Origins of War in Europe 1939

David Lehmann · Post by **David Lehmann** » 12 Jul 2005 09:06

Hello,

In September 1939 only about 18 French divisions were facing Germany (other troops were in the colonies, in the Alps, under mobilization etc.). In no way an important attack could have been launched 10 days after the declaration of war since 15 days were required for the mobilization. Note also that the French HQ expected initially Poland to resist about 6 months. From the 105 German divisions, about 40 remained in the west in September 1939.

The French attack on the Sarre, indeed very limited, was launched on 7th September 1939, 4 days after France declared war to Germany. France needed 15 days to fully mobilize. If France was to have launched a full scale offensive 15 days after it declared war this would have been around 18th September 1939. This was 4 days after the Polish government had opened negotiations on the terms of its flight to Romania and the same day that it and its military High Command fled their own country and ordered all their forces to head for neutral borders. The rapid collapse of Poland left France in a very exposed position, the single big army on the western front to face the German troops. It was facing a Germany with nearly twice its metropolitan population. The British could put only 4-5 divisions into Europe in September 1939 and would take 2 years to field a continental-scale army. The French were very cautious in September 1939, but one can see why.
Concerning the air forces, between September 1939 and April 1940, several 176 German aircrafts were lost for 82 British and 57 French ones (= 139 aircrafts for the allies). The German "Stosstruppen" and the French "corps francs" launched many deep reconnaissance patrols, prepared ambushes, took prisoners etc. behind the enemy lines. There were also artillery battles etc. The so-called Phoney War was not a completely quiet period of time and had its number of killed and wounded men.

Also in no way the French Air Force was able to start a bombing campaign. For the simple reason that the bombers fleet was really tiny, included many obsolete aircrafts and the French Air Force was a defensive arm, not an offensive one. The Air Force was not organized to be an offensive tool and could not face the German fighters force and AA means over Germany.
The French air force had some 1,900 aircrafts, of which only about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation aircrafts). It was conceived as a defensive arm, in cooperation with / attached to the ground troops. It was therefore much dispersed and it explains the importance of the reconnaissance fleet working for the ground troops. At the time of the German attack the French air force was just modernizing and reorganizing.
There were only 36 Dewoitine D520 fighters in May 1940, the others were Morane-Saulnier 406, Curtiss H75, Bloch 151, Bloch 152 and Potez 631 fighters. Only 400 fighters were operational on 10th May 1940.
Only 120 of the bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones in 1940 (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational.
From the 490 reconnaissance aircrafts only 370 are really operational and rather modern ones : Bloch 174, Potez 637 and Potez 63/11. Older Mureaux 115 and 117 were also still in use.
This was the situation in May 1940, in September 1939 it was even worse.

People frequently posting (from rather serious thoughts to harsh anti-French feelings via more or less French bashing posts) about how France did not intervene to support Poland are simply not aware of the realities of the French army of that time.

Regards,

David

Molobo · Post by **Molobo** » 12 Jul 2005 10:09

about how France did not intervene to support Poland are simply not aware of the realities of the French army of that time

France obligied itself to conduct major offensive against Germany in treaty signed with Poland.Whetever it had or had not best organisation and plans for the job is not important.After all Poland wasn't in position to fight Germany either yet it did.
Furthermore French command lied to Polish officers, saying that indeed French forces were pushing forward with offensive as agreed.Later on when it became evident that they weren't French HQ didn't allow any contacts for the Polish officers.

The idea that the French and British were planning a two pronged attack with Poland on Germany is also fantasy and can easily be proved by looking at what the UK and French Military Staffs were reporting and the talks that took place between them. There was no intention of launching an offensive in 1939 and if the Poles wanted to believe that there was well they were welcome to that view seems to have been the attitude.

You ignore then talks between French and Polish Military Staffs which signed on 19 May Kasprzycki Gamelin Protocol where it clearly stood that in event of war with Germany France will conduct a major offensive against it.

Note also that the French HQ expected initially Poland to resist about 6 months

This is untrue Poland was to engage German forces for two weeks before French offensive.

