Hey, Rich! It's always about logistics.
Regarding the OP, here is the Reader's Digest version of Fighting Patton in World War II magazine:
http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm.
In the past week, I have taken a stroll through the
Kriegstagebuch des OKW for the period under discussion in this thread working on another book. German perceptions of the main danger point shifted, in part because of Allied actions but also German ones to address the problems. On 1 September, OB West reported that the hole between Luneville and Belfort could not be plugged and requested deployment of three infantry divisions to the area. This occurred, and TUSA would have run into organized and well supplied divisions within 48 hours had the fuel decision gone its way. On 2 September, OKW decided to solidify the right wing and center and form a mobile force at Dijon to attack the Allied flank. Fifth Panzer Army was given responsibility for the counter attack on 3 September. On 6 September, Hitler and the operations staff discussed when Germany could launch a major counteroffensive in the West, and agreed that the first possible date would be 1 November. This would depend on extracting as many divisions as possible from the line for rebuilding. Hitler said the front would have to hold as far west as possible.
Fifteenth Army on 6 September received a more or less free hand and decided to concentrate its defenses at Walcherin and Süd Beveland. Seventh Army abandoned the Maas front in order to get between FUSA and Lüttich. OKW judged that the Americans intended to drive to Aachen. Forces arriving near Metz improved the front and stopped an American advance that had reached Gravelotte. Army Group G faced little pressure.
OB West's situation report on 7 September (Rundstedt takes over) assessed that the Allies had 54 divisions, 25-27 British, and the Americans 15-18, with 3-4 deployed against the north wing. German forces were battered or burned out. Combat-ready panzers numbered one hundred. OB West requested five, or better ten, divisions with Sturmgeschütz battalions, anti-tank weapons, and panzer divisions. Aachen was clearly the main concern. He had set in march to Aachen what he had: the weak 9th Panzer Division, a weak SturmPanzer battalion, and a Sturmgeschütz brigade. The 12th Volksgrenadier Division was in transit. His aim was to fight for time to prepare the West Wall for battle.
By 8 September, Fifteenth Army had flooded the area in front of the Canadians and achieved the "best outcome that could have been expected." The MLR near Antwerp was strengthened. Pressure on the line Maastricht-Lüttich was weak. Operations in the Argonne and Nineteenth Army area were going well. But OB West reported that the Americans on the north wing had freedom of movement all the way to the West Wall, currently defended by 7-8 battalions spread over 120 km. If Fifteenth Army did not receive in a short time three infantry and a panzer divisions, it would shatter and a hole open to the German border. The situation for Seventh Army was make or break. First Army in Luxembourg was in better shape and conducting a mobile defense. Army Group G had to abandon Dijon to shorten the line, giving away the planned armor assembly area. In order to conduct the counterattack, Fifth Panzer Army was to concentrate two panzer divisions (11 and 21), three panzer grenadier divisions (3, 15, 17 SS), and six panzer brigades (106-108, 111-113). [As I relate in
Fighting Patton, the original OKW operations order for the attack indicated its aim was to force the Allies to halt the rapid advance against the north wing and deal with the threat.] They were to be ready by 12 September, but OB West reported that some divisions were delayed and there were fuel shortages.
On 9 September, OB West told Hitler Seventh Army would have to fall back into the West Wall. Hitler told him it had to stand fast and that 20 Luftwaffe battalions would begin manning the West Wall behind Seventh Army that day. A new corps (LXIV) retreating from southwest France joined Nineteenth Army and strengthened its defenses.
On 11 September, American troops reached the West Wall at Metz, and pressure toward Aachen increased. The Americans forced the line back at Luneville. The next day, the Americans captured West Wall fortifications near Aachen, but a break-through was prevented. Nineteenth Army gave ground, and Hitler demanded that it stop and that the panzer concentration be achieved while it was possible to attack the enemy from the rear and not frontally. On 13 September, OB West informed OKW that Fifth Panzer Army would have to attack in packets just to prevent the loss of more territory before the Vosges. [That is what happened during the tank battles of Lorraine.]
On 16 September, the 12th Volksgrenadier Division arrived at Aachen, which stabilized the line there over the coming days.
Operation Market-Garden began on 17 September.
I guess the point here is that the Germans were taking effective steps to stop the Allied advance, so it wasn't just a question of Allied decisions and supply problems (which Hitler, by the way, had foreseen when he decided to abandon France. He had seen enough Soviet offensives sputter to a halt.).
Cheers.
