Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

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Gooner1
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Re: Re:

#31

Post by Gooner1 » 17 Apr 2018, 15:39

sitalkes wrote: For the first time the whole German airborne division was to drop together for Sealion; they refused plans to drop them at various places on the south coast. Instead they were to drop fairly close together.
All 2,500 of them. Whoop-de-doo.
Most of the British anti-tank guns were withdrawn from beach defences to the GHQ line, so the anti-tank fire on the beaches would have been from field guns and anti-tank rifles.
Nope. The 2-pdr anti-tank guns of the defending formations were typically sited behind the FDLs to provide defence in depth. Beach anti-tank (and anti-barge) work would be provided by 18-pdr and 75mm field guns sited for direct fire, and 4" guns mostly mounted on armoured trucks
Image

Still without any proper landing craft I consider it doubtful whether many German tanks could have made it to shore.
The emergency coastal batteries were sited to fire out to sea and often could not depress enough to cover the beaches.
You're making that up. Depression on a typical 6-inch coast defence guns was - 7° from the horizontal.

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Re: Re:

#32

Post by Gooner1 » 17 Apr 2018, 17:46

Sheldrake wrote: There is a British smug complacency about the performance of the BEF in 1940.

For a start the BEF faced the German feint into Belgium rather than the main armoured force, so claims that the Germans never broke through are meaningless. When the BEF did have to fight it it did not do particularly well,except in dogged static defence.
Yet why do I think that if the roles were reversed, you would be marvelling at how proficient the Germany Army were at defending, mounting counter-attacks, conducting fighting withdrawals, in organising scratch units into effective fighting units, in making rapid tactical moves to prevent catastrophe and in keeping cohesive and determined despite being cut-off and with allies surrendering.

Oh and that Bartholomew Report:

"It must be appreciated that the operations on which this report is based consisted almost entirely of a series of withdrawals which the B.E.F. was compelled to undertake to conform to the movements of Allied forces on our flanks. In spite of the enemy's superiority in materials, on no occasion were we forced to relinquish the main position by a frontal attack against the B.E.F. and, without question, the British soldier is at least as good as the German,"


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sitalkes
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Re: Re:

#33

Post by sitalkes » 18 Apr 2018, 03:10

Gooner1 wrote:
sitalkes wrote: The emergency coastal batteries were sited to fire out to sea and often could not depress enough to cover the beaches.
You're making that up. Depression on a typical 6-inch coast defence guns was - 7° from the horizontal.
No I'm not, I've been researching this for my MA. The guns were sited as high up above the beach (eg on top of a cliff) as possible and back from the coast somewhat so even if they could be depressed enough, the terrain was in the way. They were meant to shoot at ships, not troops on land. In many cases they weren't sited to defend beaches but ports.

M. Jones, History of the Coast Artillery of the British Army, R.A. Institute, 1959, Pages 227-229 - also has a complete list of every gun starting pp 229 (available on Google Books)

This is my major source for the following:

After Dunkirk there were 47coastal batteries, of two (very old) guns each, with very little ammunition. Emergency Coastal Batteries were constructed to protect ports and likely landing places. They were fitted with whatever guns were available, which mainly came from naval vessels scrapped since the end of the First World War. These included 6inch (152mm), 5.5inch (140mm), 4.7 inch (120mm) and 4inch (102mm) guns. There were 54 batteries each of two 6" guns, two batteries each of two 4" guns and nine batteries each of two 4.7" guns on the East, South East and South Coasts from Shetland to Fowey. These had little ammunition, sometimes as few as ten rounds apiece, and some were of calibres long out of production, so their ammunition was old and of uneven quality. They were installed between 200 and 400 metres from the beach and often their barrels could not be lowered enough to hit targets on the beach.

These high velocity First World War guns had originally been mounted in the secondary armament positions of major warships. The primary role of the 'beach batteries' was seaward defence, with beach defence being their secondary role. Placed in open pits without overhead protection, they relied on camouflage to prevent them being dive-bombed, strafed or shelled from the sea. Those that did have overhead concrete protection were in rectangular boxes with open fronts. Also, to aid concealment for as long as possible as well as to save ammunition that was in critically short supply and to offset the inexperience of the crews, orders were given that the gunners should hold their fire until the enemy approached within four miles. The six inch guns normally had a range of 7 miles (12,000 yards effective range), so unfortunately this would limit them to about half their effective range and such batteries were likely to prove woefully inadequate to stop a determined invasion force from pressing ashore.

In Sussex, coastal batteries were sited, seven miles apart, at Bognor, Angmering, Littlehampton, Worthing, Shoreham and Brighton. They were armed with two 6” guns except for the one at Bognor, opposite Aldwick Avenue, which had two 5.5” guns. Their control HQ was inland at Washington, and they were manned by gunners of the Territorials.

Few of the Emergency Coast Batteries really qualified as coast artillery. Normal coast artillery was provided with range-finding and position-finding equipment which enabled them to engage enemy warships on the move and at considerable range. But the ‘Emergency Batteries’ and many of the beach batteries were simply concerned with direct shooting at vessels attempting to land troops and equipment, though many of them were given rudimentary fire-control systems which extended their sphere of activity a little. Actual additions to the coast defences around Britain between 1939 and 1945 were largely concerned with placing better weapons in significant positions; thus, several twin 6pdr emplacements were placed in the Thames Estuary in order to protect coastal shipping from possible torpedo boat raids.

