What are the primary sources for these occurrings?
D'Este's "A Genius for War"
- Westphalia1812
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
I love myself way more than I love you
And I think about killing myself
So, best believe, I thought about killing you today
And I think about killing myself
So, best believe, I thought about killing you today
Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Let me pull Leleu's book again... He refers to RH 2-3042 (which was digitized just a few months ago on Invenio) and RH 20-7/145.
I should correct my statement: the 17th SS didn't claim to have enough troops to fight but took up the matter of dissollution to Himmler, to make sure it wouldn't happen. What remained of the unit was labelled a "tactical group" until being reinforced a few weeks later.
Saving the organization was the one important thing. A "unit" had to remain, with its flag, its commander, and its claims to resources.
Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Die Sturmflut und dass Ende H.Stöber Munin Verlag 1976 p 308 :' It escaped the dissolution by the Reichsführer SS only because its performances were recognized by mentioning in the Wehrmachtsberichte of 28.7,31.7 and 8.8 , that it had timely started with setting up of units near the front , in which the instream of wounded, convalesced and scattered benefited it and because General von Schweppenburg and Generaloberst Hausser had spoken out against the dissolution.'
p 377
" to SSPionier Bataillon 17:
For reporting to the Reichsführer SS are to be submitted until 8.8.1944 12.00:
1. Combat strengths of the now still deployed parts of the div. with status 1,3.5 and 7.8.1944
All troop units contained in the battlegroups as AA,,PzJgAbt., PiBtln etc..are to be listed separately.
2.At the same time troops have to submit Ist strength reports , in which separately specialists like truckdrivers, techn.staff, adminitrative staff have to be listed
3.The reports have to be submitted meticulously because the decision of the Reichsführer concerning the reconstitution of the division depends on this.
3. The delays have to be respected whatever happens to enable a fast reportung to the Reichsführer"
p 377
" to SSPionier Bataillon 17:
For reporting to the Reichsführer SS are to be submitted until 8.8.1944 12.00:
1. Combat strengths of the now still deployed parts of the div. with status 1,3.5 and 7.8.1944
All troop units contained in the battlegroups as AA,,PzJgAbt., PiBtln etc..are to be listed separately.
2.At the same time troops have to submit Ist strength reports , in which separately specialists like truckdrivers, techn.staff, adminitrative staff have to be listed
3.The reports have to be submitted meticulously because the decision of the Reichsführer concerning the reconstitution of the division depends on this.
3. The delays have to be respected whatever happens to enable a fast reportung to the Reichsführer"
Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Extreme simplification mixed with a bit of conspirationism. . There were several battlegroups and sending the tail of a division back when the combat strength is very low, is common sense and makes the refit of a division easier.Mori wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 18:02
I should correct my statement: the 17th SS didn't claim to have enough troops to fight but took up the matter of dissollution to Himmler, to make sure it wouldn't happen. What remained of the unit was labelled a "tactical group" until being reinforced a few weeks later.
Saving the organization was the one important thing. A "unit" had to remain, with its flag, its commander, and its claims to resources.
- Westphalia1812
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Thank you! Invenio has the whole 17. SS KTB + Anlagen for Normandy and even beyond. Trying to find something about this issue...Mori wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 18:02Let me pull Leleu's book again... He refers to RH 2-3042 (which was digitized just a few months ago on Invenio) and RH 20-7/145.
I should correct my statement: the 17th SS didn't claim to have enough troops to fight but took up the matter of dissollution to Himmler, to make sure it wouldn't happen. What remained of the unit was labelled a "tactical group" until being reinforced a few weeks later.
Saving the organization was the one important thing. A "unit" had to remain, with its flag, its commander, and its claims to resources.
I love myself way more than I love you
And I think about killing myself
So, best believe, I thought about killing you today
And I think about killing myself
So, best believe, I thought about killing you today
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Getting back to Carlo D'Este's book about Patton.
