D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

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Sid Guttridge
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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Sid Guttridge » 06 Aug 2019 12:53

Hi Michael Kenny,

You write, "Much is made of the German ability to fight on even when the cause is hopeless and that this is proof they never give up, are never outfought and only retreat when completely and utterly broken."

You might like to acquaint yourself with the Battle of Auerstadt!

The characteristics you describe are cultural, not inherent to any particular nationality. Fifty years before Jena-Auerstadt the Prussians had overthrown far larger numbers of French for little loss at the battle of Rossbach. The battle of Auerstadt reversed the outcome under similar odds. It was changes in their relative military cultures that produced the diametrically opposite outcomes, not their nationality.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Aug 2019 21:33

There is 'Germans in Normandy' by Hargreves https://www.amazon.com/Germans-Normandy ... B00BCOW254

I've not checked the bibliography, but the text did not set off any BS alarms.

Mori wrote:
02 Jul 2019 11:57
...
- German intelligence: pre D-Day, how could they fail to see the invasion even after ships left the British shore ?
!. The Allies attacked German air reconissance during the preceding week, the heavy overcast, a long running program of spoofing and jamming German radar, sweeping the routes for German patrol boats and submarines, approaching at night under a heavy overcast. I've seen descriptions of two German boats running into the invasion fleet in the Bai du Seine. One was a utility boat servicing a navigation bouy. It may have lacked a radio. The commander ran ahead of the oncoming fleet & momentarily escaped. The other was a patrol boat & it sent some radio messages. Not clear if those were received. The Brits were running their regularly scheduled radio jamming program. That boat was home ported in LeHarve. By the time it escaped he show ws on anyway.
during the campaign: what did they understand of the build up??
The commanders were dumfounded by the intel estimates. They were thinking in terms of 50,000 enemy ashore by midnight. The estimates were over 100,000 on the first day & the actual number was 174,00, including dead on the first day. When air photos of one of the MULBERRY harbors were circulated among 7th Army HQ staff the feeling was one of "pessimism'. Hans Spiedels memoir has some of this in it.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Mori » 15 Aug 2019 22:23

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Aug 2019 21:33
There is 'Germans in Normandy' by Hargreves https://www.amazon.com/Germans-Normandy ... B00BCOW254

I've not checked the bibliography, but the text did not set off any BS alarms.
Unfortunately, a very disappointing book. I think I talked about it in another thread. Although Hargreaves went brought to the English readers quite a lot of German testimonies, his book desesperately lacks a critical view. For example, he quotes many examples of soldiers complaining of Allied air superiority without ever (1) noting that was also a way for army men to blame the air for their defeat (2) asking what were the actual consequences of this air superiority [I'm not saying there wasn't any, I'm saying Hargreaves does not attempt at assessing impact].

His thesis can be summarized by Outnumbered the Landser always was in Normandy, but never outfought. In the end, it's not different from the post-war point of view found in German memoirs.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 16 Aug 2019 13:28

To tell the truth I've grown a bit weary of analytic history after 50+ years or reading the stuff. So much of it is badly done, agenda driven, & distorts the presentation of evidence. Some have skill at critical thinking, most just anoy me with rather obvious remarks.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Aida1 » 17 Aug 2019 14:22

Mori wrote:
15 Aug 2019 22:23
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Aug 2019 21:33
There is 'Germans in Normandy' by Hargreves https://www.amazon.com/Germans-Normandy ... B00BCOW254

I've not checked the bibliography, but the text did not set off any BS alarms.
Unfortunately, a very disappointing book. I think I talked about it in another thread. Although Hargreaves went brought to the English readers quite a lot of German testimonies, his book desesperately lacks a critical view. For example, he quotes many examples of soldiers complaining of Allied air superiority without ever (1) noting that was also a way for army men to blame the air for their defeat (2) asking what were the actual consequences of this air superiority [I'm not saying there wasn't any, I'm saying Hargreaves does not attempt at assessing impact].