Coast artillery may be divided into three types:
• Coast Artillery Batteries: Established and formal positions, many of which were sited in artillery forts that had been in occupation (and an almost continuous state of development) for four hundred years
• Emergency Coast Batteries: Properly configured gun positions built hastily in 1940 to defend vulnerable coastal points that had previously been overlooked
• Beach Batteries: Improvised positions in which a gun of almost any type or vintage might be bolted to a Heath-Robinson firing platform from which it could be used to engage an enemy landing force over open sights.

There was scarcely any reserve of coast-defence armament held by the Ordnance Department, but luckily and wisely the Royal Navy had kept in store a great assortment of guns and mountings from the ships which had been scrapped after the First War. From this providential supply, 6 inch, 5.5 inch, 4.75 inch, and 4 inch guns were issued in great number for what were now named "Emergency Coast Batteries" and which were to protect the minor ports and cover every threatened beach of Great Britain. Ammunition for these guns was also produced from naval sources, but quantities were very meagre, averaging only about 50 rounds per gun. The second problem was to equip these emergency batteries with the necessary searchlights (with their engines) and instruments, for without the former no firing could be done at night, and without the latter such firing as was done by day would be most inaccurate and ineffective. Searchlights were in very short supply and could only be issued to batteries being erected along what was considered to be the most threatened part of the coast, i.e. from Harwich to Portsmouth, but all kinds of substitutes were produced for the other batteries, ranging from portable lights on tripods to magnesium flares burnt in front of polished metal reflectors (Ryder Flares). A means of finding the range was the foremost requirement in instruments, for none of the naval guns were equipped with auto- sights, and there were very few spare D. R.F.s. However every available Barr and Stroud rangefinder of every possible size, large or small, was produced and hurried to the emergency batteries, and these, together with Dumaresques and rate-clocks, furnished the necessary instruments for engaging rapidly moving targets. The third problem was the provision of officers and men to man and serve the emergency batteries. The first to be installed were manned by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, but it was soon obvious that the Fleet could not spare the large number of men required so it was decided that the batteries should be taken over by Coast Artillery. The sources from which Coast Artillery could produce trained coast-gunners were slight, in fact there were only the Territorial regiments already on duty at the major ports and the staff and recruits under training at the Coast Artillery Training Unit at Plymouth. G.H.Q. Home Forces finally laid down that personnel for the Emergency Batteries should be provided as follows :-

(a) (b) (c) (d) (f) Officers: by posting from the Territorial Coast Artillery regiments at the major ports and by calling up officers of the 'Officers Emergency Reserve" and the "Territorial Army Reserve". Senior N.C.O.s: by posting from the Coast Artillery Training Unit. Junior N.C.O.s: by posting from the Territorial Coast Artillery regiments at the major ports. Search-light Personnel: by posting from the School of Electric Lights at Gosport. Specialists: from recruits under training as such at the Coast Artillery Training Unit. The main Body of Gunners:- (i) from Medium and Heavy Regiments which had returned from Dunkirk having lost their guns. (ii) from Recruits who had done one month's basic training at any R.A. training unit.


The establishments for the Emergency Coast Batteries varied according to the size and number of the guns, ranging from about four officers and 135 men for a three gun 6 inch battery to three officers and 90 men for a two gun 4 inch battery. The mounting of the guns at the selected positions, the construction of concrete gun-houses to protect them from hostile dive-bombers, normal air bombing, and shell fire, the building of command and observation posts, searchlight emplacements, and engine houses, and the erection of accommodation for officers and men were no light task, but by employing a mixture of special gun-mounting parties, experts from the Coast Artillery School, sailors from the Royal Navy, gunners who were to man the guns when they were in position, and the Royal Engineers Services with contract labour, and by using vast quantities of quick-setting concrete, the job was done with surprising speed. It was carried out in seven instalments:-
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Re: Re:

#34

Post by sitalkes » 18 Apr 2018, 03:18

Gooner1 wrote:
sitalkes wrote: Nope. The 2-pdr anti-tank guns of the defending formations were typically sited behind the FDLs to provide defence in depth. Beach anti-tank (and anti-barge) work would be provided by 18-pdr and 75mm field guns sited for direct fire, and 4" guns mostly mounted on armoured trucks
.
From what I've seen the 18 pdr and 75mm guns were distributed to RA units who were set back to provide indirect fire support like typical artillery units.

The Susie and Similar Lorries
Specifications
Type: Armoured truck
Manufacturer: various
Number built: 76
Crew: 6
Period of use: 1940-41
Armour: none, or steel plate for the cab
Main armament: Hotchkiss 3 pounder, Hotchkiss 6 pounder (57mm), 12 pounder (3”/75mm) or 4” (100mm) naval gun.
Secondary armament: None, or a LMG on an AA mount
Suspension: 6x4 wheel, leaf spring

On 30th May 1940 76 naval guns were ordered by General Ironside to be mounted on a mixture of (mostly unarmoured) heavy lorries and the following Royal Marine and Naval batteries were to be setup:
• 24X 12 pdr guns in three Royal Marine Lorry batteries (R.M. 1 - 3)
• 24X 12 pdr and 24 X 3 pdr guns organised into 12 4-gun mixed batteries, four to each port:
o Chatham C.1 -4
o Portsmouth P.1 -4
o Devenport D.1-4
• 24X 4-inch guns organised into six 4-gun batteries, two to each port:
o Chatham C.5 and C.6
o Portsmouth P.5 and P.6
o Devenport D.5 and D.6

Each lorry mounted a single gun, selected from obsolete Hotchkiss 3 pounder, 6 pounder (57mm) Hotchkiss, 3” (12 pounder, 75mm) and 4” naval guns. The 4” (100mm) WW1 naval gun (mounted on a 10-ton flat-bed Forden or Mammoth Major Chassis) was the biggest anti-tank gun of its time and could easily knock out any German AFV at long range. However, the size of the piece was offset by the instability of the mount (it was thought that firing the gun anything other than straight to the rear might make the truck fall over), and some had limited traverse, making it ineffective against swift armour. Ammunition was limited, and training was limited to five rounds per gun.

