Battle of the Bulge- your opinion on this statement

[Nucleicacidman]

If you do some research you will find that hitler believed the americans were the weak partner in the coalition.

I've researched quite enough...even writing a few history articles abroud on the Bulge. It would seem quite obvious that Hitler saw the Soviets as the weakest since they were in fact subhuman in his eyes. The Americans were actually some of the stronger foes, made of German blood... that's why he aimed to destroy the British armies, not the Americans.

Also the idea that germany could have continued to produce the same amounts of war material after 1944 is a non started.

According to Panzerkrieg, by Peter McCarthy, German armored productions sky rocketed under Speer, reaching the maximum of somewhere near 900 per month.

Hitler knew that if he did nothing in the west then england and america would attack and overun the western defences.

But the Hitler of 1944 was not the same Hitler as 1939. He judgement was shrouded and the whole truth was not given to hitler through fear.

Exactly my point. The Western Allies to his mind were stronger than the Soviets to his east. That's why he struck at the western allies.

And if you ever get a chance read David M. Glantz' Hitler and his Generals which are the complete stenographic records of Hitler's meetings with his generals after Stalingrad.... his generals did quite a lot to stem Hitler's mind - it was Hitler's own megalomania which shrouded his views... not his general's unwillingness to counter him.

[Jon G.]

I beg to differ on some of the numbers you offer here.

Whoa. I think a lot of you are forgetting the feat of industry that Germany was able to pull of in 1944. Although the allies were bombing Germany into the oblivion armored production skyrocketed under the leadership of Albert Speer.

It is true that German war production soared under Speer's leadership. But this should be put in relation to the overall production figures pre-1942 being very low, which makes the post-1942 figures seem very high. By December 1944, the synthfuel industry was in ruins, the Rumanian oilfields had been lost, and aircraft production had dropped sharply. German industry, for all Speer's achievements, was past its prime by December 1944.

Also, much of the equipment used for the Ardennes offensive was salvaged/repaired, not newly built material.

The ability for a nation, that had up to now, lost a little under 9 million people (both civilians and military), was quite remarkable...

This is a gross exaggeration. 4,25 million Germans died in WWII, and 1 million were reported missing. Combined, about 10% of total deaths in WWII. And a disproportionately large percentage of German casualties happened in 1945.

Also, what do you expect? The allies had stockpiled some 10 million men by the end of '44 in France ready to plug any gap in the front...

Another exaggeration, I am sure, though I do not have a number with which to correct it.

LAH... actually Hitler did not find the Western Coalition as the weaker of foes; he saw them as the more important foes (The Reich's Last Gamble, George Forty). He thought that if he was secessful in capturing Antwerp the British and the Americans would be divided and the major supply base for the allies would be lost to them (Antwerp). Then, in another major campaign he would crush the northern British, forcing the allies to sue for peace.

Well, Hitler assumed that if he could force a political decision, it would have to be with the Western Allies. Who was militarily stronger in Hitler's optic is less important.

[Wolfkin]

Hello!

There is a mistake that is repeated often, in this quote and many others, and also in many books. This is the idea that the Ardennes was the last German offensive of WWII. The Battle Of The Ardennes was NOT the last German offensive of WWII. The last few German offensives in WWII were launched in Hungary in February and March of 1945, after the Ardennes, and these offensives used some of the units that were involved in the Ardennes Offensive, namely the 6th Panzer Armee.

Cheers,

Wolfkin

[varjag]

Great posts from all. Have just re-read Otto Skorzenys 'on the ground' recollections of the battle. Key points appear to be insufficient artillery preparation (due shortage of ammo). Tougher than expected resistance from 'gum-chewing negroid American degenerates' (not his words) and a hopeless traffic jam on inferior roads by vehicles, burning vital gasoline that should have been in the tank-tanks of the Panzerspitzen. The offensive was obviously driven by fighting spirit in a minority of units deployed - the rest were just longing for Peace to break out.

[Nucleicacidman]

It is true that German war production soared under Speer's leadership. But this should be put in relation to the overall production figures pre-1942 being very low, which makes the post-1942 figures seem very high. By December 1944, the synthfuel industry was in ruins, the Rumanian oilfields had been lost, and aircraft production had dropped sharply. German industry, for all Speer's achievements, was past its prime by December 1944.

My point was not in proportion to the allies..it was that the Germans had been able to pull off quite a lot more production than pre-1944. As in proportion to themselves.

[quoteAlso, much of the equipment used for the Ardennes offensive was salvaged/repaired, not newly built material.[/quote]

Much of it was also swiped off the Eastern Front also.

This is a gross exaggeration. 4,25 million Germans died in WWII, and 1 million were reported missing. Combined, about 10% of total deaths in WWII. And a disproportionately large percentage of German casualties happened in 1945.

According to Slaughter House: The Encyclopedia of the Eastern Front and Panzerkrieg the total death count for Germany was 10 million both military and civilian.

Another exaggeration, I am sure, though I do not have a number with which to correct it.

Again, I trusted my sources: The Reich's Last Gamble (George Forty), Hitler's Last Gamble (Trevor N. Dupuy) and The Battle of the Bulge (Robin Cross). As you have presented no sources I stick by my numbers.

Well, Hitler assumed that if he could force a political decision, it would have to be with the Western Allies. Who was militarily stronger in Hitler's optic is less important.

But the argument was that Hitler saw Russia as the stronger so I cotradicted LAH's (I think) claim.

[Nucleicacidman]

Great posts from all. Have just re-read Otto Skorzenys 'on the ground' recollections of the battle. Key points appear to be insufficient artillery preparation (due shortage of ammo). Tougher than expected resistance from 'gum-chewing negroid American degenerates' (not his words) and a hopeless traffic jam on inferior roads by vehicles, burning vital gasoline that should have been in the tank-tanks of the Panzerspitzen. The offensive was obviously driven by fighting spirit in a minority of units deployed - the rest were just longing for Peace to break out.

Very good point. The Germans had not counted on the great effort the American front line units put up to speed down the German advance.

[Jon G.]

It is true that German war production soared under Speer's leadership. But this should be put in relation to the overall production figures pre-1942 being very low, which makes the post-1942 figures seem very high. By December 1944, the synthfuel industry was in ruins, the Rumanian oilfields had been lost, and aircraft production had dropped sharply. German industry, for all Speer's achievements, was past its prime by December 1944.

My point was not in proportion to the allies..it was that the Germans had been able to pull off quite a lot more production than pre-1944. As in proportion to themselves.

Neither was it mine. I put German 1942 war production (low) in relation to German 1944 war production, which was high in comparison. I made no mention of the allies here whatsoever.

This is a gross exaggeration. 4,25 million Germans died in WWII, and 1 million were reported missing. Combined, about 10% of total deaths in WWII. And a disproportionately large percentage of German casualties happened in 1945.

According to Slaughter House: The Encyclopedia of the Eastern Front and Panzerkrieg the total death count for Germany was 10 million both military and civilian.

Then those books are wrong. Such a high death count would have a dramatic effect on German demographics today; France still suffers from a low birth rate due to 1,4 million casualties (all young men, as opposed to WWII losses in general) suffered in WWI

My source is Kitchen: Nazi Germany at war.

Another exaggeration, I am sure, though I do not have a number with which to correct it.

Again, I trusted my sources: The Reich's Last Gamble (George Forty), Hitler's Last Gamble (Trevor N. Dupuy) and The Battle of the Bulge (Robin Cross). As you have presented no sources I stick by my numbers.

Fair enough. But I have very strong doubts whether the combined Western Allied armies fielded 10 million men in the ETO, even if you add in the growing French contribution. The British army was in fact shriking in size already by 1944.

I don't off-handedly know a place to check the overall size of Western Allied forces in NWE in late 1944. But I'd hazard a guess at 20-25% (ballpark) of the number you state.

[Nucleicacidman]

Then those books are wrong. Such a high death count would have a dramatic effect on German demographics today; France still suffers from a low birth rate due to 1,4 million casualties (all young men, as opposed to WWII losses in general) suffered in WWI

Russia suffered a total of 30 million dead, both military and civilian. WWII was much different from WWI, as in, both civilian and military personnel were severely targeted; especially between the Russians and the Germans... it is not such an exxageration to claim 10 million Germans dead. But I'll go along with your number until I find some more sources.

[LAH]

I think you are miss understanding me when I say that Hitler saw the Americans as the weakest member of the coalition.

I don't mean in a military / economical / ratial reference, He thought they were not mentaly strong enough to deal with the full frontal military onslaght that hitler was getting ready to unleash.

He believed that if he hit them hard enough there will to fight on would wilt.

Hitler knew that the British and the Russians had proved themseves on the field and had the will to carry on regardless of the losses.

The Americans were to a degree an unknown quantity, military and strength of character.

Thats one of the reasons why Hitler choose to attack at the point he did.

As for Speer, true he made vast improvements to the war economy while he was in charge, but thats the point, speer changed the economy to a total war economy and that was a major fact in germany being able to increase its war production.
But as the frontiers shrank so did the raw materials that speers factories needed to survive.

After the end of 1944 the War was lost from a material point of view.

Mark

[gewehrdork]

Gentlemen ; I don't get alot of posts to this topic.Simple facts are that the ardennes offensive was a massive failure on every level but one - the germans being able to conceal the amount of troops for that attack. That it was doomed to failure is a given. As well and duly noted the germans typically underestimated their enemy and paid the piper for it.
The quotes regarding german production of arms has little relavance when they had not the men to use the gear nor the means to get such material and what men they had to the front(s).
Hitler may have been a brilliant politician early on in his career , but his pompous arrogance ultimately led him and germany down the primrose lined path to destruction.

[Eightball]

Gentlemen ; I don't get alot of posts to this topic.Simple facts are that the ardennes offensive was a massive failure on every level but one - the germans being able to conceal the amount of troops for that attack. That it was doomed to failure is a given. As well and duly noted the germans typically underestimated their enemy and paid the piper for it.
The quotes regarding german production of arms has little relavance when they had not the men to use the gear nor the means to get such material and what men they had to the front(s).
Hitler may have been a brilliant politician early on in his career , but his pompous arrogance ultimately led him and germany down the primrose lined path to destruction.

How could the Germans possibly have "under estimated" the Allies when they had just thrown them out of France? My conlclusion, after reading various and numerous of sources, is that this offensive was Hitler's attempt to break up an already stressed alliance by causing them one major defeat.

[hack]

Gentlemen ; I don't get alot of posts to this topic.Simple facts are that the ardennes offensive was a massive failure on every level but one - the germans being able to conceal the amount of troops for that attack. That it was doomed to failure is a given. As well and duly noted the germans typically underestimated their enemy and paid the piper for it.
The quotes regarding german production of arms has little relavance when they had not the men to use the gear nor the means to get such material and what men they had to the front(s).
Hitler may have been a brilliant politician early on in his career , but his pompous arrogance ultimately led him and germany down the primrose lined path to destruction.

Good politician in the 1930s, a ruthless dictator in 1940s. As you point out the great failure was allied intelligences failure in detecting the amount of troops in attack.

[gewehrdork]

Hack ; Yes the allied intel was lathargic and a failure in that action , but the biggest failure still was uncle adolphs grandiose attack scheme - doomed from the start .Basically he sent his horded lambs to slaughter for some mystical belief in ubermann and wunderwaffe.As well in some misguided thought train that Ami's and brits would drop and run to the coast .Hell maybe it was all the pills he was a poppin' at that point.Can't rightly say but he was a certified loon before that juncture whom insisted in surrounding himself with as deluded bootlickers for the majority of his 'staff' ( remember "lakeitel" for one ).

[Kephra]

How could the Germans possibly have "under estimated" the Allies when they had just thrown them out of France?

That is a point. And an additional point which is often forgotten in judgements concerning strategic aspects of the Battle of the Bulge...
- is the Battle of Hürtgenwald.



Some discussions from this forum:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=31270
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=26595
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=35121

Two whole pages about Hürtgenwald:

http://www.5ad.org/hurtgen_joe.htm
http://www.hurtgen1944.homestead.com/Index.html
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Grüße!
Kephra

[Dora]

All,
Many good points and opinions, however, going back to the original posting and the essence of that post, I think we're getting off the topic. The issue to debate is the fact that Germany, who was under termendous strain to maintain her war making abilities was able to summon the necessay equipment, manpower and will to launch yet another dangerous offensive.

At a time when many other nations would have long ago 'thrown in the towel' and accepted defeat, Germany kept on fighting, no doubt, in great fear and trepidation of what life under the Soviets would entail for them. Recall the Red Army in December 1944 was a lot closer to Berlin then was the western Allied armies. In World War II Germany had the great misfortune of having her capitol closer to her most threatening enemy than the other combatants. The Germans understood that the failed war in the east spelled doom for them, it was not a matter of 'if' the Russians came into Germany, it was a matter of 'when'.

So, I see this discussion as one of considering all that Germany needed to fight the war in the east, she was still able to summon the means to launch a major offensive in a completely different, albiet related, theater of the war.

For me the most lasting impression is that of a Germany in the Second World War is one of uncompromising (some might venture stubborn) will, determination and fear of the consequences of her earlier actions.
Dora