Steve · Post by **Steve** » 12 Jul 2005 23:46

Sources :- The Impact Of Hitler, British politics and British policy 1939 1940 - Maurice Cowling - Cambridge University Press 1974
Britain, Poland and The Eastern Front - Anita Prazmowska - Cambridge University Press 1987
The War Hitler Won - Nicholas Bethell - Futura Publications - 1972
The Origins Of The Second World War - Victor Rothwell - 2001
1939 The Aliance That Never Was And The Coming Of World War 11 - Michael Jabara Carley - 1999

On the 8th of February 1939 the British Cabinet decided to open staff talks with the French the 1st stage took place between the 29th March and the 4th April the 2nd stage resumed on the 24th April. The issues of Poland and Rumania were discussed on the 26th and each delegation produced a report the British report was presented on May 4. It accepted that no effort could be made to defend Poland as it was assumed it would collapse in the early stages of fighting. The French report was not as blunt but stated that benefits to be gained from an association with Poland were marginal. The French delegation was more interested in what would happen if Italy sided with Germany and what action to take.

The British rearmament programme was peaking in 1939/40 with government income in 1939 of £1049m and expenditure of £1,817 a deficit of £768m so it could be argued that this was the best time to go to war as this level of expenditure was ruinous. But it must be clear that it is the economics of the mad house to believe your economic situation is going to improve by fighting a war against the strongest european power unless it is over quickly with a victory for you and the British Staff was not reporting that the war would be short.

There were no plans for a major offensive by the western allies in 1939 the strategy was geared to a long war. It was hoped the Poles would give the western front 6 months. Gamellin told General Ironside 4th September that he planned to lean against the German line. He told Chamberlain on the 12th he would not throw his army against the main German defences.

The British proposal communicated to Beck by Ambassador Kennard on the 21st of March was a suprise to the Poles the proposal was also communicated to the Polish ambassador in London at the same time. It seems Beck was sceptical saying according to his secretary "do they want me to go to Geneva in case of war". The proposal said that the British Government would consent as an exceptional measure to the conclusion of a bilateral understanding between the two countries.

The British had secretly started economic discussions with Germany (the carrot) they understood how dependent they would be on America if war broke out and it seems Chamberlain wanted to reduce dependency on America. The talks were broken off after Prague but then resumed in Berlin and then transferred to London they were not discussed by the cabinet. Hitler stopped the talks after the signing of the Soviet Pact. The British wanted to show Hitler the advantages he could gain from allowing a detente situation to come about.

Chamberlain and the men around him never wanted war with Germany the British and the French dragged their feet for three days hoping for a way out before declaring war.

David Lehmann · Post by **David Lehmann** » 12 Jul 2005 23:52

Hello,

You can mix politics and military issues if you want, you can say "they should have ..." but the fact is simply that it was not possible.
Gamelin in a letter indeed told wrong things to the Polish HQ. This man was much more a politician than a military.
The Sarre are was also the single area were the probe could be launched. The neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium etc. made this 180 km border (from the Rhine to Luxembourg) the single area were French and Germans were in direct contact. The Germans let only active rearguards units and a huge number of AT and AP mines everywhere.
This French move was before all political. An attack was planned on Sarrelouis on 22nd September but the Polish collapse was faster than initially believed. It had no real sense anymore. When I wrote 6 months it is no untrue, it is in no way the time before a planned French intervention but the time the French HQ thought the Polish could resist. The French army itself was preparing a war for 1941, not 1940 and for sure not 1939. There were before the war also discussions with the Soviets but they choose the German side and there was discussion about a possible intervention in Finland ... which happened finally later in Norway in 1940.
The Polish wanted before all aerial support and allied bombings. At that time nothing could be done for that. Even around Sedan on the 14th May 1940 only about 30 French bombers could be engaged ! On 3rd September 10 British light bombers dropped propaganda tracts over Germany and on 4th September there is the first British bombing mission with several planes over the naval base at Heligoland. 5 Blenheim are lost. The first combat with fighters takes place on 8th September 1939 between French H75s and German Me109s with 2 German aircrafts reported shot down. The same day a Mureaux 115 (observation aircraft) is lost over Karlsruhe. During September 1939, 24 German aircrafts, 27 British aircrafts and 30 French aircrafts are shot down.
Concerning the ground operations during the Phoney War, except the Sarre limited actions, they consisted in ambushes and deep patrols behind enemy lines led by the corps francs. Concerning the French Navy in 1939 there are several small actions :
- German freighter Chemnitz : captured by the submarine "Poncelet" on September 28th 1939.
- German submarine U-49 : heavily damaged by torpedo boat "Siroco" on November 20th 1939.
- German merchantmen "Halle" (scuttled) and "Santa Fe" (captured) : found by a joint British French Hunter-Killer group including "Dupleix" cruiser, counter-torpedo boat "Le Terrible" and counter-torpedo boat "Le Fantasque" on 25th November 1939.
- German freighter "Trifels" : captured by French auxiliary cruiser Koutoubia (November 1939)

