D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
@Sheldrake: it's not that interpretations differ, it's more than what seems not-too-complicated question are just not tackled properly, in spite of the mass of litterature on this campaign.
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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
I read once a nice book, called 'The germans in Normandy', somewhere I still have a signed edition by the author.
Even he is an englishman he is able to read and understand german...
Hi Dickie!
Jan-Hendrik
Even he is an englishman he is able to read and understand german...
Hi Dickie!
Jan-Hendrik
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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
With a book you have to learn how to differentiate between 'hard' facts and the authors attempt to link those facts together. For example it was an eye-opener for me to transition from book accounts to the source documents. It quickly became apparent that for some actions there is nothing other than brief War Diary entries and you can clearly see how one or two sentences can be spun out to make whole paragraphs. By seeding those paragraphs with a few solid checkable facts it is easy to fool the casual reader into believing the added padding is also as well-sourced. One good 'German' example is how a brief Unit Diary for 2 kp of sSS Pz Abt 102 has become 'the' source for the whole Unit and forms the bulk of Schneider and Teike's accounts of those Tigers in Normandy.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
HHargreaves's book is unsatisfying.Jan-Hendrik wrote: ↑02 Jul 2019, 21:08I read once a nice book, called 'The germans in Normandy', somewhere I still have a signed edition by the author.
Even he is an englishman he is able to read and understand german...
The positive : bringing a lot of testimonies overwise ignored in the English written litterature.
The negative: it's repetitive, confusing and completely void of analysis. Everything witnesses say is taken for granted, nothing is questioned. In the end, it paints a very traditional picture of the Germans in Normandy, the one you would get from fresh post-war accounts primarily interested in explaining their defeat by blaming everything but their own organization. "Outnumbered the Landser always was in Normandy, but never outfought", writes the author, and that's as profound as it gets in terms of thinking.
Last edited by Mori on 03 Jul 2019, 14:37, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
Hi Mori,
You seem to answer some of your own questions:
i.e. One of the impacts of Allied aerial superiority was that they were able to suppress Luftwaffe reconnaissance so that "they fail to see the invasion even after ships left the British shore".
You ask, "how could they adapt to bocage defense so effectively and consistently across units?" Probably because bocage was widespread in rural Normandy and that was therefore the fortuitous defensive terrain that had to be taken advantage of.
Cheers,
Sid.
You seem to answer some of your own questions:
i.e. One of the impacts of Allied aerial superiority was that they were able to suppress Luftwaffe reconnaissance so that "they fail to see the invasion even after ships left the British shore".
You ask, "how could they adapt to bocage defense so effectively and consistently across units?" Probably because bocage was widespread in rural Normandy and that was therefore the fortuitous defensive terrain that had to be taken advantage of.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
I meant in terms of a massive, definitive history, like Glantz's "Stalingrad Trilogy" which integrates everything up to date and to maximum operational and tactical detail combined with daily troop activity on both sides and with all units. The Glantz trilogy even has an entire tome full of documents (to add to the already expansive indices of the preceding volumes) and a map book. The selection process is already done- no need to spend a lot of search time searching for what happened, say on June 28-June 30. With such a big study then overarching generalizations can be made.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
Is that so obvious? I mean, they had been expecting the invasion for months. Why didn't they multiply sources of information / take extra risks? Or did they and failed, and then how/why?Sid Guttridge wrote: ↑03 Jul 2019, 12:20i.e. One of the impacts of Allied aerial superiority was that they were able to suppress Luftwaffe reconnaissance so that "they fail to see the invasion even after ships left the British shore".
I'm not asking for an answer from you (it's not an exam on your or anyone's knowledge!), I'm just stating the question.
Again, is that so obvious? How effective were US troops in sharing and implementing tactical best practices in other situations (e.g., forest fighting)? Why did Germans seem good at that in Normandy, what did they do than other didn't?Sid Guttridge wrote: ↑03 Jul 2019, 12:20You ask, "how could they adapt to bocage defense so effectively and consistently across units?" Probably because bocage was widespread in rural Normandy and that was therefore the fortuitous defensive terrain that had to be taken advantage of.
These are no advanced topics. But they are simply missing the books I've read on the German side in Normandy. These questions are not even asked.
I suppose we could easily find another 5 or 10.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
Interestingly there are remarks from German officers early on in the fighting stating that the allies had obviously trained for hedgerow fighting and were better at it... Shows how a lot is also up to perspective.
In 1943 Marcks (as the commander of LXXXVIII.A.K.) had issued instructions for hedgerow fighting, also addressing the problems this posed to both attackers AND defenders. These instructions were known at Armee level and Marcks himself must have shared his ideas on this when he took over LXXXIV.A.K. Other than that, like Sid, I do wonder how difficult/easy it is to make best use of hedgerows as trained soldiers, even without specific training/instructions.
In 1943 Marcks (as the commander of LXXXVIII.A.K.) had issued instructions for hedgerow fighting, also addressing the problems this posed to both attackers AND defenders. These instructions were known at Armee level and Marcks himself must have shared his ideas on this when he took over LXXXIV.A.K. Other than that, like Sid, I do wonder how difficult/easy it is to make best use of hedgerows as trained soldiers, even without specific training/instructions.
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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
There is a quote somewhere where a German General says they believed the Cromwell tank was developed specifically to fight in Normandy/close country.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
This is a common question.jpz4 wrote: ↑03 Jul 2019, 15:13Interestingly there are remarks from German officers early on in the fighting stating that the allies had obviously trained for hedgerow fighting and were better at it... Shows how a lot is also up to perspective.
In 1943 Marcks (as the commander of LXXXVIII.A.K.) had issued instructions for hedgerow fighting, also addressing the problems this posed to both attackers AND defenders. These instructions were known at Armee level and Marcks himself must have shared his ideas on this when he took over LXXXIV.A.K. Other than that, like Sid, I do wonder how difficult/easy it is to make best use of hedgerows as trained soldiers, even without specific training/instructions.
The COSSAC planners thought that the hedgerows would be neutral. Close country favoured defence, but the main allied aim was to avoid being pushed into the sea. The Germans complained that the Panther was a rotten tanks for hedgerow country as it was impossible to traverse the turret. It also played hell with any idea of large scale armoured attacks. The Germans impaled themselves on anti tank defences in the Odon Valley in late June early July.
The units which had trained in close country in the UK didn't find Normandy a hugh shock. 43 Wessex division comments were that it was like Sussex. Then 7th Armoured Division which had fought in Italy as well as the western desert and trained a bit in East Anglia hated the hedgerows. There are not adverse comments by the 101st who trained near Newbury There are from 29th US div, which is a little suprising becuase they had been in the UK for two years I guess their horizon was the D Day assault as expectations were that they might lose 60% of the assault force.
The US did not have any doctrine for "special conditions" such as fighting in urban or wooded country. The Germans did and were better prepared. Many of the Germans junior officers and NCOs had east front experience. Much of the northern half of the eastern front was forest swamp.(This came home to the Americans in the Heurtgen forest)
While Marcks may have ordered studies of fighting in the bocage his soldiers were actually employed building the defences that Rommel demanded. Rommel also insisted that they should focus on defending the beaches ratehr than the hedgerows to the rear. However, as the defenders they had more oif an opportunity to think about how they were going to fight in the ground they occupied.
This doesnlt relate to the thread topic that book added nothing to muy understanding of the Germans in Normandy.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
the artillery arm was the decisive one in the Bocage
https://www.amazon.com/St-L%C3%B4-1944- ... 1472816935
decent summary which also includes the tactics employed
The Stober' unit history of the 17.SS has the division's infantry melt away, largely through artillery fire in about 10 days. The 2.SS division was broken up into different groups and used to prop up the 7th Army Front.
This author's previous book, Hedgerow Hell is also tactical and quite good
viewtopic.php?f=19&t=242779
https://www.amazon.com/St-L%C3%B4-1944- ... 1472816935
decent summary which also includes the tactics employed
The Stober' unit history of the 17.SS has the division's infantry melt away, largely through artillery fire in about 10 days. The 2.SS division was broken up into different groups and used to prop up the 7th Army Front.
This author's previous book, Hedgerow Hell is also tactical and quite good
viewtopic.php?f=19&t=242779
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
Entscheidung im Westen 1944,Der Oberbefehlshaber West und die Abwehr der allerten Invasion by Dieter Ose,DVA 1982 gives a good overview from the German side.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
That is the conclusion I drew too...Cult Icon wrote: ↑04 Jul 2019, 02:41the artillery arm was the decisive one in the Bocage
https://www.amazon.com/St-L%C3%B4-1944- ... 1472816935
https://www.amazon.com/s?k=gunners+in+n ... nb_sb_noss
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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
Hi MORI,
You ask, "Is that so obvious? I mean, they had been expecting the invasion for months. Why didn't they multiply sources of information / take extra risks? Or did they and failed, and then how/why?"
It would be unreasonable to think that, given the virtual certainty of an invasion attempt in 1944, the Germans did not do what they could to divine Allied intentions.
I would suggest that the Germans did "multiply sources of information / take extra risks?". They believed, for instance, that they had a functioning spy network in the UK, whereas all the agents had been arrested or, more importantly, turned by the British. The British were therefore able to feed the Germans any misinformation they wanted and could back up its credibility with Operation Bodyguard. (For example, through false radio traffic, they invented a fictional US infantry division and three non-existent US Ranger battalions in Iceland, apparently threatening a landing in Norway.) E-boats were also very active in the English Channel and caused considerable losses to US landing ships during Exercise Tiger, an invasion exercise in Lyme Bay. The Luftwaffe's problem is probably best illustrated by the fact that, in the face of Allied air superiority, it only managed to mount two sorties over the invasion beaches on D-Day. They also flew meteorological flights to determine approaching weather. However, these were necessarily much less frequent and more risky than the Allied ones and they failed to pick up the gap in the weather during which the Allies landed.
You ask, "Why did Germans seem good at that (bocage fighting) in Normandy, what did they do than other didn't?" Firstly, is there any evidence that the Germans were any better at it than anyone else? After all, they were on the defensive in good defensive cover, while the Allies had to leave cover to attack them. Were German counter-attacks in the bocage consistently, or ever effective? If not, then where is the evidence that they were better at bocage fighting? It could just be that the bocage served to reinforce the existing advantage of the defence over the offence.
I have had the discussion about the US Army learning from experience before, in the context of North Africa. I suggested that without six months of experience in North Africa the US Army would have landed in Europe without any combat experience whatsoever, and lessons from this must have filtered through to the US Army generally. (Others disagreed). Generally, the US forces seem to be quick learners, so I guess they had a means for systematically assimilating and disseminating field experience. I am not sure that the bocage (which was a field system divided by thick hedgerows) counts as forest fighting, which the US really ran into in the Hurtgen Forest later in the year.
Cheers,
Sid.
You ask, "Is that so obvious? I mean, they had been expecting the invasion for months. Why didn't they multiply sources of information / take extra risks? Or did they and failed, and then how/why?"
It would be unreasonable to think that, given the virtual certainty of an invasion attempt in 1944, the Germans did not do what they could to divine Allied intentions.
I would suggest that the Germans did "multiply sources of information / take extra risks?". They believed, for instance, that they had a functioning spy network in the UK, whereas all the agents had been arrested or, more importantly, turned by the British. The British were therefore able to feed the Germans any misinformation they wanted and could back up its credibility with Operation Bodyguard. (For example, through false radio traffic, they invented a fictional US infantry division and three non-existent US Ranger battalions in Iceland, apparently threatening a landing in Norway.) E-boats were also very active in the English Channel and caused considerable losses to US landing ships during Exercise Tiger, an invasion exercise in Lyme Bay. The Luftwaffe's problem is probably best illustrated by the fact that, in the face of Allied air superiority, it only managed to mount two sorties over the invasion beaches on D-Day. They also flew meteorological flights to determine approaching weather. However, these were necessarily much less frequent and more risky than the Allied ones and they failed to pick up the gap in the weather during which the Allies landed.
You ask, "Why did Germans seem good at that (bocage fighting) in Normandy, what did they do than other didn't?" Firstly, is there any evidence that the Germans were any better at it than anyone else? After all, they were on the defensive in good defensive cover, while the Allies had to leave cover to attack them. Were German counter-attacks in the bocage consistently, or ever effective? If not, then where is the evidence that they were better at bocage fighting? It could just be that the bocage served to reinforce the existing advantage of the defence over the offence.
I have had the discussion about the US Army learning from experience before, in the context of North Africa. I suggested that without six months of experience in North Africa the US Army would have landed in Europe without any combat experience whatsoever, and lessons from this must have filtered through to the US Army generally. (Others disagreed). Generally, the US forces seem to be quick learners, so I guess they had a means for systematically assimilating and disseminating field experience. I am not sure that the bocage (which was a field system divided by thick hedgerows) counts as forest fighting, which the US really ran into in the Hurtgen Forest later in the year.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg
Hi Sid,
Your assumptions are fair and credible, and show what would have to be investigated first. On intelligence, I don't think any "Germans-in-Normandy" book covers that properly; at least I haven't read it. On "sharing experience", the German testomonies rather insist on the lack of experience of replacements or the falling number of experienced NCO/officers, hence the basic question on effectiveness of their defensive tactics in the bocage. Maybe the conclusion could be along the lines you suggest, ie "any average army would have managed to setup a proper defensive position in the bocage, it was no special achievement". (so much for the German soldier's superiority thesis).
Your assumptions are fair and credible, and show what would have to be investigated first. On intelligence, I don't think any "Germans-in-Normandy" book covers that properly; at least I haven't read it. On "sharing experience", the German testomonies rather insist on the lack of experience of replacements or the falling number of experienced NCO/officers, hence the basic question on effectiveness of their defensive tactics in the bocage. Maybe the conclusion could be along the lines you suggest, ie "any average army would have managed to setup a proper defensive position in the bocage, it was no special achievement". (so much for the German soldier's superiority thesis).