Possbilty of Seelöwe and Inertia

[Huszar666]

Morning, folks,

I made a few threads for the UK-side of the operation:
viewtopic.php?f=114&t=261526
viewtopic.php?f=114&t=261374
viewtopic.php?f=114&t=261547
And will probaly make a few others too (1st motMGBde+29th, 1st Armored, 1st Canadian, and "Other XIIth Corps stuff), if I find the time and energy.

Sonce we got sidetracked there lately, I will continue here with a non-related discussion.

Probably. However, my opinion is that the planning and preparation were real, but the realization set in that all the planning and preparation was likely useless, given the improvisational nature of the preparations, British naval superiority, and practical British air parity. The decision to delay/cancel was probably more rational than the decision to go forward though I suspect.

I, on the other, am not so sure about that. Considering the other Operations the Germans pulled off, Seelöwe looks like a work of a bored subaltern. I suspect, neither the Heer nor the Kriegsmarine wanted to have ynthig to do with the crap, concluded that the LW would not be able to achive its goal, and even if it achieved it, Hitler would not give the go-ahead. If if all that is given, they still could whine about this and that, and postpone the whole Operation so long, that it isn't possible in 1940 anymore.
So, they did some work as an alibi, gave some work-threapy for the subalterns so they didn' got bored overmuch, and been done with it.

The whole spiel tooks to me like a Occupation Force, and not a Landing Force. The UK sues for peace after the RAF-FC is defeated, keep some troops ready to move into Kent and Sussex. Resistance will be minimal, speed is of essence. Plan accordingly.

For sure, and you could easily take as a case in point the inertia that beset 21. Panzer on 6 June 1944

As far as I remember, the 8th Army wasn't on hes best at Gazala either. If not for Bir Hakheim, a whole axis division getting lost and the initial resistance of one of the motBdes, the battle would have been lost in the first day. If i'm correct (it's some years since I did some detailed reading on the battle) th British reserves got only rolling around noon, some 10 hours after initial contact. (but I may be mistaken here, it's been some years)
I'm however certain, that on 10th May it took the British and French to get moving into Belgium with the first elements.

Or the New Zealanders and MILFORCE. They had a fairly straightforward set of mission orders with objectives all nearby - Lympne and Hythe were just 25 to 30 kilometers away, half the distance traversed by 21. Panzer - and well reconnoitered.

So given the British would almost certainly have about three to five days notice of the loading of the German fleet, 18 to 24 hours notice of its sortieing and assembly off the coast, 12 hours notice of it beginning the cross-Channel movement, and two to three hours notice of its probable landing sites, I suspect the inertia experienced by British units in SEELÖWE would be considerably less than that of German units in NEPTUNE.

There are some compications here.
Hythe was not under 1st London's controll, but directly under XIIth Corps, and the rest of Zone B was under 45th Division, still not under 1st London control. Even if we assume, the Folkstone-garrison was keeping 1st London somewhat in the loop, and infromation doesn't go up the chain to XIIth Corps first and than down to 1st London, the situation south of Dymchurch would be more concerning - even if 1st London knows about the exact situation to begin with. Then the situation gets complicated, when around 6 Btls of Fallschirmjäger start falling from the sky, a good hour after the initial landing. On top of 2nd London Bde and 1st LRB HQ. (and even in the area of the neighbouring division). After that, 1st London will lose contact with 1st QW and 1st LSC (contact goes through 2nd Lon Bde, even if the two Btls have wireless and can be reached from the Division Net), and even with the rest of 1st LRB (the companies did not have wireless 1940). Meaning: 1st LonDiv HQ will have no clue what is exactly going on, where everyone is, but only a vague idea.
Enter MILFORCE and 8th RTR. Neither is under control of 1st LonDiv, they will get info from 2nd NZ and/or XIIth Corps. XIIth Corps will probably have some idea what is going on with a few hour's lag (but not what is going on in 1st LonDiv's area, since 1st LonDiv, has no clue either), and than it has to pass word along to 2nd NZ and/or Milforce. I suspect, since 1st LonDiv will have no clue, what is going on, will send out patrols (Carrier- and if it exists MC Platoon of 2/5 Queens) from Ham Street to Canterbury, and maybe ask Milforce to contribute with its Recon Element, ie C Sqd/NZ Cav. After the Fallis fell from the sky. I would be extremly surprised, if C Sqd would leave Ashford earlier than two hours after the Main Air Landing. They would need around an hour to reach the "front" - which they don't know, where it is - so three hours after the MAL and four hours after the initial landing. And probaly run head first into an ambush.
Assuming, the wireless has the range to reach Milforce HQ, and they don't need to drive back to Ashford to report, it is at this point, that 1st LonDiv and Milforce get the info they need to start rolling. I assume here, that Milforce can (or will) act on its own, and don't have to get approval from 2nd NZ/XIIth Corps. And they can word pass along to 8th RTR and they can/will act on their own, and don't wait for approval from above.
Take some time to pass word along (a tanker will not report to the boss directly, but to some guy at the radio, who passes word along to his boss, who passes word along... and so forth) correlate the info, make a decision, pass word along to the troops, and for them to start rolling. Let's say, just an hour (Nagumo at Midway, for example got the info about the US carriers one hour after the message was sent). Milforce starts rolling four hours after the MAL and five after the initial landing. They (the leading element!) need around one hour to reach the front (probably they know where it is give or take a mile or so), so they probably don't run head first into an ambush. We have MAL+5 and S+6 now, and the trailing element of Milforce is still around an hour away. 8th RTR (or at least C Sqd with the Matilda IIs) maybe just reaches Ashford, and still have 1+ hours for the leading elements to reach the front.
That is all assuming 1st LondDiv is willing to/able to/aloved to contact Milforce, C Sqd/Nz Cav can start rolling MAL+2/S+3, and is able to give word via radio and don't have to drive back to HQ (that's another hour), and 8th RTR also starts rolling MAL+4/S+5. And there are no craters or debries from an air attack, there are no refugees clogging the roads (there will be some refugees, no matter of orders) and no roadblocks some overzealous HG put up.
Coordination between arms was never a strong point of the British - 1940 it certainly wasn't - so you can assume, Milforce will give it a try without 8th RTR, then C Sqd/8th RTR will give it a try without Milforce, and then Milforce and 8th RTR will give it a third (uncoordinated) try again.

