Andreas, you fail to see the difference in context and wording.
You claimed i stated "string of defeats", what i wrote, as a quote was " a string of mainly tactical defeats". There is a world of difference.
But I agree wholeheartedly that the US military - well at least the US Army - does suffer from a congenital inability to carry forward past lessons into the future. Some of the mobilization lessons learned in World War I were applied to World War II, but many of the lessons regarding training and the development of junior leaders in combat were either lost or ignored. That in fact is quite possibly the greatest strength of the Heer, it's ability to transmit lessons and doctrinal changes throughout its "corporate" structure and it's ability to retain the "memory" of past events as something other than sterile "history" but as something that has a direct application to the present and future.
RichTO90, that is indeed one major reason for my less then stellar expectations about USAs army. Not an inability to learn from experience, but the sometimes active resistance to it.
Compare with what happened early in WWI, after a lot of briefing by the Brits and French on their experiences sofar, the USA personnel pretty much discarded it as the result of those nations being wuzzies and then started off their part in the war with 19th century charges just like what the Brits and French had warned about.
The opposite trait is also one of the best parts of the German army.
Sorry, but you need to stop putting so much reliance in Men Against Fire.
Hmm? Come again? I expect that is the name of a book?
Sorry, havent read it. I read about that in documentation at US DoD. Was online when i read it some years ago, probably still is.
Also read about it elsewhere but with not so extensive research behind it.
SLAM had a kernel of truth in his thesis, but it is evident that it was exaggerated out of all proportions in his search for self validation (and self promotion). And of course it is possible to say that a similar phenomena happened in the Heer, as witness what came to be seen as the overreliance on the LMG to the detriment of supporting fire and maneuver by riflemen (a view seen both internally by the Heer and externally by their opponents).
Later in the war, and especially in quickdrafted German units, the same can certainly be said. But i would still argue that it was to a lesser extent.
But training isn't doctrine and vice versa, although doctrine is promolugated in training. But the fundamental flaw in US Army training was that in most cases it was made secondary to other requirements - organizing formation, preparing them for overseas movement, getting them overseas, and getting them into combat.
1, Not enough training, or skimping on training due to more "administrative/logistical matters"... mmm not the best of ideas id say.
2, Training doctrine IS doctrinal. And i can say for certain i am no fan of USAs training doctrines at the time. Or to an extent, today either for that matter.
I still have no idea what you are talking about? Are you referring to "attachments"? If so the term "borrowing" doesn't apply, attachments are created by commanders orders in the same manner that a kampfgruppe was created and like a kampfgruppe a task force was a unit with attachments under a single designated task force commander.
That is PROBABLY the correct term.
However, the problem i referred to was the practise of doing such without information of this "attachment" being properly transferred upwards. Meaning that commanders sometimes found themselves without troops they THOUGHT they still had in area X or place Y.
Ie. not so much with a higher command assigning units under "him" but by commanders in the field "commandeering" nearby units temporarily.
Granted, that it was often necessary and sometimes very beneficial, but it could have used proper "rules" from the start to avoid the problems it caused.
AFAIK, that never or nearly never happened within the German kampfgruppe system.
Sorry, run those past me again, hmm, I was focusing on your errors you see.
Oh, i just held the stupid notion that people might try to be objective once in a while.
Could you define "snailpace" and "much of the time" please? And just exactly how it applies? AFAIK the Germans took from about September 1939 to September 1942 to "peak" during their strategic offensive - a snails pace of three years, which left their enemies mostly intact and able to riposte. The Allies then took from September 1942 to May 1945 to respond, utterly crushing Germany a slightly faster snails pace of two years and seven months.
Heh, well lets see, German campaign against Poland, quite possibly third strongest military in the area at the time (after USSR and Germany), measured in weeks. German campaign running over France, Netherlands and Belgium, also something measured in weeks. And far from easy opposition in either case.
The collective strength of USA, UK, Free French, Commonwealth, and all the minor troop contingents and contributors with superiority in most areas, amazingly massive superiority in some, then take almost a year to "go the other way" even though Germany at this time has its main focus on halting or at least slowing down USSR on its main front. In comparison, yeah, definetly snail paced.
What part of "you don't bring a knife to a gunfight" do you not understand?
Hmm, in this case, perhaps context?
Depends of course, the make of such a knife and how it is put to use.
If someone load a blunderbus with a knife, its definetly major ouchtime on the other side of any gunfight.
And you simply ignore that however "advantageous" its advantages may have been, such a system could not have been utilized by the US Army.