Brittany ports under siege

Discussions on WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic.
Post Reply
User avatar
Kingfish
Member
Posts: 3348
Joined: 05 Jun 2003, 17:22
Location: USA

Brittany ports under siege

#1

Post by Kingfish » 28 Sep 2016, 17:08

What was the rational for leaving the ports of Lorient, La Rochelle and St. Nazaire in German hands up to VE day?

More economical to keep them bottled up as opposed to an assault?
Were the defenses that formidable?
Why was Le Havre treated differently?
Any info on the German/Allied forces during the siege?

Thanks in advance
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Brittany ports under siege

#2

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Oct 2016, 02:56

Kingfish wrote:What was the rational for leaving the ports of Lorient, La Rochelle and St. Nazaire in German hands up to VE day?

More economical to keep them bottled up as opposed to an assault?
In the situation as seen in August/September 1944 yes. IIRC The French had primary responsibility for those. They could use second tier formations. In the broader scheme the Allies were aiming for vastly larger ports, like the Marsailles Tolun group or Antwerp that were secured in early September. The capacity of either exceeded that of the collective Biscay ports. As seen in August & September the Biscay or Atlantic ports had become a stratigic dead end for the Allies.
Were the defenses that formidable?
Compared to the forces the Allies left in the region a qualified yes. Any of them could have been reduced with suffcient heavy aartillery & a large pile of ammunition, but assemblying that would have aggravated the transportation shortage for supplying the Allied field armies advancing east.
Why was Le Havre treated differently?
The 21st Army Group wanted it. I've seen remarks about ferry docks there, allowing roll on roll off transport from the UK. That may have included a dock for rail car & locomotive ferry. If that last is correct it would make it a valuable port for the 21 AG & Allies in general.

Thats a short version. Certainly one can write volumes on the nuances of this.


User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: Brittany ports under siege

#3

Post by Sheldrake » 18 Oct 2016, 09:43

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Kingfish wrote:What was the rational for leaving the ports of Lorient, La Rochelle and St. Nazaire in German hands up to VE day?

More economical to keep them bottled up as opposed to an assault?
In the situation as seen in August/September 1944 yes. IIRC The French had primary responsibility for those. They could use second tier formations. In the broader scheme the Allies were aiming for vastly larger ports, like the Marsailles Tolun group or Antwerp that were secured in early September. The capacity of either exceeded that of the collective Biscay ports. As seen in August & September the Biscay or Atlantic ports had become a stratigic dead end for the Allies.
Were the defenses that formidable?
Compared to the forces the Allies left in the region a qualified yes. Any of them could have been reduced with suffcient heavy aartillery & a large pile of ammunition, but assemblying that would have aggravated the transportation shortage for supplying the Allied field armies advancing east.
Why was Le Havre treated differently?
The 21st Army Group wanted it. I've seen remarks about ferry docks there, allowing roll on roll off transport from the UK. That may have included a dock for rail car & locomotive ferry. If that last is correct it would make it a valuable port for the 21 AG & Allies in general.

Thats a short version. Certainly one can write volumes on the nuances of this.
The capacity of Le Havre and Rouen combined was in the same order as Cherbourg or the Brittany ports. It was one of the logistic targets. The key benefit of these ports was to allow troops to be landed direct from a US port at a port without any need to transfer to landing craft, waterproof vehicles etc.

The ports in Brittany were thought to be easier to capture as it was expected that the Germans would hold the river Seine for much longer than they did. The Atlantic ports turned out to be less useful than expected because of the damage to the French railway system.

The capture of Marseilles in August was a big help too.

billh35
Member
Posts: 30
Joined: 30 Sep 2020, 12:21
Location: Cheshire UK

Re: Brittany ports under siege

#4

Post by billh35 » 01 Oct 2020, 17:51

I think it was a wise move to leave the Breton ports until surrender at VE Day. As an example, the port of Brest was heavily fortified - most of which was underground and despite almost constant bombing by the RAF, the submarine pens at Brest received only minor damage (a small hole blown in a roof) and that was after the RAF had pulverised the city itself. The Rade de Brest was heavily defended by well concealed guns making a seaborn attack to be a huge effort. The easier option was to let them remain, contain them and let them surrender.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Brittany ports under siege

#5

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 Oct 2020, 08:39

Heres a couple charts that give a partial view of the Allied intake from the ports. These don't have any useful indication of the potiential of the uncaptured and the underused ports. I'll keep digging for a comparison of the peace time intake of the ports.
US Army Port intake 1944-45.png
US Army Port intake 1944-45.png (149.99 KiB) Viewed 996 times

21 AG Supply 1.png
21 AG Supply 2.png

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Brittany ports under siege

#6

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Oct 2020, 04:30

Heres one claim for the nominal 1930s discharge capacity of assorted ports. I have some similar claims from another source but can't find it yet.

These numbers are obviously rounded & its not clear if they are average from the entire decade or a snapshot from a single year. Theres no indication at all if they represent actual discharge or some sort of nominal capacity. The numbers for the three prefab seem very 'averaged'. What this suggests is the Bereton port group, including Quiberon Bay could have averaged above 40,000 tons daily. Fifty if Bordeaux is included. How much above is open to speculation. To put this & the other charts into perspective logistics planners had a target of 900 tons daily for each Division Slice ashore. 44,000 men I am guessing. at D+90 it was intended to raise that to 950 tons daily.

...................Thousands of tons daily
Mulberry...A.............9 Planned
Mulberry...B............12 Planned
Quiberon Bay...........10 Planned Op CHASITY target
Cross Beach Rivera.....8 Approx forty days use.
Bremen.................15
Amsterdam.............10
Rotterdam..............10
Antwerp................18 Full capacity reached near imeadiatly, but damaged railways/canals prevented full exploitation for several months.
Ostende.................1
Dunkerque..............2
Calais....................4
Boulogne................4
Dieppe...................1
LeHavre.................5 Ferry docks included rollon/off for railway cars & locomotives.
Rouen....................None given 6,109 daily from Table-4 above
Caen.....................1
Cherbourg..............8 Adjacent small ports represented another 3,000 tons potential. Atlantic storms reduced discharge in winter.
St Malo..................3 Turned over to the French government
Brest...................12 Bereton Port Group
Le Orient...............6 BPG
St Nazaire .............2 BPG
Nantes..................2 BPG
LaRochelle.............3 BPG
Bourdeux.............10
Marsailles.............12
Toulon..................3
Cannes..................1
Nice.....................2
Genova.................2

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic”