Tanks Role Not To Fight Tanks??

[Yoozername]

"Junk"? No, it didn't do what it was supposed to when confronted with high obliquities and armor harder than what it was tested against. The initial problem was discovered at Shoeburyness in May 1944 when it was found the base detonating fuze on the 3"/76mm was acting before penetration was complete, resulting in incomplete penetration.

Did you read that at The Chieftain's Hatch? Did you study the data right there in front of you, or just take his word for it? Really, look at it and maybe reassess what you think you know.

[Richard Anderson]

I get it...I get it...YOU are the well known author and town-smart-ass, and others are beneath you....

You aren't going with that well worn "Congressional ammunition story are you"? I mean, its so "Ambrose" {chills}

Not beneath me at all; I just can't figure where your hostility is coming from?

So, who told you it was a "Congressional ammunition story"?

[Richard Anderson]

Did you read that at The Chieftain's Hatch? Did you study the data right there in front of you, or just take his word for it? Really, look at it and maybe reassess what you think you know.

No, I read those things in:

Letter from Hdq., ETO, “Observations on Problems in Armored Units”, 6 June 1945, p. 6, “Military Historical Files”, Box A772, Entry 646A, NARA RG 156.
A. Hurlich, Comparative Effectiveness of Armor-Defeating Ammunition, (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: 1951), p. 1.
Hunnicutt, Sherman, p. 89.
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Ballisticians in War and Peace, A History of the United States Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Vol. I, 1914-1950. (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: NP, 1995), pp. 46-47.
J.W. Greig, Work on Sabot-Projectiles by the University of New Mexico Under Contract OEMsr-668 and Supplements, 1942-1944, NDRC Report No. A-428, OSRD Report No. 6499, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico, 1946), p. 1.
Green, et al, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 2, 372.
Subject: “Report on Comparative Firing Program Witnessed at Shoeburyness, Essex, 23 May 1944 by U.S. Army Headquarters ETO representatives,” Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 24 May 1944); “ETOUSA Outgoing Message to AGWAR”, Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 1944), Box 2, NARA RG 492.
Subject: “Firing Tests conducted 12-30 July 1944 by 1st U.S. Army in Normandy”, Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 1944), Box 2, NARA RG 492.
Subject: “U.S. Army Firing Tests conducted August 1944 by 12th U.S. Army Group at Isigny, France”, Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 1944), Box 2, NARA RG 492.
Catalogue of Standard Ordnance Items, Volume III, pp. 287-288 & 291-292.
Limited Procurement Activities of the Ordnance Department, “Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 3”, T4E17, Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 76mm, T4E17”, (ND [c. October 1944]), RG 156, Box A744, p. 1.
“Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 3”, T4E17, Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 76mm, T4E17”, pp. 1-2.
Ballistics Research Laboratories (BRL), Handbook of Ballistics and Engineering Data for Ammunition, (Aberdeen, MD: BRL, July 1950), 76-1-93, p. 4 and 90-1-304, p. 4.
C. Zener and J.F. Sullivan, Principles of Armor Protection, WAL 710/607-3, (Watertown Arsenal, NY: NP, 28 June 1944), p. 10.
Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Armor-Piercing Ammunition for Gun, 90-mm, M3, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Ordnance, 1 January 1945), p. 6.

And passim.

Where did you read they were "junk"?

[Yoozername]

Second, by "saving their bacon" I was referring to the shortage of artillery ammunition, especially the standard 105mm HE round, suffered in the ETO and MTO in the fall and winter of 1944, which resulted in stringent rationing orders from 12th Army Group and Fifth Army. That was a shortage created by Congressional interference in procurement after the "iron mountain" scandal in North Africa...Congresscritters junketing to the Med were horrified to find large stockpiles of ammunition unused and asked why the Army was so inefficient in ordering and shipping ammunition.

You and all the other people on the internet that can't read for themselves and repeat it.

[Yoozername]

So you independently came up with the same wrong assessment as the Chieftain Guy?

http://wargaming.info/1998/us-army-1944 ... EN16rIrLcs

The above is correct. Its the 90mm M82 that was defective. Look at the data.

[Richard Anderson]

So you independently came up with the same wrong assessment as the Chieftain Guy?

http://wargaming.info/1998/us-army-1944 ... EN16rIrLcs

The above is correct. Its the 90mm M82 that was defective. Look at the data.

Okay, so you meant to say that M82 was "junk" and the other rounds were fine? The problem is they all had problems with poor heat treatment and faulty BDF.

