Mori wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 01:49
For example, the PoW counts is probably the most accurate, as Richard said. But it includes anyone wearing a uniform. In mobile phases such as August 1944 or April 1945, that can be many types of personel, including depot guards, firemen, border guards, train operators, civilan affairs staff in occupied countries, non flying teams in air bases etc.
Possibly...except "depot guards" in the entirety of Ob. West probably accounted for little more than 1,000 men. For example, Ls.-Btl. 390 was assigned to the Oberquartiermeister of 7. Armee on 1 August 1943 to provide security details for the army depots and other installations, which duty continued through summer 1944. The location strength of the Stab and 2. and 3. Kompanie is unknown but the strength of 1. Kompanie as of 31 March was all of 29 O&EM.
I am also unclear how many uniformed "firemen" and "train operators" there may have been in Ob.West for the Allies to hoover up as POW or why "civilian affairs staff" would be uniformed? By "border guards I assume you mean Landesschützen? While there were large numbers of such units they tended to be weakly manned.
Why is it incorrect to count Luftwaffe ground crews - or air crew for that matter - as POW? Were they not military personnel? Because a unit is "paramilitary" - uniformed and armed - do they not count as POW?
AFAIR, there is a split of captured personel for April 1945 in TUSA or FUSA AAR. It's when the German forces eventually collapsed, so the situation is extreme. It shows that less than 10% of PoWs belong to Wehrmacht combat units.
I think what you're referring to is page 374 of volume I of the TUSA AAR.
The paralysis of the enemy's replacement system was strikingly
illustrated by an analysis of the 226,309 prisoners of war captured by
Third U. S. Army during the period 26 March to 30 April. Of these prisoners,
1,911 were from Panzer-type divisions, 10,121 from infantry divisions
and 214,277 from miscellaneous units. The enemy was forced to use
low grade troops or none at all to replace his losses. In a quality
analysis of prisoners of war, 18,148 or 8.1 percent were found to be in
Class I, consisting of combat personnel of divisions, all personnel of
General Headquarters, Army Group, anti-tank, infantry and Panzer units;
79,111 or 34.9 percent were in Class II, consisting of all personnel of
fortress and replacement units, home guard, Volkssturm, police and
foreigners; 129,050 or 57 percent were in Class III, consisting of service
and supply troops of divisions, personnel of General Headquarters
artillery, engineer and antiaircraft units, personnel from higher headquarters,
General Headquarters service and supply units. Of the 226,309
prisoners of war, 1,911 or 0.9 percent were from Panzer-type divisions,
10,121 or 4.5 percent were from infantry-type divisions, and 214,277 or
94.6 percent were from miscellaneous units.
There is little to indicate that was the norm in summer 1944 and it seems likely that it was the opposite then, given the number of divisions destroyed.