There is at least a chance 1st LonDiv and Milforce have contact and each knows something, but that's not true for 2nd NZ. They will have to wait for info (and orders!) from XIIth corps, who in turn will have info on 45th Div area, maybe Folkstone and Dover, but nothing about 1st LonDiv. At least as long 1st LonDiv doesn't know itself. That would be probably no earlier than around MAL+3,5/S+4,5. Collating, passing word along, collating, passing word along, start rolling, and 2nd NZ starts rolling... around MAL+6/S+7. Maybe a bit earlier. Maidstone-Sellindge is around 27 miles (along the M20, if you take the byways, probably a bit more), so with 8mls/hour a bit more than 4 hours for the leading elements. Arrival around MAL+10/S+11, so... say around 1700, and the Kiwis still need 4-5 hours for the trailing elements to arrive.

[Richard Anderson]

Sonce we got sidetracked there lately, I will continue here with a non-related discussion.

More SEELÖWE topics? Obviously you intend to make life even more horrible for the next generation of Huszar666's!

The whole spiel tooks to me like a Occupation Force, and not a Landing Force. The UK sues for peace after the RAF-FC is defeated, keep some troops ready to move into Kent and Sussex. Resistance will be minimal, speed is of essence. Plan accordingly.

Too much effort went into the planning, development and assembly of extemporaneous landing craft and ships, tactics and training, and the like for it all to have been a bluff/plan for occupation. Rather, I think the evidence is the Heer got the bit in its teeth, charged on assuming its capabilities at improvisation would carry through on what it viewed as just a complex river crossing operation, and kept ignoring the Kriegsmarine's warnings about the realities of the operation. The final nails in the operation's caution was the continued variable weather, which affected the mine laying program and the prospects for launching the convoys under the required conditions, the latest of the year making it that much worse, the realization that the improvised ramped "landing craft" were actually unworkable death traps once and if they got to the far shore, and the failure of the Luftwaffe to secure even marginal air superiority over England.

Then, of course, there was Hitler's waffling indecisiveness.

As far as I remember, the 8th Army wasn't on hes best at Gazala either. If not for Bir Hakheim, a whole axis division getting lost and the initial resistance of one of the motBdes, the battle would have been lost in the first day. If i'm correct (it's some years since I did some detailed reading on the battle) th British reserves got only rolling around noon, some 10 hours after initial contact. (but I may be mistaken here, it's been some years)
I'm however certain, that on 10th May it took the British and French to get moving into Belgium with the first elements.

Gazala was a mess for many reasons, but there was not an exposed flank the Germans could exploit in SEELÖWE.

There are some compications here.
Hythe was not under 1st London's controll, but directly under XIIth Corps, and the rest of Zone B was under 45th Division, still not under 1st London control.

Indeed, they were essentially fortified areas under the direct control of XII Corps...as were both 1st London and 45th Wessex Division. The New Zealanders and MILFORCE were also under direct XII Corps control as reserve. There possible actions would be either under XII Corps or by one of the area commands if XII Corps elected to place all or part of them under command of those units. That is military SOP, so I'm not sure why it would be such a problem?

Even if we assume, the Folkstone-garrison was keeping 1st London somewhat in the loop, and infromation doesn't go up the chain to XIIth Corps first and than down to 1st London, the situation south of Dymchurch would be more concerning - even if 1st London knows about the exact situation to begin with.

The typical way it would work would be the high muckity mucks give the CROMWELL alert and beginning feeding movement observations and estimates to Eastern Command and XII Corps...and the other major commands possibly threatened. Visual observations of the convoy movements, assuming they are not delayed because the Royal Navy ignores everything and has a spot of tea instead, by the forces in the coastal areas, would begin around 0430-0500, at which point the four main landing zones would be obvious.

Then the situation gets complicated, when around 6 Btls of Fallschirmjäger start falling from the sky, a good hour after the initial landing.

Er, no, that was not the plan for the Fallschirmjäger. For one thing, they certainly did not have the Ju 52 necessary for such an assault, there may have been 200 operationally ready, but certainly no more than that.

As best can be made out, the "plan" was to time the initial Fallschirmjäger landing for 0600, when the Vorausabteilungen were supposed to land. The LLSR would land by glider with KG Meindl (Stab and I. Btl.) at a LZ at Hythe, were to secure crossings over the Royal Military Canal at and west of Hythe and advance along the line from Hythe rail station to Saltwood and KG Stenzler (II. Btl.) would land at a LZ at Paddlesworth. Then the Tante Ju's would return to France - those not shot down...the route of KG Stenzler alone probably took it at low level right over the Bofors at Hawkinge as well as over any AA at Folkestone - and load up the next bunch, paratroopers this time.

KG Bräuer would drop on a LZ S of Postling, and march 5.5 miles east to take command of KG Stenzler, then seize Sandgate and the heights west of Paddlesworth. KG Bräuer was a reinforced battalion comprised of a battalion of FJR 1, PzJgKp/FJR 1, and the FJ Pionier "Btl", which was actually only a reinforced platoon under Witzig, given the battalion did not complete organization until the winter of 1940/1941.

Then the Tante Ju's would turn around again and bring in KG Sturm with the two battalions of FJR 2., which would drop into LZ Paddlesworth and secure the N Flank N of Postling. Then around again, to bring in KG Heidrich, with two battalions of the newly-formed FJR 3, also on LZ Paddlesworth, with a mission to secure the W flank and detach one battalion to capture Lympne airfield for landings by 22. Infanterie-Division. And then turn around again...

Do you notice a problem in that "plan"?

On top of 2nd London Bde and 1st LRB HQ. (and even in the area of the neighbouring division). After that, 1st London will lose contact with 1st QW and 1st LSC (contact goes through 2nd Lon Bde, even if the two Btls have wireless and can be reached from the Division Net), and even with the rest of 1st LRB (the companies did not have wireless 1940). Meaning: 1st LonDiv HQ will have no clue what is exactly going on, where everyone is, but only a vague idea.

That is pretty imaginative, but has nothing to do with the actual German plan. Yes, 1st LRB will have an interesting time fighting KG Meindl, but they would not be on top of them...the only likely place for a glider LZ was Hythe Green and Holman's Field, although some may have been tasked to land on the north side of the RMC where the Sainsbury's is now? The German airborne plan never got into real specifics. So call it in a perfect world 100 Dfs 230 and 1,000 Sturmtruppen.

So why does comms get lost because the Germans are attacking to seize the crossings of the RMC at Hythe and then advancing north on Sandgate? It rather looks like they would be pushing the battalion onto its reserves? And I suspect having sat there for three months the Signalers have had a field day laying redundant wire communications...they had little else to do.

Enter MILFORCE and 8th RTR. Neither is under control of 1st LonDiv, they will get info from 2nd NZ and/or XIIth Corps. XIIth Corps will probably have some idea what is going on with a few hour's lag (but not what is going on in 1st LonDiv's area, since 1st LonDiv, has no clue either), and than it has to pass word along to 2nd NZ and/or Milforce.

