Battle of the Bulge- your opinion on this statement

[Gungnir]

The Prussians and Germans never did consider themselves beaten in any conflcit up to 1918 and while they could hardly fail to admit defeat in 1945, the significant point in both wars is that they held out for so long. At the end of the 1939-45 war they fought against impossible odds, virtually encircled by enemies, pounded day and night by thousands of bombers, losing not mere divisions but whole armies, whole industries, entire cities. And when the Allies were convinced of near victory the Germans made their fantastic, final counter-attack in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944-45 - the Battle of the Bulge. In the end this spirited thrust was defeated, but it will forever remain a magnificent feat of arms. It was the Germans' psychological approach to the battle, not their weight of arms which produced this astonishing last ditch battle.

from
Jackboot: A History of the German Soldier 1713-1945
by John Laffin

[Gwynn Compton]

Certainly an interesting view, though the area that the offensive fell on was not garrisoned by a difficult formation to overrun.

A combination of suprise, weather, local superiority, and luck helped the Germans in this offensive. Though the psychological approach to the battle was probably only key in the fact that the soldiers actually launched the offensive, despite overwhelming odds against its success.

Gwynn

[kelty90]

Basically, complete nonsense. The Ardennes offensive was doomed to fail regardless, and simply killed a lot of German soldiers.
Remember, the offensive was predicated on certain factors:
That the US soldiers would not fight - but they did.
That the Germans would capture enough fuel to continue the advance -they didn't.
That bad weather would preclude US air support - the weather cleared.
That the Allies couldn't reinforce - but both Patton and Montgomery both sent large numbers of soldiers and tanks.
That the Germans could "break through" - but they didn't.
It was Patton who commented that the Germans should be allowed to get to the coast, as it would simply mean more captured and killed Germans when their "bulge" was cut off.
The Germans were underequipped (not enough fuel) and wrongly equipped (Tiger IIs on icy hilly roads!).
Plus, of course, it took troops from the Eastern Front, good news for the Red Army.
So, for what it is worth, i for one think Laffin wrong.

[varjag]

I think the 'psychological effect' is quite correct. It was Hitlers last throw of the dice and - since his object was to prolong the war and increase the chances of a coalition split-up. His forces were too depleted and weak to pull it off but he had no choice - he had to try it. I disagree with 'the Germans psychological approach' - it was Hitlers old instinct for hitting the enemy at a weak point. Because he lost and six decades of Fog Factor 10, obscures, that from his desk - he did pick exactly the right spot for his last throw.

[Eightball]

I think the 'psychological effect' is quite correct. It was Hitlers last throw of the dice and - since his object was to prolong the war and increase the chances of a coalition split-up. His forces were too depleted and weak to pull it off but he had no choice - he had to try it. I disagree with 'the Germans psychological approach' - it was Hitlers old instinct for hitting the enemy at a weak point. Because he lost and six decades of Fog Factor 10, obscures, that from his desk - he did pick exactly the right spot for his last throw.

The forces commited to the Battle of the Bulge, I would say, were far from weak. The reason for the collapse, as stated before, was due to the fact that the panzerforces of the main thrust never reached the front. They were jammed up on small cramped roads were manouver was impossible.

[stcamp]

The forces commited to the Battle of the Bulge, I would say, were far from weak. The reason for the collapse, as stated before, was due to the fact that the panzerforces of the main thrust never reached the front. They were jammed up on small cramped roads were manouver was impossible.

I agree. If I remember correctly the Wehrmacht did a better job of reaching their objectives than the SS did.

Final fantastic counter attack.....

....The commanders in charge of the offensive, von Runstedt(Commander of the West), Field Marshall Model(tactical commander), Josef"Sepp"Dietrich (leader of the Sixth Panzer Army), and Hoss von Manteuffel (commander of Fifth Panzer Unit) all were skeptical about Hitler's plan. They felt that taking Antwerp was something that just could not be accomplished by the German army at the time. Field Marshall Model was quoted as saying "This plan hasn't got a damned leg to stand on".

I think the passage you quoted to start this thread was written by someone who has bought into the "Invincible Geman/Prussian Super Trooper" mythos which in my opinion is more telling of the persons world view than any real grasp of history.

[WalterS]

Gungnir quoted from John Laffin's book :

And when the Allies were convinced of near victory the Germans made their fantastic, final counter-attack in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944-45 - the Battle of the Bulge. In the end this spirited thrust was defeated, but it will forever remain a magnificent feat of arms.