Though originally destined for naval bases, half were soon re-directed to beach defence as anti-tank guns. The four inch guns were organised into three batteries of which two were allotted to Eastern Command. These guns were manned by personnel from Field and Medium artillery regiments who were without equipment after the withdrawal from France.

The first four mobile 4” guns arrived in Suffolk in June 1940, manned by naval personnel (P 5 Battery) from Portsmouth under the command of Lt. Wintle R.N and were initially quartered at Glevering Hall. The White Ensign was flown from a flag staff on the lawn, a portion of the front drive was railed off to act as the “quarter-deck” and should the CRA 55th Div ring up when Lt Wintle was off duty, he was informed that he was “ashore”! The guns were mounted on specially strengthened Forden Lorries, with armoured cabins for the drivers and a LAA gun tacked on the back. They carried 25 rounds of ammunition. The guns could fire fore and aft and had a traverse of almost 25˚. The Naval detachment was soon called back to Portsmouth but left the guns, which were taken over by 120 Field Bty. The four naval guns under 120 Field Bty left Suffolk for London during August 1940.

The next batch of eight mobile 4” guns arrived from the Woolwich Arsenal and had been manufactured by the Army. These were mounted high on enormous Lorries and could only fire astern.
The guns had a limited arc of forward fire necessitated by the fact that the recoil would have rolled the lorry over had the gun been fired at an angle. Oral testimony suggests that when one such gun was test-fired the lorry moved back 200 feet, such was the force of the recoil.
These were nicknamed “Susies”. In early July 1940 115 Field Bty, 32nd Field Regt Royal Artillery, armed with six of these weapons, was assigned to the part of Suffolk near Walberswick. One gun was located to the west of Sallow Wood Covert to defend the two roads leading inland from Walberswick. The task of all six guns was to destroy enemy tanks on roads leading from the beaches and then fall back in turn on positions already reconnoitred. 11 Corps made some effort to standardise the roles of these various “fancy equipments”. Field Regiments were to be relieved of manning these guns. Two pounder anti-tank guns were to be withdrawn from Beach Defence to rear areas for training purposes and to act as a mobile reserve from which they could move to provide depth to the forward defences. The new general layout was to deploy the static pieces in a Beach Defence role. The mobile pieces would operate in a mobile zone in the rear.

From August/Sept. the Navy/RM personnel was withdrawn and the guns were gradually handed over to the Royal Artillery (anti-tank or field batteries). In the invasion zone, the 69th A/Tk Regiment (45 div.) had in September one battery (273) equipped with 8 x 4in guns on lorries, while the three other batteries were equipped with a mixture of 6pdrs, 2pdrs and 75 mm guns, until the end of the month when they were equipped with 8 x 2pdrs each (instead of 12 as per establishment). The 115th Field Regiment (Ashford area), which had lost its guns in France, had a whole collection of lorry-mounted 4in guns, 12pdrs and 3pdrs at the end of September, according to the monthly returns of the strength of the British Army (WO 73/146). The experiment with these improvised vehicles did not last long; in 1941 there are references to mechanical problems and their use seems to have been discontinued soon after.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#35

Post by sitalkes » 18 Apr 2018, 04:44

Tsofian wrote:[
The Germans guns didn't have radar fire direction in 1940 (If you can site a source that indicates they had radar blindfire ability in September 1940 I would be very interested-it would require the radar to be able to spot the splashes of the shells and target ships.), plus the fact the German coastal guns in the Channel had a hit rate less than .1% for their shooting over the entire war just indicates that these aren't going to play much of a role. The Luftwaffe has almost no maritime strike ability, especially at night. They have a very limited number of torpedoes and heavy AP bombs which are the only weapons that will effect capital ships.

The other three items work both ways, both sides laid hundreds of mines. The ability of the Germans to lay the fields they wanted to with the available resources has been questioned on this forum several times. I'll let you go back and look through those threads. One thing from that stands out though is the requirement for the M-35 minesweepers and the R boats and S boats to provide escorts for the mine laying and mine sweeping operations. For the German minefields to have the desired effect they have to risk resources that are allocated to several missions in the invasion. The same can be said for German efforts to breach the British fields. The British planned on putting their small submarines in the channel and they also had MTBs. By the time the invasion started how many of the German ships are still operation, even before the invasion convoys load up?
Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945
Peter Smith, Pen & Sword, Barnsley 2007

pp116-118 "Coastal radar stations capable of tracking surface shipping were setup by both sides, with the German system in use from August 1940 but the British system was not “established as part of the defence proper” until early 1941." I have several sources saying the German guns were radar directed (you can still see the fortified sites of the radar dishes etc near Calais) but with the problem described below:

p. 123 Heavy shore guns vs destroyers
"One night in September[1940], the destroyers Buldog and Sardonyx were in the Straits of Dover, in line ahead formation, looking for enemy vessels when without warning there was a “WHOMP”. A tower of water shot up between them. Both destroyers turned 90 degrees to port and increased to full speed back across the channel. But no matter how they weaved and turned the guns firing at them had their exact range and plot (probably by the use of radar as it was pitch black) although they could not see them for line. The heavy shells, believed to be 11 inch from Cap Gris Nez, continued to fall between them but no damage seems to have been suffered. However they were accurate enough to make the destroyers run for home and dramatically change their course and speed. This example also shows how accurate the channel guns could be, even at night.

