, bombing railroads either for interdiction of supplies or for the damaging of the war economy were the most effective use of airpower in the war, it was much more effective than the use of airpower directly on enemy formations and obviously, on the civilian population (RAF bomber command).

[Guaporense]

Once again, the other pillar of your house of cards are your use of exaggerated casualty ratios and the use of the stupid idea of attrition.

Exaggerated?



As you can see across the whole front in late 1942 German-Soviet ratio was 7-1, and that means that when entrenched and defending against attacks like Operation Mars, the ratio was even more pronounced.

One should understand that the Soviet labor force was not much larger than Germany's, at 55 million workers, to Germany's 40 million workers and Germany could import labor from occupied countries to make up the loss of domestic male workers. According to KDF, by 1943 it appears that to continue conscripting the required manpower to attack at the rate they were attacking they needed to liberate more territories from German occupation: their labor force grew from 55 million to 75 million between 1943 and 1945 which enabled the conscription of added soldiers and replacement of losses.

The soviets were breaking through and encircling armies, army groups, etc. by the summer of 1944. Axis pow counts grew in both the east/west in 43 and skyrocketed in 44' and 45'.

Indeed. Those losses were catastrophic.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Can you please show where the Barbarossa plan said that they would dig in and defend in 42?

Fuhrer Directives 21 and 32. No date was stated. Nor did I claim one was.

But you wrote :

This 'dig in and beat off all attacks' method ...

... was exactly what planning for BARBAROSSA intended...........................................

The entire premise rests on what period one is talking about. The Germans resorting to a possible defenseive strategy per force.... after the Moscow and Stalingrad game changing disasters, is a completely different proposition than their building it into their original plan.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Actually, the 1942 offensive can be understood to be a mistake now, it would be more rational for Germany to simply dig up in 1942 and try to fortify and stabilize the frontlines, enabling maximum exchange ratio with the Red Army to not consume much manpower. Well, that was what Guderian advocated but only after Stalingrad.

Handing back the initiative and reverting to attrition warfare against an enemy that would very much welcome a respite to build up a land army the likes of which history has never seen would have been the epitome of military suicide.

Hi Kingfish...

I agree with you and am surprised with the line of thought of Guaporense. I don't recollect ever coming across this paradigm i.e., no one has ever said that it would have been the correct strategy for the Wehrmacht to dig their heels in circa 1942 and let the Soviets take the initiative.

Heinz Guderian said that that it what they should have done but he said that in mid 1943: the Eastern front should be fortified to reduce it's manpower requirements, to free manpower up to defend the West. Have you heard of him?

Yes I heard of a guy by that name. Same guy who was the arch proponent of the Panzer Doctrine? Who thought that static defence was passe? Who, in his role as a WW I radio jockey( ) knew more than most what mobility can do in both offence and defence? Who, in fact, was sometimes stupidly against dug in defences (as after the defeat of Typhoon) when that was the only viable choice left?

Ahhh Mid 43 ! You wrote :

...............................

Actually, the 1942 offensive can be understood to be a mistake now, it would be more rational for Germany to simply dig up in 1942 and try to fortify and stabilize the frontlines, enabling maximum exchange ratio with the Red Army to not consume much manpower. Well, that was what Guderian advocated but only after Stalingrad.

.............................................

Whats the point of quoting Guderian on what he thought AFTER the disasters on the Ost front in this context? I had written :

"I agree with you and am surprised with the line of thought of Guaporense. I don't recollect ever coming across this paradigm i.e., no one has ever said that it would have been the correct strategy for the Wehrmacht to dig their heels in circa 1942 and let the Soviets take the initiative."

I was resonding to your assertion that it would have been better for the Germans to dig in BEFORE Stalingrad happened.

BTW I am not the "enemy" .. I am a supporter of the Wehrmacht too.. but the real Wehrmacht in a real WWII, as it happened. So......

Cheers
Sandeep

[MarkN]

The entire premise rests on what period one is talking about. The Germans resorting to a possible defenseive strategy per force.... after the Moscow and Stalingrad game changing disasters, is a completely different proposition than their building it into their original plan.

I don't understand the point you are trying to make.

Fuhrer Directive 21 clearly describes the pursuit of a defensive (and containment) strategy of the Soviet Union east of the Volga-Archangel line.



Before they implemented that strategy, certain preconditions had to be in place: namely, neutralising the Red Army and the Soviet industrial capacity to rearm.

The defence strategy and digging in did not happen in 1941, or 1942, because the preconditions had not been met.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

The entire premise rests on what period one is talking about. The Germans resorting to a possible defenseive strategy per force.... after the Moscow and Stalingrad game changing disasters, is a completely different proposition than their building it into their original plan.

I don't understand the point you are trying to make.

Fuhrer Directive 21 clearly describes the pursuit of a defensive (and containment) strategy of the Soviet Union east of the Volga-Archangel line.



Before they implemented that strategy, certain preconditions had to be in place: namely, neutralising the Red Army and the Soviet industrial capacity to rearm.

The defence strategy and digging in did not happen in 1941, or 1942, because the preconditions had not been met.

I am confused as to why the misunderstanding is coming about. You yourself have clarified that the above scenario was not relevant since the preconditions had not been met. In fact just saying that the preconditions hadn't been met is a gross understatement.

My point all along has been about the statement made here by a poster that the Germans should have dug in and defended in 42 under the actual circumstances prevailing.

[MarkN]

I am confused as to why the misunderstanding is coming about. You yourself have clarified that the above scenario was not relevant since the preconditions had not been met. In fact just saying that the preconditions hadn't been met is a gross understatement.

My point all along has been about the statement made here by a poster that the Germans should have dug in and defended in 42 under the actual circumstances prevailing.

If you agree with the point I'm making, why are you arguing against it? Perhaps that's where your confusion arises. I'm not arguing any of the points you have made.

I responded to this post by Michael Kenny: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p2027925

My response/point was to rebut the reasons he gave why the Wehrmacht didn't dig in. In otherwords, I suggest the decision was not made based upon a calculation of loss ratios and distance, but at a more fundamental (doctrinal) level. It is a difference in opinion over motive for the decision.

For reasons I do not understand, you've decided to jump in and query dates - not motive. Dates are irrelevant to my rebuttal. Hence why I don't understand the point you are still trying to make. If the Wehrmacht achieved the conditions in 1941 or 1942 or 1943, then there is a good chance the described defensive/containment strategy would have been implemented. The Wehrmacht failed to deliver those conditions.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

I am confused as to why the misunderstanding is coming about. You yourself have clarified that the above scenario was not relevant since the preconditions had not been met. In fact just saying that the preconditions hadn't been met is a gross understatement.

My point all along has been about the statement made here by a poster that the Germans should have dug in and defended in 42 under the actual circumstances prevailing.

If you agree with the point I'm making, why are you arguing against it? Perhaps that's where your confusion arises. I'm not arguing any of the points you have made.

I responded to this post by Michael Kenny: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p2027925

My response/point was to rebut the reasons he gave why the Wehrmacht didn't dig in. In otherwords, I suggest the decision was not made based upon a calculation of loss ratios and distance, but at a more fundamental (doctrinal) level. It is a difference in opinion over motive for the decision.

For reasons I do not understand, you've decided to jump in and query dates - not motive. Dates are irrelevant to my rebuttal. Hence why I don't understand the point you are still trying to make. If the Wehrmacht achieved the conditions in 1941 or 1942 or 1943, then there is a good chance the described defensive/containment strategy would have been implemented. The Wehrmacht failed to deliver those conditions.

There is a fundamental disconnect somewhere.

I am saying that digging in and defending in 42 was not a valid option as things actually stood. I will repeat: As things actually stood and as real conditions obtained.

The Fuhrer directive you have provided, related to a situation projection that was very far removed from reality at any stage of the war.

I have no other issue with what you have written.

[MarkN]

There is a fundamental disconnect somewhere.

Michael Kenny posted about motive.
I responded to that post commenting on motive.
You have taken this onwards by fixating on dates.

There's your disconnect - see underlining. Glad to have sorted that out.

I am saying that digging in and defending in 42 was not a valid option as things actually stood. I will repeat: As things actually stood and as real conditions obtained.

So? Still completely disconnected to motive.

The Fuhrer directive you have provided, related to a situation projection that was very far removed from reality at any stage of the war.

Not correct. FALL BLAU was a continuation of the attempt to bring about the conditions written in Fuhrer Directive 21.

The exact date/moment that the Wehrmacht gave up trying to secure those conditions is debatable. However, in hindsight, we can see clearly that URANUS put a practical block to any lingering aspirations that they may still have held.

Thus, it would be incorrect to say that a defensive/strategy was not a valid option in 1942. For the greater part of that year, the Wehrmacht was fighting to achieve exactly that objective.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

There is a fundamental disconnect somewhere.

Michael Kenny posted about motive.
I responded to that post commenting on motive.
You have taken this onwards by fixating on dates.

There's your disconnect - see underlining. Glad to have sorted that out.

I am saying that digging in and defending in 42 was not a valid option as things actually stood. I will repeat: As things actually stood and as real conditions obtained.

So? Still completely disconnected to motive.

Motive is something I haven't addressed at all. I was only concerned about the facts obtaining on the ground that precluded a defensive strategy as a preferred solution in 1942.

The Fuhrer directive you have provided, related to a situation projection that was very far removed from reality at any stage of the war.

Not correct. FALL BLAU was a continuation of the attempt to bring about the conditions written in Fuhrer Directive 21.

The exact date/moment that the Wehrmacht gave up trying to secure those conditions is debatable. However, in hindsight, we can see clearly that URANUS put a practical block to any lingering aspirations that they may still have held.

Thus, it would be incorrect to say that a defensive/strategy was not a valid option in 1942. For the greater part of that year, the Wehrmacht was fighting to achieve exactly that objective.

Again there is a fundamental disconnect here. "continuation of the attempt" is an euphemism. Fall Blau came at a time when the Wehrmacht was no more invincible, when the Red Army had demonstrated victory last winter and continued to thwart the Wehrmacht at Leningrad.

To contemplate the kind of defensive scenario stated in the Fuehrer Directive quoted by you, the Wehrmacht had to first reach those places in the map mentioned there! Those locations were far far far away that '42 spring/summer. What I find intriguing is that a strategy is being referred to, which was conditional to a completely different strategic situation. And it is being offered as a preferred option for a qualitatively different scenario as obtaining in '42.