Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

[MarkN]

The British tank divs didn't reflect any All Arms concept in 1940.

The British never had a tank division.

In 1940, the British had single arm tank brigades and all arms armoured divisions. By last 1940, they even had all arms armoured brigade combat groups.

[Richard Anderson]

Panzer leader is full of self justification. However, Achtung Panzer! (1937) was prescient, instructional and brilliant. It was a generation better than anything written by anybody else about how armour should be used and organised.

Indeed, Panzer Leader was also ex post facto history, written with the encouragement of Liddell Hart especially to dress up Hart's "role" in that development. Meanwhile, when Guderian wrote Achtung Panzer! it was nearly two year's into his command of 2. Panzer Division as one of three divisional commanders experimenting with the new organization, von Weich and Fessmann being the other two. Of the three, Fessmann was actually promoted prior to Guderian, but retired in September 1937 and was replaced as commander of 3. Panzer Division by Geyr. Weichs came to 1. Panzer Division via the cavalry and as commander of Weimar's 3. Kavallerie Division. Fessmann was also a cavalryman before taking command of a motorized battalion in the Weimar Army and then a motorized artillery battalion. Guderian was also a cavalryman, but more importantly a signals expert and also, like Fessmann was commander of a motorized battalion. All three were fulfilling much of the conceptual work of Seeckt and Lutz. Most importantly for Guderian's career, he was Lutz' chief of staff.

What Guderian wrote was a distillation of the common experience he, Weichs, and Fessmann had gained. Guderian just was the one who wrote the book. It also helped his career that Fessmann retired and Weichs was promoted to corps command before him.

The organisation he outlined broadly worked out of the tin, and everybody else's armoured divisions ended up copying his design. At the same time as Guderian published in open source how panzer divisions should be organised and operate, other armour visionaries such as de Gaulle and Martel were coming up with insanely unbalanced organisational designs

Guderian did not "outline" the organization, he inherited command of an existing organizational concept...and then pretty much tried to keep it in force despite all evidence that it was unbalanced. The organization Guderian always advocated was the unwieldy and unbalanced "brigade" structure. After the French Campaign he and his staff at XIX. Armeekorps wrote a paper advocating retaining the two-regiment Panzer brigade in the Panzer division, along with the infantry brigade of a motorized infantry regiment and motorcycle battalion. He then tried to recreate that organization in 1943 when he became Inspekteur der Panzertruppen.

That is evidence of Guderian's military genius. His record in making his creations work in the field in Poland, France and Russia shows he had a talent for tactical and operational command.

Sorry, but you need to read James S. Corum,The Roots of Blitzkrieg. Hans von Seeckt and the German Military Reform, Mary R. Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939, and Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command for a modern, less hagiographic view of Guderian's role.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

The British tank divs didn't reflect any All Arms concept in 1940.

The British never had a tank division.

In 1940, the British had single arm tank brigades and all arms armoured divisions. By last 1940, they even had all arms armoured brigade combat groups.

Hi

Can you pl give the ORBAT of a typical British armoured div in 1940...which I loosely termed as a tank divs btw ?

Cheers
Sandeep

[Richard Anderson]

I don't know what you think military leaders do, but Warfare is a human activity, and getting people to fight and fight well is a major part of military leadership. Generals exercise that leadership through subordinates. That comes through from Geyr's comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the Panzer formations.

Indeed, subordinates he had no contact with for three months and then some 24-48 hours to reconnect.

Actually Geyr assumed command of Panzer Gruppe West at the end of June 1944 at a time when II SS Corps were one of the Corps under his command, and committed to battle in the nearest operation that the Germans mounted to a counter offensive in Normandy before the breakout. I find it hard to believe that the status and capabilities of this formation would not have weighed on Geyr's mind, and been pretty high up in the general's priorities for reports. The battle of Gettysburg lasted for three days, but that was plenty enough for the commanders on each side to form enough of an opinion of how their subordinates performed to fill books and articles for over a century...

