Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

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Knouterer
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#46

Post by Knouterer » 19 Apr 2018, 08:59

sitalkes wrote: Nobody says the 1940 radar was as good as it was later on and as shown above the guns firing at them had their exact range and plot ...
No - the British BELIEVED the Germans had the exact range on this occasion. So that might have been just luck, and it was. As I explained above, on the basis of German sources, the German radar in use at the time did not permit accurate ranging.

For example, after a fruitless engagement by battery GK on 4 Oct. Kapt. z S. Wolf-Ehrenreich von Arnswaldt, Kommandant der Seeverteidigung Flandern, noted in his War Diary (KTB):

"Die De. Te. Geräte haben den Geleitzug nicht eindeutig als solchen erkannt, weil eine Gruppe eng zusammenstehender Ziele nur eine nach Entfernung und Richtung schwankende Anzeige ergibt, eine Erscheinung, die sich auch bei der Ortung des Monitors am 30. September gezeigt hat."

Translation:

"The radar did not clearly identify the convoy as such, because a group of targets close together produces a single echo, which keeps shifting longitudinally and latitudinally (in range and azimuth), a phenomenon that also occurred when locating the monitor on 30 Sept."

The monitor in question was the Erebus, which fired 17 shells at the Calais area that night. So on that occasion the German radar was apparently unable to distinguish the monitor from its escorts.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#47

Post by Knouterer » 19 Apr 2018, 17:03

Even in 1943, Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 608 reported that shoots on the basis of radar data had been abandoned for the time being as being too inaccurate. It was found that due to weather influences measurements might vary by as much as 1,000 m at a distance of 30,000 m. On top of that the German radar was very often effectively jammed by British transmitters. In the early years of the war, the British were clearly ahead in radar technology and electronic warfare generally.
When the big guns finally scored a few hits in 1944, it was by day and with the aid of optical instruments (rangefinders), not radar.
Last edited by Knouterer on 19 Apr 2018, 17:32, edited 1 time in total.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton


Gooner1
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#48

Post by Gooner1 » 19 Apr 2018, 17:26

MarkN wrote:Brigades and units of the 12th & 23rd Divisions between Arras and and Amiens were overrun.
The 1st Armoured Division was overrun on the 'Andelle' Line.
The 51st Division was repeatedly driven back from the Somme until surrounded then surrendering.
The entire BEF north of the Somme was driven back along lines determined by the Germans not by the British (or the Allies). Had the matelots - uniformed and civilian alike - not achieved what nobody had ever considered possible, the BEF north of the Somme would have been removed from the orbat completely in the same way the 51st Division was.
So the 12th & 23rd Divisions, who were in France for labouring duties, qualify.

'Mentality' on what you do with your force is a completely different and separate construct to the size of that force. You can have a small-war colonial policing mentality with either a small army or a ginormous one. Similarly, you can have a big-war mentality with either a ginormous army or a miniscule one. If you're still not able to accept that, there is no hope.
The British Army had a winning 'Mentality'! :D
I suggest you read the Field Service Regulations of 1935 (vols. II & III), they were clearly written with the view of a major war against a first class enemy in mind.

So?

How many field exercises, command table-top exercises or TEWTs were conducted pre-war to school and train field commanders in big-war problems and issues so they had a running start on how to lead and operate within big formations?
How many field exercises, command table-top exercises or TEWTs were conducted pre-war to give non-field staff officers understanding of big-war logistical support, combat and service support as well as communication issues so that they could effectively forward plan?

That is how (amongst others) an army's leadership 'mentality' can be converted from small-war colonial policing thought processes into big-war thought processes.
You don't get it. The army was operating under the political doctrine of 'limited liability'. The sending of an expeditionary force to the continent was fourth in the army's priorities.
"from the end of 1937 to the spring of 1939 the equipment of the five [Regular] divisions was geared down to the level of 'colonial warfare in operations in an Eastern theatre'" https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... ion-2.html
The Territorial Army was of course worse off, they only had sufficient weapons so they could train with them.
The idea of playing TEWTs would be absurd. Not only did the formations not exist in reality or on paper, there was no intention of the Government ever to create them. Until Spring 1939 that is, and then the UK was at war within six months.

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Sheldrake
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#49

Post by Sheldrake » 19 Apr 2018, 18:27

Gooner1 wrote:
<snip>
So the 12th & 23rd Divisions, who were in France for labouring duties, qualify.
Yes they do.

#1 They illustrate the lack of equipment for the massively expanded Army - a situation that would be worse after Dunkirk. Those who claim that the 1940 BEF was well equipped and did a damned good job try to excuse this as some gallant gesture. These men should never have been deployed as combat troops, and their loss achieved nothing except the loss of 30,000 badly needed men.

#2 they illustrate the likely fate of light equipped infantry troops against the wehrmacht in England itself. Yes the British had small arms and some automatic weapons, but they lost almost all their artillery and anti-tank guns.
Gooner1 wrote:I suggest you read the Field Service Regulations of 1935 (vols. II & III), they were clearly written with the view of a major war against a first class enemy in mind.

<snip>

The idea of playing TEWTs would be absurd. Not only did the formations not exist in reality or on paper, there was no intention of the Government ever to create them. Until Spring 1939 that is, and then the UK was at war within six months.
Sorry, but that is no excuse. Anyone who read the newspapers could see the possibility of a European war and anyone who studied British History will be aware of the speed with which policy can change. One lesson the modern Briotish army has learned is that it costs very little to maintain and develop the conceptual componant of fighting power. We may have a pathetically small army but it does look at how bigger armies fight. The second lesson is the need to work with your allies. Here is a piece wrote about the OP Reflect Army staff ride 2016 http://www.theobservationpost.com/blog/?p=1766

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#50

Post by MarkN » 19 Apr 2018, 19:34

Gooner1 wrote: So the 12th & 23rd Divisions, who were in France for labouring duties, qualify.
Absolutely! They, and the Beauman Division, are the closest representatives to how the majority of the forces of Home Command looked in regards level of training, military competence and equipment holdings.

The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.
Gooner1 wrote: I suggest you read the Field Service Regulations of 1935 (vols. II & III), they were clearly written with the view of a major war against a first class enemy in mind.
Responses such as this lead me to believe you are now just trolling me. :roll:
Gooner1 wrote: You don't get it. The army was operating under the political doctrine of 'limited liability'. The sending of an expeditionary force to the continent was fourth in the army's priorities.
"from the end of 1937 to the spring of 1939 the equipment of the five [Regular] divisions was geared down to the level of 'colonial warfare in operations in an Eastern theatre'" https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... ion-2.html
The Territorial Army was of course worse off, they only had sufficient weapons so they could train with them.
The idea of playing TEWTs would be absurd. Not only did the formations not exist in reality or on paper, there was no intention of the Government ever to create them. Until Spring 1939 that is, and then the UK was at war within six months.
I don't get it??? :lol:

You've just posted evidence that even if the Army leadership had the gumption to think big-war, their ability to deliver big-war was politically and resource restrained.

However, the Army leadership - save for a few notable exceptions - did not have the gumption and thus (despite the existence of FSR II & III 1935) did just about nothing to school, educate and train that written doctrine into practical reality. You do realise that a TEWT stands for Tactical Exercise Without Troops? Ie. The formations that didn't exist didn't have to exist for the TEWT to be conducted. :roll:

Inter-war, the TA existed - albeit unmobilized - and had to its account 12 infantry/motor divisions, a cavalry division and all manner of additional formation and unit level forces. Combined with the Regular Army's 5 and a bit divisions that's at least 18 divisional-sized formations on the orbat. And yet, not a single corps level field HQ let alone an army level field HQ. Why? Didn't anybody think that some of these divisions might be deployed to the same place, together, at the same time and thus need a higher coordinating and controlling HQ? Didn't anybody think that it might be a smart idea to run a few corps and army level TEWTs to build experience and knowledge? Post-BEF, corps level commands suddenly appeared. What a surprise! FSRs may well have existed, but the existance of a document does not mean small-war colonial policing mentality vanished.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#51

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 19 Apr 2018, 21:33

Mark, Sheldrake,

Although I fear that the British forces in UK post-Dunkirk would have proved somewhat disappointing when pitched against an invading German army, to be fair I should point out that the inter-war army wasn't quite as blind as perhaps you both suggest.

For example,
And yet, not a single corps level field HQ let alone an army level field HQ. Why? Didn't anybody think that some of these divisions might be deployed to the same place, together, at the same time and thus need a higher coordinating and controlling HQ? Didn't anybody think that it might be a smart idea to run a few corps and army level TEWTs to build experience and knowledge
From David French's "Raising Churchill's Army" (p.169) it appears that between the wars the British actually 'held manoeuvres only twice in which corps-sized formations were pitted against each other'. Those were in 1925 and 1935, and a further set was planned for Sep 1939. I assume that in 1935 a Corps HQ was generated specifically for the exercise? French also records a TEWT being held by Southern Command in 1938 - at that level, I guess it would have been a corps level exercise?

Regards

Tom

Knouterer
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#52

Post by Knouterer » 20 Apr 2018, 09:52

MarkN wrote: The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.
I don't see how they would be "the benchmark" if the majority of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 42nd, 44th, 48th, and 50th division troops returned home as well, having gained some valuable experience, and had by September been reorganized and re-equipped?

With the exception of certain items such as 2pdr AT guns and radios, the infantry divisions and independent infantry brigades in Britain were more or less fully equipped again by that time, if partly with obsolete equipment.

The 3rd Inf Div (for example) was alive and well, and if anything must have become more highly professional, and was stationed near Bath as part of VIII Corps in Southern Command. As the page from Philson's OOB as of 30 Sept. shows, it still consisted entirely of (ex) regular battalions, although no doubt "diluted" by new volunteers and conscripts.

To take just one example: .303 Bren Mk I: Officially introduced in 1935; series production at R.S.A.F. Enfield started in Sept. 1937 and by the start of the war ran at about 300 a week. 8,200 guns were reportedly lost in France, equivalent to the full equipment of about 13-14 infantry divisions (at 590 each). Some 15,000 were in the hands of troops in the UK at the end of June, and by the middle of August that number had increased to 18,000. By that time, Bren production was running at about 2,500 per month as far as I can make out.
War Office statement of stock –
UK Bren gun stocks Dec 1st 1940 - 26,591
Middle East Bren gun stocks Dec 1st 1940 - 7,280
DP & OG's (defended ports, other garrisons) etc Bren gun stocks Dec 1st 1940 - 2,748
Total of Bren guns stocks Dec 1st 1940 - 36,619
Total of Brens produced up until August 1940 is given as 39,277. Canadian Bren production may have been about 1,600 in 1940 but none reached the UK that year apart from 2 submitted for test/trial.

The .303 Vickers machine gun was in plentiful supply, machine gun battalions were issued 60 instead of the normal 48 and many other units received them as well, and so was the Lewis. In total, 58,983 Lewis guns were taken from storage, repaired, refitted and issued by the British during the course of World War II (source: Skennerton, Ian: British Small Arms of World War 2 (1988)). And early in the war, a number of firms received contracts to recondition 10,993 .303 Hotchkiss Mk I and Mk I* guns (still the standard LMG of horsed cavalry units in 1940).

Then of course there were the 50,000+ machine guns, plus 25,000 BARs, bought from the US in June, although many of those had not been distributed yet.

But all in all, when Churchill wrote in his memoirs that by this time Britain had become "an armed camp", he wasn't exaggerating that much.
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Gooner1
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#53

Post by Gooner1 » 20 Apr 2018, 11:52

MarkN wrote:[The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.
You could hardly be more wrong.

From the War Diary of the 2nd/4th South Lancashire Regiment, on the east coast but typical of the battalions defending the coast.
Found at the superb http://www.walberswickww2.co.uk/

"
Bulcamp June 30th
The Battalion, as a result of a really hard month’s work in which every man has
played his part is now fully prepared for any eventuality. We can assure any
prospective visitors, whether they are coming to protect us or not, of a warm
welcome. All forward companies have completed very good defensive positions. In
the interior there is plenty of room and the men are very comfortable when they have
to sleep at their posts. On the exterior there is a diversity of camouflage varying from
rubbish heaps to innocent looking fishing huts. Along the beach both at Dunwich and
Southwold, also Walberswick, there is an imposing array of concrete anti-tank
obstacles, which in some places pass right in front of the section post.
All personelle have fired their rifle and L.M.G. courses and ach company in turn fired
at toy balloons by way of A.A. practice. Several balloons were shot down. D.
Company with four were the top scorers. As many men as there were ammunition for
fired the Anti-Tank rifle. They found it to be far less frightening than they had
expected. It has now been found possible to allow one platoon of each company to go
out training locally each day."

