Patton .................

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Patton .................

#166

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 18:30

Mori wrote:Here only about sources.
Sure.
I'm still not sure where you get the 71,000 PoW from, since Allied sources give ca. 51,600 PoW, and add 38,000 KIA and WIA to get to 89,600. Would you mind mentioning the source? My figures are from the Int Sum dated March, 18 1945.
(I have seen the figures from this document quoted in several books, usually without mentioning where they came from.)

By the way, this doesn't account for the casualties inflicted by VII Corps, although this unit is part of Grenade for the first week. It would add ca. 8,500 losses, for a grand total of ca. 98,000.
22,239 reported by First Canadian Army and 29,739 reported by Ninth Army and , according to Stacey, Victory Campaign, p. 522.
For 27 February-3 March, VII Corps reported 1,800 POW and III and VII Corps another 11,700 7-24 March, MacDonald, Last Offensive, pp. 189.

I miss-added when rounding them up in my head. The figure of 81,692 for Third Army is from the AAR. We could also look at the consolidated cage reports from SHAEF (NARA II, RG331, Allied Operational and Occupation HQ WW II, SHAEF General Staff G-1, Admin Section, Decimal Files, Box25, File 383.6/1 Monthly Cumulative POW Report, which gives total for February/March as:

21 AG - 16,292/26,186
12 AG - 48,333/271,378
6 AG - 16,613/51,889
That sum up to 53,787, which is about the number of PoW from the Allied documents (maybe a confusion on "PoWs" vs. "losses". That said, would you mind also sharing the source?).
They are from the OKH Dekade reports and are the total for KIA, WIA, and MIA, which were typically compiled three to four days later from the consolidated army reports. I can give you the breakdown if you like. While as I said they are likely an undercount, I suspect most of that is WRT the MIA, which is very low given the number of PW captured in that period. From the POW Capture Rate Study we concluded that instances were that occurred were typical of pursuits and the large number of units that were out of contact did not report, skewing the figures. What was curious though was that in those instances, the count of KIA and WIA were generally accurate in the end, rather than orders of magnitude off. Note also the German figures correlate reasonably with the Allied estimates for non-POW German casualties.
Well, you can still find a detailed status of manpower at division level dated Feb, 10th, and this gives the starting point. The same type of document gives an order of magnitude of the replacements received during the month of fight.

For the end point, especially valuable is a HG G report listing the manpower by unit on Feb 28th. It shows 50% losses since beginning of Veritable. There still exists the medical diary of 2nd PARA corps, with daily losses. And for some units you can get an order of magnitude of the casualties through the number of hand weapons before and after.
Excellent. Yes, I have a copy of the February Panzerlage, but no longer have access to the ACSDB files at TDI that have those reports, although I don't recall we ever collected a II. FJK report, that is a very nice find!

[quoteAdd to that a systematic analytical effort.[/quote]

Have you published? I would love to read it.
By the way, when I started this work, my working hypothesis was that the Allied estimate were exagerated (you know, like all the destruction claims from the air force) and I was genuinely surprised to derive higher numbers from the study of German sources.
I think we focus so much on the over claiming by the Airedales and German tankers :D that we assume all such estimates were inflated for publicity. However, the basic methodology was body counting, plus PW counts, plus estimated wounded based on the body count and were periodically checked to captured German documents when possible. It can be reasonably accurate.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: Patton .................

#167

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 19:35

Mori wrote:Then on content. There are 3 levels of comments.

Forgive my ESL...
Better than my almost non-existent other language... :lol:
1) Detailed approach
Okay...as of 5 February on hand/ready for action

2. Panzer Division: 56/9 Panzer and 32/1 StuG
9. Panzer: 52/11 Panzer and 29/10 StuG
11. Panzer Division: 91/87 Panzer and 16/11 StuG
116. Panzer: 52/16 Panzer and 25/11 StuG
Lehr: 52/21 Panzer and 17/11 StuG
3. Panzergrenadier: 2/1 Panzer and 34/5 StuG
15. Panzergrenadier: unbekannt auf dem Marsch
17. SS-Panzergrenadier (oops, forgot about them): 2/2 Panzer and 73/64 StuG
Pz.Brig. 106. (forgot them too): 11/5 Panzer and 4/1 StuG
Panzerjaeger Abteilung (they were not brigades) 655 had 44/33 JgPz/StuG, 741 (ditto, not a brigade) had 38/18. Note that a significant portion of the armor/mechanized strength of the Heer at this time was in the StuG-brigaden, divisional, and non-divisional Panzerjaeger-Abteilungen, of which these were just two of 83. :D
Veritable-Grenade defeated a total of 20 divisions, supported by plenty of non-divisional troops, of which we should note 2 panzerjaeger brigades (655, 741) and 2 artillery corps. These brigades were a significant armor reserve for the Western front.
No, they weren't really, see above.
The mecanized units defeated during V-G are Pz Lehr, 9 Pz-Div, 11 Pz-Div, 116 Pz-Div, 15 PGD and the brigades. As you so rightly list, these are 5 of the 8 [if adding 17 SS PGD] mecanized division of the theater. The ratio is even more impressive if you count the number of armored vehicles instead of the number of units. That's the bulk of what was available.
Okay, in terms of operational vehicles that is 229 versus 88. Out of 802 total available. :D Would you like to break down where the rest were?
(and yes, some were partially involved only, but not because the Germans retained them, just because the operation was too fast for them to bring them in completely).
Indeed, the main weakness the Germans were suffering (among many) was the lack of large mobile formations to use as fire brigades. It was significant that V-G-B drew so many of those formations to Remagen and northwards.
Also the non-mecanized divisions are worth a look, because some like 6. FS and 2. FS are full strength units early February. They are pretty much the only full strength units of the theater, and the same applies to 116 Pz-Div. Others like 7. FS, 180 ID and 346.ID have more than 10,000 personnel, which is many compared to the typical units in the Eifel against Patton or in the West Wall against Patch.
Yes, but neither 6. FJD nor 2. FJD had a StuG-Kompanie for their PzJg-Abteilung. 116. was not full strength, but 21. Panzer and 17. SS-Panzergrenadier were close. 7. FJD also had no StuG, although 180. ID had 2/2 and 346. ID had 10/10 (it was rebuilt back to close to full strength).

Okay, facing Third Army as of 5 February:

326. 9/2
18. 6/3
560. 6/2
26. 5/1
167. 3/3
276. 9/2
340. 7/2
5. FJD -
276. 9/2
79. 0
9. 10/7
352. 10/3
212. 18/13
416. 14/14
719. 0
StuG 280. 15/12
2. Panzer 88/10
Lehr 69/32
In other words, V-G defeats what remained as prime units, in quantity and in quality.

Finally, note that only 15 PGD was in the area when the operation began. All the other units were brought in later, including 116 Pz-Div, which was further south early February.
Sure.
2) How much does manpower matter?

One striking thing about the German army as a whole in 1945 is that it never lacks manpower. We all know that, because we've heard of the millions of PoWs in the Allied cages in May 1945. Millions, not 100,000s like you'd get in the first quarter of the year.

But manpower here is just that: men. It does not mean fit, motivated, trained men, but just men. Do they have weapons? Well, "that's complicated". Can they fight? Well...

Between Veritable-Grenade and Plunder-Varsity, the Germans enjoy a couple of weeks of rest to prepare against the Rhine crossing. They receive enough replacement to fill most of their infantry-type units. But the number of weapons is wholly inadequate. And the value of the replacements (men previously unfit for duty, untrained, not motivated) is terribly low.

So when it comes to 1945, it's often more relevant to track the most professional units (some of the ID, some of the para units - but not 3rd FS, for example, it's worthless at this stage - and some of the Pz/PGD) than to take the total manpower as a gauge of effectiveness. These units are the muscle, the ones that count at operational level.
Sure...so lets do it. :D
3) Emotional approach

There an elephant in the room. The major hurdle to making an unpassionate assessment of Veritable-Grenade is one name: Montgomery.
I don't see no stinkin' elephant in the room. :lol:
Investigating V-G points to a difficult but inexorable victory. 21 AG puts the Germans in a situation they can't win, however hard they try.
Um, they were already in that position, before V-G.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Mori
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Re: Patton .................

#168

Post by Mori » 26 Jun 2018, 20:38

Richard Anderson wrote: For 27 February-3 March, VII Corps reported 1,800 POW and III and VII Corps another 11,700 7-24 March, MacDonald, Last Offensive, pp. 189.
I like to use primary sources when I do research, and let me take the VII corps figures as an example why.

Both MacDonald and Stacey are excellent historians, and it's very unusual to see anything erroneous in their work. Their books, and the green books more than the Canadians, are more things you study than casual reading because they are just too detailed. But when in study mode, they prove really good.

Back to the VII corps PoW: MacDonald mentions 1,800 POWs without being explicit what period this relates too. He does not give a source for the figure either. The paragraph suggests this is about the first 2 days of Grenade, but it's open to interpretation really.

I had to be more specific than that, so I used the daily G2-reports at corps level. These reports mention the number of PoW made in the day, so you can extract data on a very precise period. Another benefit of such daily reports is the ability to plot long series of data, and to compare trends from one corps to the next. This brings insights on the operational situation but also helps spotting discrepancies, errors or biais.

The figure I read in the G-2 reports of VII corps is 5,700 for 23rd Feb-1st March. I only took 6 days because it's debatable when exactly VII corps stops being part of Grenade (maybe on March 3rd, maybe the day before, so taking March 1st was conservative). I applied the same KIA-WIA / PoW as was used in the other documents related to US 9th army because the fighting conditions were similar (ie: fast advance and many enemy personnel surrendering without strong fight). This brought the estimate to 8,500.

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Re: Patton .................

#169

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 20:41

Gooner1 wrote:I fail to see how grounding Third Army in early September will not have an effect on First Army a week-ten days later.
And I fail to see how you manage to keep missing that Third Army was already grounded in early September. :roll: Or that the fuel problems of VII and XIX Corps of c. 8 September were a consequence of the extraordinary advance.
Eh? Well if VII Corps can capture Aachen before 13 September that's all well and good.
Well, it really needs to be before 11 September, which takes us back to teleporting American forces forward.
Well XIX Corps shouldn't still be short of gas with Third Army halted on the Meuse .. or rather they should be short of gas for less time.
If British 2nd Army is attacking in a similar direction, XIX Corps frontage is likely to be less extended.
It is not as if they are switching a pipeline from one army to the next. Despite Third Army being effectively immobilized till 5 September, there was no appreciable change in First Army receipts until c. 8 September. In the same vein, even though the decision was made to give more fuel to Third Army on 2 September,there was no appreciable change in its receipts until 5 September. You can estimate the "slack" in the system as roughly three days. So perhaps if Third Army was grounded 28 August instead of 1 September, you might get more fuel to First Army spearheads...or not. Remember, 175 miles from depots was the maximum distance estimated for efficient motor transport, validated by experience. The were running about 375 miles by the time they were approaching the "gap".
I wasn't making an assumption, just a link that came to me. Could work out nicely though. Still ideally, the weather behaves as forecasted and 4th Parachute Brigade (+) would have been attacking towards the bridge about 18 hours earlier than they did. They may well have made it.
I'd say with the addition of 325th GIR into the fighting at Nijmegen then yes, there is a good chance it falls on the 19th.
Sorry, but yes, drawing such a conclusion is exactly what an assumption is: "a thing that is accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof". It did not happen that way, but your assumption is that it "could work out nicely though", based upon changes that did not in fact happen.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Richard Anderson
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Re: Patton .................

#170

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 20:48

Mori wrote:I like to use primary sources when I do research, and let me take the VII corps figures as an example why.

Both MacDonald and Stacey are excellent historians, and it's very unusual to see anything erroneous in their work. Their books, and the green books more than the Canadians, are more things you study than casual reading because they are just too detailed. But when in study mode, they prove really good.

Back to the VII corps PoW: MacDonald mentions 1,800 POWs without being explicit what period this relates too. He does not give a source for the figure either. The paragraph suggests this is about the first 2 days of Grenade, but it's open to interpretation really.

I had to be more specific than that, so I used the daily G2-reports at corps level. These reports mention the number of PoW made in the day, so you can extract data on a very precise period. Another benefit of such daily reports is the ability to plot long series of data, and to compare trends from one corps to the next. This brings insights on the operational situation but also helps spotting discrepancies, errors or biais.

The figure I read in the G-2 reports of VII corps is 5,700 for 23rd Feb-1st March. I only took 6 days because it's debatable when exactly VII corps stops being part of Grenade (maybe on March 3rd, maybe the day before, so taking March 1st was conservative). I applied the same KIA-WIA / PoW as was used in the other documents related to US 9th army because the fighting conditions were similar (ie: fast advance and many enemy personnel surrendering without strong fight). This brought the estimate to 8,500.
Um, I'm afraid I don't see where Mac was erroneous in his work? And I can testify that what he was working from where the VII Corps (and divisional) G-3 and G-2 documents. I suspect that the figure of 1,800 is probably a subset of the 5,700, but without going through the VII Corps G-2 Journal it would be difficult to tell for sure. However, I do agree that is where you would get a much more finer analysis...it is pretty much what we used for the EPW report series.

And where is your commentary on Stacey's error? What is it? :D

[EDIT] BTW, I said I can "testify" to the work of Mac and most of the other "classic" OCMH (as opposed to the modern and problematic "CMH") authors because I have actually seen it. The work files for the "American Forces in Action" and "Green Books" are housed as part of RG 407 at NARA II and I mined them extensively for Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall and other projects. The first is a particular gold mine, since the files include the correspondence with many of the rank and file that participated in the events, who reviewed drafts of the work or later commented with corrections and additions after publication. The latter gave a lot of insight into many details of D-Day and how the historical data were collected.
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Re: Patton .................

#171

Post by Mori » 26 Jun 2018, 21:08

Richard Anderson wrote: [EDIT] BTW, I said I can "testify" to the work of Mac and most of the other "classic" OCMH (as opposed to the modern and problematic "CMH") authors because I have actually seen it. The work files for the "American Forces in Action" and "Green Books" are housed as part of RG 407 at NARA II and I mined them extensively for Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall and other projects. The first is a particular gold mine, since the files include the correspondence with many of the rank and file that participated in the events, who reviewed drafts of the work or later commented with corrections and additions after publication. The latter gave a lot of insight into many details of D-Day and how the historical data were collected.
I must say it is thanks to comments read on this forum that I also investigated these files. I made copies - I can't go to Washington every other week - in case you're interested :)

What you find varies a lot from one volume to the next... What was ready in the early 50's naturally had more comments than what came later. And some reviewers made comments in the margin of the typescripts they were provided instead of listing their remarks on a separate letter. However, such typescripts are lost, and their comments too.

The comments by the reviewers are very interesting to understand how the history is written. Except for the comments by the OCMH board, they are more of generic, high-level nature. And pretty often the author discards them. Sometimes one individual has a remark on a given paragraph that's about him, but all in all it's not a page by page review about the accuracy of this or that figure, or even pointing typos (and how could it be?).

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Re: Patton .................

#172

Post by Mori » 26 Jun 2018, 21:24

Richard Anderson wrote: Um, I'm afraid I don't see where Mac was erroneous in his work?
Really difficult to find anything erroneous in this work and the way he leverages his sources. Naturally, he couldn't use the ULTRA intercepts, so research has moved further since his book; but that's not what I meant.

Now a mistake in MacDonald. Well, I remember finding one and being *really* surprised. It was a couple of sentences explaining why a US move had slowed down, and blaming it on "SS units". But there were no SS units in area. It was rather at the end of the book and the author is fully excused for using an easy way out once in 600+ pages.

Can't find the exact page anymore, did not record it. And can't remember finding a second error.

Also, you see some small variations between his Mighty Endeavour and The Last Offensive. When that happens, I trust the The Last Offensive, because it was published later.

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Re: Patton .................

#173

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 21:38

Mori wrote:I must say it is thanks to comments read on this forum that I also investigated these files. I made copies - I can't go to Washington every other week - in case you're interested :)
Very good then. :D I used to live there and get to NARA II fairly frequently while working for TDI up to 2008...after that work and social pressure kept me from getting by except to do research for CHAW...and that was pretty much finished by spring 2009. Now I'm in the other Washington, so separated from NARA by nearly the distance you are, but plan to make some research trips as I can.
What you find varies a lot from one volume to the next... What was ready in the early 50's naturally had more comments than what came later. And some reviewers made comments in the margin of the typescripts they were provided instead of listing their remarks on a separate letter. However, such typescripts are lost, and their comments too.
Yes, I especially used the two Armed Forces in Action files for OMAHA and the Cotentin, lost of good materiel in them. The work files for Cross-Channel Attack are also wonderfully rich.
The comments by the reviewers are very interesting to understand how the history is written. Except for the comments by the OCMH board, they are more of generic, high-level nature. And pretty often the author discards them. Sometimes one individual has a remark on a given paragraph that's about him, but all in all it's not a page by page review about the accuracy of this or that figure, or even pointing typos (and how could it be?).
Yes, one reason why the "old guard" retired in the 1970's is the old precept that the author had final say began to erode.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: Patton .................

#174

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 21:53

Mori wrote:Really difficult to find anything erroneous in this work and the way he leverages his sources. Naturally, he couldn't use the ULTRA intercepts, so research has moved further since his book; but that's not what I meant.
Good to hear. I knew Mac and am always glad when I see how his work stands the test of time.
Now a mistake in MacDonald. Well, I remember finding one and being *really* surprised. It was a couple of sentences explaining why a US move had slowed down, and blaming it on "SS units". But there were no SS units in area. It was rather at the end of the book and the author is fully excused for using an easy way out once in 600+ pages.

Can't find the exact page anymore, did not record it. And can't remember finding a second error.
Well, when in doubt, blame the SS...because nobody expects the SS, our main weapon is fear and a fanatical devotion to the Fuehrer, no, our main weapons are fear and a fanatical devotion to the Fuehrer, and really cool uniforms designed by Hugo Boss, no...
Also, you see some small variations between his Mighty Endeavour and The Last Offensive. When that happens, I trust the The Last Offensive, because it was published later.
Sad to confess I never read Mighty Endeavor and should. Now that I think of it though, Last Offensive in 1973 was the end of the golden era in OCMH. It was also in 1973 that OCMH lost its status as a Special Staff under the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and was reduced to a "field operating agency" under the Chief of Staff. Mac spent the next six years at CMH drumming his heels as Deputy Chief Historian of OCMH...by the time I met him and High Cole in 1988 they had nothing good to say about OCMH operations 1973-1988 and I have seen nothing to change that since.
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Re: Patton .................

#175

Post by Mori » 26 Jun 2018, 21:57

Richard Anderson wrote:t was also in 1973 that OCMH lost its status as a Special Staff under the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and was reduced to a "field operating agency" under the Chief of Staff. Mac spent the next six years at CMH drumming his heels as Deputy Chief Historian of OCMH...by the time I met him and High Cole in 1988 they had nothing good to say about OCMH operations 1973-1988 and I have seen nothing to change that since.
Well, I think Riviera to the Rhine is also a very good book, and it was finalized during this period. But don't ask me to give another title...

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Re: Patton .................

#176

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 22:23

Mori wrote:Well, I think Riviera to the Rhine is also a very good book, and it was finalized during this period. But don't ask me to give another title...
Riviera to the Rhine is unique in that it covers the entire campaign from Southern France to the end of the war as a single volume, which means its coverage tends to be more even. There are huge gaps for example between Cross-Channel Attack and Breakout and Pursuit and then the Rhineland Campaign. Events, nuance, and continuity sort of fell between the cracks of the various volumes.

OTOH, Riviera to the Rhine has problems as well. The devils brew of authorship affected the final product and distilling down the original draft to a single volume may have eliminated too much. There are also a number of glaring errors, possibly also because of the changing authors. I used to have a list somewhere, but the only one I can recall is the account of the gallant Tank Battalion commander dying during NORDWIND. After publication, the good colonel, long retired, wrote a rather plaintive letter to OCMH explaining that he wasn't dead yet... There are others, but now I can't recall any but that one funny one. ISTR there was a thread here at some point pointing out the errors regarding NORDWIND and also IIRC the account by the vet of 6. SS-Gebirgsdivision also highlighted a number of glaring errors regarding his division's operations?

It also says something about OCMH that they have yet to manage to complete coverage of the Vietnam War...45 years after the end of our direct involvement. I think my critique, written for the Phase III Insurgency Study Report twelve years ago is still apropos.

"In the years following the Vietnam War, it appears that the US Army and its associated analytical community avoided detailed or in-depth analytical assessment of the basic nature of that conflict. Instead of extensively analyzing what was effectively the fourth largest war in US history, the military and analytical community seemed to run as fast as they could from it. This is reflected by the dearth of analytical studies on the Vietnam conflict after 1983. (The first volume of the official history was issued in 1983, four volumes in 1986-1988 and three volumes in 1996-2000. The first volume describing combat operations were issued in 1998 and to date, they have only covered the first two and half years of the war. There have also been 27 Monogram and other Vietnam Studies offered by CMH, of which 25 were published before 1984.) It is also pointedly demonstrated by the slow pace at which the Office of the Chief of Military History has issued the official history of the Vietnam War. In the thirty-one years since the US Army withdrew from Vietnam, only the first two volumes of the combat history of the war have been published (John M. Carland, Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966 (Washington D.C., US Army Center for Military History, 2000); George L. MacGarrigle., Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967 (Washington D.C., US Army Center for Military History, 1998). This delayed reaction is in stark contrast to the production of the official histories of the Civil War, WWI or WWII. This ostrich-like approach to studying the lessons of the past must be considered in part due to an emotional (and irrational) response to the failure in Vietnam."

Currently, the volumes are:

Engineers at War (2010)
Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966 (2000)
Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967 (1998)
Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973 (1996)
Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (1988)
Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973 (1988)
Military Communications: A Test of Technology (1988)
Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (1983)

Still missing are the Advice and Support volume for 1960-1965, two long-promised volumes on MACV 1962-1973, and volumes for the extensive combat operations 1968-1973. There should also of course be at least one volume on the final days 1973-1975, as well as any number of additional specialty volumes (some of which have appeared as "Vietnam studies").
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 26 Jun 2018, 22:57, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Patton .................

#177

Post by Mori » 26 Jun 2018, 22:32

That's minor errors. As small as typos, almost. They don't modify the main messages.

I made a summary of editorial history of RttR: https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... R#p2138221

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Re: Patton .................

#178

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2018, 22:38

Mori wrote:That's minor errors. As small as typos, almost. They don't modify the main messages.
Oh, I agree, but that particular one is funny... :lol:
I made a summary of editorial history of RttR: https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... R#p2138221
Yes you did, and only a few weeks ago...my memory is no longer what it used to be. :cry:
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Re: Patton .................

#179

Post by Gooner1 » 27 Jun 2018, 17:47

Richard Anderson wrote: And I fail to see how you manage to keep missing that Third Army was already grounded in early September. :roll: Or that the fuel problems of VII and XIX Corps of c. 8 September were a consequence of the extraordinary advance.
"For the week ending 2 September, FUSA received 546,500 gallons, TUSA 200,100 gallons. Week ending 9 September FUSA 540,000, TUSA 423,300."


Map probably helpful for most.

Image

Sorry, but yes, drawing such a conclusion is exactly what an assumption is: "a thing that is accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof". It did not happen that way, but your assumption is that it "could work out nicely though", based upon changes that did not in fact happen.
That would be a mathematical/scientific assumption, in alternate history assumptions can only come with possibilities or, at best, probabilities.
The 3rd lift landing as scheduled in Market Garden might make possible 1st Airbornes renewed advance to the Arnhem Bridge, it would make probable the success of the overall operation :D

Tom from Cornwall
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Joined: 01 May 2006, 20:52
Location: UK

Re: Patton .................

#180

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 27 Jun 2018, 19:51

Gooner,
4th Para Brigade were shot to pieces attacking into Arnhem only on the 19th. Particularly galling for them was the German fire from the brickworks …
That's not quite right - 4th Parachute Brigade were "shot to pieces" attacking into Arnhem on the 19th, but they were a long way from the "brickworks" on the south bank of the Neder Rijn.

11th Bn was overrun in and around the St Elisbeth's Hospital, whilst 10th and 156th Bn were "shot to pieces" advancing north of the main Ede-Arnhem railway across LZ L (the Polish glider lift landing during this battle).

I think it was the (already) remnants of 1st and 3rd Bn's that were finally stopped along the river front by fire from both north and south banks.

Regards

Tom

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