Shrek and Andreas, you have, as usual, raised some interesting points.
My first question is, why did Rommel spend so much time in Rome during the North African campaign? A hint: Commando Supremo was headquartered there.
Second question: what good are supplies to Rommel anywhere other than where he is? I'm sure that it was nice to know that the supplies he needed were somewhere, but fuel at Tripolis is of little use to tanks at El Alamein.
As to the raid, from what I read, Rommel actually had lived in that house for a short time. I think that was where he had to have the legs of his bed set in cans of gasoline to keep the 'creepie crawlies' from disturbing his sleep. Even though he may have been in Rome at the time of the actual raid, I think his actual billet at the time was considerably closer to the front than this house was.
I haven't read any of the books about Rommel specifically looking for instances of Italian bashing, but my overall opinion is that he respected the Italian soldiers, but was not happy with their commanders in most cases.
The reason that I have read 'Infantrie Greift an' three times is because I see a lot of the later Rommel in the earlier one, especially during his time with the mountain unit. The reason why I decided that it had some credibility is that he mentions several occasions when he was reprimanded for over-stepping his authority, and for a few other things that were even more serious. At the same time, he mentions his quest for the 'Pour le Merite' in several contexts.
THe big point I get out of this book, though, is that Rommel was not very intrested in logistics. He just wanted to attack and win. Do you see any parallels in North Africa? He was quite successful in Rumania, I believe, and Italy, but he makes a number of comments to the effect that, . . . "even though the troops had had no food or water for two days, they perfoered magnificently in the assault." Could it be that this was the beginning of Rommel's theory that his men could do anything with nothing in no time? He attacked when his men were cold and hungry, on his own initiative, several times. He attacked when his men were outnumbered. He attacked when his men were tired. Usually he was successful. This is known as 'positive reinforcement.' Is it any wonder that he, an infantryman, would continue to do this?
I have never said that Rommel was not flawed. My problem is that I can't really define the depths or focus of the flaw, or flaws But don't you think that his enemies would have been better prepared for him if they had read the book?
I have nothing against FM Montgomery but ....
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Alter Mann
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Re: FM Montgomery
Yes, and so was von Rintelen, OKH's liaison officer with Comando Supremo. He was very often at loggerheads with Rommel, especially over the supply issue which he bluntly called an insolvable problem in the first place. Rommel on his end accused von Rintelen of incompetence.Alte Mann wrote:Shrek and Andreas, you have, as usual, raised some interesting points.
My first question is, why did Rommel spend so much time in Rome during the North African campaign? A hint: Commando Supremo was headquartered there.
Absolutely. But Tripolis was Rommel's supply head to all intents and purposes; it was Rommel and not the Italians who created the problem by pushing the front line so far ahead, often in direct contradiction of orders.Second question: what good are supplies to Rommel anywhere other than where he is? I'm sure that it was nice to know that the supplies he needed were somewhere, but fuel at Tripolis is of little use to tanks at El Alamein.
With regard to the raid, most commanders in the Western Desert found themselves lost at one time or another. It just seems that it happened to Rommel more often than it happened to everybody else.
I can't off-handedly remember a single instance where Rommel talks favourably about the Italians.... I haven't read any of the books about Rommel specifically looking for instances of Italian bashing, but my overall opinion is that he respected the Italian soldiers, but was not happy with their commanders in most cases.
I think Rommel was a superb divisional commander. He might have excelled as a corps commander too, provided there had been a strong-willed army commander to keep him in check and remind him not to go beyond his logistical means. Other German panzer leaders such as Guderian, Hoeppner and even Manstein, when he held field command, were supremely aggressive, but they never found themselves in the same self-inflicted predicament as Rommel did time and again.THe big point I get out of this book, though, is that Rommel was not very intrested in logistics. He just wanted to attack and win. Do you see any parallels in North Africa? He was quite successful in Rumania, I believe, and Italy...
Actually, I am reminded of Sitting Bull (if I remember correctly) who said something along the lines that 'one hungry warrior is worth ten who aren't hungry'... he makes a number of comments to the effect that, . . . "even though the troops had had no food or water for two days, they perfoered magnificently in the assault."... He attacked when his men were cold and hungry... This is known as 'positive reinforcement.'
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Alter Mann
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Rommel In North Africa
Very good points, Shrek, as usual, but let me run a scenario by you and see if it makes any sense. I'm not sure that it is a real scenario based on the documentation that I have.
Suppose that Rommel was effectively seconded to the Commando Supremo to 'help' them with the British issue. We all know that Rommel did not believe that defence was superior to offence, even if the numbers were less than perfect. From what I have read, for support, he had the Italians, who were not happy with the way he did things.
In the 'Rommel Papers' it says that he was dependent on Commando Supremo for services such as road and railroad building. It would seem logical that he was also dependent on them for harbor maintenance and improvements. It is pretty definite that he was dependent on them for shipping. Given these conditions, and that he expected to be able to be re-supplied from ports closer to the front, and even pressed for this and recieved assurances before El Alamein, can you blame him for going back to his old ways?
I'm not trying to place the blame on the Italians, or anyone else. Rommel definitely had a fork in his chain of command with Berlin asking for one thing and Rome another. I never thought I would ever try to be an apologist for the man. Some of his actions are as incomprehensible to me as to anyone else, but doesn't this alternate scenario allow for some more interpretation of goals, expectations, etc.?
Suppose that Rommel was effectively seconded to the Commando Supremo to 'help' them with the British issue. We all know that Rommel did not believe that defence was superior to offence, even if the numbers were less than perfect. From what I have read, for support, he had the Italians, who were not happy with the way he did things.
In the 'Rommel Papers' it says that he was dependent on Commando Supremo for services such as road and railroad building. It would seem logical that he was also dependent on them for harbor maintenance and improvements. It is pretty definite that he was dependent on them for shipping. Given these conditions, and that he expected to be able to be re-supplied from ports closer to the front, and even pressed for this and recieved assurances before El Alamein, can you blame him for going back to his old ways?
I'm not trying to place the blame on the Italians, or anyone else. Rommel definitely had a fork in his chain of command with Berlin asking for one thing and Rome another. I never thought I would ever try to be an apologist for the man. Some of his actions are as incomprehensible to me as to anyone else, but doesn't this alternate scenario allow for some more interpretation of goals, expectations, etc.?