Although I agree with Mori that it is in general a pretty solid account, it does, in my most humble opinion, occasionally tilt over into the hyperbole department. For example, when discussing the end of the battle of Normandy, he states that:
Of more interest to me is the criticism of the Fifth Army plan for Salerno that Patton recorded in his diary. I hadn't realised he had been nominated to replace Clark if the latter had fallen under a bus on the beaches - now that would have been interesting. Patton in command of British X Corps could have been spectacular! Did Patton ever command British troops? Apart from the British transport units lent to Third Army in Normandy and strangely not mentioned in D'Este's book.
Regards
Tom
Although I agree with Mori that it is in general a pretty solid account, it does, in my most humble opinion, occasionally tilt over into the hyperbole department. For example, when discussing the end of the battle of Normandy, he states that:
One of the "gravest mistakes" - seriously? D'Este also ignores the likelihood of further self-destructive behaviour by Patton - I'm sure he would have struggled to maintain his equilibrium during the grim struggles during June and July.p. 643.
[...]
One of the gravest mistakes of the war was the reversal of roles between Patton and Bradley. Had Patton commanded 12th Army Group – as indeed he would have had he not self-destructed his career in Sicily – the events of August 1944 would have been very different.
Of more interest to me is the criticism of the Fifth Army plan for Salerno that Patton recorded in his diary. I hadn't realised he had been nominated to replace Clark if the latter had fallen under a bus on the beaches - now that would have been interesting. Patton in command of British X Corps could have been spectacular! Did Patton ever command British troops? Apart from the British transport units lent to Third Army in Normandy and strangely not mentioned in D'Este's book.
Regards
Tom
Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Last page has a mention and a few others before that.Westphalia1812 wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 20:44Thank you! Invenio has the whole 17. SS KTB + Anlagen for Normandy and even beyond. Trying to find something about this issue...Mori wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 18:02Let me pull Leleu's book again... He refers to RH 2-3042 (which was digitized just a few months ago on Invenio) and RH 20-7/145.
I should correct my statement: the 17th SS didn't claim to have enough troops to fight but took up the matter of dissollution to Himmler, to make sure it wouldn't happen. What remained of the unit was labelled a "tactical group" until being reinforced a few weeks later.
Saving the organization was the one important thing. A "unit" had to remain, with its flag, its commander, and its claims to resources.
- Texas Jäger
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Hmmm not sure about this Mori. During ‘Goodwood’ for example 12th SS had its infantry units out of the line initially/to the east of the seine in preparation to oppose another possible landing, but its artillery regiment was present in the Bourgebus-Verries area to support the defense, attached to the 272nd Division. They often did just as you say they should have.Mori wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 13:43That's an interpretation, and a fair one at that.Sheldrake wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 13:37
Over eighty percent of casualties were suffered by the infantry. So 6,000 casualties out of the C6,500 men in the two Panzer Grenadier Regiments of 12 SS meant that battalions were reduced to around one hundred men each - the KG you mention. Sure, there were another 14,000 men in the division, but these were artillerymen, signalers, maintenance men, supply, medical etc. Even the German Army had a substantial logistic tail.
However, if lacking infantry altogether, these other artillerymen etc. could/should have boosted other units. Which wasn't the case. A key factor is these SS units were not subordinated to an army corps but to an SS corps: their immediate hierarchy was looking elsewhere. Preserving SS forces was a shared agenda.
The 17th SS played with numbers to the point where OB West considered dissolving it (early August). Then they quickly claimed they did have enough troops to fight.
Also there were plenty of times when SS divisions were attached to army corps during the war.
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Divisional and Corps G-2 reports as well as page 42 of the G-2 Annex of the TUSA AAR. It was SOP to identify unit affiliations of POW and to record that. Every US Division had an attached Order of Battle Team as well as Interrogation of Prisoner of War Teams who collected such data, which was routinely recorded in the daily G-2 report.
You are deriving that assumption from two data points from the period when the entire Reich was collapsing that agree with you and ignoring the data from when Ob. West was holding the line in Normandy and then being pursued across France by the Allies that doesn't agree with you. I'm afraid hat's called confirmation bias.This pretty much fits with the assumption that in static phases most PoWs are from field units, and much less so in mobile phases.
