D'Este's "A Genius for War"

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Mori
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#61

Post by Mori » 03 Nov 2022, 22:47

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 21:57
Good point, there aren't that many comparative biographies though - I've got John English's "Patton's Peers" and Douglas Delaney's "Corps Commanders" - should go back and re-read them. I'll look into Hürter's book - thanks for that suggestion.
Which is about it. John English's is poor because of an embarassing tendency to skew sources to fit his "each one is in the shadow of..." idea. He doesn''t problematize much. Ignoring Patton is also a weakness.

Delaney is way better, because he does to look for something not obvious.

Stephen Hart's Colossal Cracks also includes a long piece on the Montgomery-Crerar and Montgomery-Dempsey relationships. It's close to a comparative biography.

Then, there is Taffee's Marshall and his Generals, backed with remarkable research. However, his common thread seems to identify who was the "best general": that's poor history.

Other than generals, there are cross-biographies of SS officers not serving in field units (Allgemeine-SS): Michael Wildt's An Uncompromising Generation and Christian Ingrao's Believe and Destroy. These are much more analytical and thoughtful than what gets written on generals.
Re Patton and the Bulge - I need to re-read John Rickard's "Advance and Destroy". IIRC he was more complimentary about Patton in that book than in his earlier book about Patton in Lorraine.
Hence I thought his book on Lorraine was better :)
Last edited by Mori on 03 Nov 2022, 23:17, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#62

Post by Mori » 03 Nov 2022, 23:11

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 22:46
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 21:57
Re Patton and the Bulge - I need to re-read John Rickard's "Advance and Destroy". IIRC he was more complimentary about Patton in that book than in his earlier book about Patton in Lorraine.
There isn't much to be complimentary about WRT Patton and the Lorraine Campaign. His character was poorly suited to the bite and hold tactics that were required to work through the German defenses.
Was it just "character"...?

I think it was just proof Patton was really skilled at a single type of situation: pursuit, once break-in is performed by someone else. This happened in Sicily (there wasn't any defense any more when Patton went to Palerma), in August 1944 in France (Bradley's Cobra did the break-in) and in March 1945 to the Rhine (Crerar+Simpson+Hodges were already on the Rhine when Patton eventually joined).

However, when in charge of breaking-in, he seemed not to know how to proceed. Crerar/Horrocks (Veritable), Simpson (Grenade), but also Patch (breaking through the Vosges) did much better.


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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#63

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Nov 2022, 23:39

Mori wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 23:11
Was it just "character"...?

I think it was just proof Patton was really skilled at a single type of situation: pursuit, once break-in is performed by someone else. This happened in Sicily (there wasn't any defense any more when Patton went to Palerma), in August 1944 in France (Bradley's Cobra did the break-in) and in March 1945 to the Rhine (Crerar+Simpson+Hodges were already on the Rhine when Patton eventually joined).

However, when in charge of breaking-in, he seemed not to know how to proceed. Crerar/Horrocks (Veritable), Simpson (Grenade), but also Patch (breaking through the Vosges) did much better.
Indeed. His character - impetuousness, headstrongness, and impatience, all of which were hallmarks of his life - was ill-suited to the patient planning and meticulous preparation required for a set-piece break-in battle. Of the American army commanders, Simpson was much better at the break-in, Patch was perhaps evenly matched and good at both types of battle, while Hodges seemed woefully unprepared for either.
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#64

Post by Mori » 04 Nov 2022, 10:32

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 23:39
Indeed. His character - impetuousness, headstrongness, and impatience, all of which were hallmarks of his life - was ill-suited to the patient planning and meticulous preparation required for a set-piece break-in battle. Of the American army commanders, Simpson was much better at the break-in, Patch was perhaps evenly matched and good at both types of battle, while Hodges seemed woefully unprepared for either.
Couldn't agree more. I came to the exact same conclusion in the work I finished 3 years ago, including surprise how skilled Patch turned to be :)

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#65

Post by phaze » 05 Nov 2022, 02:12

Mori wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 23:11

I think it was just proof Patton was really skilled at a single type of situation: pursuit,
Was he though ? Or rather, who wasn't then ? What actual general in command of semblance of motorized forces and beaten enemy, non existent cohesive front in front of him didn't clock in great advances ? The "set-piece", "slow", "plodding" Monty pulled some of the fast and farthest reaching advances, everybody's favourite whipping boy Hodges, did no worse after Normandy than Patton just a bit later. With Mons pocket, first through Rhine and to Elbe one could easily say he did better, at least in marketable feats.

Reading Patton's thoughts shows no real understanding of what happened or is happening, why the pursuit is succeeding. Plainly, his expectations on logistical support or enemy resistance in August/September 1944 and what this meant for his advance were naive to delusional and even when 3rd army was stopped on and west of Moselle he adjusted very slowly.

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#66

Post by Aida1 » 05 Nov 2022, 08:20

Westphalia1812 wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 03:15
Mori wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 02:22


For example, 17th SS div sent a report on 19 July 1944 saying it had just 876 riflemen left. But 5 days later another report said the full manpower was more than 11,000 men. The units also played games in reports to Himmler himself.


Gefechtsstärke ≠ Verpflegungsstärke
There are 3 different notions. The total ration strength, the combat strength and the socalled Gräbenstärke. The latter is the lowest one as it only contains men in the trenches and the heavy weapons behind them. Even if the division loses a lot of its combat strength , it still contains a lot of men and a refitting of the division is not too difficult based on the tail and a core of the combat units and refilling the latter with convalesced wounded and recruits..

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#67

Post by Aida1 » 05 Nov 2022, 08:23

Westphalia1812 wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 03:35
Mori wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 02:22


... Most units concealed troops and equipment in rear areas under various excuses ("training", "refershing", assignment to depot etc.), and that's especially true of SS formations.



That troops and equipment were in rear areas as the Normandy battle raged goes a long way in explaining how Germans stabilized the front in a few days early September 1944.
That's one thing I've never heard about until now. Can you cite examples? This would be very interesting for evaluating the combat readiness of the armored reserves.

AFAIK, 12th SS send some of their surviving tanks to the rear around mid August, having some left despite being one of the most engaged divs. My memory could have failed me, though :lol:
Sending support units and a core of the combat units to the rear is the normal way to prepare for refit when a division is reduced to not much in combat strength.

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#68

Post by Aida1 » 05 Nov 2022, 08:27

Mori wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 11:17
Westphalia1812 wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 03:35
Mori wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 02:22


... Most units concealed troops and equipment in rear areas under various excuses ("training", "refershing", assignment to depot etc.), and that's especially true of SS formations.



That troops and equipment were in rear areas as the Normandy battle raged goes a long way in explaining how Germans stabilized the front in a few days early September 1944.
That's one thing I've never heard about until now. Can you cite examples? This would be very interesting for evaluating the combat readiness of the armored reserves.

AFAIK, 12th SS send some of their surviving tanks to the rear around mid August, having some left despite being one of the most engaged divs. My memory could have failed me, though :lol:
The other example I've read is 12th SS, like you say.

In the first weeks of the battle of Normandy, it was heavily engaged and lost ca. 6,000 men. But after July 10th, the unit was never committed in full even though it still had ca. 14,000 personnel.

Only Kampfgruppen of 100s of men fought (and these were especially strong as they concentrated as much firepower as possible in a small group). However, they were a symbolic fraction of the full strength of the unit.

On July 23rd, most of troops outside these KGs were ordered back to their old garrison zone "to refresh the division and to safeguard men and equipement".

All this and previous assertions are from Leleu's "La Waffen-SS", which is only available in French (and in Spanish). The writer quotes a lot of archives, both from BAMA/NARA (KTB OKW, OB West (RH 19-IV), Pz Gr West (RH 20-5), Pz.AOK 5 (RH 21-5), and FMS Eberbach) and from VHA Prague archives.

It's all part of a bigger picture: how German SS units had a hidden agenda consisting on preserving themselves.
Completely wrong as it is no use keeping a big tail forward when a division is reduced to a battlegroup. So you would send parts to the rear to prepare for the eventual refit. You need a core of the combat units and the tail of the division to do a refit.
There would be a tendency of the front command to keep combat units of a division in the front even when it is earmarked for refit while the division itself would try to shift units rearward to prepare the refit starting with the support units. Not proper to waffen ss. See for example Die Geschichte der 6.Pzdiv 1937-1945 Wolfgang Paul Höntges Verlag 1977 pp 206-221 on the 1942 transfer for refit to France of 6 panzer.

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#69

Post by Mori » 05 Nov 2022, 13:32

phaze wrote:
05 Nov 2022, 02:12
Mori wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 23:11

I think it was just proof Patton was really skilled at a single type of situation: pursuit,
Was he though ? Or rather, who wasn't then ? What actual general in command of semblance of motorized forces and beaten enemy, non existent cohesive front in front of him didn't clock in great advances ?
Frankly, I wonder. Would anyone just run forward at maximum speed, ignoring potential threats on the flanks and risk of supply shortage? It's not that obvious. There *are* cases of overextended armies severely beaten, a fate Patton never suffered.

The "standard" behavior of generals should be to grap benefits of a break-out. But did Patton push it to its limits, further than most would have done? It seems it wasn't possible to be even faster / deeper than what Patton did, but I don't see how to assess whether others would have gone that far & fast.
The "set-piece", "slow", "plodding" Monty pulled some of the fast and farthest reaching advances, everybody's favourite whipping boy Hodges, did no worse after Normandy than Patton just a bit later. With Mons pocket, first through Rhine and to Elbe one could easily say he did better, at least in marketable feats.
Hodges performance in August 1944 was fair and based on that, no one could have predicted the poor then bad generalship of the next months. However, Mons pocket maneuver was rather dictated by Bradley than an initiative by Hodges.
The post-Rhine crossing advance in central Germany was certainly a fast one, but given weakness of opposing forces as well as accumulated experience of Allied troops, it''s not the best example to assess generalship.
Reading Patton's thoughts shows no real understanding of what happened or is happening, why the pursuit is succeeding. Plainly, his expectations on logistical support or enemy resistance in August/September 1944 and what this meant for his advance were naive to delusional and even when 3rd army was stopped on and west of Moselle he adjusted very slowly.
I agree, by and large. Patton was not crazy either and at least managed to check his flanks with air recce and patrols. But passed September 4th, it took him weeks to understand the situation had changed. Everyone was in the illustion of victory, though.

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#70

Post by Westphalia1812 » 05 Nov 2022, 13:35

Aida1 wrote:
05 Nov 2022, 08:20
Westphalia1812 wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 03:15
Mori wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 02:22


For example, 17th SS div sent a report on 19 July 1944 saying it had just 876 riflemen left. But 5 days later another report said the full manpower was more than 11,000 men. The units also played games in reports to Himmler himself.


Gefechtsstärke ≠ Verpflegungsstärke
There are 3 different notions. The total ration strength, the combat strength and the socalled Gräbenstärke. The latter is the lowest one as it only contains men in the trenches and the heavy weapons behind them. Even if the division loses a lot of its combat strength , it still contains a lot of men and a refitting of the division is not too difficult based on the tail and a core of the combat units and refilling the latter with convalesced wounded and recruits..
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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#71

Post by Mori » 05 Nov 2022, 14:01

Westphalia1812 wrote:
05 Nov 2022, 13:35
Great chart, thanks. Explains more than all lenghty comments.

And thanks for giving the exact archival reference.

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#72

Post by Aida1 » 05 Nov 2022, 15:30

Westphalia1812 wrote:
05 Nov 2022, 13:35
Aida1 wrote:
05 Nov 2022, 08:20
Westphalia1812 wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 03:15
Mori wrote:
01 Nov 2022, 02:22


For example, 17th SS div sent a report on 19 July 1944 saying it had just 876 riflemen left. But 5 days later another report said the full manpower was more than 11,000 men. The units also played games in reports to Himmler himself.


Gefechtsstärke ≠ Verpflegungsstärke
There are 3 different notions. The total ration strength, the combat strength and the socalled Gräbenstärke. The latter is the lowest one as it only contains men in the trenches and the heavy weapons behind them. Even if the division loses a lot of its combat strength , it still contains a lot of men and a refitting of the division is not too difficult based on the tail and a core of the combat units and refilling the latter with convalesced wounded and recruits..
Interesting to see the official instructions from the high command. Important to be aware of these notions when judging the losses of a division. The Gräbenstärke was also sometimes used by units and gives an indication of how many men there actually were in the trenches and directly behind which tells you what the density of the defenseline is. Also where the loss percentage was highest .

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#73

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 05 Nov 2022, 22:40

Westphalia1812 wrote:
05 Nov 2022, 13:35
Thanks for posting up that explanatory chart. Brilliant!

Regards

Tom

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#74

Post by Texas Jäger » 06 Nov 2022, 03:09

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 22:46
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
03 Nov 2022, 21:57
Re Patton and the Bulge - I need to re-read John Rickard's "Advance and Destroy". IIRC he was more complimentary about Patton in that book than in his earlier book about Patton in Lorraine.
There isn't much to be complimentary about WRT Patton and the Lorraine Campaign. His character was poorly suited to the bite and hold tactics that were required to work through the German defenses.
This seemed to manifest during the Ardennes too; there are no shortage of accounts regarding his frustration in the push toward Houffalize. (Threatening to relieve the 11th Armored and 17th Airborne Divisional commanders after their first battles, for example.)

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Re: D'Este's "A Genius for War"

#75

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 06 Nov 2022, 21:18

D'Este maintains his somewhat confused description of Patton's "genius" in his summary of Third Army's involvement in the Battle of the Bulge:
p.702
What the Battle of the Bulge demonstrated is that, while possessed of tremendous vision – the ability to anticipate and react with impeccable foresight to an enemy move or countermove – Patton’s greatest strength was not so much as a tactician but as an organizer, a mover and shaker. Gerald Astor, author of a recent account of the Bulge, is right on the mark when he writes that Patton’s “true genius lay in his ability to put the show on the road, to move men and machines.” [Note 86: Gerald Astor, A Blood Dimmed Tide (New York, 1992), p. 226.] Patton understood that despite the terrible conditions under which his troops fought, it was equally difficult for the enemy, and that to attack, and to keep attacking, was what would win the battle. Patton himself rated determination to succeed higher than luck or genius and observed: “We have to push people beyond endurance in order to bring the war to an end.” [Note 87: MB-PP 2, pp. 593, 595.]
[…]
If George S. Patton had never before done or would never again do anything of significance, he had earned a place in history by his extraordinary generalship early in the Ardennes. It was a short, brutal campaign that not only solidified his reputation for generalship on the battlefield but left no doubt of the quality of the army on which he had put his imprint. It is the nature of war that perfection is never attainable, but this was Patton’s and the Third Army’s finest hour. No one else could have pulled off such a feat.
"No one else"?

Regards

Tom

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