How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

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Aber
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#46

Post by Aber » 29 Nov 2016, 15:57

MarkF617 wrote:Hello,

I don't think crossing would be too much of a problem, the American paratroopers did it in canvas boats whereas in this scenario powered stormboats are used shortly backed up by rafts carrying guns and tanks across. While the bridges are being constructed this ferry service was to continue so although the bridges may only be ready at the same time as the bridges in Nijmegen were opened a lot will have already crossed as apposed to the 4 tanks that crossed at Nijmegen. The problem I see is getting all of this to the correct spot down one road. If these stormboats were so readily available why weren't they used until operation Berlin? Not to mention getting 2 bridges, rafts, pontoons, engineers and an infantry division all along a single road.

Mark.
Here's one view of the river - extensive marshy ground, and then mudflats.

http://ww2today.com/wp-content/uploads/ ... bridge.jpg

Image

There might be approach roads/hardstanding in some areas to give a base for ferry operations, but they will need to be constructed on both sides of the river. And of course the best locations are known to the defenders.

Gooner1
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#47

Post by Gooner1 » 29 Nov 2016, 18:44

Juha wrote: Remember that the British chose to fight through the Reichswald and the northern extension of the Westwall/Siegried Line and cross the Rhein near Wesel instead just crossing West of Arnhem when they had assebled enough troops for a proper Rhein crossing attempt. They probably had a good reason for that.
Yes but I don't think it was because of any special problems presented by the Neder Rijn or Ijssel.

1st Canadian Corps did take Arnhem in April '45, 56th Brigade crossing the Ijssel in Buffaloes on 12th April and attacked from the West. Follow up was by the 49th Division using a prefabricated Bailey which was floated down the Pannerdensch canal then fixed at the Ijssel by Westervoort, and by four Bailey rafts.


Juha
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#48

Post by Juha » 29 Nov 2016, 23:58

Gooner1 wrote:
Juha wrote: Remember that the British chose to fight through the Reichswald and the northern extension of the Westwall/Siegried Line and cross the Rhein near Wesel instead just crossing West of Arnhem when they had assebled enough troops for a proper Rhein crossing attempt. They probably had a good reason for that.
Yes but I don't think it was because of any special problems presented by the Neder Rijn or Ijssel.

1st Canadian Corps did take Arnhem in April '45, 56th Brigade crossing the Ijssel in Buffaloes on 12th April and attacked from the West. Follow up was by the 49th Division using a prefabricated Bailey which was floated down the Pannerdensch canal then fixed at the Ijssel by Westervoort, and by four Bailey rafts.
I was mainly guessing that the British/Commonwealth had found out that the terrain in Holland played to the hands of the German defenders with their powerful A/T guns. You probably meant that the Canadians attacked from the east. What was possible in April 45 wouldn't necessarily have been that easy in September 44. In April 45 the Allied were already across Rhein and were, where? near Bremen and Hannover?. I cannot remember but deep in the Germany anyway. No chance that any German strategic reserves would have been sent to help the defence of the Neder Rijn.
Thanks for the info on the bridging equipment used. Always interesting. The only "modern" bridging equipment I got training was a Soviet pontoon/raft system and our sturmboots had a modern outboard engines instead the original Hungarian ones.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#49

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 01 Dec 2016, 18:02

An extremely useful document here. Thanks.

What jumps out at me is the lack of attention to the importance of Antwerp. Or perhaps it is a assumption that there will be no delay or problem is operations of Antwerp as a supply port/head. As I see it Eisenhowers, and Montys, assumption for the Allied efforts September-Dec or January make sense only if Antwerp is operating at capacity sometime in September or early October. In the task list in this doc there is no mention of a Army size offensive & related resources to secure & clear the Scheldt Estuary.

I've been over the logistics numbers as presented in Ruppenthal & other secondary sources & they simply don't add up to a effective autumn 1944 offensive capacity without Antwerp.
histan wrote:Hi Aber

You are probably right in that I am overstating Eisenhower's perception of things in mid-September. He wrote a letter to Montgomery on 15th September, before the American attacks against Aachen and Metz had stalled where he indicated that the thought that the Ruhr and Saar might be in allied hands reasonably soon.

He was pulled in two different directions by allied intelligence and logistics staff.

In a brief presented at the Octagon Conference the Combined Intelligence Staff had given an assessment that the war could be over by the end of 1944. This placed great pressure on him, as did the victory euphoria of his subordinate commanders. On the other hand the reality of the logistics situation was that further advances on a broad front were not sustainable and that some kind of pause was required. His statement of intentions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff dated 9th September show an attempt to square this circle.

"PART 11
INTENTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
General.
My intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. I consider our best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar confident that he will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The first operation is one to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this the main effort will be on the left. Then we will prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany. The immediate missions assigned the army groups are set forth below.
Northern Group of Armies.
Antwerp having been seized, the northern group of armies and that part of the central group of armies operating northwest of the Ardennes will breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and seize the Ruhr.The First Allied Airborne Army supports the northern group of armies in the attainment of first objectives. An operation to seize the crossings over the Rhine and in the area Arnhem-Nijmegen has been twice postponed on account of weather and only awaits favorable weather conditions. Plans for other airborne operations in support of both groups of armies have been prepared.
Central Group of Armies,
The central group of armies less that portion operating northwest
of the Ardennes will:
a. Capture Brest.
b. Protect the southern flank of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
c. Occupy the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Saar and then seize Frankfurt. This operation is to start as soon as possible in order to forestall the enemy in this sector but troops of the central group of armies operating against the Ruhr northwest of the Ardennes must first be adequately supported.
d. Take advantage of any opportunity to destroy enemy forces withdrawing from southwest and southern France.
The ports of Lorient, St. Nazaire, Nantes and the area of Quiberon Bay are no longer essential for maintenance of United States forces. Central group of armies have therefore been instructed that it is unnecessary to reduce St. Nazaire and Lorient by force of arms and that the German garrisons isolated in these areas may for the present merely be contained.
Link up withDRAGOON Forces.
Recommendations have been transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that operational control of DRAGOON Forces will pass to this headquarters on the 15th September 1944. At present the DRAGOON Forces have been directed on the area Dijon-Besancon-Vesoul in preparation for further advance on Mulhouse and Strassburg.
Future intentions.
Once we have the Ruhr and the Saar, we have a strangle hold on two of Germany’s main industrial areas, and will have largely destroyed her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take. During the advance to the Ruhr and the Saar we will be opening the deep water ports of Le Have and Antwerp or Rotterdam which are essential to sustain a power thrust deep into Germany. I wish to retain freedom of action to strike in any direction so far as the logistical situation permits. At the moment and until we have developed the channel ports and the rail lines therefrom,our supply situation is stretched to the breaking point, and from this standpoint the advance across the Siegfried Line involves a gamble which I am prepared to take in order to take full advantage of the present disorganized state of the German armies in the west. The possibilities for further advance, depending on the situation at the time, are :
a. The Ruhr via Hanover on Hamburg or Berlin.
b. Frankfurt via Leipzig or Magdeburg on Berlin.
c. A combination of both.
Secondary operations such as the occupation of the Nuremburg-Munich area will depend on the logistical situation at the time.
The stage at which TALISMAN conditions will obtain cannot be forecast. Operation TALISMAN will be conducted as an extension of the military operations in progress when and if TALISMAN conditions arise. The necessary instructions to all concerned for the disarmament of the enemy forces, the occupation of specific targets in the Allied spheres and for the care and repatriation of prisoners of war are ready for issue and some are being issued.
Logistical developments.
Lines of communications are strained to keep up with present advances, and every effort is being made to develop railroads and ports to support rapid exploitation. Our main requirement is deep water ports east of the Seine. Brest and Le Havre will probably be opened initially for the central group of armies and Low Countries port initially for the northern group of armies. When the full capacity of rail lines operation from the original lodgement area to Paris, the Valenciennes coal field and north Belgium has been developed, considerably augmented forces can be supported in the advance into Germany. Air supply and special supply arrangements are being utilized to the maximum to support our rapid advance."

Of note is his intention to destroy the German army by forcing them to defend the Ruhr. Also of note is his timing - Comet (Market Garden), Antwerp, attack against the Ruhr.

All of this assessed as a gamble. My assessment of this is that at this stage Eisenhower was not convinced that the war would be over by the end of the year. Logistic considerations suggested a pause by which time the front would have stabilized and a more deliberate campaign would most likely be needed. On the other hand intelligence suggested an opportunity, which he was prepared to take but with no guarantee of success.

The allied planning before D-day recognized that there needed to be a decisive battle to defeat the German army. It was believed that this would not occur in France and that the Germans would conduct an orderly retreat in stages to the German border. It was there that the decisive battle would take place most likely by threatening their industrial heartland, which they would have to defend.

Regards

John

sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#50

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 01 Dec 2016, 20:25

But "did Market Garden nearly succeed" ?

I think this is the first time I am hearing this proposition since Monty's claim that it was a "90%" success :)

If anyone feels today that it nearly succeeded then that needs to be examined in the light of facts.

Cheers
Sandeep

Aber
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#51

Post by Aber » 01 Dec 2016, 20:29

Carl Schwamberger wrote:An extremely useful document here. Thanks.
Seconded.

I'd like to come back and comment on the document and its presentation of the position but that will need some digging into other sources.

Gooner1
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#52

Post by Gooner1 » 02 Dec 2016, 17:18

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
What jumps out at me is the lack of attention to the importance of Antwerp. Or perhaps it is a assumption that there will be no delay or problem is operations of Antwerp as a supply port/head. As I see it Eisenhowers, and Montys, assumption for the Allied efforts September-Dec or January make sense only if Antwerp is operating at capacity sometime in September or early October. In the task list in this doc there is no mention of a Army size offensive & related resources to secure & clear the Scheldt Estuary.
Montgomery's Operational Directive M 525 of 14th September

"1. Now that Havre has been captured, we are in a better position to be able to proceed with operations designed to lead to the capture of the Ruhr.
2. We have captured the port of Antwerp, but cannot make use of it as the enemy controls the mouth of the Scheldt; operations to put this matter right will be a first priority of 1st Canadian Army.
*
First Canadian Army

8. Complete the capture first of Boulogne, and then of Calais.
9. Dunkirk will be left to be dealt with later; for the present it will be merely masked.
10. The whole energies of the Army will be directed towards operations designed to enable full use to be made of the port of Antwerp.
I've been over the logistics numbers as presented in Ruppenthal & other secondary sources & they simply don't add up to a effective autumn 1944 offensive capacity without Antwerp.
Signal to Ike on the 11th September
“…It is basically a matter of rail and road and air transport and unless this is concentrated to give impetus to the selected thrust then no one is going to get very far since we are all such a long way from our supply bases”

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MarkF617
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#53

Post by MarkF617 » 02 Dec 2016, 23:39

Hello,

Sandeepmukherjee196 said:
But "did Market Garden nearly succeed" ?

I think this is the first time I am hearing this proposition since Monty's claim that it was a "90%" success :)

If anyone feels today that it nearly succeeded then that needs to be examined in the light of facts.
Please could you enlighten us on these "facts" so we can discuss this further?

Mark.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.

sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#54

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 03 Dec 2016, 12:25

MarkF617 wrote:Hello,

Sandeepmukherjee196 said:
But "did Market Garden nearly succeed" ?

I think this is the first time I am hearing this proposition since Monty's claim that it was a "90%" success :)

If anyone feels today that it nearly succeeded then that needs to be examined in the light of facts.
Please could you enlighten us on these "facts" so we can discuss this further?

Mark.
Hi Mark..

Are you asking me to provide "facts" in favour of a proposition that, according to me, is untenable? I thought that privilege belongs to those who are in favour of the propostion that MG "nearly succeeded"?

Cheers
Sandeep

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MarkF617
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#55

Post by MarkF617 » 04 Dec 2016, 00:30

Sandeep,

You seem incredulous that anyone could think Market Garden nearly succeded and should therefore examine it in the light of facts. I was just wondering which particular facts you were referring to? As I see it despite hurried planning leading to a flawed plan, with a little more luck it would have come off.

Thanks

Mark.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.

Gooner1
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#56

Post by Gooner1 » 06 Dec 2016, 18:45

MarkF617 wrote:Sandeep,

You seem incredulous that anyone could think Market Garden nearly succeded and should therefore examine it in the light of facts. I was just wondering which particular facts you were referring to? As I see it despite hurried planning leading to a flawed plan, with a little more luck it would have come off.

Thanks

Mark.
Nijmegan bridge was crossed by Allied tanks by 18.30 on the 20th, organized resistance at Arnhem bridge ended about 09.00 on the 21st. Nine miles or so between the two.

Rescue193
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#57

Post by Rescue193 » 07 Dec 2016, 16:15

Here's another couple of reasons to add to the list of reasons why Market-Garden (Can we please have the hyphen back in the name guys?) didn't 'quite' come off:-

XII Corps (Ritchie) and VIII Corps (O'Connor) respectively to the left and right of XXX Corps didn't press hard enough to keep the German counter-attacks off Horrocks' flanks.

If Boy Browning hadn't insisted that he and his HQ going should go in with the 82nd on the first lift Gavin would have had another at least a couple of company's-worth of air transport available and those troops could have been used to take the Nijmegen bridge on the first afternoon.

Well, why not? They're as valid as the rest of the 'reasons' surely.

Delta Tank
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#58

Post by Delta Tank » 07 Dec 2016, 20:41

Aber wrote:
Delta Tank wrote: Then there is this to consider:

Page 29: “When, a few days later, Bradley learned from his liaison officer at 21st Army Group of Eisenhower’s decision to support Montgomery’s plan, he made his objections known very strongly. His opposition to ‘Market Garden’ stemmed not only from the fact that 21st Army Group would be veering off on a tangent,, opening up a gap which his own troops would have to fill, but also because he feared that Montgomery, in his enthusiasm to outflank the enemy, had underestimated the strength and capability of the German forces along the line of the Lower Rhine. Furthermore, he believed that 21st Army Group had insufficient assets and resources at its disposal to carry out such an operation successfully.”
Is a source given for this, as the bolded sound like criticisms with the benefit of hindsight?
Aber,

I just read this, I will try to get any footnotes pertaining to this passage typed it soon.

Mike

sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#59

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 08 Dec 2016, 09:38

MarkF617 wrote:Sandeep,

You seem incredulous that anyone could think Market Garden nearly succeded and should therefore examine it in the light of facts. I was just wondering which particular facts you were referring to? As I see it despite hurried planning leading to a flawed plan, with a little more luck it would have come off.

Thanks

Mark.
Hi Mark..

Yes I am rather intrigued as to which facts may lead one to conclude that MG nearly succeeded. After all if someone is discussing a proposition based on the assertion that MG nearly succeeded then there must be some basis to it ? Some facts to back it up?

Cheers
Sandeep

sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: How did Market Garden nearly succeed?

#60

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 08 Dec 2016, 09:52

Gooner1 wrote:
MarkF617 wrote:Sandeep,

You seem incredulous that anyone could think Market Garden nearly succeded and should therefore examine it in the light of facts. I was just wondering which particular facts you were referring to? As I see it despite hurried planning leading to a flawed plan, with a little more luck it would have come off.

Thanks

Mark.
Nijmegan bridge was crossed by Allied tanks by 18.30 on the 20th, organized resistance at Arnhem bridge ended about 09.00 on the 21st. Nine miles or so between the two.
Long before the 5 vehicles crossed the Waal bridge, Col Frost's battalion had occupied the north end of the Rhine bridge at Arnhem. Bang on time, as per schedule, on the afternoon of the 17th. But what then? Did it get them anywhere on the path of success for MG? They sat there, they blew away Grabner's crack recce battalion, they fought off repeated German attacks, they bled .. they gave up !

Similarly the British tanks crossed the Waal. Had tea, had dinner and cozily retired for the night ! And when they tried to cross those "nine miles or so" to the Rhine bridge the next day, they had their ears boxed and were put in place, by the Germans in Elst...KG Knaust et al. The most they could hope for and what they creditably achieved was to extricate their defeated brethren from Driel... and then scram !

I couldn't find any traces of "nearly succeeding" in the above saga ! Could you? All I could find here is evidence that the 1 AB was nearly wiped out ... but for some deft escape act !

Cheers
Sandeep

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