D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

[Aida1]

Situation report 9.SS Pzdiv of 6 july
" Situation report of the 9.SSPz.Div. Hohenstauffen from 05.7.1944 1900 to 06.7.1944

In the last 24 hours enemy artillery only several times layed disruption fire on forward line, command posts and lines of communication. No enemy scouting activity. Own lively scouting established that the enemy has removed himself 800 to 1000 m from the own main defense line. Enemy lays mines and digs in. Probably parts were pulled out for refit or deployment on another spot.
Own artillery combatted with powerful strikes recognized enemy targets and artillery targets. Intense enemy air activity without own fighter defense.
Through the air superiority of the enemy the division has lost a significant number of trucks through machinegun fire. The transport roads for the supply of the division are so large that in case of larger combat action the supply of the division cannot be guaranteed anymore. The supply troops of a otherwise full battle worthy division still dispose merely of 150 ton tonnage in supply. A remedy has to be found fast by a closer driving up of fuel and ammo by truck transport regiments or new allocation of an adequate tonnage.
As a minimum demand a Panzer division in the current situation needs 300 ton tonnage at the supply troops."

[Aida1]

[Michael Kenny]

Loss numbers for 9th SS are mentioned in Zetterling's ' Normandy 1944' pg 338 footnote16. Footnote 22 for July 31 states that 9th SS total losses to July 31st were 20 Panthers, 13 Pz IV & 14 Stug. All sources are given. The paperwork is confusing but for sure 11 Pz IV & 13 Panther appear to have totally disappeared from the record (by July 31) with no explanation as to their fate. .

[Carl Schwamberger]

Situation report 9.SS Pzdiv of 6 july
" Situation report of the 9.SSPz.Div. Hohenstauffen from 05.7.1944 1900 to 06.7.1944

In the last 24 hours enemy artillery only several times layed disruption fire on forward line, command posts and lines of communication. No enemy scouting activity. Own lively scouting established that the enemy has removed himself 800 to 1000 m from the own main defense line. Enemy lays mines and digs in. Probably parts were pulled out for refit or deployment on another spot.
Own artillery combatted with powerful strikes recognized enemy targets and artillery targets. Intense enemy air activity without own fighter defense.
Through the air superiority of the enemy the division has lost a significant number of trucks through machinegun fire. The transport roads for the supply of the division are so large that in case of larger combat action the supply of the division cannot be guaranteed anymore. The supply troops of a otherwise full battle worthy division still dispose merely of 150 ton tonnage in supply. A remedy has to be found fast by a closer driving up of fuel and ammo by truck transport regiments or new allocation of an adequate tonnage.
As a minimum demand a Panzer division in the current situation needs 300 ton tonnage at the supply troops."

That minimum compares to the bare combat sustainment minimum allocated for the Commonwealth or US 'Division' in the same month. The allowance for a US division in sustained full offensive mode was something above 500 tons daily. The actual requirement was influenced by both the divisions and corps artillery consumption of ammunition.

[Richard Anderson]

That minimum compares to the bare combat sustainment minimum allocated for the Commonwealth or US 'Division' in the same month. The allowance for a US division in sustained full offensive mode was something above 500 tons daily. The actual requirement was influenced by both the divisions and corps artillery consumption of ammunition.

Carl, I believe the reference is not to monthly supply received but rather to the supply lift capability of the division. IIRC, the 9. SS-Panzerdivision should have had four Kraftfahrkompanie, each capable of 120 tons lift, a 60 ton Kraftfahrkolonne, and four Kesselkraftfahrkolonne, each capable of lifting 50 cbm of POL. So a total of around 740 tons of lift. They had about one-fifth of that actually operational.

[Carl Schwamberger]

That follows the other descriptions. Ruppenthal does not break down the differences between US or Commonwealth Armored and Infantry divisions. He just give the "Division Slice number (900 tons daily to D+90) & leaves the details for the reader to ruminate on. I've followed extend discussions involving guys like Jeff Lesser attempting to estimate the actual requirements and deliveries of supply material to the Africa Corps or PAA. 500 tons daily for a Pz Div is a average of the numbers argued over. But that did not include requirements of the supporting units outside the division organization.

...our Kraftfahrkompanie, each capable of 120 tons lift, a 60 ton Kraftfahrkolonne, and four Kesselkraftfahrkolonne, each capable of lifting 50 cbm of POL. So a total of around 740 to

Of course if this does not include the artillery ammo train then the numbers need to be 'reinterpreted'.

[Richard Anderson]

That follows the other descriptions. Ruppenthal does not break down the differences between US or Commonwealth Armored and Infantry divisions. He just give the "Division Slice number (900 tons daily to D+90) & leaves the details for the reader to ruminate on. I've followed extend discussions involving guys like Jeff Lesser attempting to estimate the actual requirements and deliveries of supply material to the Africa Corps or PAA. 500 tons daily for a Pz Div is a average of the numbers argued over. But that did not include requirements of the supporting units outside the division organization.

Again you are comparing apples to oranges. For the US you are looking at consumption but comparing it to German lift.

Of course if this does not include the artillery ammo train then the numbers need to be 'reinterpreted'.

There was no "artillery ammo train" at least as I think you mean it. The various "kolonne" that were part of some combat units was part of that unit's train and carried the rest of the basic load that was not carried by the firing batteries. The divisional truck companies and columns did the lifting from depots, not the unit supply columns.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Again you are comparing apples to oranges.

Continuing with that metaphor Im looking at a basket of fruit here. In other language lift capability does tell something about about what its required or expected to do. Theres X capacity, which suggests a intent to move Y tons. Other measurements like distance to supply dumps/time, vehicles deadlined, or intent for other use like also transporting men or weapons are variables in that calculation. To digress Im finding my self looking at this as a former intelligence seat holder estimating enemy capability, and as a logistics seat holder trying to estimate my capabilities.

The divisional truck companies and columns did the lifting from depots, not the unit supply columns.

Im guessing what you are trying to say there, & it draws a picture of rigidity or inefficiency in transporting the divisions expendables. Particularly as the situation moves to the static end of the scale & more vehicles are available to run to the depot. Maybe the 9th SS referred to did business differently but with us vehicles from the transport companies delivering ammunition became part of the battery or artillery group ammo train until it was time to drop the ammo. & when our battery ammo trucks emptied they went off to the ammo dump. Transferring ammo from transport company vehicles to battery or group ammo vehicles was considered evidence of someones bad planning.

[Richard Anderson]

Im guessing what you are trying to say there, & it draws a picture of rigidity or inefficiency in transporting the divisions expendables. Particularly as the situation moves to the static end of the scale & more vehicles are available to run to the depot. Maybe the 9th SS referred to did business differently but with us vehicles from the transport companies delivering ammunition became part of the battery or artillery group ammo train until it was time to drop the ammo. & when our battery ammo trucks emptied they went off to the ammo dump. Transferring ammo from transport company vehicles to battery or group ammo vehicles was considered evidence of someones bad planning.

Nope. What I'm saying is that in German and American practice the divisional long-haul transport - the QM Company in the American division and the Kraftwagen Kompanie in the German division - were the primary means of hauling supplies from rear depots to divisional dumps, be they regimental.battalion ration dumps, ammo dumps, or whatever. Yes, both German and American artillery battalions had the means of hauling ammunition from dumps as did many other smaller units. The American Service Battery in light and medium battalions had nine trucks and ammo trailers that carried most of the basic load and that could be used for replenishment from an ASP. The German battalion was more decentralized and typically had four ammunition trucks per battery to preform the same role. So it was a wash when comparing the two. Same for organic transport in most other units.

The difference is in the organic supply lift of the larger units - in the QM units of the American division and the Nachschub units in the German division - and also the supply lift assigned to the armies to support those units. IIRC, 7. Armee had just seven companies with around 250 trucks to support the operations of fourteen divisions. FUSA, as it landed on D-Day, had 51 truck companies (if I'm counting correctly) attached with 2,448 odd trucks also to support fourteen divisions...and that isn't counting the two-dozen or so Amphibious Truck companies for ship to shore supply.

So the difference in scale between both lift and supplies available was immense.

Of course, if you don't organize and equip with enough vehicles to haul the basic load you got another problem, which was found in the American Armored Division as it was reorganized in September 1943. It didn't have enough lift to carry the basic load, let alone allocate resources to hauling stuff from depots, which is why each ended up with two QM TC Truck companies permanently attached to them...which caused problems since those companies were drawn from the pool intended for theater transportation. Minor oversight with major consequences and what made it worse was it was predicted to have such an effect.