No, he assumed command of Panzergruppe West in December 1943. He lost command at 2245 hours on 10 June and then was placed in command at 1700 hours on 28 June...in order to plan the grand counterattack to oust the Allies. The problem was the four corps he was nominally assigned were already closely engaged, the commander of II-SS Panzer Korps was bumped up to take command of 7. Armee vice Dollmann, and Geyr made a big stink about the situation on the evening of 30 June to Rundstedt, sparking the tiff that resulted in Rundstedt and Geyr being relieved the evening of 1 July. So two days in which he had actual operational command of any description...quite a bit less than the interactions between most of the Confederate and Union general officer commands, who had been interacting - in some cases - for two years at that point.

[Kingfish]

The British tank divs didn't reflect any All Arms concept in 1940.

The British never had a tank division.

In 1940, the British had single arm tank brigades and all arms armoured divisions. By last 1940, they even had all arms armoured brigade combat groups.

Hi

Can you pl give the ORBAT of a typical British armoured div in 1940...which I loosely termed as a tank divs btw ?

Cheers
Sandeep

This may help:
http://www.niehorster.org/017_britain/4 ... m-div.html

[sandeepmukherjee196]

The British tank divs didn't reflect any All Arms concept in 1940.

The British never had a tank division.

In 1940, the British had single arm tank brigades and all arms armoured divisions. By last 1940, they even had all arms armoured brigade combat groups.

Hi

Can you pl give the ORBAT of a typical British armoured div in 1940...which I loosely termed as a tank divs btw ?

Cheers
Sandeep

This may help:
http://www.niehorster.org/017_britain/4 ... m-div.html

Thanks. Now can you please help me in figuring out the All Arms bit in the div's resources ?

Cheers
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi..

The superior organisation of the German panzer divisions compared to their British counterparts were partly responsible for the May 1940 sweep in the west. Otherwise compared on the medium tank component of the armoured divisions of both armies, the British armoured division IMO was superior in numbers. Pl note I have mentioned medium tanks and have not considered the light "mobile machine gun emplacements" that the light tanks actually were in both armies. So the number of medium tanks (Matilda I & II) of the one British amoured div facing the 6th Armee was equivalent to the number of equivalent machines (Pz III & IV, 38t, 35t)of the 2 pz divs of the latter.

The "other arms" in a British armoured div were not adequate in proportion to the number of tanks they were supporting.

The Stuka "flying artillery" squadrons were an integral part of the panzer divisions' tactics. The LW saw itself more as an extension of the Heer, particularly the panzerwaffe (maybe neglecting its strategic role !). Close tactical ground support role for allied aircraft came into its own later in the war.

Given below is an interesting link to an essay on All Arms Formations in WW II of the major combatants. This focuses more on the ORBATS from the later part of the war though.

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/com ... ttack_the/

I agree that Guderian played only one part, though significant, in this holistic doctrinal development. Others at the thought and operational levels played their imporant roles too. The participants in the Spanish civil war, in paticular contributed significantly to the develoment of the All Arms Panzer Doctrine.

Cheers
Sandeep

[Kingfish]

Thanks. Now can you please help me in figuring out the All Arms bit in the div's resources ?

Cheers
Sandeep

Looking at the chart I can identify all the basic components of an all arms formation.
Balance was certainly an issue, but all nations struggled with that early on.

[MarkN]

.which I loosely termed as a tank divs btw ?

"Loosely termed" is rather a poor way of saying 'lack of understanding and poor historical knowledge'.

As further evidenced by...

The superior organisation of the German panzer divisions compared to their British counterparts were partly responsible for the May 1940 sweep in the west.

No British armoured division fought north of the Somme.

No British armoured divison encountered a German panzer division in May 1940.

Otherwise compared on the medium tank component of the armoured divisions of both armies, the British armoured division IMO was superior in numbers.

Really?

Pl note I have mentioned medium tanks and have not considered the light "mobile machine gun emplacements" that the light tanks actually were in both armies. So the number of medium tanks (Matilda I & II) ...

The Mathilda I was only armed with machine guns. Does that mean it is also a "mobile machine gun emplacements"?

