"If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
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"If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Any truth to that?
Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Maybe. Most of the ATL D Day scenarios have this as a premise.
Omaha wasn't that close. 34,000 men landed at a cost of 2.500-5,000 k casualties. Those are acceptable losses. The result was only in the balance for a few hours, unt5il the germans ran out of artillery ammunition. The allies were expecting up to 60,000 casualties on D Day. When asked about what would happen if the initial assault failed IRRC Gerow(?) said that the rest of 1st and 29th Infantry followed by the 2nd Infantry then 2nd Armored Division would be sent in. D Day would not be allowed to fail. The most likely scenario, if Gerow or Bradley lost their nerve, would have been to transfer the follow on formations to Utah. This would have left the British and US Beaches separated - like at Salerno.
But what could the Germans have done to take advantage of this? The Germans were predisposed to fear the threat Caen - Falaise and deployed Ist SS Corps in this sector. It would probably have taken an additional day to have re-deployed the 21st and directed the Pz Lehr and 12 SS Panzer Divisions to the Cotentin sector. This would have left the British and Canadians to exploit beyond Caen and perhaps Villers Bocage, and certainly towards Omaha. As it was the right flank of the German 352nd Division was overrun by 50th Division. Eventually the Allies would have linked the beachheads.
So NO
Omaha wasn't that close. 34,000 men landed at a cost of 2.500-5,000 k casualties. Those are acceptable losses. The result was only in the balance for a few hours, unt5il the germans ran out of artillery ammunition. The allies were expecting up to 60,000 casualties on D Day. When asked about what would happen if the initial assault failed IRRC Gerow(?) said that the rest of 1st and 29th Infantry followed by the 2nd Infantry then 2nd Armored Division would be sent in. D Day would not be allowed to fail. The most likely scenario, if Gerow or Bradley lost their nerve, would have been to transfer the follow on formations to Utah. This would have left the British and US Beaches separated - like at Salerno.
But what could the Germans have done to take advantage of this? The Germans were predisposed to fear the threat Caen - Falaise and deployed Ist SS Corps in this sector. It would probably have taken an additional day to have re-deployed the 21st and directed the Pz Lehr and 12 SS Panzer Divisions to the Cotentin sector. This would have left the British and Canadians to exploit beyond Caen and perhaps Villers Bocage, and certainly towards Omaha. As it was the right flank of the German 352nd Division was overrun by 50th Division. Eventually the Allies would have linked the beachheads.
So NO
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Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
The only time I've seen this specific situation on the game board the defense suffered such severe losses the 'victory' freed no significant reserves. That is the 352 DI was hors combat as was the static division it reinforces. In addition committing some additional forces from the start was necessary to reach this outcome. Specifically the nearby 30th Brigade & a Regiment of Paras diverted from the UTAH Beach are. When the smoke cleared the defense had lost five to six infantry regiments, multiple artillery battalions, and assorted support units. The equivalent of three inf div reduced to a thin cadre. Category IV or worse in German terminology.
Operationaly ashore this has its effect on each side. Where it hits the Allies hard is the problem it creates for the 'A MULBERRY' That was a complex operation that started like everything else on or before 4 June. & unlike some infantry corps it cant be handily diverted to another beach. Halting the movement of the MULBERRY components, or diverting them has severe short term effects and serious long term that would reverberate long past D +90.
OTL UTAH Beach reached a intake of 5,000+ tons daily in late June & 7,000 tons daily during July. Thats enough for full supply of eight divisions & corps/army support. Even if that can be boosted to ten or twelve divisions in mid July its still barely more than half the combined support of both UTAH and OMAHA Beaches provided. Even with the US and Commonwealth Beaches joined mid June the reduced supply intake has major effects.
More common on the game board is the defense is able to destroy the left flank beaches of the invader. That has some similar outcomes. The counter attacking force is severely damaged as well, the supply intake of one or more of the Commonwealth beaches is severely curtailed, and possibly the MULBERRY B is forestalled. The long term effect is a slower build up, a slower attrition of the defense, a later advance into central France. The DRAGOON operation becomes yet more important, and the attacker needs to take a serious look at opportunities to seize a Flanders port by coup de main with a combined airborne/command operation.
Operationaly ashore this has its effect on each side. Where it hits the Allies hard is the problem it creates for the 'A MULBERRY' That was a complex operation that started like everything else on or before 4 June. & unlike some infantry corps it cant be handily diverted to another beach. Halting the movement of the MULBERRY components, or diverting them has severe short term effects and serious long term that would reverberate long past D +90.
OTL UTAH Beach reached a intake of 5,000+ tons daily in late June & 7,000 tons daily during July. Thats enough for full supply of eight divisions & corps/army support. Even if that can be boosted to ten or twelve divisions in mid July its still barely more than half the combined support of both UTAH and OMAHA Beaches provided. Even with the US and Commonwealth Beaches joined mid June the reduced supply intake has major effects.
More common on the game board is the defense is able to destroy the left flank beaches of the invader. That has some similar outcomes. The counter attacking force is severely damaged as well, the supply intake of one or more of the Commonwealth beaches is severely curtailed, and possibly the MULBERRY B is forestalled. The long term effect is a slower build up, a slower attrition of the defense, a later advance into central France. The DRAGOON operation becomes yet more important, and the attacker needs to take a serious look at opportunities to seize a Flanders port by coup de main with a combined airborne/command operation.
Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
A little.
Key Allied objectives & sequence:
Bayeux - link Omaha with British forces
Carentan - link with Utah
Cut the Cotentin
Cherbourg
All get a lot harder with a failure at Omaha, but not impossible. The biggest issue is that there will be 2 separate bridgeheads for an extended period giving the Germans the chance to concentrate against one or the other.
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Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Any concentration of troops would be begging for naval and aerial harassment.
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Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
The problem of German concentrations vulnerability is difficult. Its not just the physical concentration of vehicles and men, but the related actions. The movement of ammunition and fuel, & the increased activity=visibility of HQ when preparing for counter attacks. The fate of Schweppenbergs CP the afternoon of 10 May is a example of this.
One of the reasons OMAHA Beach has such a poor reputation is the apparent failure of fire support in the first couple hours. The move of the 352 DI to that sector created a higher concentration of defenders & a potential counter attack/s. In simple terms the fire support to the US Corps was ineffective until approximately 08:30 The defense was still unable to take full advantage of this, partly because of its leaders decisions previous and during the hours from 02:00 to 07:00. So, simply waiving away a portion of the Allied fire support is not a panacea for the defense.
One of the reasons OMAHA Beach has such a poor reputation is the apparent failure of fire support in the first couple hours. The move of the 352 DI to that sector created a higher concentration of defenders & a potential counter attack/s. In simple terms the fire support to the US Corps was ineffective until approximately 08:30 The defense was still unable to take full advantage of this, partly because of its leaders decisions previous and during the hours from 02:00 to 07:00. So, simply waiving away a portion of the Allied fire support is not a panacea for the defense.
Last edited by Carl Schwamberger on 30 May 2022, 20:57, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Both Rommel and von Rundstedt made notes in their KTBs about battleship fire interdicting movements miles behind the lines. Just a nugget.
Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Maybe. Maybe not.
Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
thoughts?
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Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Theres other documentation in the form of the reports Rommel & Rundsteadt were drawing from. Also AAR & other accounts from the Allied participants. Descriptions of German counter attacks disappearing in a few volleys of 150 & 200 mm cruiser rounds are common. Same from those involved in the interdiction missions on the 'deep targets'.OpanaPointer wrote: ↑30 May 2022, 02:33Both Rommel and von Rundstedt made notes in their KTBs about battleship fire interdicting movements miles behind the lines. Just a nugget.
Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
But also reports in German records about attacks being broken up by naval gunfire at times when the Allies were not firing ie a convenient excuse.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑30 May 2022, 21:04Theres other documentation in the form of the reports Rommel & Rundsteadt were drawing from. Also AAR & other accounts from the Allied participants. Descriptions of German counter attacks disappearing in a few volleys of 150 & 200 mm cruiser rounds are common. Same from those involved in the interdiction missions on the 'deep targets'.
Source: IIRC Buckingham D-day the first 72 hours
Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Maybe the Germans sometimes labelled incoming field artillery as "Naval gunfire". The Germans knew about naval gunfire from Sicily and Italy and how there was little they could do about it. I wonder whether it became the German version of the Tiger tank myth. It was a convenient excuse for failings by senior land commanders who could point to the failure of the Navy and air force.Aber wrote: ↑31 May 2022, 08:13But also reports in German records about attacks being broken up by naval gunfire at times when the Allies were not firing ie a convenient excuse.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑30 May 2022, 21:04Theres other documentation in the form of the reports Rommel & Rundsteadt were drawing from. Also AAR & other accounts from the Allied participants. Descriptions of German counter attacks disappearing in a few volleys of 150 & 200 mm cruiser rounds are common. Same from those involved in the interdiction missions on the 'deep targets'.
Source: IIRC Buckingham D-day the first 72 hours
I looked at naval gunfire in Gunners in Normandy. It is used extensively on D Day and shortly afterwards, but once the field artillery was ashore in numbers NGS tends to be a featured of pre -planned fire plans, and didn't feature heavily in impromptu engagements. Naval gunfre could still be important. In the battle for Tilly-sur Seulles in mid June HMS Rodney engaged German tanks from the Panzer Lehr at Hottot, 33,000 yards inland.
There were far fewer naval gunfire spotters than FOOs. The communications to warships was more fragile and the procedures for tasking a warship were not always straightforward. If you needed fire support quickly land based artillery was quicker and more certain.
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Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Thats why I mentioned the Allied record. Its a bit more accurate on when & where. The German side is useful for studying the effects.But also reports in German records about attacks being broken up by naval gunfire at times when the Allies were not firing ie a convenient excuse.
The bulk of the NGF rounds fired were from the 6" gun cruisers and smaller caliber destroyers. It would not be difficult for a soldier to conflate those with 155mm & larger ammo from the US & Commonwealth Field Artillery.
That seems to have been part of the problem in the first two hours on OMAHA Beach. The activity of the six NGF spotting teams is conspicuous by its absence. I strongly suspect all stepping ashore between 06:30 & 08:00 were hors combat within minutes.There were far fewer naval gunfire spotters than FOOs. The communications to warships was more fragile and the procedures for tasking a warship were not always straightforward. ...
The East Front Veterans seem to have been as dismissive of the NGF as they were the Allied air power. In any case Most of the leaders in the west in early 1944 expected to fight the decisive battle a bit inland. Rommel, who did know something about it bet on the beach defense that put everything important in range of the ships. Later he wrote that the fire from the ships was worse than he expected based on the Italian campaign experience of 1943. Luftwaffe doctrine at the time was to attack the ships supporting the landing force. The 300 odd sorties they managed on 6th June made that a joke.The Germans knew about naval gunfire from Sicily and Italy and how there was little they could do about it.
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Re: "If Omaha fails, Overlord fails!"
Thinking over the schedule for installing the MULBERRY A & the problems associated with relocation Im seeing a really serious problem if the defense of OMAHA Beach holds, even fior just a few days. This definitely dwarfs any tactical problems thereof.