Again imaginative, but why? None of the German attacks threaten Folkestone or Dover, which have a good view of what is transpiring. the New Zealanders and MILFORCE are XII Corps reserve, if they get placed under command 1st London Division in whole or part, the SOP is to put them in the picture.

I suspect, since 1st LonDiv will have no clue, what is going on, will send out patrols (Carrier- and if it exists MC Platoon of 2/5 Queens) from Ham Street to Canterbury, and maybe ask Milforce to contribute with its Recon Element, ie C Sqd/NZ Cav. After the Fallis fell from the sky. I would be extremly surprised, if C Sqd would leave Ashford earlier than two hours after the Main Air Landing. They would need around an hour to reach the "front" - which they don't know, where it is - so three hours after the MAL and four hours after the initial landing. And probaly run head first into an ambush.

An ambush? From whom? KG Stenzlar? There job was to secure the LZ at Paddlesworth so the carousel of Ju 52 could bring in more of the division.

Assuming, the wireless has the range to reach Milforce HQ, and they don't need to drive back to Ashford to report, it is at this point, that 1st LonDiv and Milforce get the info they need to start rolling. I assume here, that Milforce can (or will) act on its own, and don't have to get approval from 2nd NZ/XIIth Corps. And they can word pass along to 8th RTR and they can/will act on their own, and don't wait for approval from above.
Take some time to pass word along (a tanker will not report to the boss directly, but to some guy at the radio, who passes word along to his boss, who passes word along... and so forth) correlate the info, make a decision, pass word along to the troops, and for them to start rolling. Let's say, just an hour (Nagumo at Midway, for example got the info about the US carriers one hour after the message was sent). Milforce starts rolling four hours after the MAL and five after the initial landing. They (the leading element!) need around one hour to reach the front (probably they know where it is give or take a mile or so), so they probably don't run head first into an ambush. We have MAL+5 and S+6 now, and the trailing element of Milforce is still around an hour away. 8th RTR (or at least C Sqd with the Matilda IIs) maybe just reaches Ashford, and still have 1+ hours for the leading elements to reach the front.
That is all assuming 1st LondDiv is willing to/able to/aloved to contact Milforce, C Sqd/Nz Cav can start rolling MAL+2/S+3, and is able to give word via radio and don't have to drive back to HQ (that's another hour), and 8th RTR also starts rolling MAL+4/S+5. And there are no craters or debries from an air attack, there are no refugees clogging the roads (there will be some refugees, no matter of orders) and no roadblocks some overzealous HG put up.
Coordination between arms was never a strong point of the British - 1940 it certainly wasn't - so you can assume, Milforce will give it a try without 8th RTR, then C Sqd/8th RTR will give it a try without Milforce, and then Milforce and 8th RTR will give it a third (uncoordinated) try again.

There is at least a chance 1st LonDiv and Milforce have contact and each knows something, but that's not true for 2nd NZ. They will have to wait for info (and orders!) from XIIth corps, who in turn will have info on 45th Div area, maybe Folkstone and Dover, but nothing about 1st LonDiv. At least as long 1st LonDiv doesn't know itself. That would be probably no earlier than around MAL+3,5/S+4,5. Collating, passing word along, collating, passing word along, start rolling, and 2nd NZ starts rolling... around MAL+6/S+7. Maybe a bit earlier. Maidstone-Sellindge is around 27 miles (along the M20, if you take the byways, probably a bit more), so with 8mls/hour a bit more than 4 hours for the leading elements. Arrival around MAL+10/S+11, so... say around 1700, and the Kiwis still need 4-5 hours for the trailing elements to arrive.

Nicely imagined, but based considerably upon assumptions. Mess with the assumptions and you mess with the results. The biggest ones seem to me to be the idea that after three months in position the British would have limited redundancy in communications, little idea of the terrain, no contingency plans for the biggest bugaboo they had - an airborne landing - and a basic inability to see and assess what was going on from the numerous OP and BOP along the coast and high ground.

[Huszar666]

Morning,

More SEELÖWE topics? Obviously you intend to make life even more horrible for the next generation of Huszar666's!

The next generation can come and complain. At least I put the links for the other threads up

Er, no, that was not the plan for the Fallschirmjäger. For one thing, they certainly did not have the Ju 52 necessary for such an assault, there may have been 200 operationally ready, but certainly no more than that.

Er, yes, it was. A least according to that undated Op order.
First Meindl and Stenzler land with gliders an Hythe and Paddlesworth at the same time the Vorausabteilungen land.
Then the Main Air Landing happens, one hour later, by Ju 52. Namely: 2 Btls in the north, 2 Btls agains Lympne and cover to the West, in Btl (Bräuer) with all the AT-Guns of the other Rgts to push against Hawkinge and Folkstone, and one Btl as "reserve". The two Btls in the North plus the "reserve" Btl would land on top of the Bde and Btl HQ.

Indeed, they were essentially fortified areas under the direct control of XII Corps...as were both 1st London and 45th Wessex Division. The New Zealanders and MILFORCE were also under direct XII Corps control as reserve. There possible actions would be either under XII Corps or by one of the area commands if XII Corps elected to place all or part of them under command of those units. That is military SOP, so I'm not sure why it would be such a problem?

Because Beach B was part in the zone of one division, part directly under Corps supervision, and part (the hinterlands) under yet another entity. Unsually such a distribution lends itself to utter chaos.

The typical way it would work would be the high muckity mucks give the CROMWELL alert and beginning feeding movement observations and estimates to Eastern Command and XII Corps...and the other major commands possibly threatened. Visual observations of the convoy movements, assuming they are not delayed because the Royal Navy ignores everything and has a spot of tea instead, by the forces in the coastal areas, would begin around 0430-0500, at which point the four main landing zones would be obvious.

You need someone the point out the fleet leaving the harbours in the first place. Than you have to have someone constantly shadowing the fleet and reporting to you, and third (to delay) have the RN reach the scene in time.
Since it would take a few days to load everything, leave the harbours and form up, I could get behind the idea, that the British somehow manage to get the info. Since the RAF is beaten, and the LW rules the skies above the Channel (THAT's in the Op Order! The LW doesn't rule over the Channel and SE-England, the fleet will not sally), it would be hard to explain, but why not, maybe somehow the British manage it. And don't missinterpret it as an invasion NORTH of the Thames - as they believed till October.
That you somehow can shadow the fleet(s) I find harder to believe. Who would do the shadowing at night? The RAF or the RN?
As for the RN intervening, that's more of a legend than a realistic possibility. The Op Order called for Air Superiority over SE-England, which would mean, Sheerness/Chatham AND Harwich (it's actually easier to reach Harwich than Chatham from France, and if the RAF-FC pulls back, Harwich would have exactly the same cover, as Chatham) would be without air cover. If the RN doesn't want to lose it's ships in harbour, they would need to pull back everything above (and including) destroyers to the next port. That is Hull. Even if the sally is detected, the course correctly plotted, and the Hull Force does sally, it would be interesting to watch as they plow through all those minefield (UK and Ger) laying around south of the Thames. At night.

Again imaginative, but why? None of the German attacks threaten Folkestone or Dover, which have a good view of what is transpiring. the New Zealanders and MILFORCE are XII Corps reserve, if they get placed under command 1st London Division in whole or part, the SOP is to put them in the picture.

The problem is, Folkstone/Shorncliffe may report to XII. Corps (maybe even Dover, I'm not exactly certain they would have a clue what is happening at Hythe and further) what the situation is on the beaches (up to, say a bit south of Dymchurch), and can maybe report on "A lot of Fallis falling from the skies), but that is Folkstone/Shorncliffe with a spotty recolection what is happening in the North and at Lympne. 1st LondDiv/XII.Corps still have to ascertain what exactly is happening out of Folkstone's/Shorncliffe's view. Even if we assume Folkstone/Shorncliffe does report (see) the MAL to XII.Corps. At the info gets through in time.

An ambush? From whom? KG Stenzlar? There job was to secure the LZ at Paddlesworth so the carousel of Ju 52 could bring in more of the division.

One Btl of Fallis, who land West of Lympne as in the undated order.

Nicely imagined, but based considerably upon assumptions. Mess with the assumptions and you mess with the results. The biggest ones seem to me to be the idea that after three months in position the British would have limited redundancy in communications, little idea of the terrain, no contingency plans for the biggest bugaboo they had - an airborne landing - and a basic inability to see and assess what was going on from the numerous OP and BOP along the coast and high ground.

I read somewhere in the other threads, that since Milforce/2nd NZ had one of their objectives as "attack on the Lympne-Hawking-Axis" they new where the Fallis would land, and since they know where they would land, it would be obvious that Milforce/2nd NZ would already be there, when they land. I think, my argument is more compelling

[Richard Anderson]

We seem to be moving between Fantasy SEELÖWE, where all the planning is completed, all the resources are available, and all the prerequisite conditions fall into place, and Reality SEELÖWE, where the planning keeps change, resources are limited, and the prerequisite conditions are only partly met, if at all.

Er, yes, it was. A least according to that undated Op order.
First Meindl and Stenzler land with gliders an Hythe and Paddlesworth at the same time the Vorausabteilungen land.
Then the Main Air Landing happens, one hour later, by Ju 52. Namely: 2 Btls in the north, 2 Btls agains Lympne and cover to the West, in Btl (Bräuer) with all the AT-Guns of the other Rgts to push against Hawkinge and Folkstone, and one Btl as "reserve". The two Btls in the North plus the "reserve" Btl would land on top of the Bde and Btl HQ.

Sure, but I was viewing it from the Reality SEELÖWE POV where the entire Luftwaffe in September averaged just 337.5 transport aircraft of all kinds operational during the month of September and where there were likely fewer than 200 that would be prepared to fly such a mission. Yes, the Luftwaffe plan envisaged six FJ Abteilungen descending from the skies at 0700, but I do not see how they could get that done?

We can look at MERKUR, where the Luftwaffe had concentrated 520 Ju 52 out of its 615 total operational transport aircraft, to lift some 10,100 para (in 9 battalions and attachments) and 750 glider troops. I do not see how a force of c. 6,000 para and 400 to 500 glider troops can manage with under 200 transports? Even if they do fly from French bases with the first wave, return, refuel, embark a second wave, and drop it within an hour of the first wave? For one thing, what French bases?

Because Beach B was part in the zone of one division, part directly under Corps supervision, and part (the hinterlands) under yet another entity. Unsually such a distribution lends itself to utter chaos.

Perhaps...except the landing forces assigned to B were similarly split, with half landing on the right side of the same boundary and some on the left...and then going off in multiple directions. Usually such a distribution also lends itself to utter chaos.

You need someone the point out the fleet leaving the harbours in the first place. Than you have to have someone constantly shadowing the fleet and reporting to you, and third (to delay) have the RN reach the scene in time.

The RAF, observing visually from Dover, the CHL/CD radar picture, the odd nighttime cruiser and destroyer bombardment raids, and the nightly Auxiliary Patrol vessels are insufficient? The invasion fleets are moving at a maximum 5 to 6 knots per hour.

Since it would take a few days to load everything, leave the harbours and form up, I could get behind the idea, that the British somehow manage to get the info. Since the RAF is beaten, and the LW rules the skies above the Channel (THAT's in the Op Order! The LW doesn't rule over the Channel and SE-England, the fleet will not sally), it would be hard to explain, but why not, maybe somehow the British manage it.

Okay, so now we are back to Fantasy SEELÖWE? Where the intensive mining operations taking ten days is accomplished, the weather cooperates, the RAF is beaten, and the Royal Navy is incompetent, while every British leader has donned their blindfold?

And don't missinterpret it as an invasion NORTH of the Thames - as they believed till October.

Actually, Brooke's order to move 31 Brigade is a good indicator they had gotten away from that idea...the assembly of vessels in Le Havre helped. In any case, CROMWELL alerted everyone to imminent invasion and once Flotte B passes through the straits the notion of anyone landing north of the Thames pretty much evaporates.

That you somehow can shadow the fleet(s) I find harder to believe. Who would do the shadowing at night? The RAF or the RN?

The Auxiliary Patrol, CHL/CD, standing RN patrols.

As for the RN intervening, that's more of a legend than a realistic possibility. The Op Order called for Air Superiority over SE-England, which would mean, Sheerness/Chatham AND Harwich (it's actually easier to reach Harwich than Chatham from France, and if the RAF-FC pulls back, Harwich would have exactly the same cover, as Chatham) would be without air cover. If the RN doesn't want to lose it's ships in harbour, they would need to pull back everything above (and including) destroyers to the next port. That is Hull. Even if the sally is detected, the course correctly plotted, and the Hull Force does sally, it would be interesting to watch as they plow through all those minefield (UK and Ger) laying around south of the Thames. At night.

Back to Fantasy SEELÖWE again. German mine fields are laid as planned, but the RN does not know what fields they themselves have laid and have lost the capability of sweeping German mines.

The problem is, Folkstone/Shorncliffe may report to XII. Corps (maybe even Dover, I'm not exactly certain they would have a clue what is happening at Hythe and further) what the situation is on the beaches (up to, say a bit south of Dymchurch), and can maybe report on "A lot of Fallis falling from the skies), but that is Folkstone/Shorncliffe with a spotty recolection what is happening in the North and at Lympne. 1st LondDiv/XII.Corps still have to ascertain what exactly is happening out of Folkstone's/Shorncliffe's view. Even if we assume Folkstone/Shorncliffe does report (see) the MAL to XII.Corps. At the info gets through in time.

So Dover and Deal Sub-Areas are independent entities reporting only as they desire to whom they desire? Really? And here I thought they were all Sub-Areas of the XII Corps Area.

One Btl of Fallis, who land West of Lympne as in the undated order.

I must have missed that, since I see one battalion of KG Heidrich landing at Paddlesworth and then heading west to Lympne?

I read somewhere in the other threads, that since Milforce/2nd NZ had one of their objectives as "attack on the Lympne-Hawking-Axis" they new where the Fallis would land, and since they know where they would land, it would be obvious that Milforce/2nd NZ would already be there, when they land. I think, my argument is more compelling

No, they did not know where the FJ would land, but they were pretty well fixed on dealing with them when they did land. The FJ were the big buggaboo, along with Fifth Columnists. Would whatever concentration of FJ they could achieve at Paddlesworth halt a counterattack by MILFORCE supported by the New Zealanders? I dunno, because I still haven't figured out how the Germans managed to get a substantial force of FJ at Paddlesworth in the first place...unless they invoke Fantasy SEELÖWE.

[Huszar666]

Morning,

We seem to be moving between Fantasy SEELÖWE, where all the planning is completed, all the resources are available, and all the prerequisite conditions fall into place, and Reality SEELÖWE, where the planning keeps change, resources are limited, and the prerequisite conditions are only partly met, if at all.

If we assume, the go ahead-order is given, and the Op really starts, we do have to assume:
- the LW did manage to beat the RAF
- the planning was completed in time
- the majority of the resources are availabe where they should be
- the other prerequistes are also met.
If only one of these are not met, the order will not be given, and the fleet will not sally. Even if Hitler in fact does give the order. And then we still have to assume, the Heer and Kriegsmarine does not stall till October because of rain, wind, waves, sunshine, whatever.
(and all these have to be met in the first ten days of September at the very latest, because the 24th was the very last day possible, the Germans needed 10 days to organise, and at least I would like to have a reserve of a few days)

So yes, if we talk about Seelöwe happening, we can base the discussion on the As Is situation in Mid-September.

Sure, but I was viewing it from the Reality SEELÖWE POV where the entire Luftwaffe in September averaged just 337.5 transport aircraft of all kinds operational during the month of September and where there were likely fewer than 200 that would be prepared to fly such a mission. Yes, the Luftwaffe plan envisaged six FJ Abteilungen descending from the skies at 0700, but I do not see how they could get that done?

I do remember around 400 Ju 52 plus some other types. The LW told Hitler, they have 1000 transport planes, but I assume there were smaller planes in this figure included. Not 200.

The RAF, observing visually from Dover, the CHL/CD radar picture, the odd nighttime cruiser and destroyer bombardment raids, and the nightly Auxiliary Patrol vessels are insufficient? The invasion fleets are moving at a maximum 5 to 6 knots per hour.

RAF, not so much. Visual observation at night, not so much. The odd nighttime force, they wold have come down from Hull, so it is highly possible, they miss the whole show. As for the small vessels, they have to come down from Sheernes or Harwich (Dover and Ramsgate did not have much left, if I recall correctly).

Okay, so now we are back to Fantasy SEELÖWE? Where the intensive mining operations taking ten days is accomplished, the weather cooperates, the RAF is beaten, and the Royal Navy is incompetent, while every British leader has donned their blindfold?

the first three are a given, see above, and I did not say the last two. However, even the RN and leadership are not all-seeing and all-knowing. They need information too.

Back to Fantasy SEELÖWE again. German mine fields are laid as planned, but the RN does not know what fields they themselves have laid and have lost the capability of sweeping German mines.

The first is a given, see above. Of course the RN will know, where they have their own mines - and will not go there, since there are signs posted: "Danger! Binefields!". I do not think any capain would willingly enter a known minefield, since well, there are things there built to sink ships. As for the last part, its a bit iffy. If they realise, there are minefields planted somewhere, I would say, they will to at least try to sweep them. Than post a Sign: "DAnger! Binefields!" and do not send their warships into the area.

So Dover and Deal Sub-Areas are independent entities reporting only as they desire to whom they desire? Really? And here I thought they were all Sub-Areas of the XII Corps Area.

I don't understand. They have to see things to report, they will report to their supperiors, the report has to reach the addressee (in time), the report has to be processed by the addressee, and than orders have to be transmitted to subordinates. If there is insuficient intel, the boss can not make an educated quess.

I must have missed that, since I see one battalion of KG Heidrich landing at Paddlesworth and then heading west to Lympne?

No. Stenzelr (LLSturm) should land at Paddlesworth and stay there. MAybe take Hawkinge with KGr Bräuer from FJR 1.
FJR 2 should land at Postling and take over the defense to the north.
FJR 3 (that's Heidrich) should land with one Btl at Lympne and take it, with the other Btl land in the West and screen to the West. According to the map in Golla, this screen should be erected somewhere between Sellindge and Bonnington.
There is no mention or intention to let someone land in the NE and than make a hike to Lympne and further West.

o, they did not know where the FJ would land, but they were pretty well fixed on dealing with them when they did land. The FJ were the big buggaboo, along with Fifth Columnists. Would whatever concentration of FJ they could achieve at Paddlesworth halt a counterattack by MILFORCE supported by the New Zealanders? I dunno, because I still haven't figured out how the Germans managed to get a substantial force of FJ at Paddlesworth in the first place...unless they invoke Fantasy SEELÖWE.

Of course, the Fallis at Paddlesworth and north of Postling would not be able to halt a counterattack from the West. They are there to stall a counterattack from the North or North-East. The Fallis at Lympne and further West are the folks who should/would deal with anything coming from the West. And those two Btls will not land anywhere near Paddlesworth-Postling, but at Lympne and further West.

Ok, maybe you gould shave some time here and there from my "time table", but Milforce will not and could not reach the Front (i.e something around Sellindge) much earlier than MAL+4/S+5. Definately not at or around MAL+1/S+2. Simply because of information, inertia and distance to travel.

We have the problem with RAF Lympne, that we do not know what and who defended the airfield. We can assume, there was some RAF detachement there (who would report most likely to their supperior at RAF Somewhere). What else there was and who they were (i.e. who they will report to), we do not know. We can only assume, that it was some HD-folks (I don't mean HG-folks!) and maybe some Field Army (as in 1st LRB or Engineers, or whatever). But we don't know.

[Richard Anderson]

If we assume, the go ahead-order is given, and the Op really starts, we do have to assume:
- the LW did manage to beat the RAF
- the planning was completed in time
- the majority of the resources are availabe where they should be
- the other prerequistes are also met.
If only one of these are not met, the order will not be given, and the fleet will not sally.

I agree, but since none of those prerequisites were completed in time, any scenario based on it is a fantasy, something that did not happen. Furthermore, any scenario based upon it going forward while ignoring any or all of those prerequisites, is also a fantasy scenario.

However, assuming the fantasy, then likely the British lose, because then the German plan functions perfectly.

Even if Hitler in fact does give the order.

That I am not so sure about.

And then we still have to assume, the Heer and Kriegsmarine does not stall till October because of rain, wind, waves, sunshine, whatever.
(and all these have to be met in the first ten days of September at the very latest, because the 24th was the very last day possible, the Germans needed 10 days to organise, and at least I would like to have a reserve of a few days)

Agreed and also the problem with the repetitive what if scenarios that only function by ignoring all that.

So yes, if we talk about Seelöwe happening, we can base the discussion on the As Is situation in Mid-September.

Yes, and in that case, the failure to complete the mine barriers and the poor weather precludes the operation setting off.

I do remember around 400 Ju 52 plus some other types. The LW told Hitler, they have 1000 transport planes, but I assume there were smaller planes in this figure included. Not 200.

If the Luftwaffe told Hitler that, they were lying. The total of all transport aircraft, not Ju 52, in the Luftwaffe as of 14 September were 413, of which 352 were operational. As of 21 September it was 415 and 350. That would include the various Transport-Staffeln of the Flieger-Korps, as well as the smaller number of specialty transports like the Ju 89, Ju 90, He 115, B&V seaplanes, and the like. However, the major deficit was in operational crews trained in parachute operations.

I did forget that a Luftlandegeschwader for the Dfs 230 was working up with obsolescent Do 17 at Hildesheim from 27 July, but I do not know when they became operational.

RAF, not so much. Visual observation at night, not so much. The odd nighttime force, they wold have come down from Hull, so it is highly possible, they miss the whole show. As for the small vessels, they have to come down from Sheernes or Harwich (Dover and Ramsgate did not have much left, if I recall correctly).

Indeed, if it is Fantasy SEELÖWE then all the CH, CHL, and GL radar has been knocked out by Stuka, which did not prove so sadly vulnerable in August and so were not shot down in droves, crippling the Stukagruppen until winter 1940/1941.

the first three are a given, see above, and I did not say the last two. However, even the RN and leadership are not all-seeing and all-knowing. They need information too.

Yes, but it is only under the terms of Fantasy SEELÖWE that the multiple sources of information available to the British go dark.

The first is a given, see above. Of course the RN will know, where they have their own mines - and will not go there, since there are signs posted: "Danger! Binefields!". I do not think any capain would willingly enter a known minefield, since well, there are things there built to sink ships. As for the last part, its a bit iffy. If they realise, there are minefields planted somewhere, I would say, they will to at least try to sweep them. Than post a Sign: "DAnger! Binefields!" and do not send their warships into the area.

Except the Germans did lay some of the minefields, but only gained minimal results, because the British swept them. And vice, versa, although at a glance the British mine laying was more productive in sinking German ships.

I don't understand. They have to see things to report, they will report to their supperiors, the report has to reach the addressee (in time), the report has to be processed by the addressee, and than orders have to be transmitted to subordinates. If there is insuficient intel, the boss can not make an educated quess.

However, the only case when there is insufficient intelligence would be if Fantasy SEELÖWE were in play. In reality, the British were able to maintain near real=time intelligence on the German developments from multiple sources.

No. Stenzelr (LLSturm) should land at Paddlesworth and stay there. MAybe take Hawkinge with KGr Bräuer from FJR 1.
FJR 2 should land at Postling and take over the defense to the north.
FJR 3 (that's Heidrich) should land with one Btl at Lympne and take it, with the other Btl land in the West and screen to the West. According to the map in Golla, this screen should be erected somewhere between Sellindge and Bonnington.
There is no mention or intention to let someone land in the NE and than make a hike to Lympne and further West.

7.Flieger-Division (drop zones Lyminge-Sellindge-Hythe) Generalmajor Richard Putzier (landing by KG Meindl and Stenzler as seaborne landings begin, other elements land one hour later)
FJR 1 (I.-III. Btl.) Oberst Bruno Bräuer
KG Bräuer – LZ S of Postling, takes command of KG Stenzler, seizes Sandgate and heights west of Paddlesworth
Btl/FJR 1
PzJgKp/FJR 1
FJ Pionier Btl (actually only a reinforced platoon under Witzig, the battalion was completed until the winter of 1940/141).
Division Reserve
FJR 1 (-)
FJR 2 (I. and II. Btl. only, there was no III.) Oberst Alfred Sturm
KG Sturm – LZ Paddlesworth, secure N Flank N of Postling
FJR 3 (I.-III. Btl.) Oberst Richard Heidrich (newly formed in July)
KG Heidrich – LZ Paddlesworth, secure W flank and detach one battalion to capture Lympne airfield for landings by 22. Inf-Div
LLSR 1 Oberst Eugen Meindl (actually had only begun to expand from its origin as KG
Koch, which was a heavily reinforced company.)
KG Meindl (Stab and I. Btl.) – LZ at Hythe, secure crossings over the RMC at and west of Hythe and advance along the line from
Hythe rail station to Saltwood
KG Stenzler (II. Btl.) – LZ at Paddlesworth
FS-Artillerie-Abtl. (12 7.5cm le.I.G.)
22.Infanterie-Division (Luftlande) (when airfield at Lympne is secured, to as late as S+5)

Of course, the Fallis at Paddlesworth and north of Postling would not be able to halt a counterattack from the West. They are there to stall a counterattack from the North or North-East. The Fallis at Lympne and further West are the folks who should/would deal with anything coming from the West. And those two Btls will not land anywhere near Paddlesworth-Postling, but at Lympne and further West.

The Fallis have to get there first, which may be problematic except in Fantasy SEELÖWE.

Ok, maybe you gould shave some time here and there from my "time table", but Milforce will not and could not reach the Front (i.e something around Sellindge) much earlier than MAL+4/S+5. Definately not at or around MAL+1/S+2. Simply because of information, inertia and distance to travel.

Probably.

We have the problem with RAF Lympne, that we do not know what and who defended the airfield. We can assume, there was some RAF detachement there (who would report most likely to their supperior at RAF Somewhere). What else there was and who they were (i.e. who they will report to), we do not know. We can only assume, that it was some HD-folks (I don't mean HG-folks!) and maybe some Field Army (as in 1st LRB or Engineers, or whatever). But we don't know.

In late September 1940, two Bofors of C Troop, 163 Battery, 55th Light AA Regiment, RA, were probably at Lympne, together with some number of Vickers AAMG, two Bofors of the same battery were at Hawkinge, and the remaining two were at Croydon. However, 164 Battery of the same regiment had no Bofors, only AAMG, while 165 Battery had 12 Bofors and was likewise deployed at airfields around Dover, Deal and Folkestone. Another example is 35 Battery, 12th Light AA Regiment, RA, which was at Farnborough about the same time, although I have not discovered how many Bofors it had.

Most of the available Light AA, especially Bofors, appear to have been deployed to defend airfields, mostly because of the threat of the FJ, but also because of the Erprobungsgruppe raids highlighting their vulnerability.

Ground forces are more of a guess.

[Gooner1]

Hythe was not under 1st London's controll, but directly under XIIth Corps, and the rest of Zone B was under 45th Division, still not under 1st London control. Even if we assume, the Folkstone-garrison was keeping 1st London somewhat in the loop, and infromation doesn't go up the chain to XIIth Corps first and than down to 1st London, the situation south of Dymchurch would be more concerning - even if 1st London knows about the exact situation to begin with. Then the situation gets complicated, when around 6 Btls of Fallschirmjäger start falling from the sky, a good hour after the initial landing. On top of 2nd London Bde and 1st LRB HQ. (and even in the area of the neighbouring division). After that, 1st London will lose contact with 1st QW and 1st LSC (contact goes through 2nd Lon Bde, even if the two Btls have wireless and can be reached from the Division Net), and even with the rest of 1st LRB (the companies did not have wireless 1940). Meaning: 1st LonDiv HQ will have no clue what is exactly going on, where everyone is, but only a vague idea.

From 1st London Divisions Operational Instruction No. 12 of July 25th 1940

"Home Defence emphasises the importance of attack to recover beaches and to dislocate the plans of enemy landed from the air. Area Defence is one of our problems; great mobility is necessary, and readiness to attack in any direction. Commanders will ensure that all units under their command are able to concentrate and be ready to move at short notice. This concentration will take place on receipt of the code word (b) or on news of enemy attempting a landing. Mobile Columns – early contact with the enemy landed from the air or who may have broken through the beach defences is essential. In Sub Areas 4 (Shorncliffe), 5 (Dover), 6 (Deal), 7 (Thanet), 8 (Sheppey) mobility in defence must be provided for. A defence which relies on occupying a series of defensive posts and has no provision for a mobile reserve is taking grave risks. An element of landward defence of the above areas should be well organised observation on the landward side with mobile detachments to move out and engage the enemy promptly. If contact with the Division is broken area commanders will not hesitate to act. The maxim of Nelson still holds good … no Captain will be wrong who lay's his ship alongside an enemy's ship and engages her."

[Richard Anderson]

Interesting, since that implies that the sub-areas were in fact under 1 London Division command, which actually makes much more sense than supposing they were directly under XII Corps control.

[Gooner1]

Enter MILFORCE and 8th RTR. Neither is under control of 1st LonDiv, they will get info from 2nd NZ and/or XIIth Corps. XIIth Corps will probably have some idea what is going on with a few hour's lag (but not what is going on in 1st LonDiv's area, since 1st LonDiv, has no clue either), and than it has to pass word along to 2nd NZ and/or Milforce. I suspect, since 1st LonDiv will have no clue, what is going on, will send out patrols (Carrier- and if it exists MC Platoon of 2/5 Queens) from Ham Street to Canterbury, and maybe ask Milforce to contribute with its Recon Element, ie C Sqd/NZ Cav. After the Fallis fell from the sky. I would be extremly surprised, if C Sqd would leave Ashford earlier than two hours after the Main Air Landing. They would need around an hour to reach the "front" - which they don't know, where it is - so three hours after the MAL and four hours after the initial landing. And probaly run head first into an ambush.
Assuming, the wireless has the range to reach Milforce HQ, and they don't need to drive back to Ashford to report, it is at this point, that 1st LonDiv and Milforce get the info they need to start rolling. I assume here, that Milforce can (or will) act on its own, and don't have to get approval from 2nd NZ/XIIth Corps. And they can word pass along to 8th RTR and they can/will act on their own, and don't wait for approval from above.
Take some time to pass word along (a tanker will not report to the boss directly, but to some guy at the radio, who passes word along to his boss, who passes word along... and so forth) correlate the info, make a decision, pass word along to the troops, and for them to start rolling. Let's say, just an hour (Nagumo at Midway, for example got the info about the US carriers one hour after the message was sent). Milforce starts rolling four hours after the MAL and five after the initial landing. They (the leading element!) need around one hour to reach the front (probably they know where it is give or take a mile or so), so they probably don't run head first into an ambush. We have MAL+5 and S+6 now, and the trailing element of Milforce is still around an hour away. 8th RTR (or at least C Sqd with the Matilda IIs) maybe just reaches Ashford, and still have 1+ hours for the leading elements to reach the front.
That is all assuming 1st LondDiv is willing to/able to/aloved to contact Milforce, C Sqd/Nz Cav can start rolling MAL+2/S+3, and is able to give word via radio and don't have to drive back to HQ (that's another hour), and 8th RTR also starts rolling MAL+4/S+5. And there are no craters or debries from an air attack, there are no refugees clogging the roads (there will be some refugees, no matter of orders) and no roadblocks some overzealous HG put up.
Coordination between arms was never a strong point of the British - 1940 it certainly wasn't - so you can assume, Milforce will give it a try without 8th RTR, then C Sqd/8th RTR will give it a try without Milforce, and then Milforce and 8th RTR will give it a third (uncoordinated) try again.

There is at least a chance 1st LonDiv and Milforce have contact and each knows something, but that's not true for 2nd NZ. They will have to wait for info (and orders!) from XIIth corps, who in turn will have info on 45th Div area, maybe Folkstone and Dover, but nothing about 1st LonDiv. At least as long 1st LonDiv doesn't know itself. That would be probably no earlier than around MAL+3,5/S+4,5. Collating, passing word along, collating, passing word along, start rolling, and 2nd NZ starts rolling... around MAL+6/S+7. Maybe a bit earlier. Maidstone-Sellindge is around 27 miles (along the M20, if you take the byways, probably a bit more), so with 8mls/hour a bit more than 4 hours for the leading elements. Arrival around MAL+10/S+11, so... say around 1700, and the Kiwis still need 4-5 hours for the trailing elements to arrive.

All very imaginative but almost entirely opposite to what the the Milforce Operational Instruction No.4 tells us.