Magnificent feat of arms? Within days of its launching the Ardennes offensive was bogging down due to unexpectedly stiff Allied resistance in places like St Vith and Bastogne. Although initial German penetration was impressive in some areas, Dietrich's 6th SS Panzer Army (made up mostly of Heer units) was unable to accomplish a breakout as planned thus forcing the axis of advance to be shifted south to von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army. His failure to take Bastogne and free up the road network doomed that part of the operation.

[Timo]

Everybody seems to overlook one crusial point: the German soldiers were not motivated. Falaise, the bombed cities, with the Soviet armies in Ostpreußen and ready to lauch their next offensive they were angry and in despair, but not motivated.

[stcamp]

Motivated enough to capture my Uncle He spent the rest of the war in a Stalag and learned to hate cabbage.

[Timo]

Yes, for a similar reason (forced labor in Berlin) my grandfather hates Pelkartoffeln

[Jon G.]

I think the Ardennes offensive was Hitler's attempt to emulate his 1940 blitzkrieg success. It was even launched over the same terrain.

He wanted to tactically seperate the British forces from the US forces (as he split the French forces from the BEF in 1940) in order to achieve a political aim; sever the alliance on the battlefield, split it up politically too.

An unrealistic goal of course, but the offensive was still a remarkable accomplishment, considering that the German armies in the west were on the brink of collapse in Aug. and Sept. 1944.

All the same, Hitler greatly underestimated the fighting abilities of the US Army, and he greatly overestimated the fighting prowess of his own armies. It is folly to launch a large scale offensive whose success is wholly dependent on overcast weather.

In all fairness, the Allied intelligence services had greatly underestimated German ability to counterattack, too -

[LAH]

Some people regard the battle of the bulge as a waste of effort and the troops could have been used to prop up the eastern front and saved east germany from being overun.

This idea is probably what most of us and probably the german high command would have thought was a better allocation of resources.

But Hitler was not interested in propping up the eastern front until the western troops arrived he wanted victory, and by attacking what he believed were the weakest member of the coalition he believed he could achieve that.

And durring the crises for the americans it did start to push a wedge between england and america, especially on the ground between montgomery and the american commanders.

And just for a thought, In my opinion had the western forces not had air superiority I think the german army may have reached its goal.
(And had the fuel)

Mark

[Rommel8]

didnt he launch this attack westwards because he figured if it was a significant enough of a blow, the western allies would sue for peace...

[Nucleicacidman]

Whoa. I think a lot of you are forgetting the feat of industry that Germany was able to pull of in 1944. Although the allies were bombing Germany into the oblivion armored production skyrocketed under the leadership of Albert Speer.

The ability for a nation, that had up to now, lost a little under 9 million people (both civilians and military), was quite remarkable. Not only this, but the ability for a nation, who had lost most of its fine soldiers in the fields of the Ostfront, to coordinate such an attack at such an oppurtune moment is even more amazing.

Although the offensive was doomed to failure, it is interesting how willing the German soldiers were to go to the offensive, and how happy they were that they thought the tides of war had turned once again. Also, what do you expect? The allies had stockpiled some 10 million men by the end of '44 in France ready to plug any gap in the front. It's also quite amazing how the Germans were able to exploit complete Allied intelligence debacles. It makes american intelligence quite the oxymoron in fact.



Also:

LAH... actually Hitler did not find the Western Coalition as the weaker of foes; he saw them as the more important foes (The Reich's Last Gamble, George Forty). He thought that if he was secessful in capturing Antwerp the British and the Americans would be divided and the major supply base for the allies would be lost to them (Antwerp). Then, in another major campaign he would crush the northern British, forcing the allies to sue for peace.

Then he could concentrate on the Russians. What he didn't take in mind was the suprise Soviet offensive in Pomerania in January '45 and the American reserves.

[LAH]

If you do some research you will find that hitler believed the americans were the weak partner in the coalition

Also the idea that germany could have continued to produce the same amounts of war material after 1944 is a non started.

Speer as good as he was was not a miracle worker.

Hitler knew that if he did nothing in the west then england and america would attack and overun the western defences.

But the Hitler of 1944 was not the same Hitler as 1939. He judgement was shrouded and the whole truth was not given to hitler through fear.