D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

[Michael Kenny]

Maybe the conclusion could be along the lines you suggest, ie "any average army would have managed to setup a proper defensive position in the bocage, it was no special achievement". (so much for the German soldier's superiority thesis).

Much is made of the German ability to fight on even when the cause is hopeless and that this is proof they never give up, are never outfought and only retreat when completely and utterly broken. In reality the Commanders (in Normandy) knew they were beaten and disaster was looming in June and repeatedly asked for permission to fall back into the interior of France. It was Hitler's insane 'no retreat' policy that forced them to stand and fight when they knew the sensible option was to retreat whilst they still had some mobility. If they had been left to make their own choices there would not have been a tenacious defence of Normandy. You can not say 'Hitler did not listen to his Generals' whilst holding up the insane tactics demanded by the lunatic as something to be admired and emulated.

[Cult Icon]

That is the conclusion I drew too...
https://www.amazon.com/s?k=gunners+in+n ... nb_sb_noss

Thanks for your work. I will look out for that.

On "sharing experience", the German testomonies rather insist on the lack of experience of replacements or the falling number of experienced NCO/officers, hence the basic question on effectiveness of their defensive tactics in the bocage.

On the British sector, Stadler and other German commanders have reports that convincing shows that artillery supremacy was the king of battle. In Stadler's opinion, infantry quality didn't matter very much. Stadler's report is reprinted in PzTruppen II and books that have report compilations for the Germans in Normandy. I think this is quite clear in the battle histories/unit histories of various normandy battles which record the exceptional amount of artillery strikes on their positions. (same for the US sector) In major counterattacks the German infantry units go over the top and frequently take heavy losses. The Allies attack and take heavy or moderate losses. (hence the static nature of much of the campaign) The Germans defend more passively and take comparably few losses. The endurance of German divisions in Normandy rested on the reliance on the final option.

[Mori]

In reality the Commanders (in Normandy) knew they were beaten and disaster was looming in June and repeatedly asked for permission to fall back into the interior of France.

This is again a topic for renewed analysis. Certainly the high level conferences with Rundstedt and Rommel explaining that all is lost are well-known. That Hitler's refusal to agree on their proposals for redeployment was extensively used after the war as an excuse for their defeats does not erase the truth of their argument.

However, a few things related to these conferences are never or rarely underlined. This gives a taste of how much research & analysis there is left to do:
- That Rundstedt and al. admitted that the battle was lost as early as June is also a proof that Montgomery's overall plan was recognized as a sure road to Allied victory. In other words... it makes the whole July Eisenhower-Montgomery controversy moot.

- One of the conferences took place right after the fall of Cherbourg. In post war memoirs like Speidel's, this is conveniently overlooked. First and before all the dictator wanted to slate / criticize his generals. It was the worst thinkable moment to propose a strategic retreat to the Seine. Rundstedt and al. were extremely clumsy. This seems like 2=2=4 but I don't think any book described these conferences this way.

- About the dedeployment plan itself, I am yet to see a description more specific than "build a line behind the Seine". How much time until execution? What losses on the way? Etc. None of this was investigated at the time, it was like the generals were only doing guesswork. The next question would then be "What allied reaction", esp. if you consider ULTRA.

I mention all these to (again) show gaps in describing and understanding the Battle for Normandy.

[Mori]

It was Hitler's insane 'no retreat' policy that forced them to stand and fight when they knew the sensible option was to retreat whilst they still had some mobility. If they had been left to make their own choices there would not have been a tenacious defence of Normandy. You can not say 'Hitler did not listen to his Generals' whilst holding up the insane tactics demanded by the lunatic as something to be admired and emulated.

As Gerhard Weinberg underlined in an article published in 2011, Hitler accepted many deliberate withdrawals: the whole army group covering half of France in August 1944 ; the armies in Greece, Albania and southern Yugoslavia in fall 1944 ; army group north at least until they reached Curland (especially after being temporarily cut off at the end of Bagratian).

So it's time to drop the "insane tactics demanded by the lunatic" as relevant to historical analysis.

[Mori]

On the British sector, Stadler and other German commanders have reports that convincing shows that artillery supremacy was the king of battle. In Stadler's opinion, infantry quality didn't matter very much. Stadler's report is reprinted in PzTruppen II and books that have report compilations for the Germans in Normandy. I think this is quite clear in the battle histories/unit histories of various normandy battles which record the exceptional amount of artillery strikes on their positions. (same for the US sector) In major counterattacks the German infantry units go over the top and frequently take heavy losses. The Allies attack and take heavy or moderate losses. (hence the static nature of much of the campaign) The Germans defend more passively and take comparably few losses. The endurance of German divisions in Normandy rested on the reliance on the final option.