Indeed, which was something that had not happened before during the pursuit phase in August-September 1944. Because in the earlier period the Reich wasn't collapsing, only Ob.West collapsed. It was similar in Italy in May-June 1944.TUSA was struggling in the Eiffel and the Saar-Moselle triangle during the 1 January - 19 February period, making little headway => 2.3% and 10.5% of PoWs not-from-divisions.
TUSA got into the open around 8 March 1945 => then ratio of non-divisional PoWs increased.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Hyperbole sells books I'm afraid. Look at Hastings, Beevor, Ambrose, et al along with D'Este.Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 21:24One of the "gravest mistakes" - seriously? D'Este also ignores the likelihood of further self-destructive behaviour by Patton - I'm sure he would have struggled to maintain his equilibrium during the grim struggles during June and July.
If Patton hadn't self destructed then he would likely have been the real commander of FUSAG and Bradley would have conducted the dogfight under Montgomery in Normandy as in real life. Patton would not have been directly involved until FUSAG was activated on the Continent. Bradley then would have continued to command FUSA instead of Hodges, which might have been interesting since who commands TUSA?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Definitively, often happened before.Texas Jäger wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 22:12Also there were plenty of times when SS divisions were attached to army corps during the war.
What was new in Normandy was SS divisions under SS corps under an SS army. [I haven't checked detailed OOB, correct me if this never happened]. That multiplied the ability to put safegarding SS troops as a priority over fighting the Allies.
All in all, I am not sure why it seems so surprising that an organization created with a political agenda, such as the SS, also had a political agenda while in action.
Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Counterfactual at its worst.p. 643.
[...]
One of the gravest mistakes of the war was the reversal of roles between Patton and Bradley. Had Patton commanded 12th Army Group – as indeed he would have had he not self-destructed his career in Sicily – the events of August 1944 would have been very different.
I can see how some could quote this as a conclusion by a renowed author, but it was so void that I just didn't bother.
Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
Is it also the source for Can II Corps data? Just asking genuinely.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑01 Nov 2022, 23:22Divisional and Corps G-2 reports as well as page 42 of the G-2 Annex of the TUSA AAR. It was SOP to identify unit affiliations of POW and to record that. Every US Division had an attached Order of Battle Team as well as Interrogation of Prisoner of War Teams who collected such data, which was routinely recorded in the daily G-2 report.
I admit I never noticed the breakdown in PoWs annexed daily to XIX Corps G-2 reports. Since you gave consolidated data for August, I suppose someone also typed all data in a file for ease of calculation. (Just asking in case this someone is you, and in case the file could be shared ).
I looked at a sample of G-2 reports from other corps: XV corps split PoWs more or less the way XIX did; but V corps and VII Corps didn't give any data except the grand total of PoWs. Obviously operating procedures were not that "standard"
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
It was not an "SS army". They were under 7. Armee initially, then Panzergruppe West, which transmogrified into 5. Panzerarmee.Mori wrote: ↑02 Nov 2022, 00:56What was new in Normandy was SS divisions under SS corps under an SS army. [I haven't checked detailed OOB, correct me if this never happened]. That multiplied the ability to put safegarding SS troops as a priority over fighting the Allies.
All in all, I am not sure why it seems so surprising that an organization created with a political agenda, such as the SS, also had a political agenda while in action.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"
It is a 2d Canadian Corps intell SITREP. Have to dig through scads of photos to find it.
The divisions reported and were consolidated by corps and then army. The higher it went the more numbers were more important. SHAEF simply collected the raw totals. But divisions reported the breakdowns daily as they could with obvious holes and "catch ups" due to operational circumstances. One huge hole is that VIII Corps destroyed almost all its G-2 records in the Ardennes.I admit I never noticed the breakdown in PoWs annexed daily to XIX Corps G-2 reports. Since you gave consolidated data for August, I suppose someone also typed all data in a file for ease of calculation. (Just asking in case this someone is you, and in case the file could be shared ).
If you are interested, the divisional reports are the most profitable.
Yep, gotta look at the divisional G-2 reports for some corps since they were apparently too lazy to consolidate the reports.I looked at a sample of G-2 reports from other corps: XV corps split PoWs more or less the way XIX did; but V corps and VII Corps didn't give any data except the grand total of PoWs. Obviously operating procedures were not that "standard"
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell