D'Este's "A Genius for War"

[Texas Jäger]

What was new in Normandy was SS divisions under SS corps under an SS army. [I haven't checked detailed OOB, correct me if this never happened]. That multiplied the ability to put safegarding SS troops as a priority over fighting the Allies.

All in all, I am not sure why it seems so surprising that an organization created with a political agenda, such as the SS, also had a political agenda while in action.

It was not an "SS army". They were under 7. Armee initially, then Panzergruppe West, which transmogrified into 5. Panzerarmee.

Yes, and even though 7th Army (when under Hausser) and 6th Panzer Army both had SS commanders before, if I recall correctly the first and only actual SS armies were when the 11th SS Panzer Army was formed and 6th Panzer Army was re-designated 6th SS Panzer Army in February 1945. (I could be mistaken about the latter)

[Aida1]

Also there were plenty of times when SS divisions were attached to army corps during the war.

Definitively, often happened before.

What was new in Normandy was SS divisions under SS corps under an SS army. [I haven't checked detailed OOB, correct me if this never happened]. That multiplied the ability to put safegard3ng SS troops as a priority over fighting the Allies.

All in all, I am not sure why it seems so surprising that an organization created with a political agenda, such as the SS, also had a political agenda .

Wrong. The first SS Panzercorps was set up in 1942 and there was no SS army in Normandy. And there could hardly be a political aganda while in action and certainly not keep out of action. :roll: :roll: Actually the only division where allegations were made about it being kept out of action for political reasons was the Heer 116.Pzdiv. based on statements made by Speidel and even that is doubtful.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... zKorps.htm
And not all waffen ss units were part of an SS corps. 17 SS was part of LXXXIV corps and Das Reich was subordinated to this corps too in july.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... VKorps.htm
In the battle of Normandy waffen ss divisions were always in the thick of it and suffered high casualties . The only safeguarding that was attempted in general was trying to keep the mobile divisions in reserve so they could be used for counterattacks. Never worked because the lack of infantrydivisions so mobile divisions were used up in defensive fighting.

[Aida1]

What was new in Normandy was SS divisions under SS corps under an SS army. [I haven't checked detailed OOB, correct me if this never happened]. That multiplied the ability to put safegarding SS troops as a priority over fighting the Allies.

All in all, I am not sure why it seems so surprising that an organization created with a political agenda, such as the SS, also had a political agenda while in action.

It was not an "SS army". They were under 7. Armee initially, then Panzergruppe West, which transmogrified into 5. Panzerarmee.

Yes, and even though 7th Army (when under Hausser) and 6th Panzer Army both had SS commanders before, if I recall correctly the first and only actual SS armies were when the 11th SS Panzer Army was formed and 6th Panzer Army was re-designated 6th SS Panzer Army in February 1945. (I could be mistaken about the latter)

According to Lexicon der Wehrmacht 6.Pz army was never formally a SS army.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... armee6.htm

[Mori]

I'm fixing my statement thanks to your feedback. We can resume the thread from here.

Also there were plenty of times when SS divisions were attached to army corps during the war.

Definitively, often happened before.

What was new in Normandy was SS divisions under SS corps under an army headed by a SS general. That multiplied the ability to put safegarding SS troops as a priority over fighting the Allies.

All in all, I am not sure why it seems so surprising that an organization created with a political agenda, such as the SS, also had a political agenda while in action.

[Aida1]

I'm fixing my statement thanks to your feedback. We can resume the thread from here.

Also there were plenty of times when SS divisions were attached to army corps during the war.

Definitively, often happened before.

What was new in Normandy was SS divisions under SS corps under an army headed by a SS general. That multiplied the ability to put safegarding SS troops as a priority over fighting the Allies.

All in all, I am not sure why it seems so surprising that an organization created with a political agenda, such as the SS, also had a political agenda while in action.

SS units were never safeguarded in Normandy, rather the contrary. You would be hard put to prove your strange theory which implies that Hausser allegedly kept waffen ss units out of the fight when he took over 7. Armee. :roll: :roll: Factually impossible given how complicated the command was structured in Normandy and to who the Panzerdiv. were actually subordinated which was Panzergruppe West on june 30 (Ose p161) .
https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=3562e641 ... VzdA&ntb=1
As all mobile divisions , waffen ss divisions bore the brunt of the fighting and were used up.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hyperbole sells books I'm afraid. Look at Hastings, Beevor, Ambrose, et al along with D'Este.

Hi Rich,

Please don't make me look at Hastings, Beevor or Ambrose!

I didn't notice it last time I read D'Este's book, but bits of hyperbole keep on jumping out at me this time round. For example, later when talking about the Verdun conference on 19 December 1944 and Patton's famous promise to counterattack with 3 divsions within 48 hrs, the Colonel tells us that:

After more than thirty-four years, it was as if destiny had groomed him for this single, defining instant in which the fate of the war rested upon the right decisions being made and carried out by the men in that dingy room.

"The fate of the war"? "Destiny"? If Patton had skidded off the icy roads on his way to Verdun, does D'Este seriously want us to believe that the war could have been lost by the Allies? I'm pretty sure that by December 1944 many of the more experienced American corps commanders could have effectively assumed command of Third Army without an enormous impact on the rest of the war.

That D'Este seems trapped by the conflict between his professional military analysis and the need to justify the title of his work seems to me to be revealed in a later passage in which he summarises Patton's impact on "the Bulge":

p.699
[…]
After being stymied and frustrated in Lorraine and the Saar, in the Ardennes Patton was presented with another opportunity not only to display his genius for war but to turn a wretched situation to his advantage, and that of the Allies. However, as with any military operation, there were flaws. Patton’s manoeuvring of Third Army to relieve Bastogne did not win the Battle of the Bulge.

He goes on to describe Third Army's "disappointingly slow progress" which is often overlooked.

For D'Este, therefore, Patton's impact both displayed his supposed "genius for war" but didn't win the battle, displayed his long years of military study but resulted in "disappointingly slow progress", and ended with a self-imposed race to capture Houffalize reminiscent of the madness of Patton's imaginary "race to Messina".

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

SS units were never safeguarded in Normandy, rather the contrary.

Apologies for pointing out the elephant in the room, but I don't think Mori is saying that the SS units were protected from suffering savage losses at the hands of the Allies but that the formations themselves were protected from being dissolved when reduced to cadre status. I don't know whether he is right in such a statement, but it is true that several non-SS formations were broken up and folded into other formations.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, and even though 7th Army (when under Hausser) and 6th Panzer Army both had SS commanders before, if I recall correctly the first and only actual SS armies were when the 11th SS Panzer Army was formed and 6th Panzer Army was re-designated 6th SS Panzer Army in February 1945. (I could be mistaken about the latter)

AFAIK, neither 6. nor 11. Armee were ever officially retitled "SS" and I don't believe 11. Armee was ever titled as a Panzerarmee.

[Aida1]

SS units were never safeguarded in Normandy, rather the contrary.

Apologies for pointing out the elephant in the room, but I don't think Mori is saying that the SS units were protected from suffering savage losses at the hands of the Allies but that the formations themselves were protected from being dissolved when reduced to cadre status. I don't know whether he is right in such a statement, but it is true that several non-SS formations were broken up and folded into other formations.

Regards

Tom

He said that Hausser being in charge of 7.Army enabled him to safeguard the SS units instead of fighting the allies. That is clearly not abour disbandment of units as that would mean being used to fill up another depleted unit so still fighting the allies. And a disbandment is not a decision that would be taken at his level anyway. And most SS panzerdivisions were not subordinated to him because they were part of Panzergruppe West when he took over command of 7 army.
It would be the Reichsführer SS that would decide on a disbandment which he did consider for 17.SS div. but the division turned to be in a better shape for being refitted than originally thought so it was not disbanded. Obviously none of the best waffen ss divisions would ever be considered for disbandment neither would any better Heer division be. Units would rarely be disbanded and it would not be the best ones.

In another thread i did mention the allegations about Heer units being held back for political reasons: "He does mention that political grounds were mentioned for not sending 2 and 116 pz div to Normandy- in the years after the war also based on statements by speidel himself. He mentions that heinz gunther guderian will certainly have authentical information about that in his history of the 116 pz. Heinz Gunther Guderian does elaborate on that on pp 59-61 of Das letzte Kriegsjahr im Westen Die Geschichte der 116.Panzer Division. He mentions that David Irving reproached Speidel to have kept back the 116 pz div from the front to be used in the overthrow of Hitler. In a letter to Guderian of 04 10 1978, Speidel confirms that before the invasion there were considerations to keep back trustworthy pz div(2 and 116) for coming events. He states these considerations happened within the controversy about where to station the pz div. After the invasion there can be no talk anymore about keeping back the 116 pz division for these reasons. That the 116 pz was only released on 19.07 must be due to its refit not being ended. Guderian then elaborates some more and still is clearly not entirely convinced that there were no political considerations concerning the movements of 116 pz in the period after the invasion ."

[Mori]

Hyperbole sells books I'm afraid. Look at Hastings, Beevor, Ambrose, et al along with D'Este.

Hi Rich,

Please don't make me look at Hastings, Beevor or Ambrose!

I didn't notice it last time I read D'Este's book, but bits of hyperbole keep on jumping out at me this time round. For example, later when talking about the Verdun conference on 19 December 1944 and Patton's famous promise to counterattack with 3 divsions within 48 hrs, the Colonel tells us that:

After more than thirty-four years, it was as if destiny had groomed him for this single, defining instant in which the fate of the war rested upon the right decisions being made and carried out by the men in that dingy room.

"The fate of the war"? "Destiny"? If Patton had skidded off the icy roads on his way to Verdun, does D'Este seriously want us to believe that the war could have been lost by the Allies? I'm pretty sure that by December 1944 many of the more experienced American corps commanders could have effectively assumed command of Third Army without an enormous impact on the rest of the war.

That D'Este seems trapped by the conflict between his professional military analysis and the need to justify the title of his work seems to me to be revealed in a later passage in which he summarises Patton's impact on "the Bulge":

p.699
[…]
After being stymied and frustrated in Lorraine and the Saar, in the Ardennes Patton was presented with another opportunity not only to display his genius for war but to turn a wretched situation to his advantage, and that of the Allies. However, as with any military operation, there were flaws. Patton’s manoeuvring of Third Army to relieve Bastogne did not win the Battle of the Bulge.

He goes on to describe Third Army's "disappointingly slow progress" which is often overlooked.

For D'Este, therefore, Patton's impact both displayed his supposed "genius for war" but didn't win the battle, displayed his long years of military study but resulted in "disappointingly slow progress", and ended with a self-imposed race to capture Houffalize reminiscent of the madness of Patton's imaginary "race to Messina".

Regards

Tom

All you point is true and troublesome in this book, yet do not ruin some excellent research and some good ideas.

The issue, I believe, lays in what a biography is about. When studying a single character, it is difficult to avoid his/her "heroic" moments. So the typical biography resolves around a few "heroic" points, either to praise them without limits or to downgrade them to insignificant events. This is a serious limit in standard biographies. Note that if the author studies several officers in the same work, he/she may come with another analytical angle (e.g., Hitlers Heerführer, by Hürter).

About d'Este's hagiographic description of Patton at the Verdun conference, I shared your feelings: it's just "too much". But (1) If you go see some earlier works, like Farago's Patton, ordeal or triump, you will see d'Este is kind of tuned down... (2) d'Este is very critical of post-Bastogne operations, and I interpreted it as if he wanted to prove he could also be a more balanced historian, after letting himself loose on Verdun.

Finaly, when I worked on Patton, I found it useful to have both d'Este's and Hirshon's biographies. Hirshon is definitively "anti-Patton" and brings very interesting points which escaped d'Este, e.g.,on what the Patton social environment was etc. The points of view they adopt on the Sicily slapping are pretty different as they write from different perspectives. Hirshon is not that strong on military operations, however.

[Mori]

SS units were never safeguarded in Normandy, rather the contrary.

Apologies for pointing out the elephant in the room, but I don't think Mori is saying that the SS units were protected from suffering savage losses at the hands of the Allies but that the formations themselves were protected from being dissolved when reduced to cadre status. I don't know whether he is right in such a statement, but it is true that several non-SS formations were broken up and folded into other formations.

Regards

Tom

Friends, it's all so much more interesting and civil when Aida's posts are hidden. Try it and you'll love it.

[Texas Jäger]

Yes, and even though 7th Army (when under Hausser) and 6th Panzer Army both had SS commanders before, if I recall correctly the first and only actual SS armies were when the 11th SS Panzer Army was formed and 6th Panzer Army was re-designated 6th SS Panzer Army in February 1945. (I could be mistaken about the latter)

AFAIK, neither 6. nor 11. Armee were ever officially retitled "SS" and I don't believe 11. Armee was ever titled as a Panzerarmee.

I was mistaken then. But authors sure do like calling them that tho, history be damned.

[Aida1]

SS units were never safeguarded in Normandy, rather the contrary.

Apologies for pointing out the elephant in the room, but I don't think Mori is saying that the SS units were protected from suffering savage losses at the hands of the Allies but that the formations themselves were protected from being dissolved when reduced to cadre status. I don't know whether he is right in such a statement, but it is true that several non-SS formations were broken up and folded into other formations.

Regards

Tom

Friends, it's all so much more interesting and civil when Aida's posts are hidden. Try it and you'll love it.

You are hiding from seeing all your inaccurate postings exposed.

[Tom from Cornwall]

All you point is true and troublesome in this book, yet do not ruin some excellent research and some good ideas.

Yep, I agree - some great research and an interesting overview of Patton's somewhat tempestuous character.

The issue, I believe, lays in what a biography is about. When studying a single character, it is difficult to avoid his/her "heroic" moments. So the typical biography resolves around a few "heroic" points, either to praise them without limits or to downgrade them to insignificant events. This is a serious limit in standard biographies. Note that if the author studies several officers in the same work, he/she may come with another analytical angle (e.g., Hitlers Heerführer, by Hürter).

Good point, there aren't that many comparative biographies though - I've got John English's "Patton's Peers" and Douglas Delaney's "Corps Commanders" - should go back and re-read them. I'll look into Hürter's book - thanks for that suggestion.

Re Patton and the Bulge - I need to re-read John Rickard's "Advance and Destroy". IIRC he was more complimentary about Patton in that book than in his earlier book about Patton in Lorraine.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

Re Patton and the Bulge - I need to re-read John Rickard's "Advance and Destroy". IIRC he was more complimentary about Patton in that book than in his earlier book about Patton in Lorraine.

There isn't much to be complimentary about WRT Patton and the Lorraine Campaign. His character was poorly suited to the bite and hold tactics that were required to work through the German defenses.