Patton .................

[Sheldrake]

This is all with hindsight.

The original Overlord plan did not envisage the was being won by the advance guard that secured the beachhead. The calculations were that it would take around 100 divisions with appropriate logistic support to win the war on land.

There were a lot of unknowns at the beginning of September 1944.

Hindsight, schmindsight. Monty was talking about seizing the Ruhr quickly before the battle of Normandy was even over.

- Was the German resolve stronger than in September 1918? Would a push into the Reich, anywhere be enough to persuade the Germans to throw in the towel.

It's not a question of resolve but ability to fight on. Bill Williams, I think it was, who estimated that the German war machine would last 3 months with the loss of the Ruhr.

The planners were the COSSAC team of 1943 whose plan was approved by the combined Joint Chiefs.

Montgomery's stance was that a phalanx of 40 Divisions under his command could walk into the Ruhr. His 21 Army Group directive dated 26 August said that having completed the tasks of destroying the Germans in Belgium and NE France, capturing Pas de Calais, and securing Antwerp as a port; "the eventual mission of the Army Group will be to advance Eastwards into the Ruhr"

Perhaps I have missed something, but I would not interpret "eventual" to mean "seize quickly."

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, action reaction, expected. The Germans cannot take their eye off TUSA completely, and...

Who said they would? However, if the decision is made c. 3/4 September, then TUSA remains grounded in its bridgeheads on the Meuse at St Mihiel and Verdun. If they continue to remain there for another week the Germans might twig that something was up.

in the meantime FUSA could have taken Aachen for nothing and be halfway through the Siegfried Line.

Except VII Corps, which had Aachen and the so-called "Aachen-gap" and "Stolberg Corridor" in its zone attempted to do just that and failed. The "reconnaissance in force" of 12 September failed.

What changes that allows FUSA to take "Aachen for nothing and be halfway through the Siegfried line"? The forces cannot change measurably and consist of the 1st ID and 3d AD with 9th ID in corps reserve. There is virtually no corps artillery for support, since they have been mostly grounded to provide the trucks to move up the gas that got VII Corps to where it is. Artillery ammunition is short for the same reason. If you want to bring up more troops, then they require more truck and more fuel, which are already short. You also have to force them down the same routes potentially clogging them more.

Nor is there really a "gap" or a "corridor". This is what VII Corps faced:

"Averaging six to seven miles in depth and traversed by few roads other than muddy, easily-blocked trails and firebreaks, the forest barrier marks the northern reaches of the Eifel and includes, south of Eupen, the Hertogenwald, and southeast of Aachen, the Roetgen, Wenau, and Huertgen Forests. Once past the Hertogenwald, a semblance of a corridor avoiding the greatest stretches of forest runs northeast to Dueren from the vicinity of the villages of Lammersdorf and Rollesbroich; but the only real avenue in the entire area skirts the northern and northwestern edges of the forest barrier. This avenue is the Stolberg corridor. On its western approaches the Stolberg corridor presents hilly terrain readily adaptable to defense, particularly in the sharp valleys of the upper Inde and Vicht Rivers."

It's not my idea. British 2nd Army and US 1st Army, keeping close together, bulldoze their way through the Aachen Gap, jump the Rhine with Allied First Airborne Army, and surround/take the Ruhr. Not necessarily all in September though

Sorry, but argumentum ad verecundiam is hand-waving of the worst sort. Your "plan" is to force the entire Second British Army and First U.S. Army, some dozen divisions, into a 35 mile-wide zone, then across the Roer plain, then drop FAAA across the Rhine, and thus win the war? Did you happen to notice how much of a problem XXX Corps had getting two divisions from Eindhoven to Arnhem?

101st have all their artillery, 82nd have 325th Glider Infantry Regiment and 1st Airborne have the Polish Paras dropping about a mile from Frost's men at the bridge.

Sorry, but no. On 18 September 4th Para Brigade was lifted into the 1st Airborne Division perimeter and was shot to pieces. Graebner made his attempted coup de main and failed. The Polish lift was on 19 September, only delayed, their drop zone was hemmed in by the 10. SS-PAA at the brickworks south of the river to their west and by the remnants of 9. SS-PAA to their south. Also immediately in their vicinity were the various reinforcements crossing the ferry east of Arnhem and heading to Nijmegen. The results for the Poles were the same as for 4th Para.

There were orders not to blow the Nijmegen bridge. Even if they did, the operation would probably still be better off than in the OTL with having more men up where it matters.

Yes, there were, until the order to blow the bridge was given.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Montgomery's stance was that a phalanx of 40 Divisions under his command could walk into the Ruhr. His 21 Army Group directive dated 26 August said that having completed the tasks of destroying the Germans in Belgium and NE France, capturing Pas de Calais, and securing Antwerp as a port; "the eventual mission of the Army Group will be to advance Eastwards into the Ruhr"

Perhaps I have missed something, but I would not interpret "eventual" to mean "seize quickly."

What jumps out at me is most of the goals here are still in the future. The Germans in Belgium and NE France are not yet "destroyed", and Antwerp is still on the other side of Belgium. How much of 21 AG were even across the Seine on 26 Aug? Note that its specified "securing Antwerp as a port". Perhaps I'm not foamier enough with the English idom of 74 years ago, but its difficult for me to interpret that in any other way than having Antwerp as a major supply source.

[Aber]

What jumps out at me is most of the goals here are still in the future. The Germans in Belgium and NE France are not yet "destroyed", and Antwerp is still on the other side of Belgium. How much of 21 AG were even across the Seine on 26 Aug? Note that its specified "securing Antwerp as a port". Perhaps I'm not foamier enough with the English idom of 74 years ago, but its difficult for me to interpret that in any other way than having Antwerp as a major supply source.

Agreed.

It's not clear that Montgomery had any idea that the advance in the next week would be so dramatic - the Germans were planning a defensive line on the Somme. Any discussion on strategic choices must be clear about exactly which dates are being considered.

[Sheldrake]

If you are planning the movements of an Army group you should be looking at least a month ahead.

Its a function of command and control and logistics.

The battalion commander is thinking about what is happening about an hour ahead.
The brigade commander - 6 hours time
The divisional commander - the next day
The corps commander - next 48 hours
Army commander next week
Army Group - a fortnight to a month.

Until it reaches the level of political control where 24 hours can be a long time...

The collapse of the Germans in France in retreat was as much of an OODA loop shock as the advance of 1940. OP Market Garden was planned on the hoof

[Gooner1]

Montgomery's stance was that a phalanx of 40 Divisions under his command could walk into the Ruhr. His 21 Army Group directive dated 26 August said that having completed the tasks of destroying the Germans in Belgium and NE France, capturing Pas de Calais, and securing Antwerp as a port; "the eventual mission of the Army Group will be to advance Eastwards into the Ruhr"

Perhaps I have missed something, but I would not interpret "eventual" to mean "seize quickly."

Couple of unnecessary calumnies there, don't you think?
Anyway, that 26th August directive was after Eisenhower rejected Monty's proposals on 22-23rd August. They were:

"1. The quickest way to win this war is for the great mass of the Allied armies to advance northwards, clear the coast as far as Antwerp, establish a powerful air force in Belgium and advance into the Ruhr.
2. The force must operate as one whole, with great cohesion and so strong it can do the job quickly.
3. Single control and direction of the land operations is vital for success. This is a whole time job for one man.
4. The great victory in N.W. France has been won by personal command. Only in this way will future victories be won. If staff control of operations is allowed to creep in, then quick success becomes endangered.
5. To change the system of command now, after having won a great victory, would be to prolong the war."

Monty suggested to Ike to let Bradley control the battle. So not an ego thing, on Monty's part anyway.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

A couple of points:

It wasn't until the 18th that 43 Division was brought up to 30 Corps, while 3 Division remained grounded far in the rear.

Not exactly - for 43 Division:

15 September 1944
1700 The 43rd Division concentrated in fwd area EAST of DIEST and came under comd of 30 Corps.
Warning Order sent out of Corps Comd’s Conference and 43 Div “O” Gp.

and 3 Division began crossing the Escaut Canal on the night 18/19 Sep 44.

My only other comments are on this:

For the week ending 2 September, FUSA received 546,500 gallons, TUSA 200,100 gallons. Week ending 9 September FUSA 540,000, TUSA 423,300. If TUSA remains grounded, and the additional fuel is diverted to FUSA, then Third Army remains west of the Meuse and there is nothing to stop the Germans from shifting the forces allocated to the Vosges offensive northward. Without the threat of encirclement by TUSA, 1. and 19. Armee should have no problem halting Sixth Army Group.

Couldn't US XIX Corps have been allocated some of the petrol allocated to TUSA in the week ending 9 Sep 44? Could US VII Corps and XIX Corps together made more progress through the West Wall north and south of Aachen if this was done before the Germans could have reacted (as no doubt they would have done) by pulling reserves from in front of TUSA to FUSA's front. Maybe this would change your analysis of FUSA's chances by nearly doubling the forces available:

forces cannot change measurably and consist of the 1st ID and 3d AD with 9th ID in corps reserve.

and this:

On 18 September 4th Para Brigade was lifted into the 1st Airborne Division perimeter and was shot to pieces.

4th Para Brigade didn't suffer too much on their actual lift and landing - it was on Tuesday 19 Sep 44 that the brigade was overrun both in Arnhem town and during attempts to advance towards it.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Sheldrake,

IIRC one person who differed from this assessment was Montgomery who had a wager with Eisenhower that the war would not be over by 1st December. OK part of that wager was based on Montgomery's lack of faith in Ike - or anyone other than himself, as the supreme land commander.

To be fair to Montgomery's few critics it is worth noting that he seems not to have been totally immune to the "victory fever" that was sweeping the Allied armies at this time. After all, on 4 Sep 44 he did write to Eisenhower that:

I consider we have now reached a stage where one really powerful and full blooded thrust towards BERLIN is likely to get there and thus end the German war.

I think Nigel Hamilton's biography is quite interesting here in the linkage he makes with other times when Montgomery allowed himself to be swept away with excess optimism - I'm thinking particularly after the initial landings went so well in Sicily. Both times, in hindsight, the normal, more steady, Monty would perhaps have been the more appropriate - but then again we would now all be debating why he was so cautious!

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

argumentum ad verecundiam

Good phrase...

But who is the improper authority and what is the latin for hand-waving?

'andwavium?

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

...
Montgomery's stance was that a phalanx of 40 Divisions under his command could walk into the Ruhr. His 21 Army Group directive dated 26 August said that having completed the tasks of destroying the Germans in Belgium and NE France, capturing Pas de Calais, and securing Antwerp as a port; "the eventual mission of the Army Group will be to advance Eastwards into the Ruhr"

Perhaps I have missed something, but I would not interpret "eventual" to mean "seize quickly."

What jumps out at me is most of the goals here are still in the future. The Germans in Belgium and NE France are not yet "destroyed", and Antwerp is still on the other side of Belgium. How much of 21 AG were even across the Seine on 26 Aug? Note that its specified "securing Antwerp as a port". Perhaps I'm not foamier enough with the English idom of 74 years ago, but its difficult for me to interpret that in any other way than having Antwerp as a major supply source.

What jumps out at me is which 40 divisions and when? As of 26 August when Monty wrote, there were only 35 divisions on the Continent, the 59th Division having just been disbanded and not counting the three operational airborne divisions in England. The next three divisions to arrive on the Continent, the U.S. 26th, 94th, and 104th ID, were all stripped of their trucks to provide transport for the pursuit. However, the force across the Seine was already reduced to just 30 divisions by 1 September. And by 6 September that pursuit was effectively 17 divisions.

[Richard Anderson]

Rich,

argumentum ad verecundiam

Good phrase...

Argument from authority or appeal to authority fallacy. Unless you prefer the appeal to reverence?

But who is the improper authority and what is the latin for hand-waving?

'andwavium?

Manu silentio postulato?

[Richard Anderson]

Not exactly - for 43 Division:

(snip)
and 3 Division began crossing the Escaut Canal on the night 18/19 Sep 44.

Sorry, I was going by the SHAEF maps...nevertheless the point remains, much of the Allied forces were immobilized or near immobilized in order to keep some semblance of a pursuit moving.

My only other comments are on this:

Couldn't US XIX Corps have been allocated some of the petrol allocated to TUSA in the week ending 9 Sep 44? Could US VII Corps and XIX Corps together made more progress through the West Wall north and south of Aachen if this was done before the Germans could have reacted (as no doubt they would have done) by pulling reserves from in front of TUSA to FUSA's front. Maybe this would change your analysis of FUSA's chances by nearly doubling the forces available:

How do they make faster progress? The spearheads got where they did, when they did, by motor, they weren't out of gas. And yet when they got there, the Germans were also there. I think part of the problem is that we imagine the Germans were still in full retreat as late as 12-17 September, but in fact it was 9 September when the Germans turned back to the defense, occupying the Westwall, while 9. and 116. Panzer Division executed a delay.

So double the fuel and double the troops? Okay, but the VII Corps reconnaissance in force of 12 September was turned back by a German counterattack estimated as 80 infantry...I think that may give you some idea of just how weak those leading elements of the pursuit were.

Essentially, if the decision point is 3 September, and Third Army remains grounded so as to provide more fuel for XIX and VII Corps (but not V Corps? ), then XIX and V Corps (and, apparently Second British Army ) need to accelerate their advance by one-third. In other words, they need to move in six days what it took them nine days to do, when they were already going full out.

Oh, and they get to decide somehow whether or not to finish the Mons pocket or drive on.

And how do they know that is what they need to do? Again, its hand-waving, sorry, manu silentio postulato

4th Para Brigade didn't suffer too much on their actual lift and landing - it was on Tuesday 19 Sep 44 that the brigade was overrun both in Arnhem town and during attempts to advance towards it.

Sure, again I was going by memory rather than digging deeply...because how does that change just because "if the weather was better"? Which was the argument being made by the original poster.

[Richard Anderson]

I think Nigel Hamilton's biography is quite interesting here in the linkage he makes with other times when Montgomery allowed himself to be swept away with excess optimism - I'm thinking particularly after the initial landings went so well in Sicily. Both times, in hindsight, the normal, more steady, Monty would perhaps have been the more appropriate - but then again we would now all be debating why he was so cautious!

Tom, for me it is not a question of caution versus audacity, but is rather a question of priorities. Do you prioritize a pursuit of a beaten enemy (by whatever route and width of advance) or do you prioritize sustaining the means of maintaining that pursuit? The Allies were suffering logistical problems in the pursuit before they reached the Seine. Again, 35 divisions available when Monty was gabbing on about 40, then its down to 30 divisions when 38 were available less than a week later, then down to just 17 a few days after that.

If the future plan was a full-blooded thrust through north Germany by 40 divisions, then surely the priority had to be ensuring that such a thrust could be supplied? And indeed, yes, I blame Ramsay for failing to be more forceful, Poole and Williams ditto, the SHAEF and 12th Army Group staffs, and Eisenhower as well. They made a choice and took a chance that the German collapse would continue, but it didn't.

[Aber]

How do they make faster progress? The spearheads got where they did, when they did, by motor, they weren't out of gas. And yet when they got there, the Germans were also there. I think part of the problem is that we imagine the Germans were still in full retreat as late as 12-17 September, but in fact it was 9 September when the Germans turned back to the defense, occupying the Westwall, while 9. and 116. Panzer Division executed a delay.

So double the fuel and double the troops? Okay, but the VII Corps reconnaissance in force of 12 September was turned back by a German counterattack estimated as 80 infantry...I think that may give you some idea of just how weak those leading elements of the pursuit were.

Essentially, if the decision point is 3 September, and Third Army remains grounded so as to provide more fuel for XIX and VII Corps (but not V Corps? ), then XIX and V Corps (and, apparently Second British Army ) need to accelerate their advance by one-third. In other words, they need to move in six days what it took them nine days to do, when they were already going full out.

The decision point is 2 September with Eisenhower's meeting with Bradley and Patton.

On 2 September, as Eisenhower met with Bradley, Hodges, and Patton, he reinstituted what later came to be called the broad-front strategy

As to faster progress, the US spearheads were NOT going full speed towards Aachen with plenty of gas.

eg from Breakout and Pursuit Chapter XXIII

The XIX Corps halted at Tournai, as much because the units were out of gasoline as because of orders.

V Corps accelerated its pace on the evening of 31 August. The corps advanced continuously until the morning of 2 September when, in the vicinity of Landrecies, about twenty miles short of the border, most of the units ran out of gasoline.

The XIX Corps thus remained inactive for several days.

Gerow's V Corps in the center, virtually pinched out by the converging advances of the corps on its flanks, was to move across the rear of Collins' VII Corps to a new zone on the army right.

The 3d Armored Division, immobilized at Mons twenty-four hours for lack of gasoline, began a forty-mile march to Namur on 4 September

Corlett's XIX Corps--which remained temporarily out of action near Tournai awaiting gasoline--The 79th Division departed the corps to rejoin the Third Army

[Tom from Cornwall]

Aber,

Exactly, there seems little doubt that US XIX Corps's progress was hindered by lack of "gas" after the 2 Sep 44 decision to get Patton moving again.

But what impact that had at the level of the whole western front is essentially a "what if" - would it have got the Allies to Berlin in the autumn of 1944? No, almost definitely not. Would it have allowed FUSA to make greater progress into Germany in Sep 44, yes probably.

Rich,

Do you prioritize a pursuit of a beaten enemy (by whatever route and width of advance) or do you prioritize sustaining the means of maintaining that pursuit?

Indeed, and, with hindsight, I think we can safely say that the senior Allied commanders left it too long to switch priorities from the former to the latter.

Whatever happened though we would still be talking about it.

Regards

Tom