Regards,

David

michael mills · Post by **michael mills** » 13 Jul 2005 02:33

The following is from the book by Anna Cienciala, "Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939", London/Toronto 1968.

This is a very pro-Polish book, and in fact is a vindication of the policies of Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Jozef Beck.

First, on the subject of a British proposal for a Four-Power declaration:

Page 213:

Although the British government realised that its anxiety for Rumania was prematire, further steps were taken to implement a more active policy and this led to the support of Poland's attitude in the Danzig question. Lord Halifax, who had for some time already been favourably inclined to Poland in this matter, was the moving spirit in the construction of a diplomatic front to check German expansion.On 20 March, he informed the British Ambassador in Paris that, despite doubts as to the accuracy of the reports on the German ultimatum to Rumania [my comment: the reports were indeed false], the absorption of Czechoslovakia indicated the German government's determination to go beyond the aims of consolidating the German race. In view of this development, Halifax felt that an organisation for mutual support should be set up, including all htose who wished to prevent further violations of the laws of international society. As a first step, it was proposed that France, Poland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union should join in signing and publishing a formal declaration as follows:

We the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, hereby declare that, inasmuch as peace and security in Europe are matters of comon interest, and since European peace and security may be affected by any action which constitutes a threat to the political independence of any European State, our respective Governments hereby undertake immediately to consult together as to what steps should be taken to offer joint resistance to any such action.
Although Chamberlain did not yet believe that a radical change of policy was necessary, the sending of the proposal to Paris, Warsaw, and Moscow, on 20 March, constituted an important development in the international situation.

So Steve is mistaken. What Britain initially proposed was not a bilateral agreement but a multilateral one, requiring agreement by all four powers.

According to Cienciala, the British proposal was opposed by Poland (and Rumania) because of the involvement of the Soviet Union, and the prospect that a multilateral military confrontation of Germany would lead to Soviet forces entering Polish and Rumanian territory.

Again according to Cienciala, the British guarantee issued on 31 March 1939 was the result of an initiative by Beck, and came after intensive negotiations between the two parties.

She does not regard the guarantee as decisive, and gives far more weight to the agreement reached on 6 April, after Beck travelled to London for negotiations in the wake of the issuing of the guarantee.

Here is her assessment of that agreement:

Pages 234-235:

In return for the Polish Foreign Minister's agreemnet to the principle of reciprocity, Great Britain promised to aid Poland if her independence should be threatened. Decision in this matter was left expressly in the hands of the Polish government. Both governments were to keep each other informed of any developments threatening the independence of either. In the 'Summary of Conclusions' embodying this agreement which was drawn up on 6 April, it was stated:

As an earnest of their intention to enter into a formal agreement to render assistance to Poland in the circumstances contemplated above, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have informed the Polish Government, and have stated publicly, that during the period required for the conclusion of the formal agreement outlined in paragraph 2 above, in the event of any action which clearly threatened POlish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all the support in their power.
In contrast with the ambiguities of the guarantee of 31 March, the interpretation of what constituted a threat to Polish independence was extremely liberal and flexible, and was left entirely to the discretion of Warsaw. If Germany attempted to undermine Polish independence by economic penetration, 'or in any other way', Britain would support Poland in her resistance. Moreover, 'in the event of other action by Germany which clearly threatened Polish, and was of such a nature that the Polish Government considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would at once come to the help of Poland'. This all-embracing guarantee was the result of Polish fears of a German annexation of Danzig and Beck's insistence that this possibility should be provided for.

In a footnote to the above, Cienciala writes:

Raczynski [the Polish Ambassador in London] reported that to cover the contingency of a German annexation of Danzig, the Under-Secretary of State, Sir Alexander Cadogan, had called in a legal adviser, Mr Malkin, who drafted the appropriate paragraph; Note by Raczynski, 6 April 1939, APEL [= Archives of the former Polish Embassy, London, at the General Sikorski Historical Institute, London], P-GB, 1939. A Foreign Office memorandum of the previous day put the case for Danzig very strongly, saying that Germany's aim was to 'use Danzig and the Corridor to secure the neutralisation and ultimately, perhaps, a further partition of Poland'. Ambassador Henderson [Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin] protested that such a formulation of the Danzig-Corridor question did not consider the German position. He was in favour of an arrangement whereby Poland would exchange control over Danzig foreign policy for a German undertaking not to militarise Danzig. He thought it preferable to wait for such a German-Polish agreement before guaranteeing Polish independence.

What Cienciala writes is highly significant. Here we have an avowedly pro-Polish historian admitting that Poland had been given a "blank cheque", allowing it to trigger war between Germany and Britain by the simple expedient of bringing its forces into a military confrontation with Germany at a time of its own choosing, most obviously by sending its army into Danzig, thereby triggering a German response.

Cienciala admits that the concept of a "threat to Poland's independence" was so broad that Poland could claim that almost any action by Germany affecting the status of Danzig constituted such a threat. There did not need to be an actual German invasion of Polish territory for Poland to trigger the agreement of 6 April and force Britain into war with Germany.

Cienciala concludes:

Page 236:

The Polish Foreign Minister had scored a great diplomatic success with the agreement of 6 April 1939. On the unsteady ground of the ambiguous and provisional guarantee of 31 March he had built a de facto bilateral alliance, and this despite Chamberlain's original aim of concluding merely a vague multilateral agreement. By offering a public and reciprocal agreement Beck succeeded in transferring the British project for a general arrangement between several parties into an agreement between Poland and Great Britain, accompanied by a provision for British support whenever the Polish government should consider its independence to be threatened. Poland was no longer an isolated potential victim of German aggression; an attack on her would, in all likelihood, launch a world war.

The Anglo-Polish Agreement of 6 April 1939 was an alliance in all but name - it was to be formalised by the signing of a treaty on 25 August. It was the result of Col. Beck's long efforts to establish close relations between Poland and Britain, and of the British government's realisation, under the pressure of public opinion and political opposition, that the time had come to present a united front against Germany, even if that front were only a diplomatic one. Lord Halifax had greatly contributed to the rapprochement by his sympathy with the Polish attitude on Danzig and his belief that Poland should be granted a promise of help in return for her co-operation with London and Paris against Germany. Beck's policy of gaining time by a skilful direction of conversations with Berlin and of simultaneously presenting a firm attitude made it possible for the British government to regard Poland as the key to any organisation of states which could be set up to check German expansionism. It seemed at last as if, after evading the issue for twenty years, the British government had recognised the fact that Europe was strategically an indivisible whole and that the independence of every country was therefore its vital interest.

Note that Cienciala confirms that an objective threat to Poland's independence did not need to exist. All that was needed to trigger war was for the Polish Government to claim that its independence was threatened by some German action.

After 6 April 1939, Poland had the instrument to trigger a war, and Britain had deliberately given it that instrument. But Poland did not want to risk war until it had received guarantees of actual military action. Cienciala describes how these were given by France on 19 May 1939.

According to Cienciala, Poland required a revised Franco-Polish military convention to supersede the one signed in 1921 (in the wake of the Polish-Soviet War). Military protocols were signed on 19 May in Paris by General Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff, and General Kasprzycki, Polish Minister for War.

The protocols provided that the Frencxh Air Force would begin action against Germany on the outbreak of war, and that the French Army would begin offensive action on the 15th day after the outbreak.

Cienciala believes that the French Government was deceiving Poland and had no intention of living up to the protocols. Be that as it may, the Polish Government believed that it could now risk war with Germany, given that if it used its forces in a confrontation with Germany, it would only have to hold out for 15 days, after which France would invade Germany.

As a result, Poland became totally obdurate in its negotiations with Germany over the latter's request for the reunification of Danzig with it, in the belief that it could safely respond to any fait accompli in Danzig by sending in its army, which Germany had openly stated it would regard as a casus belli, since the resulting armed conflict would not only involve it and Germany, but would also pit Britain and France against its antagonist.

Steve says that it "it is the economics of the mad house to believe your economic situation is going to improve by fighting a war against the strongest european power unless it is over quickly with a victory for you and the British Staff was not reporting that the war would be short". Nevertheless, the British Government, through entering the agreement of 6 April deliberately and advisedly put itself into a position where it could be pushed into such a fight by Poland.

Molobo · Post by **Molobo** » 13 Jul 2005 09:37

You can mix politics and military issues if you want, you can say "they should have ..." but the fact is simply that it was not possible.

That is not important.It is a matter of they "should have" but the matter "they were obligied to".
The treaty with France wasn't about what France "should" do but what France "would" do.And as France didn't do it, then it broke the treaty.

Military protocols were signed on 19 May in Paris by General Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff, and General Kasprzycki, Polish Minister for War.

The protocols provided that the Frencxh Air Force would begin action against Germany on the outbreak of war, and that the French Army would begin offensive action on the 15th day after the outbreak.

Mills is a actually right about this.The protocol in question also talked about military help from France in case of Polish intervention in Gdansks due to German threats.

Steve says that it "it is the economics of the mad house to believe your economic situation is going to improve by fighting a war against the strongest european power unless it is over quickly with a victory for you and the British Staff was not reporting that the war would be short". Nevertheless, the British Government, through entering the agreement of 6 April deliberately and advisedly put itself into a position where it could be pushed into such a fight by Poland

I do think it's a lot more complicated then that.In Poland there is a view among historians that the Western Allies deceit was to buy time to rearm and also to channel Hitler's attack into the east direction against Soviet Union.French and British support for Finland gives a hint of their policies at the time.

Steve · Post by **Steve** » 13 Jul 2005 12:49

I would not argue with most of what Mr Mill's quoted source Anna Ciencial says on the subject but she seems unaware of the meeting that took place between Beck and Kennard in Warsaw and the meeting between Raczynski and Halifax on 21 March 1939.

The following is part of the message communicated by the British government to the Poles and if anyone wants to find the original documents they will need this :-
PRO FO 371. C4086/3356/18. 24 March 1939. DBFP(ser. iii), Vol. IV. No. 518, p. 500
"that his Majesty's Government should consent, as an exceptional measure in view of the special circumstances, to the conclusion of a confidential bilateral understanding between the two countries by which the two Governments would undertake to act in accordance with the terms of the proposed declaration, as supplemented by the interpretation which I had given the ambassador, at a previous consultation as regards in particular the question of Danzig." The Poles decided to accept this and asked for an agreement. From Anita Prazmowska's book

It is not wise to automatically assume that the Poles bolstered by the British/French guarantee of their independence now decided to act in an obdurate manner. The Poles having seen how guarantees had helped the Czechs were always distrustfull of the British not least because of the British liking for ambiguous language. We know from Becks secretary that he was distrustfull of the British offer and that he had been distrustfull of the British for some time because of Danzig. It is clear from Chamberlains letters to his sister Hilda that he expected frontier revision in favour of Germany something that Beck probably suspected and this may be why he played his cards so close to his chest thus avoiding British pressure.

The Poles had decided not to give way to Germany before recieving the guarantee so while they were pleased their bottom line on concessions did not change. The British over reacted when issuing the guarantee, the reasons for the issuing of the guarantee turned out to be false and the state of Polish German negotiations was not known by the British, Kennard was sending back optimistic messages because the Poles were being optimistic and Beck not trusting the British lied over the state of negotiations. Another reason for the guarantee which seems to have been ignored by most historians but which Chamberlain puts into his letter to Hilda on 2 April 1939 is that his personal credibility had been restored and Hitler given a "check".

Ample evidence has ben presented in this discussion that the French never intended to launch an offensive and could not have done so even if they had wanted to. There was no plan to force a war in 1939 and squeeze Germany between a western and eastern front no matter what the Poles were told. It should be remembered that one reason for the guarantee was to keep them out of Germanys camp so a false impression on help may have been given. Rearmament was a strain on the economy but war would be a greater strain and unless short would make Britain dependent on the USA. The idea that the Poles wanted to bring about a european war to move their frontier west while fine in theory as the Poles did have delusions of grandeur is completly unproven. That the frontier was moved west is thanks to Stalin who never took any notice of what the Poles wanted.

All refrences to Chamberlains letters are from Maurice Cowlings book

Molobo · Post by **Molobo** » 13 Jul 2005 13:01

It should be remembered that one reason for the guarantee was to keep them out of Germanys camp so a false impression on help may have been given

Then you agree that French government lied and broke treaties in regards to Poles ?

The idea that the Poles wanted to bring about a european war to move their frontier west while fine in theory as the Poles did have delusions of grandeur

Please refrain from posting prejudice against Poles, after all it is forbidden on the forum anyway.
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michael mills · Post by **michael mills** » 13 Jul 2005 13:28

When assessing France's attitude in the May discussions with Poland on arrangements for a joint military confrontation with Germany, it is necessary to take into account what the general expectation was at the time in regard to the nature of such a controntation.

It was not envisaged that Germany would use its entire military force in an all-out strike on Poland in order to annihilate the latter's military power.

Rather it was envisaged that the conflict would initially be limited to the Danzig and Corridor area, and that its course would be determined by Poland's actions. The conflict could break out in either of two ways:

1. Poland would send its intervention force into the territory of Danzig on the pretext that local actions threatened its independence. Since Germany had declared that the entry of Polish forces into Danzig would constitute a casus belli, Germany would certainly react by sending in its own troops to expel the Polish forces. Under the terms of the agreements with Poland, Britain and France would declare war on Germany.

2. The Danzig Senate would declare unilateral union with Germany, and the latter would send its troops into Danzig to protect that decision. Poland would declare a threat to its independence and send its Danzig intervention force into action. Britain and France would then declare war on Germany.

Under both the above expected scenarios, the initial fighting between German and Polish forces would be limited to the Danzig and Corridor area. Therefore, it was quite reasonable for the French Government to plan for the Polish army to continue to engage German forces for 14 days, until the French offensive from the West could begin.

What stymied the French military plan was first the neutralisation of the Soviet Union by the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August, and secondly the massive scale of the German attack which essentially knocked Poland out before France and Britain could even think of intervening.

With Poland knocked out and its large army (equal in size to the German) eliminated as a factor, and no prospect of the Soviet Union being drawn in against Germany, there was no longer any possibility of an immediate two-front war against Germany, and hence no point in launching an offensive in the West.

Ex post facto allegations that the French were somehow deceiving the Poles are unfair and distort historical truth. They are largely based on hindsight and a knowledge of the actual course of events, which French military planners of course did not have in May 1939. Measured against the scale of the German Blitzkrieg on Poland, French and British actions seem weak and half-hearted; but those actions really need to be assessed against what Britain and France were expecting to happen.

