Nordwind

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jesk
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Nordwind

#1

Post by jesk » 11 Dec 2017, 21:32

Already to explain laziness where Hitler was mistaken. It is enough to discover the discussion between Hitler and the generals. Further nothing to explain it is not necessary. Everything is clear.

http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-R ... ra-27.html

Planning Operation NORTHWIND
(21-27 December 1944)

By 21 December the German high command had begun to examine its operational alternatives on the battlefield. The momentum of Army Group B's attack in the Ardennes had begun to dissipate, the important road junction at Bastogne was still in American hands, and pressure on the southern flank of the German advance was steadily mounting as Patton wheeled his Third Army north.3 However, both Hitler and von Rundstedt realized that the Allies had greatly weakened their southern army group to meet the Ardennes thrust and believed that a fresh German offensive in the south could exploit this weakness. At the very least it would bring some relief to Model's hard-pressed forces in the Ardennes.

Von Rundstedt's staff at OB West initially proposed an attack north of Saarbrucken by Army Group G toward Metz, threatening to envelop either Patton's Third Army to the north or Patch's Seventh in the south. But Hitler and von Rundstedt quickly concluded that they lacked the resources for such an ambitious undertaking. Instead Hitler, who had moved his headquarters from Berlin to Command Post Adlerhorst near Bad Nauheim in early December in order to keep a close watch over the entire campaign, approved an attack south of the Saarbrucken area toward the Saverne Gap, with the goal of splitting the U.S. Seventh Army and clearing northern Alsace. If successful, the German high command intended to launch a second series of attacks from the Sarre valley-Saverne area toward Luneville, Metz, and the rear of Patton's Third Army, tentatively code-named Operation ZAHNARZT ("Dentist").4 Von Rundstedt ordered General Blaskowitz, who had returned to replace Balck as the Army Group G commander on 22 December, to begin planning immediately and authorized the rehabilitation of two mobile divisions (panzer or panzer grenadier) to form the core of the attacking force.

In the days that followed, the German military leaders debated several operational plans. Hitler favored a main effort southeast of Saarbrucken along the Sarre River valley to Phalsbourg and the Saverne Gap. The attacking forces could be concentrated fairly easily using the road and rail net around Saarbrucken, and the axis of advance was relatively flat with enough roads to support a rapid armored thrust. But von Rundstedt and Blaskowitz were uneasy over their shortage of armor and lack of air support, and argued that the open nature of the Sarre River valley made it too dangerous for a successful offensive. Instead, they favored a main effort farther east, from the Bitche sector in the Vosges, judging that the heavily forested hills and mountains would offer the attackers cover from Allied air observation and interdiction during the critical first phase of the attack. In addition, about half of the large Maginot Line fortresses around Bitche were still in German hands, providing cover and concealment for the assembly areas. Although road communications into the Bitche area and along the projected Vosges line of advance were more limited, the two generals believed that swiftly moving infantry could exploit what they suspected was a weakly defended gap in the American lines between the Seventh Army's two corps; with their infantry units gradually pushing south to the Saverne Gap, they could send their mobile panzer reserves into either the Sarre River valley on the west or the Alsatian plains on the east.

Both plans had serious disadvantages. A Sarre River offensive would have to pass through the American-occupied portion of the Maginot Line and would be open to Allied air attacks during daylight hours. A drive from Bitche through the Vosges Mountains, on the other hand, would leave the XV Corps and the bulk of the American armored forces free to counterattack the western flank of the advance. In addition, both plans assumed supporting attacks by Army Group Oberrhein to keep the U.S. VI Corps occupied, actions over which OB West had no control or authority.

On 27 December Hitler, von Rundstedt, and Blaskowitz approved a rough compromise. Under the operational control of the First Army, one panzer grenadier and one infantry division would punch a hole in the American Sarre River valley defenses, while four refitted infantry divisions would push off from the Bitche area along a southwest axis of advance through the Vosges. Blaskowitz would keep his strongest units, the equivalent of two panzer divisions, in reserve to exploit any breakthrough. However, on Hitler's instructions, the reserve units were to remain in the Saarbrucken area in the expectation that the main effort would develop along the Sarre River valley. In addition, Blaskowitz's request that units of Army Group Oberrhein launching supporting attacks be placed under Army Group G's jurisdiction was disapproved, as was his proposal to delay the start of the offensive until more troops and matériel could be assembled. Hitler informed Blaskowitz that Army Group Oberrhein would launch supporting attacks north and south of Strasbourg, but only after the main effort down the Sarre River valley corridor had been successful. He also felt that speed was essential, and he scheduled the beginning of the First Army's two northern attacks--one down the Sarre valley and the other through the Low Vosges--for New Year's Eve 1944. Code-named NORDWIND ("NORTHWIND"), these attacks would begin the last major German offensive of the European war.

... On the morning of 28 December Blaskowitz brought his attacking corps and division commanders to OB West headquarters at Ziegenberg and then, after a twenty-minute bus ride, to Hitler's Adlerhorst for a personal pep talk by the Fuhrer. For most of the participants, it was the first time that they had ever seen their supreme commander in person. Although physically in poor condition, Hitler led off with a fifty-minute speech that showed he had lost none of his personal magnetism. Despite tremendous sacrifices, he conceded, the Ardennes offensive had failed. Perhaps no one was to blame. With the Russians threatening in the east, however, he impressed on them that defeat in the forthcoming offensive was unthinkable. The Western Allies had to be stopped and their offensive capabilities so badly damaged that most of Germany's military strength could be devoted to the eastern front in the months ahead. To accomplish this the German Army had to keep the initiative, attacking the Allied forces wherever they were weak and using speed to avoid being crushed by Allied matériel superiority. Hitler discussed the details of the forthcoming operation individually with each commander, continually emphasizing both its necessity and its possibility for success. To all he stressed that the objective of NORDWIND was neither terrain nor prestige, but "manpower . . . the destruction of enemy forces."

... Command and Control

Both German and American post-battle autopsies of the NORDWIND offensive severely criticized the planning and conduct of the Sarre River valley attack. The XIII SS Corps had put the assault together hastily, and even the American commanders were surprised by its poor execution. The division-level leadership and staff work of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division in particular proved marginal. The unit was unable even to bring its armor up to the battle area until the third day because of icy road conditions and limited engineer support; the German demolition effort had been too thorough when they had vacated the area in early December. Artillery support had also been badly coordinated, as had just about everything else. In fact, during the battles for northern Alsace the SS division went through about five division commanders, mostly SS colonels with comparatively little military experience.27 Given the means at Blaskowitz's disposal and the strength of the Allied forces west of the Low Vosges, however, perhaps the failure of what Hitler hoped would be the main German effort was inevitable.

The inability of the successful Vosges attacking forces to break out of the mountain exits was another matter entirely. Here the divided German command structure on the Alsatian front clearly contributed heavily to the ultimate lack of success. Had Army Group Oberrhein launched supporting attacks across the Rhine at the start of the offensive, Brooks might not have been able to transfer the three regiments of Task Force Herren from the Rhine to the Vosges so readily, and at least some of the eastern mountain exits might have fallen to the advancing volksgrenadiers. Although Blaskowitz might still have elected not to employ his panzer reserves through the Vosges, the results would have greatly increased his options. But as future events would show, Himmler had his own objectives in mind, and the lack of coordination between Army Group G and Army Group Oberrhein during NORDWIND and in the ensuing campaign was remarkable.

... The XXXIX Panzer Corps Attacks

The fourth German assault against the Seventh Army began in earnest on 7 January along the vulnerable northern portion of the Lauterbourg salient. On the previous day Blaskowitz had finally obtained permission from Hitler to commit the panzer reserve units in this area, and Decker's XXXIX Panzer Corps arrived to control the operation, with both armored divisions and the 245th Volksgrenadier Division in support.

Image

Mori
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Re: Nordwind

#2

Post by Mori » 15 Dec 2017, 15:37

The text is well known, and is from one of the best volumes of the US official history.

The map, however, is not from this book and is pure post-war reconstruction. The Germans never made any such plan, either before or during the fight. This map is not in Clarke's book, by the way
The inability of the successful Vosges attacking forces to break out of the mountain exits was another matter entirely. Here the divided German command structure on the Alsatian front clearly contributed heavily to the ultimate lack of success. Had Army Group Oberrhein launched supporting attacks across the Rhine at the start of the offensive, Brooks might not have been able to transfer the three regiments of Task Force Herren from the Rhine to the Vosges so readily, and at least some of the eastern mountain exits might have fallen to the advancing volksgrenadiers. Although Blaskowitz might still have elected not to employ his panzer reserves through the Vosges, the results would have greatly increased his options
This analysis is questionable. The Germans crossing of the Rhine at Gambsheim could not go very far for the simple reason they lacked a bridge to supply any large force. It is not that they tried and failed to erect a bridge; more that they did not have any bridging material at all. All their supply was through river boats. As a matter of fact, they had no intention to push further inland and immediately prepared defensive positions, which allowed them to defend effectively against the US counterstroke. In other words, synchronizing the crossing with the rest of Nordwind would not have changed much.


jesk
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Re: Nordwind

#3

Post by jesk » 15 Dec 2017, 17:06

Mori wrote:The text is well known, and is from one of the best volumes of the US official history.

The map, however, is not from this book and is pure post-war reconstruction. The Germans never made any such plan, either before or during the fight. This map is not in Clarke's book, by the way
The German plan presupposed a rough dispersion of forces. On another map the same.

Image

The inability of the successful Vosges attacking forces to break out of the mountain exits was another matter entirely. Here the divided German command structure on the Alsatian front clearly contributed heavily to the ultimate lack of success. Had Army Group Oberrhein launched supporting attacks across the Rhine at the start of the offensive, Brooks might not have been able to transfer the three regiments of Task Force Herren from the Rhine to the Vosges so readily, and at least some of the eastern mountain exits might have fallen to the advancing volksgrenadiers. Although Blaskowitz might still have elected not to employ his panzer reserves through the Vosges, the results would have greatly increased his options
This analysis is questionable. The Germans crossing of the Rhine at Gambsheim could not go very far for the simple reason they lacked a bridge to supply any large force. It is not that they tried and failed to erect a bridge; more that they did not have any bridging material at all. All their supply was through river boats. As a matter of fact, they had no intention to push further inland and immediately prepared defensive positions, which allowed them to defend effectively against the US counterstroke. In other words, synchronizing the crossing with the rest of Nordwind would not have changed much.
The Germans still attacked in the Drusenheim area. On January 6, the Americans threw them over the Rhine. Do not argue with what Clark wrote. There were opportunities to shackle enemy forces in the first stage of the battle.

Image

video of American counterattack

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpEmk9RHwhE

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Re: Nordwind

#4

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Dec 2017, 23:51

jerk wrote:... Do not argue with what Clark wrote. ...
Why not? In the context of the several posts that statement seems very arrogant.

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Re: Nordwind

#5

Post by jesk » 16 Dec 2017, 00:35

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
jerk wrote:... Do not argue with what Clark wrote. ...
Why not? In the context of the several posts that statement seems very arrogant.
I proceed from the fact that Hitler's criticism is always justified. Therefore, to argue, the Germans still would not have succeeded, as Clarke suggested, is to deviate from the general line of history. Hitler always lied, every minute, every second deceived the people around him and the whole world. Approximately as written below:
I would say that politics as an art of management is more based on deceit than on lies. There is a small semantic difference.
If you remember the postulates of the Concept of Public Security about conceptual power, then it says that everyone, in the best of his knowledge (understanding) works for himself, and, to the best of his ignorance (misunderstanding), works for someone who knows (understands) more.
Because the structure of society is like a pyramid, where a minority governs the majority (implementing policies), the managed majority is less self-sufficient (as far as it understands), but more likely to work for a minority that understands more.
This is the whole policy - I understand more and manage others who understand less. My task is not necessarily to lie to others. It is more important for me that they know (understand) less than me. This is not necessarily a lie, but it is necessarily a deception - limiting knowledge of others, forming their incomplete (often false) understanding gives me the opportunity to manipulate these people.
In politics, as a system of relations between states, this principle is preserved, someone always knows (understands) more and tries to manipulate those who understand less. As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, when comparing geopolitics with chess, the ideal party is when you go for yourself and for your opponent. At the same time the enemy thinks that he walks by himself. Without deception there is nothing))

jesk
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Re: Nordwind

#6

Post by jesk » 16 Dec 2017, 08:39

What Hitler did. Prohibited until January 7 to bring into battle 21 and 25 panzer divisions. Did not subordinate the 19 Army to the command of Army Group G. A blow across the Rhine came on January 5. Americans during this time saw all the plans of the Germans, regrouped and further the war honestly. The Germans are attacking, the Americans are defending. In the first days of the offensive, the Germans could create numerical superiority on the 6th Corps of the 7th US Army and destroy it. Frank sabotage on the part of Hitler. Why did the generals perform the defiant and grossly erroneous orders of Hitler. 1941 and 1945 are one and the same. Hitler orders, the generals argue, but carry out everything that Hitler wants. Carried this cross to the end.

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Re: Nordwind

#7

Post by jesk » 16 Dec 2017, 09:28

Composition of the 19 Army on December 31. Hitler forbade her to use in "Nordwind".

http://www.diedeutschewehrmacht.de/19%20armee.htm
LXIII.AK 338.ID, 159.ID, 269.ID
LXIV.AK 198.ID, Pz.Brig.106 "Feldherrnhalle", 708.VGD, T.716.ID, 189.ID, 16.VGD
der Armee direkt unterstellt: XIV.SS-AK, XVIII.SS-AK, Div.Nr.405, T.716.ID, stv.Gen.Kom.V.AK

Personally, the Fuhrer of the German Reich reduced the number of attacking German divisions on January 1-3 by 4-5 and this number could be enough to defeat the 6 Corps, with the further continuation of successful attacks. He gave the Americans time to regroup and pull up reserves.

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Prosper Vandenbroucke
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Re: Nordwind

#8

Post by Prosper Vandenbroucke » 16 Dec 2017, 13:17

Hi Jesk,
Have a look over here:
https://www.39-45.org/portailv2/downloa ... ie-n-7.php
It's in french language but very interesting
Kindly regards
Prosper :wink: :wink:

Mori
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Re: Nordwind

#9

Post by Mori » 16 Dec 2017, 22:38

jesk wrote:
Mori wrote:The text is well known, and is from one of the best volumes of the US official history.

The map, however, is not from this book and is pure post-war reconstruction. The Germans never made any such plan, either before or during the fight. This map is not in Clarke's book, by the way
The German plan presupposed a rough dispersion of forces. On another map the same.

Image
This map describes what happened, not the plan (as much as there was one). Showing both axis of attack as if such was the intent is misleading. The Germans tried one, failed, then tried further East. They never intented to do both at the same time.
jesk wrote:Do not argue with what Clark wrote. There were opportunities to shackle enemy forces in the first stage of the battle.
Well, you've read Clarke alright, and his book is high-class, no question about it. But you should imagine that some of the contributors here have done more than reading Riviera to the Rhine, and that their expertise may well be deeper than what you get from this single read.

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Re: Nordwind

#10

Post by Mori » 16 Dec 2017, 22:53

jesk wrote:What Hitler did. Prohibited until January 7 to bring into battle 21 and 25 panzer divisions. Did not subordinate the 19 Army to the command of Army Group G. A blow across the Rhine came on January 5. Americans during this time saw all the plans of the Germans, regrouped and further the war honestly. The Germans are attacking, the Americans are defending. In the first days of the offensive, the Germans could create numerical superiority on the 6th Corps of the 7th US Army and destroy it. Frank sabotage on the part of Hitler. Why did the generals perform the defiant and grossly erroneous orders of Hitler. 1941 and 1945 are one and the same. Hitler orders, the generals argue, but carry out everything that Hitler wants. Carried this cross to the end.
I wonder whether it's worth pointing all the misleading statements and errors in interpretation of these few lines. I won't even comment on such arrogant statements as "German had numerical superiority thus could destroy [yes, destroy, nothing left!] the 6th US army corps". Or " Americans during this time saw all the plans of the German" [they definitively anticipated the attack, but is that similar to "saw all the plans"? Have you checked the Ultra interceptions yourself, my friend?]

That said: certainly the decision to have 19 Army under the same Army Group as Nordwing is at Hitler's level. But that's pretty much it.

What is especially interesting with Nordwind, when you take the German high command perspective, is it's an operation designed by the lower levels. It's not an idea from Berlin at all. It's a proposal crafted by Army Group G, which Rundstedt agrees with. Hitler then likes the idea (always interesting to note he listens to the army ideas at times, even late 1944), and expands it a bit, like a boss stretches the objectives of the management below.

Why does Army Group G propose Nordwind? Well, first, they see an opportunity, they see some weakness in Patch's lines. But there is an obvious second thought: this attack is also an excellent reason to keep their divisions, and maybe to receive more. Take their point of view: the Ardennes offensive means Germany has way more reserves than what they've been told so far, except they all went to another Army Group. It'd be fair to get a share of that too.
(This you don't read in Clarke, by the way).

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Re: Nordwind

#11

Post by jesk » 17 Dec 2017, 07:51

Mori wrote: I wonder whether it's worth pointing all the misleading statements and errors in interpretation of these few lines. I won't even comment on such arrogant statements as "German had numerical superiority thus could destroy [yes, destroy, nothing left!] the 6th US army corps". Or " Americans during this time saw all the plans of the German" [they definitively anticipated the attack, but is that similar to "saw all the plans"? Have you checked the Ultra interceptions yourself, my friend?]
Americans from the interceptions knew that the Germans attacked on January 1-3, but were more inclined to the option of striking through Rimling. On the diagram below, I drew, if not Hitler, for an offensive through Bitsch and the Rhine would take part in 4-5 divisions more. Numerical superiority over 6 corps was created and with a high probability of 20-40 thousand Americans in the first days of January were taken prisoner. As a result of Hitler's actions through the Rhine, one 553 division attacked and only on January 5. The 21st and 25th divisions entered the battle on January 7th.

Image
That said: certainly the decision to have 19 Army under the same Army Group as Nordwing is at Hitler's level. But that's pretty much it.
No. At the level of generals. You just do not know. Hitler always argued with the generals and imposed his more than strange decisions.
What is especially interesting with Nordwind, when you take the German high command perspective, is it's an operation designed by the lower levels. It's not an idea from Berlin at all. It's a proposal crafted by Army Group G, which Rundstedt agrees with. Hitler then likes the idea (always interesting to note he listens to the army ideas at times, even late 1944), and expands it a bit, like a boss stretches the objectives of the management below.
Hitler reduced the strength of the initial strike. After the Americans regrouped, the offensive with the available forces lost its meaning.
Why does Army Group G propose Nordwind? Well, first, they see an opportunity, they see some weakness in Patch's lines. But there is an obvious second thought: this attack is also an excellent reason to keep their divisions, and maybe to receive more. Take their point of view: the Ardennes offensive means Germany has way more reserves than what they've been told so far, except they all went to another Army Group. It'd be fair to get a share of that too.
(This you don't read in Clarke, by the way).
Clarke writes about this, Hitler imposed his plan of operation and he expectedly failed. As the Italian writer Umberto Eco said, the fascists are losing wars because they can not correctly assess their fighting ability and the enemy. So all the wrong assessment came from Hitler.

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Re: Nordwind

#12

Post by Mori » 17 Dec 2017, 13:54

Dear jesk,

Your ability to listen is very limited, and you only seem interested in stating your point of view. I wonder why you waste time writing on this forum.

I could repeat the same argument, which you did not hear, but then I would myself be wasting my time.

(And imagining that the decision which army belongs to what army group is delegated by Berlin to lower levels is great news. You should write a book about it).

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Re: Nordwind

#13

Post by jesk » 17 Dec 2017, 17:00

Mori wrote:Dear jesk,

Your ability to listen is very limited, and you only seem interested in stating your point of view. I wonder why you waste time writing on this forum.

I could repeat the same argument, which you did not hear, but then I would myself be wasting my time.

(And imagining that the decision which army belongs to what army group is delegated by Berlin to lower levels is great news. You should write a book about it).
I will remind your introduction to the topic. Started with ignorance. You ignored the scheme of the German plan, which seemed erroneous to you. Then a bridge was remembered. But there was one more. And now you try to show the supremacy in a discussion.
Consider your entry into the topic unsuccessful.
Mori wrote:The text is well known, and is from one of the best volumes of the US official history.

The map, however, is not from this book and is pure post-war reconstruction. The Germans never made any such plan, either before or during the fight. This map is not in Clarke's book, by the way
The inability of the successful Vosges attacking forces to break out of the mountain exits was another matter entirely. Here the divided German command structure on the Alsatian front clearly contributed heavily to the ultimate lack of success. Had Army Group Oberrhein launched supporting attacks across the Rhine at the start of the offensive, Brooks might not have been able to transfer the three regiments of Task Force Herren from the Rhine to the Vosges so readily, and at least some of the eastern mountain exits might have fallen to the advancing volksgrenadiers. Although Blaskowitz might still have elected not to employ his panzer reserves through the Vosges, the results would have greatly increased his options
This analysis is questionable. The Germans crossing of the Rhine at Gambsheim could not go very far for the simple reason they lacked a bridge to supply any large force. It is not that they tried and failed to erect a bridge; more that they did not have any bridging material at all. All their supply was through river boats. As a matter of fact, they had no intention to push further inland and immediately prepared defensive positions, which allowed them to defend effectively against the US counterstroke. In other words, synchronizing the crossing with the rest of Nordwind would not have changed much.


WWII U.S. Army combat action footage with sound. Infantry and Armor Attack Drusenheim Bridge Jan 6, 1945. Soldiers of the 79th Infantry Division and tanks from the 12th Armored Division in combat as they assault a bridge in Drusenheim, France during World War II. This action takes place shortly after the launch of the German offensive known as Operation Nordwind, Hitler's last advance in the Alsace region, on January 1, 1945.

Shown here are troops from the 314th Infantry Regiment of the 79th Infantry Division supported by Shermans from the 43rd Tank Battalion and 714th Tank Battalion Combat Command B of the 12th Armored Division with support of their own 56th Armored Infantry Battalion.

Public domain footage from Combat Bulletin No. 40.

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Re: Nordwind

#14

Post by Mori » 17 Dec 2017, 21:53

jesk wrote: I will remind your introduction to the topic. Started with ignorance. You ignored the scheme of the German plan, which seemed erroneous to you. Then a bridge was remembered. But there was one more. And now you try to show the supremacy in a discussion.
Consider your entry into the topic unsuccessful.
I actually studied Nordwind, and even wrote a piece about it. I read many of the primary sources available, in 3 langages. Just so that you know.

But sharing this knowledge with you would be educating a hostile person. I don't see why I should give you an opportunity to learn something and become a better person. Probably other contributors feel the same.

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Re: Nordwind

#15

Post by jesk » 17 Dec 2017, 22:14

Mori wrote:
jesk wrote: I will remind your introduction to the topic. Started with ignorance. You ignored the scheme of the German plan, which seemed erroneous to you. Then a bridge was remembered. But there was one more. And now you try to show the supremacy in a discussion.
Consider your entry into the topic unsuccessful.
I actually studied Nordwind, and even wrote a piece about it. I read many of the primary sources available, in 3 langages. Just so that you know.

But sharing this knowledge with you would be educating a hostile person. I don't see why I should give you an opportunity to learn something and become a better person. Probably other contributors feel the same.
Whence hostility. At such a micro level.
The study of the entire operation will take not a few pages. But the plan of operation made under pressure of Hitler assumed success of Americans in defense. There was not enough superiority in the forces in the attacking areas. The Germans went into battle with the sole purpose of losing. Such an unusual second world war. "Nordwind" in particular.

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