I think this statement should have been removed, as stereotyping tactics has serious problems and is unqualified. The 4th Pz Army counteroffensive in Feb-March 1943 was in very different tactical and terrain conditions from the 48th Pz Corps counterattacks west of Kiev Nov-Dec 1943. The latter was characterized by higher German losses per results, and strongpoints heavily equipped with Soviet anti-tank batteries and minefields, while the former was in a more fluid environment. The former was characterized by Soviet offensive exhaustion and overextension, and then the German exploitive counteroffensive. It should be remarked that the US army used similar methods when performing fast advances once the environment got fluid, the German opponent was demoralized and defenses were weak.These rough tactics, though proven successful during 1943
German operations in the Ukraine, violated established German
armoured doctrine that propagated the use of all arms, especially
infantry support, artillery and airstrikes, to conduct operations. The
Russians, so familiar to the Germans, fought in an entirely different
manner than Anglo-Canadian forces. The lack of available resources
confronting both sides in the Ukraine often negated the ability to use
artillery preparatory fire to reduce enemy defences. Often groups of
German tanks with limited infantry support present could achieve
battlefield objectives using shock and surprise on the vast steppes of
the Ukraine, where Russian anti-tank and artillery forces in depth
were often absent.8
Besides that you'd be hard pressed to prove this claim and it would require a long paper to do so.. leave the connection to the "East" to the use of tanks in mobile shock action and Meyer and the 12 SS decision to do so on this day.