His thesis can be summarized by Outnumbered the Landser always was in Normandy, but never outfought. In the end, it's not different from the post-war point of view found in German memoirs.
It seems to me that you disregard the book because it disturbs your preconceived notion that Total air superiority has no major impact on the other sides operations.It should not be rocket Science to know that it has and not only in WW2.Always a big problem for the side that is on the receiving end.German sources from during and after the war will show you that allied total air superiority had a big impact on movement and logistics.See for example the Lagebeurteilung OB West of 11 June 1944 which in Point 2 a) details the devastating effect of allied air superiority (Entscheidung im Westen D Ose DVA 1982).Nothing surprising in that.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by JKernwerk » 17 Aug 2019 18:10

Hans Sakkers wrote a really nice book about the timetable and decisions during D-Day.
Hans is a researchwriter from The Netherlands and specialized in WW2 (with some sidesteps to older and jounger happenings).
I can recommend his book about D-Day, "Normandie, 6 juni 1944", H. Sakkers, published: Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück, 1998, it is however hard to find and pretty pricy, but it is worth every Euro/Dollar.
JK

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Aug 2019 18:42

Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 14:22


It seems to me that you disregard the book because it disturbs your preconceived notion that Total air superiority has no major impact on the other sides operations.It should not be rocket Science to know that it has and not only in WW2.Always a big problem for the side that is on the receiving end.German sources from during and after the war will show you that allied total air superiority had a big impact on movement and logistics.See for example the Lagebeurteilung OB West of 11 June 1944 which in Point 2 a) details the devastating effect of allied air superiority (Entscheidung im Westen D Ose DVA 1982).Nothing surprising in that.
Mark you are the one who appears 'disturbed'. It is a fact that the Germany Army was outfought. War is a combined all-arms effort and it is odd to see one or two areas specifically chosen (chosen because it is where the Germans do well) as the only true measure of fighting ability. Anyone who 'wins' by not engaging the Germans directly in those areas where they have a superiority (real or imagined)is judged to have more or less 'cheated' and thus undeserving of their victory.
It is the old 'never beaten in a 'fair fight' trope.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Aug 2019 18:49

Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 14:22

It seems to me that you disregard the book because it disturbs your preconceived notion that Total air superiority has no major impact on the other sides operations.It should not be rocket Science to know that it has and not only in WW2.Always a big problem for the side that is on the receiving end.German sources from during and after the war will show you that allied total air superiority had a big impact on movement and logistics.
I went through Shores 2nd TACF In Normandy ( check current asking prices for the 4 volumes on Abe if you want a heart attack https://www.abebooks.co.uk/book-search/ ... mas-chris/ ) a few years back and checked the weather for June to August. I was surprised how many days had no flying because of the weather. Not always bad weather either. Ground mist in the mornings was a big problem. There were many days when movement was not restricted.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Aida1 » 17 Aug 2019 19:16

Michael Kenny wrote:
17 Aug 2019 18:42
Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 14:22


It seems to me that you disregard the book because it disturbs your preconceived notion that Total air superiority has no major impact on the other sides operations.It should not be rocket Science to know that it has and not only in WW2.Always a big problem for the side that is on the receiving end.German sources from during and after the war will show you that allied total air superiority had a big impact on movement and logistics.See for example the Lagebeurteilung OB West of 11 June 1944 which in Point 2 a) details the devastating effect of allied air superiority (Entscheidung im Westen D Ose DVA 1982).Nothing surprising in that.
Mark you are the one who appears 'disturbed'. It is a fact that the Germany Army was outfought. War is a combined all-arms effort and it is odd to see one or two areas specifically chosen (chosen because it is where the Germans do well) as the only true measure of fighting ability. Anyone who 'wins' by not engaging the Germans directly in those areas where they have a superiority (real or imagined)is judged to have more or less 'cheated' and thus undeserving of their victory.
It is the old 'never beaten in a 'fair fight' trope.
Besides the fact that my first name is not Mark you have clearly read things that i did not write.I did no more than stating the obvious fact that the side that has air superiority has a major advantage.Even an important aspect of Blitzkrieg.And war is not a game so you cannot cheat.You need to win.Period.Nobody has ever pretended otherwise.There are those that have problems with the idea that the Germans were beaten because the other side had more of everything as if that that has any importance.That is why they try to downplay the effect of allied air power which is a silly game as iair superiority is something you should aim at given the effect it has on enemy operations.
I have no doubt that you would also try to downplay the effect of superior allied firepower from artillery and warships.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Aug 2019 19:36

Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 19:16

Besides the fact that my first name is not Mark you have clearly read things that i did not write.I did no more than stating the obvious fact that the side that has air superiority has a major advantage............................
But not on the days when weather stopped flying. Thus it was not a problem every day. I read that the Allied interdiction of the French rail lines made non-military movement vanish and by ending all civilian traffic the Germans were able to keep supplies moving albeit it with some difficulty. By stripping the rest of France of its rail assets the military trains kept rolling. It never got to the stage where military movements were stopped. Reading British Intelligence In The Second World War I was a bit surprised to see the intercepts about the trains needed to transport II SS Pz Korps to France (well over 100) with other units coming up from the south through Le Mans and Angers/Tours. I had always assumed all traffic was stopped but it seems I (we?) are mistaken.
There is a long ranking of such excuses and as soon as you dispose of one 'hydra' the next head enters the debate. The Allied artillery superiority? The equipment/supplies imbalance? The 'poor' quality of the Germans? Why not just admit to the obvious. The Western Allies had perfected a Army/Air Force/Navy killing machine than simply ground the Germans into the dust. In KISS terms the 1944-45 Allies completely outfought the Germans.
Last edited by Michael Kenny on 17 Aug 2019 19:58, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Aida1 » 17 Aug 2019 19:47

Michael Kenny wrote:
17 Aug 2019 19:36
Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 19:16

Besides the fact that my first name is not Mark you have clearly read things that i did not write.I did no more than stating the obvious fact that the side that has air superiority has a major advantage............................
But not on the days when weather stopped flying. Thus it was not a problem every day. There is a long ranking of such excuses and as soon as you dispose of one 'hydra' the next head enters the debate. The Allied artillery superiority? The equipment/supplies imbalance? The 'poor' quality of the Germans? Why not just admit to the obvious. The Western Allies had perfected a Army/Air Force/Navy killing machine than simply ground the Germans into the dust. In KISS terms the 1944-45 Allies completely outfought the Germans.
I am not surprised that you would also try to downplay the superior allied firepower.According to you we can
take all that away and things happen the same way.So in war having superior firepower and air superiority have no importance.Obviously they do and you aim to have that advantage.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Aida1 » 17 Aug 2019 19:55

Rommels Lagebeurteilung of 11 June 1944 gives a detailed explanation of what makes German operations difficult or impossible.Mentioned are allied air superiority,enemy naval artillery fire,superior material equipment and the way airborne units we're used(Entscheidung im Westen 1944 D Ose DVA 1982 pp 322-323).

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Aug 2019 20:00

Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 19:55
Rommels Lagebeurteilung of 11 June 1944 gives a detailed explanation of what makes German operations difficult or impossible. Mentioned are..............enemy naval artillery fire...........
Move inland 5 miles. Problem solved.

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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Aug 2019 20:10

Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 19:47


I am not surprised that you would also try to downplay the superior allied firepower.
I do not downplay it.
It did not happen by accident.
The Allies made choices.
They did not choose the German option of many multi-million men armies.
They looked at and rejected the German way of doing things.
Instead they built up smaller more mobile fully motorised Armies backed by a number of specialised arms (like artillery & TAC) specifically tasked with negating with the known German superiority in certain areas.
The Allies by design opted for smaller armies.
Smaller but more deadly armies.
History shows the Allies made the right choices and the Germans made the wrong choices.
An Allied soldier in 1944-45 was a formidable opponent.
British Inf ,,..,, (1).jpg
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Re: D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

Post by Aida1 » 17 Aug 2019 20:27

Michael Kenny wrote:
17 Aug 2019 20:00
Aida1 wrote:
17 Aug 2019 19:55
Rommels Lagebeurteilung of 11 June 1944 gives a detailed explanation of what makes German operations difficult or impossible. Mentioned are..............enemy naval artillery fire...........
Move inland 5 miles. Problem solved.
More than that.Shortening the front to escape the allied naval firepower was proposed by Hausser,Rommel and Geyr Von Schweppenburg on June 30(D Ose pp 327-329).Rundstedt agreed but Hitler forbade it and Rundstedt and Geyr lost their job(D Ose p 158).

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