"During the following two years, approximately 20% of the convoys passing through the Straights of Dover was attacked, with each convoy receiving on average 29 rounds. Comparatively few ships were hit by shellfire, for small ships at long range are not easy targets, but in their many passages during four years, the men of the coasters experienced `1,500 flashes followed by 1,500 (32 second) periods of suspense. It no doubt was cause for concern in the German camp that guns supposed to hit destroyers were unable to hit five knot coasters after two hours’ deliberate practice. Possibly this was another nail in the coffin of the Sealion plan. " Note that these are small targets, not large warships, and there were small numbers of targets at any one time - while 50 warships entering the channel would surely provide a target rich environment, especially if they were dodging fire from German aircraft, submarines, and various types of escorts plus avoiding mines and shoals at the same time.

Pp. 91, 93, 119: A Flotilla of five MTB’s was moved to Dover 21 June. This was supplemented by two more Norwegian manned MTBs 1 July as well as a single old submarine, H-49. These along with the seven destroyers of the Dover flotilla were supposed to stop the invasion.

British MTB’s were much smaller than the German S-Boats and more temperamental due to their power plants, more vulnerable thanks to their petrol engines, and more lightly equipped. They were more likely to be forced to withdraw due to adverse weather conditions. On the night of 7-8 September, four MTBs sailed from Dover against the mass of invasion traffic passing south-west through the Straights but two were forced back by the weather and the remaining two made a couple of ineffective attacks on some unidentified targets off Calais. Up to that date, the coastal craft of the Royal Navy had not been particularly successful. So disappointing had been the results for the MTB that initial enthusiasm for the type had generally been replaced in the Royal Navy regular warship crews by a tolerant resignation. Not for another year or more was this poor record to be rectified to any great extent with more and better armed craft, plus improved training and tactics.

of MGB's, only the Fairmile "A" model was available in September 1940, and only a few of them. They were what were really needed, as it happened several times during the war that MTB's fired torpedoes at low draft transport ships (MFP's and the like) and the torpedoes went under the target without causing any damage.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#36

Post by Knouterer » 18 Apr 2018, 08:39

Extracts from/notes for my upcoming (well, maybe next year ...) book on the subject, concerning the German long-range guns (Fernkampfgeschütze):

First, a distinction must be made between the Navy and Army batteries. As is well known, the Organisation Todt performed a near-miracle in dismantling heavy coastal batteries on the German coast and the Westwall and installing them again at Cap Gris Nez in a matter of weeks. By the end of Sept. the following heavy naval batteries were operational:

1) Batterie “Oldenburg” – 2 x 24 cm S.K. L/50 – range 26,700 m
2) Batterie “Grosser Kurfürst” – 4 x 28 cm S.K. L/50 – range 39,100 m
3) Batterie “Friedrich August” – 3 x 30,5 cm S.K. L/50 – range 32,500 m, 51,000 m with super charge
4) Batterie “Prinz Heinrich” – 2 x 28 cm S.K. L/45 – range 36,100 m (according to Ian V. Hogg, German Artillery of WW II - Sakkers & Machielse give the range as 39,100 m, the same as for the L/50 guns, but that would seem to be an error)

„Batterie Siegfried“ (from 15.3.1942 “Batterie Todt”) with 4 x 38 cm S.K. C/34 guns, range 42,000 m with standard shell, fired its first shot on 8.10.1940. It seems that with much effort the guns were provisionally made ready on 23.9 as ordered, but the electrical wiring was incomplete and the ammunition hoists were “jury-rigged” so the battery would presumably not have played much of a role in Seelöwe.

Since the Channel at its narrowest is about 34,000 m wide it follows that apart from Siegfried only the batteries GK, FA with supercharge and PH (just barely …) could reach across.

Ammunition expenditure:
Siegfried/Todt, up to 15.2.1944: 519 rounds (129/130 per gun), of which only 22 in 1940, none in 1941.
Grosser Kurfürst, up to 31.1.1944: 693 (between 144 and 187 per gun), of which 451 in 1940.
Friedrich August, up to 15.2.1944: 770 (220/265/285 per gun)
The three 40,6 cm guns of Batterie Lindemann (installed 1942) fired an unknown number of shots, but at a rough estimate perhaps 200-300 in 1942-43, on 27 separate occasions/days. As of 6.12.1943 there were 1,350 shells of various types in store and it would seem that in the following nine months these were all fired off. Last salvoes on 26.9.1944, when 16 rounds were fired.
The commanders of the naval batteries had to husband their limited ammunition because they could not be certain when or if they would be resupplied, given that the German armaments industry was unable to meet all the demands made upon it. Similarly, barrel wear was a limiting factor, useful barrel life was no more than two to three hundred rounds or so, after which maximum range and accuracy dropped significantly. Battery “Siegfried” in particular would have to practice strict economy, otherwise there might be a shortage of 38 cm shells for Bismarck and Tirpitz when they became operational, as Admiral Witzell of the Marinewaffenhauptamt pointed out.

Many other batteries with smaller guns were installed at intervals along the coast. These were typically old 17 cm naval guns with a maximum range of 27,200 meters and were mainly tasked with protecting coastal traffic and guarding against enemy incursions.

In 1940 the available radio direction finding equipment (Funkmessanlagen or De-Te-Gerät, two installed near Cap Gris Nez) was still relatively primitive and no help in accurate shooting: distance measurement could easily be 1,000 meters off, and convoys tended to produce one diffuse shifting echo, making it impossible to distinguish individual ships or to determine speed and course with any accuracy. In other words, the operators of this equipment could do little more than pick up the phone, call the batteries and tell them that “something seems to be moving somewhere over there” (at least, that’s my understanding from the available literature, I do not claim to be an expert on the subject …). The British had built up a strong electronics industry between the wars and could now profit from their technological lead. In particular, their radar could detect the splash of falling shells, which enabled them to correct their aim accordingly. Nevertheless, in 1940-41 they were only marginally more successful than the Germans in hitting traffic along the opposite coast.

What is undisputed is that in 1940 the German naval batteries did not hit a single ship. Apart from some splinter damage, British coastal convoys (mostly slow-moving colliers) sailed through the gunfire unscathed. In fact the first real success against naval targets was on 6 June 1944, when they sank the freighter Sambut (7,219 GRT).
There was also a Luftwaffe air observation unit to assist the naval batteries, the 3rd Staffel of Fernaufklärergruppe 11, which operated Me 110 and Do 17 from an airfield near Zutkerque. In Sept. 1940 five naval officers were detached to this unit to act as observers. In spite of strong protests from the Kriegsmarine, the unit was transferred to the Balkans in May 1941, and no replacements were ever provided by the Luftwaffe. As the British were successfully jamming the De-Te-Geräte from March 1941, the effectiveness of the coastal batteries was further reduced.
In the Seelöwe planning two Staffel were scheduled to direct artillery fire:
3./(F) 11 with 9 Do 17 and 3 Me 110,
3./(F) 10 with 5 Do 17 and 1 Me 110.

The army for its part deployed a number of heavy railroad guns and the damage done to Dover, Deal, Folkestone and other places was mostly the work of the 28 cm K5 guns of Art. Abt. 702 which fired a 255 kg shell to a range of 62,180 m. Schenk mentions six guns, Sakkers and Machielse (Artillerieduell der Fernkampfgeschütze am Pas de Calais 1940-1944) indicate one or two less. Klee has in his collection of documents a “Vorläufige Weisung” (preliminary orders) of 16th Army of 9.9.1940, which assumes that "Siegfried" will be fully operational and mentions 5 x K5 guns, so let’s keep it at that.
There was also a 21 cm K12 extreme long range railroad gun, a modernized version of the “Paris Gun” of WWI, but this was more of an experimental weapon and it fired only a few rounds in November 1940 and again in 1944, which landed in the region of Chatham and Maidstone, and also near Eastbourne according to some reports.
Finally, there was an assortment of other heavy army guns which did not have the range to reach across the Channel (except K3) and proved even less effective than the Kriegsmarine batteries against moving naval targets, and can therefore be disregarded. Schenk mentions Czech 24 cm guns (M16) hitting Dover but according to Gander & Chamberlain, Small Arms, Artillery and Special Weapons of the Third Reich, these guns had a range of “only” 29,875 m. The confusion probably stems from the fact that the second Abteilung of Art. Regt. 84 was armed with six of these Czech guns while I./84 had six 24 cm K3 guns (on wheeled mounts, not railroad guns), a more modern design (by Rheinmetall-Borsig) with a range of 37,500 m.
Since the K5 railroad guns were too valuable to expose to air attack (cost per gun was 1,250,000 Reichsmark – a 10,5 cm howitzer cost 16,400 RM and a Pz III tank about 105,000 RM) special bunkers and tunnels were constructed where they could retreat into in daytime.

The army’s long-range batteries opened fire on a coastal convoy for the first time on the 12th of August but failed to score any hits. About a dozen shells also fell on Dover, Deal and Folkestone. The navy’s guns (battery “Grosser Kurfürst”) first opened fire on a convoy on the 22nd but the expenditure of ninety-seven 28 cm shells again produced no results.

As regards specific planning for Seelöwe: according to the War Diary of the 17. I.D. (as quoted by Ansel, Hitler confronts England, page 277), on 17 September General Loch settled on the following shoots with the railway artillery commander (that would have been Generalmajor Karl Böttcher, Artilleriekommandeur (Arko) 104):

a) Preceding Stuka attack concentrate all batteries on Sandgate. Neutralize batteries there (which “batteries” are meant here is unclear – could be a reference to the HAA battery at Pedlinge Court)
b) After Stuka attack, train on Folkestone (…)
c) Later neutralize batteries about Dover (…)

Note that no fire on the invasion beach itself was planned. Dispersion of shot was – obviously – very great at such extreme distances, and shells could fall anywhere within a radius of several hundreds of meters from the point of aim. Therefore, these guns could not be used in a tactical role, only as weapons of “indiscriminate terror”.
According to Ansel, no prearranged fires from the Navy batteries at Cap Gris Nez appear in the Division records. In fact, the navy did not see this as a primary task of their gun batteries, judging by an entry in the War Diary of the Navy High Command (Seekriegsleitung, Skl.) of 17 Sept (my translation):
“Admiral Channel Coast has requested a decision concerning the use of coastal batteries against land targets during Seelöwe, if the naval situation and available ammunition permit. Skl. agrees in principle to such use. Naval targets should however always have priority. Firing at targets on land only at specific request of Army and when situation at sea, ammunition supply and condition of gun barrels permit.”
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#37

Post by Knouterer » 18 Apr 2018, 08:58

For comparison, a 1944 sketch map. The 9.4 cm guns are captured British 3.7" HAA guns.
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#38

Post by MarkN » 18 Apr 2018, 11:34

Gooner1 wrote:The Germans never broke the front of the BEF in France and Flanders.
Yes they did.
Sheldrake wrote:There is a British smug complacency about the performance of the BEF in 1940.
I'd say it was more delusion than smugness.
Sheldrake wrote: For a start the BEF faced the German feint into Belgium rather than the main armoured force, so claims that the Germans never broke through are meaningless. When the BEF did have to fight it it did not do particularly well,except in dogged static defence.