For a start NZ Div. is not under command of 1st London Div. but under XII Corps.

Their orders are as clear as possible: Tasks in General: "The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are: (a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon. Div. area, especially in the area North and N.W. of DOVER and FOLKESTONE."

The intention for Milforce was "MILFORCE will act as Divisional Advance Guard and will take up a position covering the debussing of 5 Inf. Bde."

Communications in Milforce were:

INTERCOM.
20. MILFORCE to N.Z. Div. by Wireless Telegraphy and Despatch Rider.
21. MILFORCE to Cav. Sqn. by W/T on same frequency as MILFORCE rear link.
22. Until commencement of active operations, W/T silence except as authorised by instructions issued from time to time, and W/T silence during air raid warning “red”.
23. On receipt of warning order 7 A.Tk. Regt. will detail one officer with Motor Cycle. to report to N.Z. Div. as MILFORCE Liaison Officer and one officer with M/C. to report to MILFORCE as Motor Contact Officer.

[Gooner1]

Hythe was not under 1st London's controll, but directly under XIIth Corps, and the rest of Zone B was under 45th Division, still not under 1st London control. Even if we assume, the Folkstone-garrison was keeping 1st London somewhat in the loop, and infromation doesn't go up the chain to XIIth Corps first and than down to 1st London, the situation south of Dymchurch would be more concerning - even if 1st London knows about the exact situation to begin with. Then the situation gets complicated, when around 6 Btls of Fallschirmjäger start falling from the sky, a good hour after the initial landing. On top of 2nd London Bde and 1st LRB HQ. (and even in the area of the neighbouring division). After that, 1st London will lose contact with 1st QW and 1st LSC (contact goes through 2nd Lon Bde, even if the two Btls have wireless and can be reached from the Division Net), and even with the rest of 1st LRB (the companies did not have wireless 1940). Meaning: 1st LonDiv HQ will have no clue what is exactly going on, where everyone is, but only a vague idea.

This is what 45th Divisions communication set up was, expect 1st London Divisions to be similar. As you can see multiple redundancies built into the system.

PART 10 COMMUNICATIONS.

46. General

(a) The main system of comn is by civil P.O. System, supplemented by field cable.
(b) The following P.O. direct lines have been installed:-

H.Q. 45 Div to H.Q. 12 Corps.
H.Q. 1 London. Div.
H.Q. BROCFORCE.
H.Q. All Sub-areas.
H.Q. 31 Inf. Bde Gp.
N.O.I.C. NEWHAVEN.

(c) There is a teleprinter service – 45 Div. To 12 Corps.


47. Wireless.

(a) The following are grouped on Div. Nets :-

Net 1. H.Q. A, B, C Sub-areas & 31 Inf. Bde. Gp.
Net 2. 5 Loyals, N.O.I.C. NEWHAVEN, Armoured Train
Net 3. C.R.A., 69 A/Tk Regt., 324 S/L Coy.

(b) The following are on one Corps net :-

45 Div., BROCFORCE., 29 Inf. Bde Gp.



48. “PHANTOM”

(a) A G.H.Q. Recce Unit, whose code name is “PHANTOM”
has been formed with the role of obtaining information
and sending it with the minimum of delay by wireless
direct to G.H.Q.

(b) It is to obtain this information by liaison and by recce.
It may operate as a unit or by dets in any part of the
British Isles.

(c) Personnel of the Unit wear a white letter “P” on a black
black background on the right shoulder. Vehicles are
also marked with a letter “P”.

(d) When engaged on urgent missions vehicles fly a small
black flag with a letter “P” in the centre.

(e) Personnel of this Unit are to be given every
assistance in carrying out their task.


49. Pigeons.

(a) The Corps loft provides Div. To Corps services.

(b) The Div. Loft provides Sub-area to Div. Service,
and Bn to Div. Services.

[Richard Anderson]

Do you have dates on those instructions? The reference to 31 Brigade is interesting. I had also forgotten about 29 Brigade.

[Gooner1]

Do you have dates on those instructions? The reference to 31 Brigade is interesting. I had also forgotten about 29 Brigade.

Ah sorry, no. I photocopied(!) the entire Defence Scheme, 60-odd pages, years ago but I forgot to make a note of its precise date though I'm pretty sure it's lateish October.

[Richard Anderson]

That makes sense. Thanks!

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Has anybody actually read what Mr. Gooner1 posted ?

46. General
(a) The main system of comn is by civil P.O. System, supplemented by field cable.
(b) The following P.O. direct lines have been installed:-
H.Q. 45 Div to H.Q. 12 Corps.
H.Q. 1 London. Div.
H.Q. BROCFORCE.
H.Q. All Sub-areas.
H.Q. 31 Inf. Bde Gp.
N.O.I.C. NEWHAVEN.

49. Pigeons.
(a) The Corps loft provides Div. To Corps services.
(b) The Div. Loft provides Sub-area to Div. Service,
and Bn to Div. Services.

Yeah. That's right. The British Army, facing the Wehrmacht, who had overrun Poland, Denmark,
Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and FRANCE, was now going to go into battle with
their principle forms of communication being a Public Telephone System, and CARRIER PIGEONS !



Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Richard Anderson]

Quelle horreur! The British Army in World War II used CARRIER PIGEONS!
Quelle horreur! The U.S. Army in World War II used CARRIER PIGEONS!
Quelle horreur! The soviet Army in World War II used CARRIER PIGEONS!
Quelle horreur! The German Wehrmacht in World War II used CARRIER PIGEONS! Himmler was a big pigeon fancier.

Gee, I wonder who knew the British Post Office was a government entity and effectively controlled the British telephone and telegraph system from 1912, transferring it from private to public control in a process effectively begun around 1905? Or that the Post Office began war preparations well before 1 September 1939, laying additional cables between important locals over different and alternative routes, bypassing entirely particularly vulnerable sites, and placing the old manual telephone exchanges that had been superseded by automatic exchanges in reserve as a back-up system, while earmarking critical public trunk lines for future use by the Services, switching those over fully to military control upon the declaration of war in September 1939? Or that in the first six months of the war the Post Office established links by telephone and telegraph of throughout the Home Defence establishment, particularly Fighter and Anti-Aircraft Commands. By summer 1940, the British telecommunications system was highly redundant, linking communications centers with all defense stations and was continually expanding.

Gee, I wonder who remembers the effective use by Allied airborne forces of the Dutch telephone exchange in September 1944?

Gee, I wonder who knew Bell Telephone Labs and the U.S. Army Signal Corps cooperated closely in the development of digital voice encryption, SIGSALY, beginning in 1936, and that the Signal Corps and Bell Telephone wartime efforts were closely intertwined?