Bulcamp 26 [July]
The Unit completely fitted in ’37 equipment – first time since the war that the Unit
has had uniformity in equipment; included in above – officers and specialists
equipment ’37 web. All ’08 and leather equipment returned to Ordnance. All
personnel have two suits serviceable (B.D.) and two pairs of boots. All Anti-Gas
equipment up to War Scale. The Unit holds in addition reserves of Clothing,
Equipment, and Anti-Gas Stores.
The Ammunition position is very happy, the Unit holding full War Scale of S.A.A. in
forward positions, after having created a Battalion Reserve of 20,000. A surplus of
rifles is held to meet replacements under repair. Revolvers to supply all officers in
possession of Unit for first time. Unit now in position to carry out our own boot
repairs and equipment repairs, as necessary kits are now in possession.
Guns, etc., - Unit holds full complement of Bren Guns (50) and 12 2” Trench Mortars
with bombs. No 3” Trench Mortars yet supplied to the Unit.

Bulcamp Aug.
General
During the month the Unit was instructed to submit 1098-modilisation indents to
complete all equipment to War Establishment scale. An interesting acquisition was
the Thompson sub Machine Gun firing .45 bullets and 4 Hotchkiss guns. The 2 3”
Trench Mortars arrived at last but we are still awaiting another 8 anti-Tank rifles to
complete our establishment. Towards the end of the month we received 7 Bedford
trucks and three vans for the Motorcycle Platoon. The Battalion was honoured by
being the only one in the Division to which Officers of the Dutch army have been
attached and we hope that they thoroughly enjoy their time with the Battalion and will
gain valuable experience.

4.10.40
General
All defence positions are in good order, and it is certain that the enemy would meet
with a very warm reception should he care to test them. The past month has been
marked by increase in the numbers of 2” and 3” Mortar bombs bringing the numbers
up to approximately War Establishment, the receipt of U.S. Army Smith Wesson
Revolvers (8) for the use of D.Rs, and the full establishment of compasses liquid. The
unit has been issued with shoulder titles (Worsted) for use on great coats and indents
have been submitted for winter underwear. An additional two blankets per man have
been issued prior to 1st October owing to inclement conditions, and so many personnel
sleeping in exposed positions. A very gratifying feature has been that many friends
have come forward to offer gifts of fruit and vegetables for the use of the troops, and
in certain cases the unit has been allowed to help itself in orchards. The weekly daily
leave recently instituted has been very greatly appreciated by all concerned, and it can
be said that the morale of the troops is of a high standard.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#54

Post by MarkN » 20 Apr 2018, 12:15

Tom from Cornwall wrote: Although I fear that the British forces in UK post-Dunkirk would have proved somewhat disappointing when pitched against an invading German army, to be fair I should point out that the inter-war army wasn't quite as blind as perhaps you both suggest.
Blind? No. A precious few had their eyes wide open - but the vast majority had a very narrow and blinkered view.
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
And yet, not a single corps level field HQ let alone an army level field HQ. Why? Didn't anybody think that some of these divisions might be deployed to the same place, together, at the same time and thus need a higher coordinating and controlling HQ? Didn't anybody think that it might be a smart idea to run a few corps and army level TEWTs to build experience and knowledge
From David French's "Raising Churchill's Army" (p.169) it appears that between the wars the British actually 'held manoeuvres only twice in which corps-sized formations were pitted against each other'. Those were in 1925 and 1935, and a further set was planned for Sep 1939. I assume that in 1935 a Corps HQ was generated specifically for the exercise? French also records a TEWT being held by Southern Command in 1938 - at that level, I guess it would have been a corps level exercise?
Indeed. Not a single corps or army level field HQ existed and the grand sum of TWO corps-levelish exercises were conducted between the wars. The Southern Command TEWT exercise was held based upon the initiative of its commander - not an army-wide aytempt to build experience and skill sets.

How to command divisions, corps and armies was 'taught' to junior captains and majors at Staff College Camberley. They were 'taught' by Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels who, by definition, had never held a field command above battlion level themselves. The course itself was predicated upon teaching staff work not command and leadership or large formations. The system assumed that those junior captains and majors would retain the knowledge and be able to apply it to a completely different army 10-15 years later if they reached the appropriate rank and position.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#55

Post by MarkN » 20 Apr 2018, 12:17

Knouterer wrote:
MarkN wrote: The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.
I don't see how they would be "the benchmark" if the majority of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 42nd, 44th, 48th, and 50th division troops returned home as well, having gained some valuable experience, and had by September been reorganized and re-equipped?

With the exception of certain items such as 2pdr AT guns and radios, the infantry divisions and independent infantry brigades in Britain were more or less fully equipped again by that time, if partly with obsolete equipment.
For someone who has studied this topic to infinite detail, this response is - academically-speaking - utterly dishonest.