Well, in the larger picture of things, Rommel was sent to Libya to prevent Italy's North African empire from collapsing. By the time he arrived, the front line was at Sirte, some 300 or so miles E of Tripolis, but well W of both Tobruk and Benghazi. Originally, the Italians had wanted to hang on to only Tripolis, but Hitler overrruled this because he thought the Axis forces in Libya would then be a too concentrated target for British air strikes.
Once Rommel arrived, he immediately took the war to the enemy and went on the offensive. Probably a wise thing to do at that time, but he may have been intoxicated by this early success. He learned that total force is less important in the vast and fluid desert environment than rapid concentration of available force is, but he perhaps neglected to notice that concentration of force is only possible as long as you're amply supplied. As soon as his forces came to a halt, as they did before Tobruk in 1941 and at Alamein in 1942, British superiority of numbers began to tell.
Rommel must bear full responsibility for his 1942 attack on Egypt. If he had not thought that he could have made it to the Suez - an objective completely outside his original orders - he would never have found his army immobilized for want of supplies at Alamein. The Italians from Mussolini downwards had warned him of the supply problems an attack all the way to the channel zone was bound to meet.
On the other hand - Rommel did manage to stave off Axis defeat in North Africa for nearly two years. Considering how Germany and Italy's fortunes developed elsewhere in this period, I would call his North African campaigns a qualified success. But if he had stayed on the defensive in 1942 and had the Axis instead concentrated on taking Malta in that year to easen the burden on the Italian navy, he could have kept the British away from Tripolis for even longer.
Once Rommel arrived, he immediately took the war to the enemy and went on the offensive. Probably a wise thing to do at that time, but he may have been intoxicated by this early success. He learned that total force is less important in the vast and fluid desert environment than rapid concentration of available force is, but he perhaps neglected to notice that concentration of force is only possible as long as you're amply supplied. As soon as his forces came to a halt, as they did before Tobruk in 1941 and at Alamein in 1942, British superiority of numbers began to tell.
Rommel must bear full responsibility for his 1942 attack on Egypt. If he had not thought that he could have made it to the Suez - an objective completely outside his original orders - he would never have found his army immobilized for want of supplies at Alamein. The Italians from Mussolini downwards had warned him of the supply problems an attack all the way to the channel zone was bound to meet.
On the other hand - Rommel did manage to stave off Axis defeat in North Africa for nearly two years. Considering how Germany and Italy's fortunes developed elsewhere in this period, I would call his North African campaigns a qualified success. But if he had stayed on the defensive in 1942 and had the Axis instead concentrated on taking Malta in that year to easen the burden on the Italian navy, he could have kept the British away from Tripolis for even longer.
Two words about the initial topic.
Georgie Patton had a very negative opinion about Monty. If I got it right from Patton's memoirs Monty was rensonsible for losing a chance in August 1944. The Allies could select one of two ways of offensive - on the left flank (under Monty's command) where they faced strong fortifications, heavy-going terrain, wide rivers... etc. or on the right flank - in the area of the 1st and 3d American armies, there Patton found weak resistance and was going to reach the Siegried line before the retreating Germans. But Monty used his informal relations with Ike and American government and promoted the first - worse one - choice. Due to Monty's efforts Patton was deprived of supplies and reinforcements. All airborne forces were also concentrated in Monty's hands - just to be destroyed in Market Garden. In order to get more prestigious tasks and more resources Monty descended to dirty intrigues - he even secrectly sent his envoys to Washington to find support in Roosvelt's environment.
In two words if Monty had been a good strategists he should have insisted on advancing on Patton's direction and deploying all resources to there. But Monty was either too stupid to see it or too vainglorious.
Georgie Patton had a very negative opinion about Monty. If I got it right from Patton's memoirs Monty was rensonsible for losing a chance in August 1944. The Allies could select one of two ways of offensive - on the left flank (under Monty's command) where they faced strong fortifications, heavy-going terrain, wide rivers... etc. or on the right flank - in the area of the 1st and 3d American armies, there Patton found weak resistance and was going to reach the Siegried line before the retreating Germans. But Monty used his informal relations with Ike and American government and promoted the first - worse one - choice. Due to Monty's efforts Patton was deprived of supplies and reinforcements. All airborne forces were also concentrated in Monty's hands - just to be destroyed in Market Garden. In order to get more prestigious tasks and more resources Monty descended to dirty intrigues - he even secrectly sent his envoys to Washington to find support in Roosvelt's environment.
In two words if Monty had been a good strategists he should have insisted on advancing on Patton's direction and deploying all resources to there. But Monty was either too stupid to see it or too vainglorious.
Montgomery strongly advocated the famously well-known 'single, full-blooded thrust' towards the Ruhr right after the Normandy landings. Whether it would have succeeded or not has been the object of much heated debate - but he did not get his way with Ike, who favoured a broad front approach to Germany after France had fallen.
In a certain light, you could call Market Garden a full-blooded thrust lite, but it was carried out mostly with units organic to Montgomery's army group - and it was not aimed at the Ruhr, but merely attempting to force river crossings in the perfect defensive country of The Netherlands, as well as making Antwerp useful to the Allies.
Save for the massive airlift involved, Market Garden did not involve the use of supplies and resources otherwise earmarked for Bradley's army group as far as I know.
In a certain light, you could call Market Garden a full-blooded thrust lite, but it was carried out mostly with units organic to Montgomery's army group - and it was not aimed at the Ruhr, but merely attempting to force river crossings in the perfect defensive country of The Netherlands, as well as making Antwerp useful to the Allies.
Save for the massive airlift involved, Market Garden did not involve the use of supplies and resources otherwise earmarked for Bradley's army group as far as I know.
Would Rommel have done much better if he decided to stop the attack and permit enemy to gather itself? Whole German doctrine was based on the idea of numerically inferior force creating deep penetration and preventing enemy from creating new solid frontline. If he had stopped his attack british military would have dug in and prepared positions. Now with greater amount of supplies he would have been more powerful in next attack but at the same time his enemies would have better positions and would still have logistical advantage due to shorter range.
Karelian isthmus at the end of Continuation war tells how imperative it is when reaching breakthrough to try to follow it all the way in and prevent enemy from gaining balance. Soviet army failed to keep up pressure and it was again possible for finnish military to rally and stop the advance.
Admitted, same took place in North Africa but in both cases attack came close to success so close anything could have happened with minor change in situation.
Karelian isthmus at the end of Continuation war tells how imperative it is when reaching breakthrough to try to follow it all the way in and prevent enemy from gaining balance. Soviet army failed to keep up pressure and it was again possible for finnish military to rally and stop the advance.
Admitted, same took place in North Africa but in both cases attack came close to success so close anything could have happened with minor change in situation.
Monty and Antwerp
If Montgomery hadn't been as strategically blind as he was--or perhaps as glory-blinded as he was--there'd have been no need for Operation Market-Garden, because the Allies would have had all the supplies they needed to maintain the pace of their advance. Yet Patton was stopped with hardly any organized opposition before him, so that Monty could have the supplies for Arnhem.
The reason for this is the port of Antwerp. Monty's forces captured it intact, at which point he called a halt when British forces had no organized opposition in front of them that could have prevented their taking the approaches to Antwerp. The result was that German forces seized Walcheren Island and sealed off the Scheldte Estuary and the approaches to Antwerp, an inland port.
Yet Monty was specifically warned beforehand several times--by numerous people, including Admiral Bertram Ramsey--that the approaches to Antwerp needed to be grabbed in order for the port to be used......and he knew the port was needed in order to supply the Allied advance.
From a review of Peter Beale's book, Antwerp--The Great Mistake: " What was the great mistake? On 4 September 1944 elements of British 11th Armored Division rolled into Antwerp. Although they quickly captured the vital docks and related facilities, the tankers failed to seize bridges over the Albert canal, advance a few miles to Woensdrecht, seal off the German 15th Army, and open the sea route into Antwerp. Had 11th Armored taken those steps immediately, all sources seem to concur the division could have easily succeeded against very light and disorganized opposition, and consequently rendered unnecessary the ensuing bloody campaign to open the route to Antwerp for Allied shipping. Beale quotes relevant paragraphs from books by several historians and generals to make his point. In particular, although Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey dispatched a warning, also on 4 September, that the Scheldt must be cleared, multiple layers of command failed to heed him."
The stop was due to orders Montgomery personally issued to 11th Armored Division.
The orders were responsible for many deaths, both in the short-term and in the long-term. Canadians have never forgiven Montgomery because of the casualties they wound up taking while clearing the Scheldt Estuary.
And history will never forgive him for the deaths that resulted because WW II in Europe continued for months after it could have and should have ended. And with the supplies Antwerp would have provided, that is what would have happened.
The reason for this is the port of Antwerp. Monty's forces captured it intact, at which point he called a halt when British forces had no organized opposition in front of them that could have prevented their taking the approaches to Antwerp. The result was that German forces seized Walcheren Island and sealed off the Scheldte Estuary and the approaches to Antwerp, an inland port.
Yet Monty was specifically warned beforehand several times--by numerous people, including Admiral Bertram Ramsey--that the approaches to Antwerp needed to be grabbed in order for the port to be used......and he knew the port was needed in order to supply the Allied advance.
From a review of Peter Beale's book, Antwerp--The Great Mistake: " What was the great mistake? On 4 September 1944 elements of British 11th Armored Division rolled into Antwerp. Although they quickly captured the vital docks and related facilities, the tankers failed to seize bridges over the Albert canal, advance a few miles to Woensdrecht, seal off the German 15th Army, and open the sea route into Antwerp. Had 11th Armored taken those steps immediately, all sources seem to concur the division could have easily succeeded against very light and disorganized opposition, and consequently rendered unnecessary the ensuing bloody campaign to open the route to Antwerp for Allied shipping. Beale quotes relevant paragraphs from books by several historians and generals to make his point. In particular, although Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey dispatched a warning, also on 4 September, that the Scheldt must be cleared, multiple layers of command failed to heed him."
The stop was due to orders Montgomery personally issued to 11th Armored Division.
The orders were responsible for many deaths, both in the short-term and in the long-term. Canadians have never forgiven Montgomery because of the casualties they wound up taking while clearing the Scheldt Estuary.
And history will never forgive him for the deaths that resulted because WW II in Europe continued for months after it could have and should have ended. And with the supplies Antwerp would have provided, that is what would have happened.
Eisenhower favoured the broad front concept, with each of the armies advancing at roughly the same pace...ordered Montgomery to concentrate first on the capture of Antwerp itself (achieved September 4th), and then the positions along the Scheldt estuary to enable the Allies to open and use the port.
Montgomery argued that the Germans had a long front to defend, had few fixed defences at the northern end of their front in Holland, and that a concentrated thrust on the left of the front would cause those relatively light defences to crumble. If, he reasoned, an airborne landing in the vicinity of Arnhem could capture roads and bridges to form a "carpet" along which an armoured thrust could advance quickly around the northern end of the Siegfried Line and into Germany's industrial heartland in the Ruhr, the Reich's armaments production programme would be strangled, and the war could be brought to an early end. Eisenhower was persuaded by the sheer imaginativeness of the Arnhem scheme, and gave it his approval.
General Bradley was amazed, not only that the "pious, teetotalling Montgomery", known for the caution of his actions, should have come up with what he regarded as a harebrained plan, but also that his commander, Dwight Eisenhower, should have allowed it to go ahead. Nonetheless, he conceded after the war the potential of the idea, and regretted deeply its failure.
http://www.whatifyou.com/ww2memorial/ww ... ter_40.htm
In short, the Arhem plan was supposed to make redundent the need for Antwerp in order to win the war in the West. Market-Garden was a brilliant plan that fell apart due to bad timing, poor weather and sheer bad luck.
D-day could've gone the same way as Market-Garden but it didn't. Sadly the allies weren't to be blessed with the same ammount of luck a second time.
Perhaps had Patton been given the go ahead to focus the allied assault on his sector, he'd have had the necessary luck? May be but may be not.
It is disingenuous to suggest that Montgomery's actions prolonged the war...Germany's actions did that. A succesful Market-Garden may well have ended it by Christmas 1944 with all of Germany in the NATO camp.
Montgomery argued that the Germans had a long front to defend, had few fixed defences at the northern end of their front in Holland, and that a concentrated thrust on the left of the front would cause those relatively light defences to crumble. If, he reasoned, an airborne landing in the vicinity of Arnhem could capture roads and bridges to form a "carpet" along which an armoured thrust could advance quickly around the northern end of the Siegfried Line and into Germany's industrial heartland in the Ruhr, the Reich's armaments production programme would be strangled, and the war could be brought to an early end. Eisenhower was persuaded by the sheer imaginativeness of the Arnhem scheme, and gave it his approval.
General Bradley was amazed, not only that the "pious, teetotalling Montgomery", known for the caution of his actions, should have come up with what he regarded as a harebrained plan, but also that his commander, Dwight Eisenhower, should have allowed it to go ahead. Nonetheless, he conceded after the war the potential of the idea, and regretted deeply its failure.
http://www.whatifyou.com/ww2memorial/ww ... ter_40.htm
In short, the Arhem plan was supposed to make redundent the need for Antwerp in order to win the war in the West. Market-Garden was a brilliant plan that fell apart due to bad timing, poor weather and sheer bad luck.
D-day could've gone the same way as Market-Garden but it didn't. Sadly the allies weren't to be blessed with the same ammount of luck a second time.
Perhaps had Patton been given the go ahead to focus the allied assault on his sector, he'd have had the necessary luck? May be but may be not.
It is disingenuous to suggest that Montgomery's actions prolonged the war...Germany's actions did that. A succesful Market-Garden may well have ended it by Christmas 1944 with all of Germany in the NATO camp.
To the contrary, it is NOT "disingenuous". Montgomery was so fixated on his grand scheme that he appears to have been unable to notice anything else of importance. Not only did he fail to open the approaches to Antwerp--thus solving the Allied supply problem--he even ignored a chance to cross the Rhine when Antwerp was taken, regardless of what had happened with Antwerp. On 4 September the Rhine was 75 miles from the British spearhead, which had plentiful fuel and supplies, with no significant German forces in their front. General Bradley comments: "...Monty now committed two tactical blunders that must rank among the costliest of the war. Once again he failed to exploit his opportunities--go for the juglar."
To quote from General Horrocks memoirs concerning the matter of Montgomery's ordering him to halt on 4 September: "Had we been able to advance that day, we could have smashed through...and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine...if we had taken the chance and carried straight on the whole course of the war in Europe might have been changed."
Concerning Antwerp, he had been ordered to capture the port as a matter of the "highest strategic priority". Opening it would cut 400 miles off the Allied supply line and freed thousands of trucks then doing nothing but ferrying fuel forward. It would have restored full mobility to all American units, as well as to British units--there would have been no need to halt Patton in order to ensure Montgomery had the fuel needed for his needle thrust.
Further, he had been specifically and repeatedly warned that the approaches to Antwerp needed to be captured. On 3 September Admiral Ramsey sent him a telegram that drew particular attention to the "peculiar geography" of Antwerp and warned that it was "essential" that the Walcheren batteries be captured, or the port would be blocked. Montgomery's HQ ignored all warnings and ordered a halt when Antwerp was captured--at a time when nothing prevented a quick advance down the Schelde and the overrunning of the entire north bank. Not only would that have opened Antwerp, it would also have cut off the retreating elements of 15th Army.
General Horrocks says the failure was "a serious mistake". "My eyes were fixed entirely on the Rhine and everything else seemed of subsidiary importance. It never entered my head that we would not be able to use Antwerp until the channel had been swept and the Germans cleared from the coastlines on either side." Montgomery had been warned of that, specifically. General Horrocks' comments are evidence that he failed to pass on either the information or the importance of it to his subordinate commanders. General Horrocks' halt order is further evidence that Montgomery was ignoring HIS orders.
Throughout his career Montgomery showed he had a large blind spot in his military makeup. As Hanno said to Hannibal after Cannae, "You know how to win battles, but not how to use them." So the same can be said for Montgomery. When he revised FSR I, the British infantry manual, he sent the proof manuscript to the author of the previous edition, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, and asked for his comments. Liddell Hart replied that the work was well done, but he wondered why the entire chapter on exploitation had been removed. Monty said that was an error and it would be fixed. But when the final version was issued, there was no chapter on exploitation after battle.
And throughout his career, Montgomery failed to exploit. He SHOULD have utterly destroyed Rommel after El Alamein, for instance, since he outnumbered him many to one, he had command of the sea and air supremacy. Instead, Rommel was allowed to check 8th Army's advance time after time.
This was the situation and the problem at Antwerp. Monty had one thing on his mind.....Market-Garden, his big chance for glory. He was so concentrated on it, he ignored everything else, from strategic opportunities to specific orders from higher command.
It is NOT "disengenuous" to say that Montgomery's actions--or maybe his inactions--prolonged the war. Logistics is the heart of warfare and the Allied logistical problem would have been solved by the opening of Antwerp. That would have meant that Monty could continued with Market-Garden if he wanted to. And at the same time, Bradley's armies could have continued attacking all along THEIR front, at a time there was no organized opposition in front of them, with the momentum of the attacks serving to help prevent the formation of opposition, the same as had been done on the pursuit after the Normandy breakout.
Go study the matter more deeply.....I think you'll change your opinion if you do.
To quote from General Horrocks memoirs concerning the matter of Montgomery's ordering him to halt on 4 September: "Had we been able to advance that day, we could have smashed through...and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine...if we had taken the chance and carried straight on the whole course of the war in Europe might have been changed."
Concerning Antwerp, he had been ordered to capture the port as a matter of the "highest strategic priority". Opening it would cut 400 miles off the Allied supply line and freed thousands of trucks then doing nothing but ferrying fuel forward. It would have restored full mobility to all American units, as well as to British units--there would have been no need to halt Patton in order to ensure Montgomery had the fuel needed for his needle thrust.
Further, he had been specifically and repeatedly warned that the approaches to Antwerp needed to be captured. On 3 September Admiral Ramsey sent him a telegram that drew particular attention to the "peculiar geography" of Antwerp and warned that it was "essential" that the Walcheren batteries be captured, or the port would be blocked. Montgomery's HQ ignored all warnings and ordered a halt when Antwerp was captured--at a time when nothing prevented a quick advance down the Schelde and the overrunning of the entire north bank. Not only would that have opened Antwerp, it would also have cut off the retreating elements of 15th Army.
General Horrocks says the failure was "a serious mistake". "My eyes were fixed entirely on the Rhine and everything else seemed of subsidiary importance. It never entered my head that we would not be able to use Antwerp until the channel had been swept and the Germans cleared from the coastlines on either side." Montgomery had been warned of that, specifically. General Horrocks' comments are evidence that he failed to pass on either the information or the importance of it to his subordinate commanders. General Horrocks' halt order is further evidence that Montgomery was ignoring HIS orders.
Throughout his career Montgomery showed he had a large blind spot in his military makeup. As Hanno said to Hannibal after Cannae, "You know how to win battles, but not how to use them." So the same can be said for Montgomery. When he revised FSR I, the British infantry manual, he sent the proof manuscript to the author of the previous edition, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, and asked for his comments. Liddell Hart replied that the work was well done, but he wondered why the entire chapter on exploitation had been removed. Monty said that was an error and it would be fixed. But when the final version was issued, there was no chapter on exploitation after battle.
And throughout his career, Montgomery failed to exploit. He SHOULD have utterly destroyed Rommel after El Alamein, for instance, since he outnumbered him many to one, he had command of the sea and air supremacy. Instead, Rommel was allowed to check 8th Army's advance time after time.
This was the situation and the problem at Antwerp. Monty had one thing on his mind.....Market-Garden, his big chance for glory. He was so concentrated on it, he ignored everything else, from strategic opportunities to specific orders from higher command.
It is NOT "disengenuous" to say that Montgomery's actions--or maybe his inactions--prolonged the war. Logistics is the heart of warfare and the Allied logistical problem would have been solved by the opening of Antwerp. That would have meant that Monty could continued with Market-Garden if he wanted to. And at the same time, Bradley's armies could have continued attacking all along THEIR front, at a time there was no organized opposition in front of them, with the momentum of the attacks serving to help prevent the formation of opposition, the same as had been done on the pursuit after the Normandy breakout.
Go study the matter more deeply.....I think you'll change your opinion if you do.
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gunslinger
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Galahad
To the contrary, it is NOT "disingenuous". Montgomery was so fixated on his grand scheme that he appears to have been unable to notice anything else of importance.
Well the thing of most importance that Monty was concerned with was winning the war...that was what Market-Garden was all about, thus negating the need to slog it out in the Dutch countryside.
General Bradley comments: "...Monty now committed two tactical blunders that must rank among the costliest of the war. Once again he failed to exploit his opportunities--go for the juglar."
Supposedly Bradley later admitted that Market-Garden was a brilliant and daring plan which goes some way to de-bunking the Myth that Montgomery was incapable of imaginative thinking.
To quote from General Horrocks memoirs concerning the matter of Montgomery's ordering him to halt on 4 September: "Had we been able to advance that day, we could have smashed through...and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine...if we had taken the chance and carried straight on the whole course of the war in Europe might have been changed."
This is the same Horrocks who led XXX corps in a slow slog to Arnhem against very weak German forces?
Horrocks' performance in trying to reach the beleaguered paras at Arnhem doesn't exactly convince me that he could've done that he claims.
Opening it would cut 400 miles off the Allied supply line and freed thousands of trucks then doing nothing but ferrying fuel forward. It would have restored full mobility to all American units, as well as to British units--there would have been no need to halt Patton in order to ensure Montgomery had the fuel needed for his needle thrust.
Possibly but perhaps if Monty had focussed on a longer term tactical plan, then people would be saying that Arnhem was a lost opportunity to win the war by Christmas 1944.
Monty was in fact ordered to focus on Antwerp by Eisenhower and Monty persuaded him otherwise.
Market-Garden didn't work but could've shortened the war by months.
It is to Eisenhower's credit that he changed his "broad front" strategy and allowed a bold strike - the shame is that it didn't work.
Had we known that Market-Garden would fail, then the longer term path of Antwerp would've helped somewhat but nowhere near as much as a success at Arnhem would've.
Montgomery was focussed on winning the war as quickly and as cheaply (in lives) as possible - Patton was interested in glory and prestigue. I know which army I would have preferred to serve in.
To the contrary, it is NOT "disingenuous". Montgomery was so fixated on his grand scheme that he appears to have been unable to notice anything else of importance.
Well the thing of most importance that Monty was concerned with was winning the war...that was what Market-Garden was all about, thus negating the need to slog it out in the Dutch countryside.
General Bradley comments: "...Monty now committed two tactical blunders that must rank among the costliest of the war. Once again he failed to exploit his opportunities--go for the juglar."
Supposedly Bradley later admitted that Market-Garden was a brilliant and daring plan which goes some way to de-bunking the Myth that Montgomery was incapable of imaginative thinking.
To quote from General Horrocks memoirs concerning the matter of Montgomery's ordering him to halt on 4 September: "Had we been able to advance that day, we could have smashed through...and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. We might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine...if we had taken the chance and carried straight on the whole course of the war in Europe might have been changed."
This is the same Horrocks who led XXX corps in a slow slog to Arnhem against very weak German forces?
Horrocks' performance in trying to reach the beleaguered paras at Arnhem doesn't exactly convince me that he could've done that he claims.
Opening it would cut 400 miles off the Allied supply line and freed thousands of trucks then doing nothing but ferrying fuel forward. It would have restored full mobility to all American units, as well as to British units--there would have been no need to halt Patton in order to ensure Montgomery had the fuel needed for his needle thrust.
Possibly but perhaps if Monty had focussed on a longer term tactical plan, then people would be saying that Arnhem was a lost opportunity to win the war by Christmas 1944.
Monty was in fact ordered to focus on Antwerp by Eisenhower and Monty persuaded him otherwise.
Market-Garden didn't work but could've shortened the war by months.
It is to Eisenhower's credit that he changed his "broad front" strategy and allowed a bold strike - the shame is that it didn't work.
Had we known that Market-Garden would fail, then the longer term path of Antwerp would've helped somewhat but nowhere near as much as a success at Arnhem would've.
Montgomery was focussed on winning the war as quickly and as cheaply (in lives) as possible - Patton was interested in glory and prestigue. I know which army I would have preferred to serve in.
Polynikes writes: "Well the thing of most importance that Monty was concerned with was winning the war...that was what Market-Garden was all about, thus negating the need to slog it out in the Dutch countryside."
And you think that securing the port which would allow ALL the Allied armies to continue attacking without halt had nothing to do with winning the war? Within a week of Antwerp finally being usable in November, it was supplying approximately the same tonnage as the Normandy beaches AND ports--but without the several hundred miles of travel needed to get the supplies to the front. Those supplies COULD have been arriving by the start of the second week of September, rather than the end of November. If Montgomery hadn't halted 11th Armored and 30th Corps. Montgomery knew WHY it was important to take Antwerp; he knew WHY he had to open the approaches--he was specifically informed, by Ramsey AND by Tedder. And instead of doing so, he ordered his units to halt.
Polynikes writes: "Supposedly Bradley later admitted that Market-Garden was a brilliant and daring plan which goes some way to de-bunking the Myth that Montgomery was incapable of imaginative thinking."
What does General Bradley's comment on Market-Garden have to do with his statement that Montgomery made two tactical blunders that "rank among the costliest of the war"? Seems to me you're trying to ignore the issue.
Polynikes writes: "This is the same Horrocks who led XXX corps in a slow slog to Arnhem against very weak German forces? Horrocks' performance in trying to reach the beleaguered paras at Arnhem doesn't exactly convince me that he could've done that he claims."
Denigrating Horrocks in an attempt to render his observations unbelievable won't work. Considering that same General Horrocks had just completed a dash that wound up covering some 200 miles in a week and had wound up seizing Antwerp intact, and had put his forces in a position to at LEAST cut off the retreat of the German 15th Army, why shouldn't his thoughts on the matter be worthy of consideration? As for the slowness of his movement on Arnhem, try remembering that it was against organized opposition--and that an entire corps was supposed to advance down a single road, on what was effectively a one tank front with long and open flanks continually interdicted by enemy forces. Courtesy of the brilliance of Montgomery's daring plan, the one he was so involved in thinking about when he pissed off the chance to open Antwerp. Do you think that YOU could have moved sixty thousand men and their machines down one road much faster under the same conditions?
Polynikes writes: "Possibly but perhaps if Monty had focussed on a longer term tactical plan, then people would be saying that Arnhem was a lost opportunity to win the war by Christmas 1944.
Monty was in fact ordered to focus on Antwerp by Eisenhower and Monty persuaded him otherwise."
There is no "possibly" about it and no longer term about it.....opening Antwerp to Allied use would have IMMEDIATELY freed thousands of trucks for uses other than simply ferrying fuel and supplies nonstop from Normandy to the front and have solved the Allied logistics problem. Mostly US trucks, btw. And, about that second sentence, are you saying that Montgomery persuaded Eisenhower not to focus on Antwerp, and that the halt was thus EISENHOWER'S fault? If so, you're wrong.
Somewhere along the line, in trying to defend the indefensible, you're ignoring the central point. Montgomery IGNORED orders and IGNORED specific advices. Why? Because he was focused on his opus magnus, Market-Garden, the plan which would "win the war"--and, incidentally, grab back the spotlight and the glory he had lost to Patton.
You don't seem to get it that had the Allied logistics problem been solved--as it WAS solved when Antwerp became operational in November, and WOULD have been solved had Montgomery not blown the chance to make it operational in September, then ALL Allied forces could have continued to attack all along the line. As it was, to give Montgomery the supplies he needed, Bradley's army group was effectively halted. Which gave the Germans time to regroup, reorganize and form a defensive front, which same wasn't existent before Bradley's troops had to halt.
Do you honestly think that allowing the enemy time to organize defenses and regroup is something that is going to further the cause of that enemy's defeat?
Polynikes writes: "Market-Garden didn't work but could've shortened the war by months."
So could opening Antwerp and allowing all the Allied forces to continue attacking, rather than forcing half of them to halt so Montgomery could have the supplies needed for Market-Garden.
Since you didn't like quotes from General of the Army Bradley, and General Horrocks, how about this, from Montgomery, The Field Marshal, by R.W. Thompson: "The Field Marshal's failure to seize Antwerp entire, and to advance across the Albert Canal to cut off the Bevelands--and the German 15th Army--is his most agonizing failure." That failure to cut off 15th Army not only kept Antwerp closed, it also added some 80,000 men to the German order of battle for Arnhem.
Or this, from N. F. Dixon's On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence: "....the field marshal's desire to capture the whole show not only did great harm to Anglo-American relations but also, it could be argued, resulted in his embarking on the costly and abortive Arnhem adventure in preference to the more mundane, though vital, task of opening up the port of Antwerp."
Or this, from Lord Chalfont's Montgomery of Alamein: "The failure to secure the Antwerp approaches was conceded as a major mistake by Montgomery, Eisenhower and all the lesser commanders involved. It seems extraordinary that Montgomery, a past master of logistics, should have ignored the need for a port which would be absolutely crucial to his logistics. With the enemy in complete disarray, there was no need for his forty-division thrust; but if such a large blow HAD been neccessary, then the approaches to Antwerp should have been his first priority."
Or this, from Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's diary entry on 5 October 1944: "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place."
Keep arguing all you want; you're wrong. Keep sidestepping and avoiding the central issue--the very fact you're doing it shows the weakness of the position you're trying to defend.
Montgomery made a BIG blunder, and that blunder prolonged the war in Europe. I say you're wrong when you oppose the point, and so does just about every military man who has written on the matter, regardless of nationality and regardless of whether they like Montgomery or dislike him. And so does every single one of Montgomery's biographers. And, for that matter, so does Montgomery, in his Memoirs.
And you think that securing the port which would allow ALL the Allied armies to continue attacking without halt had nothing to do with winning the war? Within a week of Antwerp finally being usable in November, it was supplying approximately the same tonnage as the Normandy beaches AND ports--but without the several hundred miles of travel needed to get the supplies to the front. Those supplies COULD have been arriving by the start of the second week of September, rather than the end of November. If Montgomery hadn't halted 11th Armored and 30th Corps. Montgomery knew WHY it was important to take Antwerp; he knew WHY he had to open the approaches--he was specifically informed, by Ramsey AND by Tedder. And instead of doing so, he ordered his units to halt.
Polynikes writes: "Supposedly Bradley later admitted that Market-Garden was a brilliant and daring plan which goes some way to de-bunking the Myth that Montgomery was incapable of imaginative thinking."
What does General Bradley's comment on Market-Garden have to do with his statement that Montgomery made two tactical blunders that "rank among the costliest of the war"? Seems to me you're trying to ignore the issue.
Polynikes writes: "This is the same Horrocks who led XXX corps in a slow slog to Arnhem against very weak German forces? Horrocks' performance in trying to reach the beleaguered paras at Arnhem doesn't exactly convince me that he could've done that he claims."
Denigrating Horrocks in an attempt to render his observations unbelievable won't work. Considering that same General Horrocks had just completed a dash that wound up covering some 200 miles in a week and had wound up seizing Antwerp intact, and had put his forces in a position to at LEAST cut off the retreat of the German 15th Army, why shouldn't his thoughts on the matter be worthy of consideration? As for the slowness of his movement on Arnhem, try remembering that it was against organized opposition--and that an entire corps was supposed to advance down a single road, on what was effectively a one tank front with long and open flanks continually interdicted by enemy forces. Courtesy of the brilliance of Montgomery's daring plan, the one he was so involved in thinking about when he pissed off the chance to open Antwerp. Do you think that YOU could have moved sixty thousand men and their machines down one road much faster under the same conditions?
Polynikes writes: "Possibly but perhaps if Monty had focussed on a longer term tactical plan, then people would be saying that Arnhem was a lost opportunity to win the war by Christmas 1944.
Monty was in fact ordered to focus on Antwerp by Eisenhower and Monty persuaded him otherwise."
There is no "possibly" about it and no longer term about it.....opening Antwerp to Allied use would have IMMEDIATELY freed thousands of trucks for uses other than simply ferrying fuel and supplies nonstop from Normandy to the front and have solved the Allied logistics problem. Mostly US trucks, btw. And, about that second sentence, are you saying that Montgomery persuaded Eisenhower not to focus on Antwerp, and that the halt was thus EISENHOWER'S fault? If so, you're wrong.
Somewhere along the line, in trying to defend the indefensible, you're ignoring the central point. Montgomery IGNORED orders and IGNORED specific advices. Why? Because he was focused on his opus magnus, Market-Garden, the plan which would "win the war"--and, incidentally, grab back the spotlight and the glory he had lost to Patton.
You don't seem to get it that had the Allied logistics problem been solved--as it WAS solved when Antwerp became operational in November, and WOULD have been solved had Montgomery not blown the chance to make it operational in September, then ALL Allied forces could have continued to attack all along the line. As it was, to give Montgomery the supplies he needed, Bradley's army group was effectively halted. Which gave the Germans time to regroup, reorganize and form a defensive front, which same wasn't existent before Bradley's troops had to halt.
Do you honestly think that allowing the enemy time to organize defenses and regroup is something that is going to further the cause of that enemy's defeat?
Polynikes writes: "Market-Garden didn't work but could've shortened the war by months."
So could opening Antwerp and allowing all the Allied forces to continue attacking, rather than forcing half of them to halt so Montgomery could have the supplies needed for Market-Garden.
Since you didn't like quotes from General of the Army Bradley, and General Horrocks, how about this, from Montgomery, The Field Marshal, by R.W. Thompson: "The Field Marshal's failure to seize Antwerp entire, and to advance across the Albert Canal to cut off the Bevelands--and the German 15th Army--is his most agonizing failure." That failure to cut off 15th Army not only kept Antwerp closed, it also added some 80,000 men to the German order of battle for Arnhem.
Or this, from N. F. Dixon's On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence: "....the field marshal's desire to capture the whole show not only did great harm to Anglo-American relations but also, it could be argued, resulted in his embarking on the costly and abortive Arnhem adventure in preference to the more mundane, though vital, task of opening up the port of Antwerp."
Or this, from Lord Chalfont's Montgomery of Alamein: "The failure to secure the Antwerp approaches was conceded as a major mistake by Montgomery, Eisenhower and all the lesser commanders involved. It seems extraordinary that Montgomery, a past master of logistics, should have ignored the need for a port which would be absolutely crucial to his logistics. With the enemy in complete disarray, there was no need for his forty-division thrust; but if such a large blow HAD been neccessary, then the approaches to Antwerp should have been his first priority."
Or this, from Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's diary entry on 5 October 1944: "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place."
Keep arguing all you want; you're wrong. Keep sidestepping and avoiding the central issue--the very fact you're doing it shows the weakness of the position you're trying to defend.
Montgomery made a BIG blunder, and that blunder prolonged the war in Europe. I say you're wrong when you oppose the point, and so does just about every military man who has written on the matter, regardless of nationality and regardless of whether they like Montgomery or dislike him. And so does every single one of Montgomery's biographers. And, for that matter, so does Montgomery, in his Memoirs.
Galahad
...and you think that securing the port which would allow ALL the Allied armies to continue attacking without halt had nothing to do with winning the war? Within a week of Antwerp finally being usable in November, it was supplying approximately the same tonnage as the Normandy beaches and ports.
Well if you were resigned to fighting on into 1945, I suppose securing Antwerp might have been the way forward.
Had Market-Garden been a success, then the war might have been over by then.
You seem to be criticsising Monty for not pursuing a slow methodical approach which seems disingenuous to me as precisely the opposite accusation is made of his operations in Normandy.
What does General Bradley's comment on Market-Garden have to do with his statement that Montgomery made two tactical blunders that "rank among the costliest of the war"?
See above.
...as for the slowness of his movement on Arnhem, try remembering that it was against organized opposition--and that an entire corps was supposed to advance down a single road, on what was effectively a one tank front with long and open flanks continually interdicted by enemy forces. Courtesy of the brilliance of Montgomery's daring plan, the one he was so involved in thinking about when he pissed off the chance to open Antwerp. Do you think that YOU could have moved sixty thousand men and their machines down one road much faster under the same conditions?
Not after Nijmegen ... getting to Arnhem WAS possible but the casualty conscious British moved too slowly. Higher casualties getting to Arnhem might well have led to much lower casualties for the rest of the war.
There is no "possibly" about it and no longer term about it.....opening Antwerp to Allied use would have IMMEDIATELY freed thousands of trucks for uses other than simply ferrying fuel and supplies nonstop from Normandy to the front and have solved the Allied logistics problem. Mostly US trucks, btw. And, about that second sentence, are you saying that Montgomery persuaded Eisenhower not to focus on Antwerp, and that the halt was thus EISENHOWER'S fault? If so, you're wrong.
You're deliberately missing the point - the tactical situation would've changed immediately had Market-Garden been a success.
Secondly, Eisenhower DID sanction Market-Garden so yes ultimately he does, as supreme allied commander, bear the responsibility.
Somewhere along the line, in trying to defend the indefensible, you're ignoring the central point. Montgomery IGNORED orders and IGNORED specific advices.
Let me get this straight, are you saying that Eisenhower, at no time, accepted Monty's plan to relegate the capture of Antwerp to a secondary objective?
Are you saying that Monty, in choosing to strike at Arnhem in an attempt shorten the war instread of focussing on Antwerp, did NOT have the supreme allied commander's approval?
Do you honestly think that allowing the enemy time to organize defenses and regroup is something that is going to further the cause of that enemy's defeat?
No, that's why I think that Market-Garden was worth trying and worth giving priority to.
So could opening Antwerp and allowing all the Allied forces to continue attacking, rather than forcing half of them to halt so Montgomery could have the supplies needed for Market-Garden.
Would the window of opportunity still be available had Market-Garden been delayed in order to clear German troops from Belgium?
...Field Marshal, by R.W. Thompson: "The Field Marshal's failure to seize Antwerp entire, and to advance across the Albert Canal to cut off the Bevelands--and the German 15th Army--is his most agonizing failure." That failure to cut off 15th Army not only kept Antwerp closed, it also added some 80,000 men to the German order of battle for Arnhem.
Of course had Market-Garden worked, they would've been out of the war anyway.
"Montgomery initially suggested a limited airborne assault, Operation Comet, consisting of an airborne assault in front of the British XXX Corps. Operation Comet was dropped in favor of a more ambitious plan, consisting of an attack north to Arnhem, deep inside the Netherlands, bypassing the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine, and capturing the entire German 15th Army behind their lines between Arnhem and the shores of the IJsselmeer. This would also have the side effect of cutting off the V-2 launch sites, which were bombarding London at this time.
Eisenhower continued to dither...Montgomery insisted that with more supplies, they could march straight to Berlin...pointed out that his plan ringed the entire Antwerp area well behind Allied lines, allowing it to be easily opened once the attack was completed."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_ ... Background
Keep arguing all you want; you're wrong.
In hindsight, a deliberate move to take Antwerp would've been the best course. However I doubt whther it would've meant that the war being over much quicker. The Ardennes offensive would probably have been initiated anyway.
Montgomery made a BIG blunder, and that blunder prolonged the war in Europe.
No, the failure of Market-Garden meant that the war was to roll into 1945. Had it been a success then Antwerp would have fallen into Allied hands with an entire German army.
It is strange to hear US voices' chief grievance against Monty as being too ambitious.
...and you think that securing the port which would allow ALL the Allied armies to continue attacking without halt had nothing to do with winning the war? Within a week of Antwerp finally being usable in November, it was supplying approximately the same tonnage as the Normandy beaches and ports.
Well if you were resigned to fighting on into 1945, I suppose securing Antwerp might have been the way forward.
Had Market-Garden been a success, then the war might have been over by then.
You seem to be criticsising Monty for not pursuing a slow methodical approach which seems disingenuous to me as precisely the opposite accusation is made of his operations in Normandy.
What does General Bradley's comment on Market-Garden have to do with his statement that Montgomery made two tactical blunders that "rank among the costliest of the war"?
See above.
...as for the slowness of his movement on Arnhem, try remembering that it was against organized opposition--and that an entire corps was supposed to advance down a single road, on what was effectively a one tank front with long and open flanks continually interdicted by enemy forces. Courtesy of the brilliance of Montgomery's daring plan, the one he was so involved in thinking about when he pissed off the chance to open Antwerp. Do you think that YOU could have moved sixty thousand men and their machines down one road much faster under the same conditions?
Not after Nijmegen ... getting to Arnhem WAS possible but the casualty conscious British moved too slowly. Higher casualties getting to Arnhem might well have led to much lower casualties for the rest of the war.
There is no "possibly" about it and no longer term about it.....opening Antwerp to Allied use would have IMMEDIATELY freed thousands of trucks for uses other than simply ferrying fuel and supplies nonstop from Normandy to the front and have solved the Allied logistics problem. Mostly US trucks, btw. And, about that second sentence, are you saying that Montgomery persuaded Eisenhower not to focus on Antwerp, and that the halt was thus EISENHOWER'S fault? If so, you're wrong.
You're deliberately missing the point - the tactical situation would've changed immediately had Market-Garden been a success.
Secondly, Eisenhower DID sanction Market-Garden so yes ultimately he does, as supreme allied commander, bear the responsibility.
Somewhere along the line, in trying to defend the indefensible, you're ignoring the central point. Montgomery IGNORED orders and IGNORED specific advices.
Let me get this straight, are you saying that Eisenhower, at no time, accepted Monty's plan to relegate the capture of Antwerp to a secondary objective?
Are you saying that Monty, in choosing to strike at Arnhem in an attempt shorten the war instread of focussing on Antwerp, did NOT have the supreme allied commander's approval?
Do you honestly think that allowing the enemy time to organize defenses and regroup is something that is going to further the cause of that enemy's defeat?
No, that's why I think that Market-Garden was worth trying and worth giving priority to.
So could opening Antwerp and allowing all the Allied forces to continue attacking, rather than forcing half of them to halt so Montgomery could have the supplies needed for Market-Garden.
Would the window of opportunity still be available had Market-Garden been delayed in order to clear German troops from Belgium?
...Field Marshal, by R.W. Thompson: "The Field Marshal's failure to seize Antwerp entire, and to advance across the Albert Canal to cut off the Bevelands--and the German 15th Army--is his most agonizing failure." That failure to cut off 15th Army not only kept Antwerp closed, it also added some 80,000 men to the German order of battle for Arnhem.
Of course had Market-Garden worked, they would've been out of the war anyway.
"Montgomery initially suggested a limited airborne assault, Operation Comet, consisting of an airborne assault in front of the British XXX Corps. Operation Comet was dropped in favor of a more ambitious plan, consisting of an attack north to Arnhem, deep inside the Netherlands, bypassing the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine, and capturing the entire German 15th Army behind their lines between Arnhem and the shores of the IJsselmeer. This would also have the side effect of cutting off the V-2 launch sites, which were bombarding London at this time.
Eisenhower continued to dither...Montgomery insisted that with more supplies, they could march straight to Berlin...pointed out that his plan ringed the entire Antwerp area well behind Allied lines, allowing it to be easily opened once the attack was completed."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_ ... Background
Keep arguing all you want; you're wrong.
In hindsight, a deliberate move to take Antwerp would've been the best course. However I doubt whther it would've meant that the war being over much quicker. The Ardennes offensive would probably have been initiated anyway.
Montgomery made a BIG blunder, and that blunder prolonged the war in Europe.
No, the failure of Market-Garden meant that the war was to roll into 1945. Had it been a success then Antwerp would have fallen into Allied hands with an entire German army.
It is strange to hear US voices' chief grievance against Monty as being too ambitious.