Much of the BEF was ill trained for mechanised warfare. Wireless sets were in short supply and training curtailed for fear of compromising security. Few units or formations were able to communicate by wireless or practiced in long moves (Montgomery's 3 div the exception) The Arras counter attack was a shambolic affair , marked by a lack of co-operation between arms and the loss of most of the attacking armour. Yes I know, that even as a tactical failure it disproportionately worried some Germans. But it was an example of how not to mount a mechanised manouvre.

The BEF was ill structured and under equipped. The country that invented the tank did not have an armoured division in France until after the German attack - and then it was frittered way. The 12th and 23rd infantry Divisions were hastily deployed across the old Somme battlefield against the Panzer spearhead,where, lacking anti-tank or other heavy weapons and artillery they were overrun. The excuse is that these were labour battalions that should never have been used as infantry. But they serve as one marker of the fate of the LDV or under equipped post Dunkirk Home forces units.

Tactically the Germans were better trained to co-operate in the uncertain chaotic conditions of warfare. With few exceptions it was the Germans who seized the tactical initiative in every engagement. Even on the Dyle and Escaut canal the non mechanised German infantry held the initative against British formations lavishly equipped, by 1940 standards with light AFVs.

There was a similar pattern in Norway where the Germans out manouvred the under trained and ill equipped British. The proof of the pudding is in 1) the Batholomew report which was quite scathing with respect to British shortcomings. 2) the subsequent development of training in Home Forces.3) the widespread lack of confidence in the British Army shown by some of the most talented junior officers into forming their own private armies - commandos - LRDG - SAS- Paratroops SOE . Read their memoirs. They were embarrassed by the Blimpish Army.

When you use the term "fighting worse" I think you mean has lower fighting power. This is a combination of the physical, conceptual and moral components of power. I don't think anyone doubts the courage or fighting spirit of the Tommy, but guts goes only so far against an enemy out manoeuvred them or used weapons to which they could not respond.

That was the story of British reverses from Norway through France Greece,Crete North Africa and the Far East, Under trained under equipped troops deployed expected to make do and muddle through against a better trained and equipped enemy. The post Dunkirk Home Forces were in the same position. Would they have fought more bravely than the Poles who rode horses against machine guns? Or the French that fought to the last? No one will know.
The British forces north of the Somme were fully trained and fully equipped. What they lacked in training was down to a poor understanding of the war they were about to become involved in which was a product of a small war colonial policing mentality. Their equipment was, in the round, no worse than that of the Germans. Theoretically they could have gone toe-to-toe with the Wehrmacht - albeit on a very limited front due to being so small in scale.

The British 'success' of being able to motor rearwards quicker than the German advance is no military feat worth praise when the German forces opposing them were on Shank's Pony.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#39

Post by Gooner1 » 18 Apr 2018, 14:34

MarkN wrote: Yes they did.
You better inform the Bartholomew Committee and call for an urgent rewrite of all the histories of the 1940 campaign then.
The British forces north of the Somme were fully trained and fully equipped. What they lacked in training was down to a poor understanding of the war they were about to become involved in which was a product of a small war colonial policing mentality.
Ah, yes your idée fixe. Sending an army of three corps rapidly forward to hold a line against the main expected attack of a first class enemy is not a common small war colonial policing action.
Theoretically they could have gone toe-to-toe with the Wehrmacht
Historically they did go toe-to-toe with the Wehrmacht. If the BEF would've lost there would have been no Dunkirk evacuation.

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Re: Re:

#40

Post by Gooner1 » 18 Apr 2018, 14:46

sitalkes wrote: No I'm not, I've been researching this for my MA. The guns were sited as high up above the beach (eg on top of a cliff) as possible and back from the coast somewhat so even if they could be depressed enough, the terrain was in the way. They were meant to shoot at ships, not troops on land. In many cases they weren't sited to defend beaches but ports.

M. Jones, History of the Coast Artillery of the British Army, R.A. Institute, 1959, Pages 227-229 - also has a complete list of every gun starting pp 229 (available on Google Books)
Well I suggest you examine where the Emergency Coastal Batteries were actually sited then.

From the above work by Maurice-Jones "it was decided to surround Great Britain from the Orkneys to the Outer Hebrides with a ring of coast-defence batteries which would cover every probable and possible landing-place, be it port, harbour, bay, cove, inlet or open beach, "

From the Brocforce war diary 3rd October 1940:


3. The role of the 6" Naval guns has been laid down by the Eastern Command as:-

(a) To engage hostile vessels approaching within 3 sea miles of the coast.
(b) To prevent transports from approaching beaches suitable for landing troops and A.F.Vs and to engage them when beached so as to destroy their contents.
(c) To engage troops in boats or landing craft and A.F.Vs attempting to gain a footing on beaches.
(d) In the last event to engage targets on the beaches but the 6" guns would only be justified in engaging this type of target if there was not a single transport or landing craft afloat with enemy troops in it.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#41

Post by MarkN » 18 Apr 2018, 16:27

Gooner1 wrote: You better inform the Bartholomew Committee and call for an urgent rewrite of all the histories of the 1940 campaign then.
You silly billy!!!

Ellis' OH clearly identifies British formations being either overrun or being pushed backwards by the Germans - not just retreating to conform with Johnny Foreigner on the flanks.
Gooner1 wrote: Ah, yes your idée fixe. Sending an army of three corps rapidly forward to hold a line against the main expected attack of a first class enemy is not a common small war colonial policing action.
Ah yes! Your 'ignorance en spectacle'. The ability to put 3 million men into uniform and engaging with the enemy as a concept is wholly separate from the 'mentality' of what to do with them.

But, keep it coming. It makes for a good laugh.
Gooner1 wrote: Historically they did go toe-to-toe with the Wehrmacht.
No. Historically, the held a line until first contact then retreated. There were exceptions.
Gooner1 wrote: If the BEF would've lost there would have been no Dunkirk evacuation.
They had lost. That's why there had to be the Dunkirk evacuation. You do realize that had the matelots - uniformed and civilian alike - not achieved what nobody had ever considered possible, the BEF north of the Somme would have been removed from the orbat completely.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#42

Post by Gooner1 » 18 Apr 2018, 17:57

MarkN wrote:Ellis' OH clearly identifies British formations being either overrun or being pushed backwards by the Germans - not just retreating to conform with Johnny Foreigner on the flanks.
Which 'formations' were overrun? Of course you realise there is a huge difference between being pushed back, and the enemy breaking through.

The ability to put 3 million men into uniform and engaging with the enemy as a concept is wholly separate from the 'mentality' of what to do with them.
What?!
As the Field Service Regulations put it "The ultimate national aim in war is to force the enemy to abandon the purpose for which he resorted to arms and to conclude peace on satisfactory terms."
At this stage in the war the Allies were preparing to fight a mostly defensive battle whilst building up the resources required to take offensive action.
That the British Expeditionary Force was as limited in size as it was, was wholly the responsibility of the politicians. As far back as 1935 the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee had recommended a field force of 17 divisions and, as noted above, the CIGS was calling for a lot of tanks.

No. Historically, the held a line until first contact then retreated. There were exceptions.
The exceptions being on the Dyle, the Escaut, the Canal Line, the Ypres-Comines Canal, the Dunkirk perimeter ...

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#43

Post by MarkN » 18 Apr 2018, 19:18

Gooner1 wrote: Which 'formations' were overrun? Of course you realise there is a huge difference between being pushed back, and the enemy breaking through.
Brigades and units of the 12th & 23rd Divisions between Arras and and Amiens were overrun.
The 1st Armoured Division was overrun on the 'Andelle' Line.
The 51st Division was repeatedly driven back from the Somme until surrounded then surrendering.
The entire BEF north of the Somme was driven back along lines determined by the Germans not by the British (or the Allies). Had the matelots - uniformed and civilian alike - not achieved what nobody had ever considered possible, the BEF north of the Somme would have been removed from the orbat completely in the same way the 51st Division was.
Gooner1 wrote:
The ability to put 3 million men into uniform and engaging with the enemy as a concept is wholly separate from the 'mentality' of what to do with them.
What?!
'Mentality' on what you do with your force is a completely different and separate construct to the size of that force. You can have a small-war colonial policing mentality with either a small army or a ginormous one. Similarly, you can have a big-war mentality with either a ginormous army or a miniscule one. If you're still not able to accept that, there is no hope.
Gooner1 wrote: As the Field Service Regulations put it "The ultimate national aim in war is to force the enemy to abandon the purpose for which he resorted to arms and to conclude peace on satisfactory terms."
At this stage in the war the Allies were preparing to fight a mostly defensive battle whilst building up the resources required to take offensive action.
That the British Expeditionary Force was as limited in size as it was, was wholly the responsibility of the politicians. As far back as 1935 the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee had recommended a field force of 17 divisions and, as noted above, the CIGS was calling for a lot of tanks.
So?

How many army level (****) field headquarters existed at the beginning of WW2?
How many corps level (***) field headquarters existed at the beginning of WW2?
How many divisional level (**) field headquarters existed at the beginning of WW2?

How many field exercises, command table-top exercises or TEWTs were conducted pre-war to school and train field commanders in big-war problems and issues so they had a running start on how to lead and operate within big formations?
How many field exercises, command table-top exercises or TEWTs were conducted pre-war to give non-field staff officers understanding of big-war logistical support, combat and service support as well as communication issues so that they could effectively forward plan?

That is how (amongst others) an army's leadership 'mentality' can be converted from small-war colonial policing thought processes into big-war thought processes.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#44

Post by Tsofian » 18 Apr 2018, 23:53

You had a lot of text that indicates the Germans were shooting at ships at night but nothing that is a definitive citation that says they were using a radar directed system
sitalkes wrote: "During the following two years, approximately 20% of the convoys passing through the Straights of Dover was attacked, with each convoy receiving on average 29 rounds. Comparatively few ships were hit by shellfire, for small ships at long range are not easy targets, but in their many passages during four years, the men of the coasters experienced `1,500 flashes followed by 1,500 (32 second) periods of suspense. It no doubt was cause for concern in the German camp that guns supposed to hit destroyers were unable to hit five knot coasters after two hours’ deliberate practice. Possibly this was another nail in the coffin of the Sealion plan. " Note that these are small targets, not large warships, and there were small numbers of targets at any one time - while 50 warships entering the channel would surely provide a target rich environment, especially if they were dodging fire from German aircraft, submarines, and various types of escorts plus avoiding mines and shoals at the same time.
Your evidence is anecdotal. It does not prove or even really indicate that German coastal artillery guns were being directed by blindfire radar. The “small targets” you mention are colliers and were not substantially smaller then destroyers, but they were certainly far slower. What German aircraft are they dodging? If it is night there are almost no Luftwaffe assets available.

The mine fields are unlikely to exist as the Germans desired. The British were out sweeping every night, and laying their own fields. The Germans would have to lay fields, sweep fields and also defend and rebuild their existing fields every night for almost two weeks straight up to S Day. The Germans have to use either some very old and slow converted merchant layers or practically their entire force of destroyers light destroyers and fleet minesweepers as well as R boats to get enough lift to put the number of mines they intended to put down. Some of these fields are within range of British coastal batteries. So for these mine lines to be laid the Germans have to control the waters in which they are to be laid and to be able to keep the British from sweeping them. The efforts of the United States Navy to clear mines by Corregidor indicates what the Germans would have faced from the British Batteries alone. With complete air and sea supremacy the US suffered two minesweepers hit by shells (one damaged one sunk) two destroyers hit by shells and two hit by mines. This set of engagements alone would remove around 10% of the M-35 minesweepers and a like % of destroyers/torpedo boats. This is a single area being swept under conditions far better than the Germans will face. The USN in the Pacific in 1945 could sustain these losses. The KM could not. A few night like this and their will be no escort vessels available.

So let us say everything goes as you say. The minefield exist, the KM doesn’t lose all its surface vessels in the attempts to lay their fields and sweep the British ones. The Germans have radar ranging on their heavy guns. There is still a problem. As the insane melee develops in the Channel even if the radar can discriminate individual ships and shell splashes how will they tell the barges and the escorts from the British ships? Once everyone is stuck in the guns can’t fire any longer without risking hitting their own ships. If you want a target rich environment I can’t imaging one more rich than the barge convoys. The law of averages says if there are 50 British ships and 1000 barges the likely point of impact will be far closer to a barge.
There is also the strange assumption that the German guns, firing blind at night at high speed targets at extreme ranges will make a number of hits that will be tactically significant while the British shooting in daylight at slow moving (or anchored) targets, only a few thousands yards out will not have a tactical or operational effect, even though there are historical precedents (Wake 1941, Corregidor 1942, 1945, Guam 1945, Tarawa 1943, Tobruk 1942 and lots of others).

It comes down to some very basic points-The German guns were not designed to be fired at maximum range at high speed maneuvering targets. There was no fire control system in the world in 1940 that could. The basic fact (fact) that the guns fired 1500 rounds during the war and got less then 15 hits indicates that this system did not work. Why would it have worked better in 1940 then in the next years, when the crews would have had more practice, better training, better electronics and experience? Even if there were 15 hits from the 1500 rounds fire and they were all crammed into the invasion period that still leaves 35 destroyers undamaged coming for the convoys.

On the British coastal defense guns side the weapons are firing in a role for which they are specifically designed. The Royal Artillery 12 pdr, 4 inch and 6 inch MK VII guns and their fire control systems were specifically designed to hit minesweepers and minelayers. They fire rapidly and have a heavy enough shell to damage their targets. Their fire control is entirely adequate for the target speed, size and range and the light conditions. Even the Emergency Batteries would have enough fire control for this. The ability of the Marine 5 inch guns at Wake, which had limited fire control, to hit damage and sink similar targets shows what could have happened.

To get back to the original question. I have never seen a primary source that gives the German artillery blindfire radar capability in September 1940. I have seen a lot of information that indicates they did not, that the German military didn’t have that capability at all at that time. KMS Bismarck does not appear to have had that ability in 1941. If you can cite the radar system and its capabilities that provided this to the German guns in 1940 I would be really grateful.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#45

Post by sitalkes » 19 Apr 2018, 08:12

So evidence provided that somehow in September 1940 according to British records, British destroyers were made to run for home at night by accurate gunfire (doesn't matter how, the effect is what matters) .. however evidence doesn't fit pre-conceived ideas so it is classed as an anecdote and more evidence requested - pointless exercise. Nobody says the 1940 radar was as good as it was later on and as shown above the guns firing at them had their exact range and plot although they could not see them for line. However at this stage of the war German marine radar was better than British marine radar, was mounted on a higher proportion of German ships, and it was used to enable ships like the S & G to evade British patrols in 1939-41 (after that British radar was better as was radar detection). I'll put in the references for that when I get home, it's from two books translated from German, one on Sealion, the other on the Kriegsmarine.

Peter Schenk Invasion of England1940, Conway Maritime, 1990, p. 325 gives the names of the types of radar used and their ranges, as well as other details.

Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Naval War, Doubleday, New York, 1974 p.116

(Egbert Kieser, Hitler on the Doorstep, Arms & Armour Press, London, 1997 (trans from 1987 edition) p. 226 is the source for the two week's rations provided for the first wave units. On p. 172 he also describes how the zeppelin sent to listen for British radar emissions before the war didn't hear anything because those on board listened to the wrong frequencies, though the zeppelin did appear on British radar screens.
Last edited by sitalkes on 19 Apr 2018, 12:57, edited 2 times in total.

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