[Richard Anderson]

Second, by "saving their bacon" I was referring to the shortage of artillery ammunition, especially the standard 105mm HE round, suffered in the ETO and MTO in the fall and winter of 1944, which resulted in stringent rationing orders from 12th Army Group and Fifth Army. That was a shortage created by Congressional interference in procurement after the "iron mountain" scandal in North Africa...Congresscritters junketing to the Med were horrified to find large stockpiles of ammunition unused and asked why the Army was so inefficient in ordering and shipping ammunition.

After going back through the sources I see I do need to make a correction. It wasn't junketing Congress making the decision to scale back artillery production, it was the War Department, "The cutback policy was reinforced in the fall of 1943 when the War Department Procurement Review Board, headed by Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, urged curtailment of production on the ground that excessive stocks of many kinds had been built up both in the ZI and in overseas theaters". (Thomson & Mayo, Procurement and Supply, p. 143.) However, I still seem to recall a Congressional connection - not Ambrose-inspired BTW, I first looked into the ammunition shortage when working on the ACSDB c. 1989-1991.

[Yoozername]

No. You can't make that claim from just looking at that data. The 17 pdr. worked fine. The 90mm M82 has issues and is defective as far as that test firings.

The 76mm is penetrating (PTP) but its fuze is not going off (failure of fuze), I would not expect a 76mm to penetrate 120mm/30deg @ 500 yds or 120mm/30deg @ 100 yds. but it 'should' penetrate 100mm/30deg @ 500 yds and does so twice.

The 75mm is under a different test and is fired with and without HE charge. Basically, face hardened spaced armor is setting off the fuze between the plates. Inert loaded 75mm M61 will penetrate both plates. The loaded and inert are fired at 70mm single homog. plate also, and the fuze seems to work.

From looking at the thicknesses, it is suspiciously (to me) testing for Panther Mantlet, Tiger frontal armor and possibly spaced armor on Panzer III and Panzer IV. Just my conjecture, of course. The M62 projectile is shared between the M10/M18/3 inch and M1A1 76mm Sherman gun. It is noted that the Sherman 76mm, which is used to fire the M62, has issues with muzzle blast obscuring the gunner/TC tracking of the tracer. The muzzle brakes were not available. Funny they test the Sherman 76mm yet they don't land them on D-Day. So, maybe they expected the M10s to do the work. That test is scary considering what the Allies would be facing in Normandy.

The test would have been better if they fired at the plates at additional ranges. They might also fire M72 and M79 ammunition.

This webpage below gives the test and conclusions. I would not use The Chieftain's Hatch as a primary source. He interjects thoughts and obscures the data with his assumptions, which are not entirely correct. To his credit, he says that "he is an armor officer but don't believe everything I say".

http://wargaming.info/1998/us-army-1944 ... ERnpLIrLct

[MarkN]

No. You can't make that claim from just looking at that data.

He didn't.

He's made the claim based upon reading a shed load of documents. He gave you a list of some of them.

That data is just a small snippet that you posted to support your claim.

No wonder you come across as being so difficult when you are deliberately being obtuse and misleading. Not to mention all your earlier flip-flopping.

[Richard Anderson]

No. You can't make that claim from just looking at that data. The 17 pdr. worked fine. The 90mm M82 has issues and is defective as far as that test firings.

The 76mm is penetrating (PTP) but its fuze is not going off (failure of fuze), I would not expect a 76mm to penetrate 120mm/30deg @ 500 yds or 120mm/30deg @ 100 yds. but it 'should' penetrate 100mm/30deg @ 500 yds and does so twice.

The 75mm is under a different test and is fired with and without HE charge. Basically, face hardened spaced armor is setting off the fuze between the plates. Inert loaded 75mm M61 will penetrate both plates. The loaded and inert are fired at 70mm single homog. plate also, and the fuze seems to work.

From looking at the thicknesses, it is suspiciously (to me) testing for Panther Mantlet, Tiger frontal armor and possibly spaced armor on Panzer III and Panzer IV. Just my conjecture, of course.

Intriguing conjecture, but there doesn't seem to be a smoking gun linking the Shoeburyness test and the evaluation of the captured Panther resulting in the "oh shit!" technical memo of 5 June. BTW, yes indeed that is the test. The original file copy is "Subject: “Report on Comparative Firing Program Witnessed at Shoeburyness, Essex, 23 May 1944 by U.S. Army Headquarters ETO representatives,” Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 24 May 1944), Box 2, NARA RG 492. Along with the reports on the two Isigny tests and various others.

The M62 projectile is shared between the M10/M18/3 inch and M1A1 76mm Sherman gun. It is noted that the Sherman 76mm, which is used to fire the M62, has issues with muzzle blast obscuring the gunner/TC tracking of the tracer. The muzzle brakes were not available. Funny they test the Sherman 76mm yet they don't land them on D-Day. That test is scary considering what the Allies would be facing in Normandy.

