D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

[Montgomery]

Hi All

Interesting phrase that Von Ronstadt requested to release the Tanks when the Allied arrived at the beached of Normandy in th D-Day!
As that was the plan by the German Army!
Some how Hitler was sleeping and they delayed the order to release the tanks X hours till he woke up!!

Was that true?
Which source mentioned that ? Memoirs of Whom ?

I heard it in interview of Ex-Army officer!!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9YJyUGdyz4

Cheers

[OpanaPointer]

https://www.uh.edu/engines/epi3129.htm

Harrison ignores the issue: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... nel-8.html pg. 333.

BBC less bashful. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48215675

https://www.military.com/daily-news/201 ... nzers.html

[Carl Schwamberger]

A detailed chronological description of the telephone calls from Rundsteadts HQ to OKW on 6th June is in 'Countdown to D Day' by Peter Margaritas. The primary sources for this are Jodels & Runsteadts testimony. Plus some surviving logbooks. Specifically that Jodel refused Rundsteadts plea to release the armored reserve, & second that he did not order the staff to awaken Hitler. The personal servants of Hitler including his doctor agreed Hitler did not awaken until 10:30 or a few minutes later. Surviving records of OKW, & staff recall Hitler did not receive his initial brief on the situation in Normandy unit nearly 11:30. He did not receive another full brief on the events until around 14:00 in the afternoon. After nearly a hour of discussion with the OKW staff he ordered the armored reserve released to Runsteadts orders. At 15:30 the tank divisions received the orders to move and started leaving their camouflage. This was almost ten hours after the defenders on the beaches first saw the invasion fleet at sunrise.

Much of the reasoning behind Jodels decision and Hitler taking half the afternoon to reach a decision was the incomplete and ambigious reports Rundsteadts staff were forwarding to OKW. Between effective jamming of German radio communications and destruction of the telephone lines the reports of the fighting were never delivered or severely delayed. It was not until after night fall that Rundsteadts HQ & OKW understood the actual scale of the attack.

Rommels Chief of Staff Hans Spidel also referred to a exchange of phone calls between he at Rommels HQ and Rundsteadts HQ about the release or non release of the armored reserve.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Carl,

I suppose the next question is how much difference did it make in practice?

Cheers,

Sid

[Sheldrake]

Hi Carl,

I suppose the next question is how much difference did it make in practice?

Cheers,

Sid

It rather screwed over Rommel's plan to fight the allies on the beaches...

The formation whihc could have responded earlier had it been permitted to deploy was the 12 SS Panzer Division which did not move toward the sea bourne landings until PM of D Day and did not come into action that day - although some recce cars were witnesses to events.

von Rundstedt did have authority to deploy the OB West reserves. One of these, the 21st Panzer Division, was the closest to the D Day beaches and was ordered to counter attack long before Higtler was woken and briefed.

The absence of firm orders from higher formations did not mean that the 12th SS and 21st Panzer divisions did nothing. Under their standing orders for operations against commandos and raids, both formations marched towards the nearest reports of paratroops. The 21st Panzer division against the British airborne landings east of the river Orne, and the 12 SS against the reports of paratroops in the area between the Dives and Seine from 15th Army who interpreted the paratroops and gliders scattered east by the wind as an attack. By the time the main threat had been identified these formations were strung out in the wrong direction and took many hours to to turn around.

[Hans1906]

"Der Führer schläft noch immer!"

One of famous scenes from the movie "The Longest Day":

German actor Herr Curd Jürgens complaining about the "Führer" in Berlin still sleeping...



Oha!, Hollywood, but they picked it up for the movie, for whatever...


Hans

[Montgomery]

This is exactly my point
There is no creditable primary source , e.g. a memoir of first or second line witness to prove this disaster dictatorship of Hitler and cowardness of the team around him!!

The German were building fortification across Atlantic and piling the troops and tanks near the beaches!
they were expecting this to happen any day any minute! waking up Hitler to release the tanks or even someone entitle to do that if Hitler is sick or killed , can be feasible !!

One of Hitler's fatal decision - turned out to be wrong - is halting the troops for almost 2-3 days near Dunkirk as reported by Heinz Guardian !! and no body still for sure know about the reason , why Hitler did that!! it is just theories
Keitel mentioned that in his memoire, and he said it clearly - it was unfortunately blamed fully on Hitler - Keitel admitted it was a wrong decision.
So, Hitler did it , and nobody knows till today for certain why he did it !! but all agreed it was wrong and his mistake saved huge amount of British soldier’s life fleeing from Dunkirk to British Isles !

There might be other logical reasons to delay the release of the tanks to engaged on D-Day!
for example:-
- The German troops probably for some reason – they thought it is not full-scale landing and just attack- and delayed the report to OKH.
- There might be no delay at all !! The tanks released within expected time, but it was too late as the allied massive number of artilleries, massive air raids/ carpet bombing the beaches and huge number of troops caused made no effect wither the tanks released 2-3 hours earlier or not!

Hitler was sleeping sounds like a bogus phony tale!!

Cheers

[Sheldrake]

This is all with the advantage of hindsight. At the time the officers at OKW had to make the decision to release reserves they had limited information.

These comments are from the Canadian Historical narrative and sourced to Maj Gen Horst Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels, (commonly known as von Buttlar), Chief of Army Operations (OKW) WFst from 12 Jan 42 to 15 Nov 44. It is not clear whether Jodl woke Hitler to obtain his opinion about the release of reserve or declined on his own authority. It should be noted that the request to release the armoured reserves made in the early hours to release the 12th SS was to release them to clear airborne forces East of the river Dives and not to a position where they could oppose the seabourne landings

The first reports of any enemy landing attempt began to flow to WFst during the night 5/6 Jun roughly between 0300 and 0500 hrs. They came from various sources . They soon gave a comparatively clear picture of a fairly strong airborne landing in the area of the mouth of the Orne, but those concerning enemy naval activity end the attack on the coast still gave no reliable impression on the strength and the extent of the landing, up to about 1000 hrs 6 Jun

The general impression by noon 6 Jun was approximately as follows:

a) Despite unfavourable weather conditions the enemy had attaoked the German coastal fortifications at the mouth of the Orne and to the lest of it, as well as between the Orne and the Vire, in combination with an airborne landing. The landing of the airborne troops was carried out in close tactical coordination with an attack from the sea; the attack was, for the moment, limited to a restricted area. There were, up to that time no indications that a major strategic operation was impending••••
b) Fighting has in progress around the coastal fortifications and in the zone of resistance behind the coastal 'sector under attack; the local reserves disposed in Normandy had been committed promptly, especially 21 pz Div.
c) No striking movements were to be observed in the Fifteenth Army sector, nor, in particular, along the Channel Coast.

This picture of the situation corresponded entirely to the WFst expectations With regard to the first phase of a large-acale invasion.

It left the question open, in the WFSt as well as in OKL and OKM, as to whether this was a tactical diversion, a strategic landing with a limited objective, or the prelude to the decisive main effort.

A telephone conversation with O.B.West's Operations Officer revealed that the O.B.West picture of the situation on the morning of 6 Jun was no clearer nor essentially more complete than that summarized above. The WFSt was not informed of any specific judgment by A Gp B which was in command on the spot, end the WFst was unaware of the absence of the Army Group Commander, Rommel.

In the general obscurity of the situation, O.B.West.s request that the only strategic reserves in the West which could rapidly be made available (pz Lehr and 12 SS pz Div) be given orders to march, and then the report that they were already on the march, came as a surprise. The request was refused by JodI. I do not know Whether prior to this refusal the Chief of WFst had obtained a decision from Hitler.

Col Gen 10dl based his refusal on the following considerations:
a) The picture of the situation at the time did not justify the opinion that the enemy's main landing operation had already begun••••
(UA study in Command", 2ll cit., Annex Five, quoting: O.C.L.H., F.S.B.:J1,S B-672, von
Buttlar, O.B.West Coumand Relationships 1943-1945, Part 26 of 31 parts, peras 1-6)

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

So, basically, (1) nobody needed to wake Hitler up to get the armour moving and (2) the German military command decided on its own to wait until the situation had clarified itself before ordering a full armoured response..

Is that a fair summary?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sheldrake]

Hi Guys,

So, basically, (1) nobody needed to wake Hitler up to get the armour moving and (2) the German military command decided on its own to wait until the situation had clarified itself before ordering a full armoured response..

Is that a fair summary?

Cheers,

Sid.

Yes

[Montgomery]

Hi Guys,

So, basically, (1) nobody needed to wake Hitler up to get the armour moving and (2) the German military command decided on its own to wait until the situation had clarified itself before ordering a full armoured response..

Is that a fair summary?

Cheers,

Sid.

Yes

There are more than theory here , I guess the fairest was the actual timing of releasing the armour was not related to Hitler sleeping or not.
And this sleeping of Hitler is not authenticated story!

Cheers

[Sheldrake]

This is from David Irvings War Path.

During the night the news of the parachute and glider landings in Normandy hardened, and ships’ engines were heard offshore. Goebbels, brought this news a few minutes after four a.m. at Berchtesgaden, exclaimed: ‘Thank God, at last! This is the final round.’ But the Führer was not awakened; his adjutants consulted with Jodl, who said that the uncertainty would not be dispelled until daybreak anyway. It followed from this that until midday Hitler took no decision on the appeals by Rundstedt to release the OKW panzer reserves to counterattack......
Hitler finally released the OKW panzer reserves – two divisions – at about 2.30 p.m. He and his generals were supremely confident all that first day.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Montgomery,

Hitler's sleep patterns are well established. He liked to talk into the small hours of the morning and then sleep late. It would very much have been an exception had he been awake at dawn on any day.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

That he was sleeping on D Day is a myth : he was early up ,because he had a meeting with the Hungarians in Schloss Klessheim ( Source is his LW adjudant,Nicolaus von Below ).

[Hans1906]

Sid,

as far as I personally know from hearsay, the "Führer" was a "night owl" ("Nachteule") and "late riser" ("Langschläfer"), and definitely not an "early riser" ("Frühaufsteher").

50 cents for just one of his dreams..!

German saying: "Der frühe Vogel fängt den Wurm!"
(There is much truth in this.)


Hans