US Army logistical failures in NWE

[Aber]

I'm going to assume you're just joking, that you're not seriously alleging a contradiction.

You've been all over the place in this thread.

There's plenty to explore on US planning and logistics if you want to.

There's even more on the value of hindsight.

Take it in whatever direction you want to.

[TheMarcksPlan]

You've been all over the place in this thread.

Ok so you're joking? You do understand the difference between assuming an upside case versus failing to prepare for one?

[Kingfish]

The next problem is less obvious to a beginner but should still be obvious to any remotely-informed military amateur: failure to prepare for contingency, especially for easily-foreseeable opportunity. That the German army would rapidly be defeated was easily foreseeable. See my next points.

He who chases two rabbits, catches none.
-Confucius

I'll let that sink in for a moment.

[Cult Icon]

Add in the US Army's shell crisis in the midst of the NWE campaign it's hard to swallow the notion that this army was exceptionally competent on matters of supply.

Is there any good critical literature on these themes?

You will never get anyone willing to look into the matter from this same crowd.

Related to my comment #16 but is there any extensive and intensive research on the 'pointy end'?

The supply problems were also connected with the way the army was organized and its tactical doctrine (liberal use of ammunition and liberal distribution of equipment). There is a quip that the US Army would fire at anything that moves but the Red Army would fire everything at the decisive point.

It is a big subject that the Red Army was the polar opposite of the W.Allies and even the Germans in their approach, that they subordinated the tactical capabilities to the operational level, and really pared down their formations to a minimum. This lead to higher causalties but also an army that was pretty manueverable despite comparably limited non-combat equipment and ammunition. What post 16 was aiming at is paring down the US Army and at the same time, increasing its combat efficiency. Eliminating the bloat/excess.

[Aber]

You do understand the difference between assuming an upside case versus failing to prepare for one?

The Allies DID prepare for an upside case, just not the the one that happened.

[TheMarcksPlan]

You will never get anyone willing to look into the matter from this same crowd.

No of course not.

Related to my comment #16 but is there any extensive and intensive research on the 'pointy end'?

What do you mean exactly?

There is a quip that the US Army would fire at anything that moves but the Red Army would fire everything at the decisive point.

I could see that being true. You have reports of Germans being astounded by the volume of US fires but then we know that objectively and front-wide, US was short of ammo.

Doctrine was probably based around an expectation that of course the country with 5x more steel than anyone else would supply its guns liberally, but of course that didn't happen. The stunned Germans were those unlucky enough to face US soldiers properly supplied. Every German should have been treated so.

A lot of the US Army's problems weren't the Army's fault at all. It was the stepchild service, eating last in manpower (quality) and equipment terms. Of course many problems were its fault.

What post 16 was aiming at is paring down the US Army and at the same time, increasing its combat efficiency. Eliminating the bloat/excess.

Yep and it was/is too big a topic for me to tackle in this thread but by all means get the ball rolling.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The Allies DID prepare for an upside case, just not the the one that happened.

Yeah you can't expect someone in 1944 to believe it was possible to conquer France in six weeks.

[Cult Icon]

I could see that being true. You have reports of Germans being astounded by the volume of US fires but then we know that objectively and front-wide, US was short of ammo.

Doctrine was probably based around an expectation that of course the country with 5x more steel than anyone else would supply its guns liberally, but of course that didn't happen.

What is normal for one army is exceptional for another.

I am referring not only the consumption of ammunition but the organization and equipment of the army (OOB). Removing excess personnel, units, and equipment & adding other types. Making modifications to its tactical doctrines. Like a corporate reorganization, a right-sized/pared down force could potentially 1. decrease its supply requirements 2. at the same time, increase its combat effectiveness.

[Appleknocker27]

What was the original question posed here? I read the thread, went back to the first post(s) and its tough to identify....
Seems to be a rant about a few failures on the Allied campaign logistics score card but lacks real clarity. That's probably why it went OT so quickly.

[Richard Anderson]

Add in the US Army's shell crisis in the midst of the NWE campaign it's hard to swallow the notion that this army was exceptionally competent on matters of supply.

Is there any good critical literature on these themes?

You will never get anyone willing to look into the matter from this same crowd.

Well, the initial problem with the particular individual in "this same crowd" is that they - the OP after all is a member of "this same crowd" - as usual has created a straw man argument. Who here has asked anyone to "swallow the notion that this army was exceptionally competent on matters of supply"? Not me for one and no one else has raised that shibboleth except for the OP.

The next problem is that none of the OP posts have anything to do with understanding "US Army logistical failures in NWE" as the thread title implies. Instead, the OP is suffering major "vibes" of the US Army performance mirroring the problems of the German Army on the Ostfront. Really? Well no shit.

Related to my comment #16 but is there any extensive and intensive research on the 'pointy end'?

Isn't it the problem there is too much research on the pointy end and not enough on the mundane problems with supply? For example, does anyone here realize that the American jerrycan played a huge role in the problems with gasoline supply during the fall campaign in Europe?