That German counter-attacks were the one time when Allies could and did inflict a lot of casualties is something fairly well established. I think I read this in Stephen Hart's Colossal cracks, and then in John Buckley's and others. It is worth noting that Germans never stopped counter-attacking, even as late as April 1945: they never adapted.

Where you go one step further is in making artillery the fundamental weapon of the campaign, thus making infantrymen quality / weapons somewhat irrelevant. Nice, I like the idea.

[Michael Kenny]

. The next question would then be "What allied reaction", esp. if you consider ULTRA.

I mention all these to (again) show gaps in describing and understanding the Battle for Normandy.

I am just re-reading 'British Intelligence In The Second World War ' Vol III Pt 2 about Normandy and it seems ULTRA was a blessing and a hindrance. The retreat from Hill 112 during EPSOM was directly caused by intercepts about 9th/10th SS being ready to strike so Monty 'tidied up' his lines to absorb the blow which, when it came, was not as troublesome as was expected ( so Hill 112 could have been held) and on June 10-12th intercepts had placed 2nd Panzer Division and 1st SS in the French interior. 2 PD was not expected at the front until June 14th at the earliest so when prisoners from 2nd PD were captured on June 13th at Villers Bocage doubts began to form about the wisdom of holding the town when more unlocated units could appear. Monty chose caution and pulled in his horns.

[Aber]

It is worth noting that Germans never stopped counter-attacking, even as late as April 1945: they never adapted.

If you never counterattack, then you will inevitably run out of territory to defend and lose the war.

If you want to counter-attack then you have 2 main options.

Immediate counterattack with local reserves. This has the advantage that the attackers will not have time to bring up anti-tank guns, lay mines or install barbed wire around positions, and may not have organised co-operation with artillery & air support.

Organised counterattack drawing in units from a wider area. This has the advantage of using stronger forces eg armour support and coordination with supporting arms. The downside is that the defenders can also use the time to improve their position. IIRC the German learnt that if they gave the British 24 hours to organise a position, then any counterattack would be unsuccessful. Therefore the focus on the immediate counterattack.

[Michael Kenny]

Where you go one step further is in making artillery the fundamental weapon of the campaign, thus making infantrymen quality / weapons somewhat irrelevant. Nice, I like the idea.

Artillery provide a means for Infantry to approach the enemy without suffering too many casualties. Artillery/tanks are a 'shield' for Infantry as they close in on their objective. It always comes down to boots on the ground and it was the lack of Infantry Divisions that did for the Germans in Normandy.

[Michael Kenny]

IIRC the German learnt that if they gave the British 24 hours to organise a position, then any counterattack would be unsuccessful.

I believe the exact words were 'almost impossible to shift' but given the same quote continues to make slightly less favourable comments about US Infantry I suspect we have another example where you tell your British captors what they want to hear and when the Americans question you then you reverse your rankings of who were the better Allied soldiers!

[Cult Icon]

That German counter-attacks were the one time when Allies could and did inflict a lot of casualties is something fairly well established. I think I read this in Stephen Hart's Colossal cracks, and then in John Buckley's and others. It is worth noting that Germans never stopped counter-attacking, even as late as April 1945: they never adapted.

Where you go one step further is in making artillery the fundamental weapon of the campaign, thus making infantrymen quality / weapons somewhat irrelevant. Nice, I like the idea.

Stadler commanded 9th SS "H", one of the best units on the German side.

There was nothing fundamentally wrong with German counterattack doctrine- it extended WW2. Inadequate German infantry quality (you can see this in Zetterling's Normandy 1944 and unit histories) was not the main factor that decided the battle of Normandy. These type of comparisons are rather immature and show that one doesn't really grasp the actions. IMHO "Fighting Power" by Dupuy is certain kind of nonsense.

Artillery was the decisive weapon of the Normandy campaign- more so than air power, tanks, and infantry. It paralyzed German divisions continuously and fixed them on the defensive- even minor counterattacks were plastered. We were talking about the Bocage- 1 million shells were fired by the US 1st Army in the battle of the bocage and units like 17.SS felt the impact as their infantry attritted away.

The German army had a long track record on the Eastern Front of holding overextended, undermanned fronts for extended periods of time against heavy assault, and their units successfully repeated their tactics in Normandy. (eg. the resistance generated by 12th SS HJ). It was nothing unusual, really.

[Michael Kenny]

The German army had a long track record on the Eastern Front of holding overextended, undermanned fronts for extended periods of time against heavy assault, and their units successfully repeated their tactics in Normandy. (eg. the resistance generated by 12th SS HJ). It was nothing unusual, really.

Perhaps you should check the distances in Normandy. From Caen west to the Atlantic is 89 km. Please tell us more about the 'overextended, undermanned fronts' held by 12th SS only (unsupported and with no other units present) in Normandy.

[Michael Kenny]

1 million shells were fired by the US 1st Army in the battle of the bocage............

I think that must be an under-estimate. The Commonwealth forces expended over 3 million artillery rounds (7.2 in /5.5 in/4.5 in/25pdr & 155mm) in just June & July.

[Mori]

1 million shells were fired by the US 1st Army in the battle of the bocage............

I think that must be an under-estimate. The Commonwealth forces expended over 3 million artillery rounds (7.2 in /5.5 in/4.5 in/25pdr & 155mm) in just June & July.

What about the Germans?

[Sheldrake]

1 million shells were fired by the US 1st Army in the battle of the bocage............

I think that must be an under-estimate. The Commonwealth forces expended over 3 million artillery rounds (7.2 in /5.5 in/4.5 in/25pdr & 155mm) in just June & July.

What about the Germans?

I am not sure I have ever seen a consolidated record of ammunition expenditure by OB West. They lost the battle and their supply bases were overrun.

However, German field units probably fired no more than one tenth of the amount the allies expended. Eberbach who commanded Panzer Group West wrote that artillery ammunition supply was a major problem. In order to answerr complaints about British artillery domination he ordered IInd SS Panzer Corps to fire a surprise artillery concentration on British positions SW of Caen. They concentrated 2,500 rounds for the shoot. The British retaliation in minutes was some 22,000 rounds.

The British and Americans reported that they had won the counter battery battle - which implies a dominance in ammunition expenditure. Mortars and Nebelwerfer were the main German weapons, but these are the weapons of the weak. They are shoot and scoot and easily suppressed. They cannot be relied upon to deliver a two mile wide barrage for an hour or two that stops an infantry attack.

German artillery supply was hindered by the variety of types of ammunition for the wide variety of German, French, Italian, Russian and Czech equipment in use.


Eberbach thought that supply was the problem. There were plenty of rounds of ammunition in depots in North Eastern France, where the railway system could deliver them from the factories. The allied transportation plan badly damaged the rail routes to the battle area. Panzer Gruppe West, as a Panzer gruppe did not have its own logistic units, but relied on Seventh army. The Seventh army was a non-motorised formation which relied on horse drawn transport for much of its supply. The rail heads themselves at Rennes were too far for a horse drawn column in one night.

The IIIrd Flak Corps was better supplied with ammunition. The Luftwaffe's supply organisation was motorised, possibly more lavishly scaled than the army. They enough ammunition to engage in the ground battle, not in the anti tank role, but as field artillery.

When the combat elements of the 16th Divsion were destroyed in Op Goodwood, Eberbach redeployed the HQ, signals and supply element to be the logistic command for the Panzer Gruppe, which may explain its re-designation as a Panzer Armee at the end of July. 5th Panzer Army's artillery did become more effective from mid July.British War diaries show quite a few nasty counter battery strikes in August.

[Aida1]

Maybe the conclusion could be along the lines you suggest, ie "any average army would have managed to setup a proper defensive position in the bocage, it was no special achievement". (so much for the German soldier's superiority thesis).

Much is made of the German ability to fight on even when the cause is hopeless and that this is proof they never give up, are never outfought and only retreat when completely and utterly broken. In reality the Commanders (in Normandy) knew they were beaten and disaster was looming in June and repeatedly asked for permission to fall back into the interior of France. It was Hitler's insane 'no retreat' policy that forced them to stand and fight when they knew the sensible option was to retreat whilst they still had some mobility. If they had been left to make their own choices there would not have been a tenacious defence of Normandy. You can not say 'Hitler did not listen to his Generals' whilst holding up the insane tactics demanded by the lunatic as something to be admired and emulated.

True.Southern France would have been given up and a shorter line in Northern France occupied which would have shortened the supply lines .