... of the one British amoured div facing the 6th Armee was equivalent to the number of equivalent machines (Pz III & IV, 38t, 35t)of the 2 pz divs of the latter.

I repeat, no British armoured division fought north of the Somme.

Also, no British armoured division came in to contact with the Wehrmacht 6.Armee during Fall Gelb or Fall Rot.

And, there were only 23 Mathilda II north of the Somme. These were the only British tanks armed with the 2-pdr north of the Somme. There were over 200 armed with machine guns.

The "other arms" in a British armoured div were not adequate in proportion to the number of tanks they were supporting.

That may be true. But you claimed something quite different earlier on.

[MarkN]

Looking at the chart I can identify all the basic components of an all arms formation.
Balance was certainly an issue, but all nations struggled with that early on.

Indeed. And the 7th Armoured Division which was quite different by default (ie not enough equipment to form a full strength division) and was thus more balanced in practice given the same: 2 motor battalions, an additional 8 25-pdrs and an armoured car regiment to balance out just 4 understrength armoured regiments (tank battalions). Of course, that changed when 2 additional armoured regiments showed up to make up the numbers.

[Stiltzkin]

The participants in the Spanish civil war, in paticular contributed significantly to the develoment of the All Arms Panzer Doctrine.

Not at all.

If I recall correctly from M.v.Creveld/Brower/Canby Air War college "Air Power and Maneuver Warfare": If the Germans had hoped to make Spain into a showcase of modern operativ warfare, they were disappointed.

Franco pursued a different strategy, he described it as "poco a poco". Town for town, it was more of an attritional warfare with tanks operating alongside infantry, it saw no accumulation of concentrated deep strike mechanized units (the closest to it would be probably Guadalajara or Teruel), Poland was the first scenario. One just has to look at the topography of Spain, this should be self explanatory.

[Richard Anderson]

I can't comment on either the US or Russian experience.

The American experience was characterized by the tensions between the Infantry and Cavalry branches over control of tanks, exacerbated by the Congressionally-mandated outlawing of "tanks" in the Cavalry.

As an aside, whatever Eisenhower might have written in the 1920s concerning the "Deep Battle", he had certainly forgotten it by the time of the Normandy campaign.

No, Eisenhower was not writing about "deep battle". "A Tank Discussion" is just that; a discussion of the technical aspects of tanks and its capabilities and limitations. The major lesson Ike learned was that bucking the system was a near career ender for him. Soon after publication in November 1920, Chief of Infantry Major General Charles S. Farnsworth called Eisenhower on the carpet for espousing ideas that were “not only wrong but dangerous.” Farnsworth went so far as to threaten him with court martial if he ever wrote such an article again. Eisenhower believed the Army directed similar threats at Patton for espousing his radical views. BTW, both articles were written for the Infantry Journal.

There is no evidence that any of the allied planning in Normandy involved such a concept and the US operational concept has been summed up as "attack everywhere all of the time".

It would be more fair if instead it was said that the Allied operational concept could be summed up as "attack everywhere all of the time". The planned (as opposed to the actual) exploitation of the Normandy beachhead was an Allied concept, not an American one, and envisaged a broad-front expansion from the outset. The actual exploitation was an improvisation, changing rapidly as events changed and was limited by logistical realities that became evident as the campaign progressed.

[histan]

Hi Richard

I agree, the planning was Allied and Ike inherited the COSSAC plan and Montgomery developed it. So lots of British input and the UK concept was slow and steady, phase by phase - the UK certainly had no concept of a "Deep Battle" - they made it up as they went along during the pursuit phase in Normandy but didn't do too bad a job of it.

The quote is taken from:
"Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 1 From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front 1944" by CJ Dick University Press of Kansas 2016

Actually, looking more closely the quote is really aimed at Bradley's operational concept in Normandy up until Operation Cobra, when he concentrated his forces and achieved a decisive breakthrough.

If you haven't read it, and I have only just bought it in the last week, it is well worth a read.

Just about to buy this as well:
From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 1944 Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 2 (Modern War Studies) also by Dick
This should be a very good read as Dick is an expert on Russian concepts and doctrine having been a member of and finally the head of the Soviet Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst, which had massive influence in the UK in the 1970s and 80s.

Have a very happy Christmas

Regards

John

[Richard Anderson]

The quote is taken from:
"Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 1 From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front 1944" by CJ Dick University Press of Kansas 2016

I will look for it. Thanks.

Actually, looking more closely the quote is really aimed at Bradley's operational concept in Normandy up until Operation Cobra, when he concentrated his forces and achieved a decisive breakthrough.

However, if this is true I will have to question Dick's research. The original expectation was for VII Corps to drive for Cherbourg simultaneous with V, XIX, and VIII Corps expanding the beachhead southward, i.e., FUSA would execute two main efforts dictated by geography to go in opposite directions. Then, when the corner was turned, TUSA would occupy Brittany before turning east. Meanwhile Second British Army would push eastward.

That was the Allied operational concept as laid out by Montgomery. It wasn't Bradley's, but Bradley attempted to follow it in his zone just as Dempsey attempted to in his. However, logistics and the unloading of follow-on troops, especially the hiatus caused by the June storm, dictated what FUSA could support that month, which was the single drive on Cherbourg. It wasn't until 3 July that FUSA was able to execute a concentrated, multi-corps operation to expand the beachhead south as planned and by that time the Germans had been able to stabilize the front and bring in reinforcements. That led to the grinding attrition of the twin battle for St. Lo and Mont Castre.

That result was also mirrored on the British side of the battlefield. PERCH and EPSOM were both single-corps efforts dictated by the slowed unloading. 7th Armoured Division was especially effected as was 15th Highland Division. Both were rushed to their assembly areas and became the thin point of concentration, which broke down into an attritional battle.

If you haven't read it, and I have only just bought it in the last week, it is well worth a read.

Just about to buy this as well:
From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 1944 Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 2 (Modern War Studies) also by Dick
This should be a very good read as Dick is an expert on Russian concepts and doctrine having been a member of and finally the head of the Soviet Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst, which had massive influence in the UK in the 1970s and 80s.

Given what the Soviet studies "experts" were saying about the Soviets in the 1970s and 80s versus what the reality was in the Soviet Union, I'm afraid that might be damning with faint praise.

[histan]

Hi Richard

Nothing really to disagree with in your last post.

This is from the forward by Glantz and shows the intention behind the two books.
"C.J. Dick's two-volume study is a comparative critique of the differing approaches employed by the Allied powers as they conducted military operations in western and eastern Europe against the Wehrmacht of Hitler's Germany during the summer of 1944. It's uniqueness rests in its comparative nature. Rather than detailing the course of military operations, emphasizing battles and leaders as so many previous books have done, Dick analyzes and compares Allied approaches to conducting war strategically and more importantly operationally. As he states in his introduction, 'My purpose is to put forward broad arguments about the conduct of the war at the operational level - the handling of armies and army groups by both Western Allies and the Red Army in contemporaneous campaigns.' This he accomplishes objectively, sometimes caustically but always thoroughly, with the 'jewelers eye' of a professional army officer and a skilled student of military history and with the analytical tools of an accomplished military theorist."

I think it's getting closer to what I would like to see which is a proper analysis of these (and other) campaigns using the analytical concepts and techniques outlined in the latest version of AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning - "Ends", "Ways", "Means", "Risks", "Decisive Conditions", "Lines of Operation" as well as the more traditional "Cetres of Gravity", "Culmination", etc.

Also, getting closer to an analysis across the Lines of Development, currently I think there is too much emphasis on Equipment and numbers. In particular, Training (both individual and collective), Personnel, Logistics, Concepts and Doctrine, Organisation, and Information (in particular intelligence).

All of these combine together to produce combat effective forces and only by understanding these can relative combat effectiveness be understood.

Over the past few years there has, I think, been some good work done in some of these areas - I think "Colossal Cracks" for example is a good start.

Regards

John