BTW, yes, there are reams of critical literature on this theme and it is much better than the ham-handed "analysis" that results from the OP reading the 55 pages of Section VI, The Invasion of Normandy, in Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operation Overseas and then proclaiming themself an expert on the issues. There are also the two volumes of the Quartermaster Corps and Ordnance Department histories dealing with quartermaster and ordnance logistical issues. There are the the two volume Logistical Support of the Armies. There are the original ETOUSA SOS studies that delve m ore into specific issues that did not make it into the histories, but most important there are the General Board studies, which specifically examined the problems encountered and made suggestions on corrections. By quick count there are fourteen of those studies that directly relate to the question.

The supply problems were also connected with the way the army was organized and its tactical doctrine (liberal use of ammunition and liberal distribution of equipment). There is a quip that the US Army would fire at anything that moves but the Red Army would fire everything at the decisive point.

It is a big subject that the Red Army was the polar opposite of the W.Allies and even the Germans in their approach, that they subordinated the tactical capabilities to the operational level, and really pared down their formations to a minimum. This lead to higher causalties but also an army that was pretty manueverable despite comparably limited non-combat equipment and ammunition. What post 16 was aiming at is paring down the US Army and at the same time, increasing its combat efficiency. Eliminating the bloat/excess.

And yet, for all that paring down and operational maneuverability, Soviet offensives also regularly came a cropper because of logistical difficulties after a few hundred mile advance and required an operational pause to refit, just as did the German and American.

[Richard Anderson]

What was the original question posed here? I read the thread, went back to the first post(s) and its tough to identify....
Seems to be a rant about a few failures on the Allied campaign logistics score card but lacks real clarity. That's probably why it went OT so quickly.

Indeed. Is it "US Army logistical failures in NWE"? Or "I got this vibe dude"? That is because all the OPs posts amount to nothing more than pearl-clutching cris de cœur designed to display to best advantage the moral and intellectual superiority of the OP. It is a wonder they have not dislocated both shoulders from all the pats on the back they give themself. :roll:

[Appleknocker27]

Indeed. Is it "US Army logistical failures in NWE"? Or "I got this vibe dude"? That is because all the OPs posts amount to nothing more than pearl-clutching cris de cœur designed to display to best advantage the moral and intellectual superiority of the OP. It is a wonder they have not dislocated both shoulders from all the pats on the back they give themself. :roll:

Sounds a little Dunning/Kruger....

[Michael Kenny]

What was the original question posed here? I read the thread, went back to the first post(s) and its tough to identify....
Seems to be a rant about a few failures on the Allied campaign logistics score card but lacks real clarity. That's probably why it went OT so quickly.

The original poster was smarting because one of his (many) threads to find a way reverse the result of WW2 went in a direction that did not please him. He decided to 'get back' at those that upset him (i.e. anyone who does not recognise his greatness and unique insight) by initiating a heated debate' disparaging the NWE campaign. It is a troll pure and simple and his contributions will get even sillier as it progresses. There is another perennial 'The Soviets won WW2 all by themselves' devotee who has decided to join in and lend support to the troll. The 'ranting' is deliberate and the only positive is that the pair are so badly informed that it is easy to see they can not distinguish their gluteus maximus from their arm's synovial joint. Like The German Army they are completely outclassed and will fare just as badly here as the Germans did in Normandy.

[Richard Anderson]

I could see that being true. You have reports of Germans being astounded by the volume of US fires but then we know that objectively and front-wide, US was short of ammo.

Doctrine was probably based around an expectation that of course the country with 5x more steel than anyone else would supply its guns liberally, but of course that didn't happen.

What is normal for one army is exceptional for another.

Or not as the case may be. The root cause for artillery ammunition shortages in the ETOUSA was a "failure to discharge sufficient critical [ammunition] supplies on the continent and inability to move sufficient tonnages of the critical items into forward areas available to armies." Change that to "failure to [ship] sufficient critical [ammunition] supplies [from Germany to the various fronts] and inability to move sufficient tonnages of the critical items into forward areas available to armies." and you get a perfect description for why the Germans had the same problem, exacerbated by their less abundant artillery and despite their relatively high level of artillery ammunition manufacture. That meant that relatively speaking, the American Army rationing level was much higher than the German.

[Richard Anderson]

Indeed. Is it "US Army logistical failures in NWE"? Or "I got this vibe dude"? That is because all the OPs posts amount to nothing more than pearl-clutching cris de cœur designed to display to best advantage the moral and intellectual superiority of the OP. It is a wonder they have not dislocated both shoulders from all the pats on the back they give themself. :roll:

Sounds a little Dunning/Kruger....

Very much so and yet another proof that a little knowledge remains a dangerous thing. I suspect I was just the same fifty years ago when playing war games, hoovering up "facts" from S&T, and eagerly devouring the Green Books like they were tablets delivered by god. Since then though I have read a bit more, widened my scope, and noticed the occasional man behind the curtain you are supposed to ignore.

As an aside, for all those that buy into the "McNair delayed delivery of heavy tanks to the US Army" did you ever notice that history is written almost solely from the POV of the US Army Ordnance Department? And that Army Ground Forces as essentially a wartime entity without bureaucratic longevity, never got to publish their side of the story? Or that Gladeon Barnes, Chief of Research and Engineering in the Ordnance Department, got to publish his side of the story numerous times for sixteen years after McNair conveniently died in a Norman field? :roll: