German counter attacks against EPSOM

[Stoat Coat]

Can somebody explain why Panzergruppe West counter attacked rhe spear heads of Epsom instead of attacking at the base along the Carpiquet-Fontenay road? This would have threatened the salient with an encirclement.

[Kingfish]

Distance?

To me the distance Carpiquet/Fontenay is twice that of Grainville/Tourville.

[Sheldrake]

There are several likely reasons for not attacking along the Fontenoy/Carpiquet axis.

#1 Time and space. There wasn't enough space to deploy even battlegroups of six panzer divisions in that area. The city of Caen was a choke point as is the maze in the bocage country south of Tilly-sur-Seulles.

#2 Exposure to allied firepower while forming up and deploying. As it was the II Panzer Corps was shelled and bombed in its assembly areas. A more northerly route would leave the attacking troops vulnerable to flanking indirect and direct fire.

The sketch map in post #1 creates a misleading impression that there was a gap between 1st and 8th Corps. It has the 3rd Canadian Division apparently facing 21st Panzer Division, whereas 3rd British Division was North of Caen while 3rd Canadian Division was North west of it. As you can see from the uploaded map, there were two infantry brigades on wither flank uncommitted to Op Epsom.

[Sean Oliver]

The Brtish armor which was threatening to cross the Odon in strength, roll over point 112 and exploit southwards to Falaise was the Germans' main concern, and the British salient seemed too strong in depth, especially with their artillery deployed in that area, with fresh infantry and armor reserves nearby. A flank attack at Epsom's base near Carpiquet was likely to face strong British troops, an unpleasant option. German forces available were too weak to attack both the crossing of the Odon, and at the base of the salient.
And 112 was far too important for the Germans to risk losing.

[Michael Kenny]

As an indication of how badly the Germans were handled it should be noted that II SS Pz K. were stopped dead on the start line for their attack. They Germans bet everything on this Offensive and it was their last chance to defeat the landings. Put simply they were completely outmatched and outfought. Montgomery was not one known to leave himself open to a flank attack/encirclement (he gave up Hill 112 for this reason) and he had made sure he would be able to deal with any German attack no matter from which direction it came. In short there never was a realistic chance ANY German attack would succeeded.

[Sean Oliver]

Despite Epsom's less than spectacular geographic results, it was nonetheless an important psychological victory which proved to German forces in the west of all ranks that they were basically doomed.
One of the Foreign Military Studies reports by a German infantry division commander describes how he spent 2 years before D-Day in France thoroughly training and nurturing his divisional 'Fusilier' battalion to make it his elite counterattack/assault unit, which he would keep out of combat until a decisive moment. His division was then ordered to Normandy, to the British sector around the time of Epsom, and a few days later, the commander decided it was time to send his proud Fusiliers into battle.
The battalion assembled for its attack in an area hidden from enemy observation, and just as they were about to march into combat, a sudden and massive British artillery strike came roaring down and annihilated the battalion within a few short minutes.
The entire division and its commander were shocked and devastated by the almost instantaneous destruction of the unit, which received the best training possible. They could not determine how the British artillery had pinpointed its location as no British troops were nearby to act as FOs. The commander goes on to describe how this incident produced a feeling of futility and helplessness which devastated his and his unit's morale permanently.