There were all kinds of issues with the M1 76mm Gun. In addition to blast obscuration the flash was bad as well due to incomplete combustion in the cartridge (it may be why they referred to the likelihood the tracer would be obscured as well). That had been known for a while and a new "long" primer was developed, which solved it, but from the various "trip reports" in the campaign it looks like it was still uncommon in the fall. There are no end of wonderful remarks about just how effective it would be for the TC to dismount to observe fall of shot.

The test would have been better if they fired at the plates at additional ranges.

Yep. It has long made me wonder if friction between Armor and Ordnance in the ETOUSA with the War Department establishment in CONUS had already developed. I suspect they were beginning to take Ordnance test results at Aberdeen with a grain of salt.

This webpage below gives the test and conclusions. I would not use The Chieftain's Hatch as a primary source. He interjects thoughts and obscures the data with his assumptions, which are not entirely correct. To his credit, he says that he is an armor officer but don't believe everything I say.

The data are one and the same and are identical to those found in RG 156. Interpretation and analysis are different. We (you, me, Mick, and the rest of the odd types who like this sort of thing) develop our own opinions and assessments based upon our interpretation of the data...all of which may be more or less correct and more or less clear to others. Meanwhile, neither the Chieftain's Hatch or your war gaming website are "primary sources" - its the documents which are (a fact that seems to escape an astounding number of posters).

BTW, yes Mick is a serving armor officer in the NG and served in Iraq. Oddly enough though, his career started in the Irish Army. Whether that does him credit or not I don't know - I try to judge by the quality of the assessment. He can be "loosy-goosey" with his leaps of inference, but so do we all. I don't agree with everything he says (he is wrong about the whole "name thing", but only in detail and for much the same reason I used to think the same). In the same way I know and like a lot of Steve Zaloga's writing and he has provided me no end of documentary evidence for unexpected things, but I still don't agree with all of his analysis and conclusions. Ken Estes is also a good friend and knows more about the USMC armor experience than I will ever know...but I still check things out he says as much as I can.

Meanwhile, we all have out flights of fancy and tricks our mind plays on us (I used to teach critical thinking and got fascinated by the aberrant quirks of our memory). I still think there is basis on the Congressional story feeding into the ammo crisis, but it was nearly thirty years ago, so the roots are long obscured in my mind. I don't recall ever reading an "Ambrose account" of it, but may be wrong and don't have Ambrose in my library so can't check.

[Yoozername]

@Marn
was referring to that test. And, yes he made the same false interpretation that The Chieftain's hatch made. Shed load or not, one has to analyze data correctly. So, thanks for playing but please try and follow what is being said. Or, if you like to misdirect, put a little more effort into it?

[Yoozername]

I use the term "Ambrose" as a descriptor for any loosey-goosey, kneejerk, hack-jobbed, writing that profits a person and not the historical record. Sort of an Urban definition.

[MarkN]

@Marn
was referring to that test. And, yes he made the same false interpretation that The Chieftain's hatch made. Shed load or not, one has to analyze data correctly. So, thanks for playing but please try and follow what is being said. Or, if you like to misdirect, put a little more effort into it?

Whilst trying to bear in mind the high degree of flip flopping in your behalf, this particular segment went as follows (combat indicator is the word "junk"):

I see, two wrongs make right. Very good. Except the 76mm/3inch projectile was widely hailed as junk. The Sherman 75mm HE was widely hailed as better (not that better than others but somewhat better). Neither as good as a 105mm but, again, believe the oft-trotted-out BS if you want.

Except the 76mm/3inch projectile was widely hailed as junk. The Sherman 75mm HE was widely hailed as better (not that better than others but somewhat better). Neither as good as a 105mm but, again, believe the oft-trotted-out BS if you want. Harassing rounds saved the bacon. What next?

"Junk"? No, it didn't do what it was supposed to when confronted with high obliquities and armor harder than what it was tested against. The initial problem was discovered at Shoeburyness in May 1944 when it was found the base detonating fuze on the 3"/76mm was acting before penetration was complete, resulting in incomplete penetration. A related problem discovered about the same time was insufficient final heat treating for hardness on the nose and shoulders of the APC round, which could lead to nose failures, projectile shattering, and other not so good things. And it was the same for both the 76mm and 90mm APC, which led to using monobloc AP...which suffered from other problems ("...simple AP shot was more effective than APC in penetrating under-matched armor at all angles of impact and was more effective than both APC and HVAP shot at penetrating moderately overmatched armor (where the armor was no thicker than 1.25 times the diameter of the shot) at all angles of impact greater than approximately 45°. On the other hand, APC was found superior to AP in penetrating greatly overmatching armor, (where the armor was thicker than 1.25 times the diameter of the shot) at angles between 20° and 45°, but both APC and AP were greatly inferior to HVAP and HVAPDS striking at low angles of impact against heavily overmatching armor targets.) (From my research in the BRL studies).

"Junk"? No, it didn't do what it was supposed to when confronted with high obliquities and armor harder than what it was tested against. The initial problem was discovered at Shoeburyness in May 1944 when it was found the base detonating fuze on the 3"/76mm was acting before penetration was complete, resulting in incomplete penetration.

Did you read that at The Chieftain's Hatch? Did you study the data right there in front of you, or just take his word for it? Really, look at it and maybe reassess what you think you know.

Did you read that at The Chieftain's Hatch? Did you study the data right there in front of you, or just take his word for it? Really, look at it and maybe reassess what you think you know.

No, I read those things in:

Letter from Hdq., ETO, “Observations on Problems in Armored Units”, 6 June 1945, p. 6, “Military Historical Files”, Box A772, Entry 646A, NARA RG 156.
A. Hurlich, Comparative Effectiveness of Armor-Defeating Ammunition, (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: 1951), p. 1.
Hunnicutt, Sherman, p. 89.
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Ballisticians in War and Peace, A History of the United States Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Vol. I, 1914-1950. (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: NP, 1995), pp. 46-47.
J.W. Greig, Work on Sabot-Projectiles by the University of New Mexico Under Contract OEMsr-668 and Supplements, 1942-1944, NDRC Report No. A-428, OSRD Report No. 6499, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico, 1946), p. 1.
Green, et al, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 2, 372.
Subject: “Report on Comparative Firing Program Witnessed at Shoeburyness, Essex, 23 May 1944 by U.S. Army Headquarters ETO representatives,” Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 24 May 1944); “ETOUSA Outgoing Message to AGWAR”, Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 1944), Box 2, NARA RG 492.
Subject: “Firing Tests conducted 12-30 July 1944 by 1st U.S. Army in Normandy”, Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 1944), Box 2, NARA RG 492.
Subject: “U.S. Army Firing Tests conducted August 1944 by 12th U.S. Army Group at Isigny, France”, Armored Fighting Vehicle & Weapons Section, (ETOUSA, 1944), Box 2, NARA RG 492.
Catalogue of Standard Ordnance Items, Volume III, pp. 287-288 & 291-292.
Limited Procurement Activities of the Ordnance Department, “Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 3”, T4E17, Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 76mm, T4E17”, (ND [c. October 1944]), RG 156, Box A744, p. 1.
“Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 3”, T4E17, Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 76mm, T4E17”, pp. 1-2.
Ballistics Research Laboratories (BRL), Handbook of Ballistics and Engineering Data for Ammunition, (Aberdeen, MD: BRL, July 1950), 76-1-93, p. 4 and 90-1-304, p. 4.
C. Zener and J.F. Sullivan, Principles of Armor Protection, WAL 710/607-3, (Watertown Arsenal, NY: NP, 28 June 1944), p. 10.
Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Armor-Piercing Ammunition for Gun, 90-mm, M3, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Ordnance, 1 January 1945), p. 6.

And passim.

Where did you read they were "junk"?

So you independently came up with the same wrong assessment as the Chieftain Guy?

http://wargaming.info/1998/us-army-1944 ... EN16rIrLcs

The above is correct. Its the 90mm M82 that was defective. Look at the data.

So, to summarise, you started a claim that the "76mm/3inch projectile was widely hailed as junk" wander round the houses and then produce evidence to support that claim that "Its the 90mm M82 that was defective".

Flip flop.

And then complain that others don't understand data!

[Yoozername]

Again, as far as THAT test, you could not make that claim. You have reading comprehension issues. Good luck.

[MarkN]

I use the term "Ambrose" as a descriptor for any loosey-goosey, kneejerk, hack-jobbed, writing that profits a person and not the historical record. Sort of an Urban definition.

"any loosey-goosey, kneejerk, hack-jobbed, writing that profits a person and not the historical record" ???

Is that similar to when posters make claims that Patton honeymooned in Normandy - when he didn't. And then the flip flop.

Is that similar to when posters make claims that Tank Destroyers formed their own "'branch'" and were "bloated" - based upon having "insignia" it seems after the flip flop.

Is that similar to when posters make claims that certain rounds were "junk" - and then flip flop and provide evidence for something completely different - whilst complaining others can't understand data.

It's difficult to discuss seriously with posters constantly projecting.