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#56

Post by MarkN » 20 Apr 2018, 12:19

Gooner1 wrote:
MarkN wrote:[The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.
You could hardly be more wrong.

Snipped to save users' bandwith
So that's your defence?

:lol: :lol: :lol:

Knouterer
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#57

Post by Knouterer » 20 Apr 2018, 12:42

MarkN wrote:
Knouterer wrote:
MarkN wrote: The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.
I don't see how they would be "the benchmark" if the majority of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 42nd, 44th, 48th, and 50th division troops returned home as well, having gained some valuable experience, and had by September been reorganized and re-equipped?

With the exception of certain items such as 2pdr AT guns and radios, the infantry divisions and independent infantry brigades in Britain were more or less fully equipped again by that time, if partly with obsolete equipment.
For someone who has studied this topic to infinite detail, this response is - academically-speaking - utterly dishonest.
I don't suppose you have any actual facts or arguments to back that up, apart from your preconceived notions about the poor state of British defences? Why on earth would the officers and men of the the 3rd Inf Div be any less "highly professional" than they had been four months before?

As regards re-equipment, to summarize:
Machine guns and other small arms, mortars, AT rifles - more or less up to establishment (at two 3" mortars per infantry battalion)
Carriers - 100% (over 4,000 on hand)
2pdr AT guns - about 50%, partly compensated by a variety of other weapons including the American 75 mm guns, naval guns on lorries, etc.
Field artillery - about 80%, but up to to 100% for units in the path of the invasion.
Motor vehicles - losses in France about 50% replaced after three months as regards new production, shortfall made up by requisitioned civilian vehicles, as had been the case in the BEF. Fifty Troop Carrying Companies and Motor Coach Companies formed, enough (in principle) to lift the marching elements of as many infantry brigades.
And so on and so forth.

Certainly there were various shortages (mortar ammunition for example), but not nearly as bad as the shortages the outnumbered German troops (in all probability) would have suffered within a day or two, if they had somehow gotten across.
Last edited by Knouterer on 20 Apr 2018, 12:50, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#58

Post by Gooner1 » 20 Apr 2018, 12:50

MarkN wrote:[
Snipped to save users' bandwith
So that's your defence?

:lol: :lol: :lol:
Err .. I think anyone reading that War Diary, and I have read many just like them, would find the notion "12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.<> They, and the Beauman Division, are the closest representatives to how the majority of the forces of Home Command looked in regards level of training, military competence and equipment holdings." utterly ridiculous.

The British Army units defending the coast were by September 1940, either at their War Establishment or remarkably close to it. In personnel they were typically overstrength, their training and military competence more than adequate for their tasks.
There could hardly be a bigger contrast to the 12th and 23rd Divisions who were caught in the open, under trained and equipped with one Bren per platoon and one Boys per company, if they were lucky and with a fraction of the normal artillery. Nevertheless in their unequal battle against the German armoured divisions they fought about as well as could be expected.
The German War Diary says they met for the first time' English troops who fought tenaciously (a battalion of the Buffs) … The battle for Doullens claimed the whole attention of the troops. In spite of the use of numerous tanks it was only possible to break down their resistance after about two and a half hours.'
"The War Diary of the German XXXXI Corps says of the 6th and 8th Armoured Divisions that 'from about 1300 hours onwards they were only able to gain ground slowly and with continual fighting against an enemy who defended himself stubbornly'"

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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#59

Post by Knouterer » 20 Apr 2018, 13:18

In that context, the 35th Infanteriedivision, which would land between Greatstone and Dymchurch, had been given a bloody nose by the British in May, according to a history of the division (Dörfler, Die 35. Infanteriedivision 1939-45, p. 19, my translation):

“The following engagements to force a crossing of the Scheldt (Escaut) were the heaviest and the costliest of the campaign in the West. The crossing began in the afternoon of the 20th. Infantry Regiments 109 at Antoing and 111 at Peronnes wrested bridgeheads from English elite troops. Very heavy artillery fire and counterattacks with tanks caused these lodgings to be largely lost again. Only IR 109 managed to retain a foothold. IR 34 too had to repel fierce attacks. The division was unable to advance on the 21st and the 22nd. On the morning of the 23rd it was found that the British had withdrawn towards the Channel coast.”

The reference to “englische Elitetruppen” sounds like a typical excuse for a (temporary) setback. In fact the Germans were facing the 48th Infantry Division, with one regular and two territorial battalions in each of its three brigades. According to Philson, IR 111 was (mainly) pushed back by the 4th Ox & Bucks and IR 109 tangled with the 8th Royal Warwickshire, both territorial units.
The tanks mentioned in this account were presumably Mk VI light tanks of Brigadier C. W. Norman's 1st Light Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade, which had come under command of the 48th Division.
The commander of the 48th Division was Major-General A.F.A.N. Thorne, who in September (as a Lieutenant General) would command XII Corps holding the invasion zone in Kent and East Sussex. So it can be said that he already had some experience in throwing German attackers back across water obstacles.
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Re: Sealion compared to historical amphib assaults?

#60

Post by MarkN » 20 Apr 2018, 13:23

Knouterer wrote:
MarkN wrote:
Knouterer wrote:
MarkN wrote: The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark.
I don't see how they would be "the benchmark" if the majority of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 42nd, 44th, 48th, and 50th division troops returned home as well, having gained some valuable experience, and had by September been reorganized and re-equipped?

With the exception of certain items such as 2pdr AT guns and radios, the infantry divisions and independent infantry brigades in Britain were more or less fully equipped again by that time, if partly with obsolete equipment.
For someone who has studied this topic to infinite detail, this response is - academically-speaking - utterly dishonest.
I don't suppose you have any actual facts or arguments to back that up, ...
Fact to back up what? You have looked into this topic to FAR greater than I. You have the data already. Your decision to ignore all of that data is part of the academic dishonesty in your previous response.

My statement was, "The notion that all those undertrained and ill/unequipped infantry divisions, LDV and Home Guard Units would perform to the same level as the professional 3rd Infantry Division (for example) is fantasy. 12th, 23rd, 46th and Beauman are the benchmark."

Your response was to name the nine divisions that went to, and returned from, France, to make assumptions that do not really stand up and assume that somehow I would be too daft as to recognise this. Then provide a wall of factual text to misdirect and camouflage the dishonesty.

1. Those 9 divisions were NOT representative of the state of Home Forces in their entirety.
....You have the data I'm sure. What was the state of training, operational military competence and equipment holdings of the 9, 15, 18, 38, 43, 45, 46, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 61, 66, 69, 1Ldn, 2Ldn, Aus, Can & NZ divs; 1 and 2 Armd divs; the unbrigaded 3rd and 4th line territorial battlions; the myriad of Home Guard and LDV units and so on and on... Some of these have training and equipment on a par with the 9 BEF divs. The vast majority don't.

2. The experience gained by those 9 divisions in France would not have had much, if any, value in the defence of the UK - but you posit that notion as a 'fact'.
....I do not wish to dimish the experience of really being shot at rather than just somebody shouting 'bang' very loudly in your ear. However, very few relatively-speaking BEF troops saw the 'whites of the German faces' and those that did rarely had more than a couple of short and sharp skirmishes with them before retreating. The one 'major' counter-attack conducted gave experience to just a couple of infantry battalions and was a disaster. None of that was what was needed in the UK.

3. The performance of those 9 divsions in France - where they were pushed back along lines not of their choosing to the point where they were completely surrounded and had to be rescued by uniformed and civilian matelots in an operation that nobody had previously even considered as feasable - demonstrates that the training and equipment that even they had (the best trained and equipped) was not up to the job. The training and equipment of a British infantry division circa 1940 was not up to the job.

Fact: the establishment of a British infantry division in 1940 was less than 14,000 all up. The establishment of a British infantry division in 1944 was over 18,000 despite having approximately the same number of 'bayonets' at the sharp end. That change was a reflection of a shift from peacetime small-war colonial policing mentality to big-war thought against the Wehrmacht. The 9 divisions that you quote may have been close to 'full establishment' in equipment and 'fully trained' according to 1940 era thought, but that establishment and training was not up to dealing with the 1940 Wehrmacht.

In brief, I've made a claim - which I haven't attempted to evidence because I believe anybody who has read up on the subject as you and gooner1 have - should recognise it to be accurate. The level of training, operational military competence and equipment holdings across the Home Forces as a whole was on a par with 12, 23, 46 and Beauman divsion and not the pre-war professional divisions.

I don't feel any compulsion to have to argue against your (and gooner1's) deflections and camouflage. The only way to 'prove' my claim as valid or nonsense would be to look in infinite detail the entire Home Force organisation then analyse what is the 'average' and compare that against 12, 23, 46 and Beauman divsion. It would be far too time consuming for either you or I to do that. However, if that's what rocks your world, crack on. Cherry-picked deflections are simply dishonest.

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