Molobo · Post by **Molobo** » 13 Jul 2005 13:35

Ex post facto allegations that the French were somehow deceiving the Poles are unfair and distort historical truth

Gamelin told Polish delegates that French major offensive was taking place in September Campaing.And when it became clear he lied, Polish delegates weren't allowed to meet him.

France didn't fulfill the protocol signed with Poland on 19 May 1939.While claiming to Poles that it did.

michael mills · Post by **michael mills** » 13 Jul 2005 13:44

That the frontier was moved west is thanks to Stalin who never took any notice of what the Poles wanted.

That begs the question of why Stalin would have wanted to move Poland's frontier to the west, thereby fulfilling the aims of the Dmowskite branch of Polish nationalism.

It would probably have been more in his interest to maintain a larger East Germany ruled by German Communist puppets. After all, he had no desire to destroy Germany, but rather to bring it under his control as an advanced industrial base for the European empire he envisaged.

In short, Stalin had no reason of his own for handing over German territory to Poland, particularly as he deeply distrusted the Poles as a people (he had even wiped out the Polish Communist Party just before the war).

It is more likely that he was conforming to a policy held by all the Allied powers, and which had been influenced by the ambitions of the Polish Government-in-Exile. As I have written before, during the war there had been a flurry of books published in Britain putting the case for transferring German territory east of the Oder to Poland and expelling the existing German population.

The only difference may have been that rather more German territory was taken than had been originally envisaged, eg the Stettin region west of the Oder, and also Lower Silesia west of the Oder.

For example, before the war even the most enthusiastic Dmowskites did not claim Stettin for Poland. At the Paris Peace Conference, Paderewski, the co-leader of the Polish delegation and later President of Poland, used words that indicated that he saw Stettin as lying close to the envisaged border between Germany and a new Polish state; in fact he compared the position of Stettin to that of Seattle.

Molobo · Post by **Molobo** » 13 Jul 2005 14:32

The reason for such large transfer of territory into west was simple.Stalin made Poles dependent on Soviet Union to preserve their existance and territory.Communist propaganda often boasted that without SU military aid and protection Poland would lose Ziemie Odzyskane to german revisionists.As Western Germany didn't reckognise the border with Poland till 1990 and Poland's existance till 1970s and talk about regaining those territories was happening even in higher places of German politics, Communists had an real Ace so to speak in the hand when talking about the necessity of Polish-Soviet alliance.

David Lehmann · Post by **David Lehmann** » 13 Jul 2005 15:14

1) French declared war to Germany and did not manage to have the support of Soviet Union against Germany as they hoped previouly.

2) Yes Gamelin exagerated in his report the intensity of the French operation which was launched 4 days after France declared war. It was more a political move towards Poland than a huge military operation. All the previous political work was to isolate Germany.

The combats were not intense, they looked more like traps, ambushes, a bit like guerilla warfare against the cautiously advancing French troops. All the reports insist on the numerous mines hidden everywhere even AP mines in the trees. It was not intense but there were losses anyway and the French captured also German troops. The French 21e DI alone for example had 329 losses.

In front of the French troops in the sector of the Moselle the reinforcement of the German front is also a reality :
- 28th August 1939 : 6 divisions
- 6th September 1939, after France declared war and just before the French move : 12 divisions
- 12th September 1939 : 14-16 divisions
- 20th September 1939 : 18-20 divisions
So yes the German moved troops (about 14 divisions) to this part of the border but of course it was far from sufficient to help the Polish troops.

3) As I already explained it the French army was in no way able to launch an offensive but for you this does not matter at all.

4) Later operations were intended but had no justification at all since Poland was already defeated.

5) After that France felt roughly alone to face the German army which at that time had a pact with the Soviets (which led to strikes and some sabotages from communists in France to target the French military industry).
Belgium and other neighbours were at that time neutral, they did not allow the French troops to deploy on their territory before an invasion and had rather tiny armies. Great Britain had a mighty Navy and a good Air Force but only 4-5 divisions able to be sent on the continent in 1939. UK had no continental army. So yes suddently in 1939 France was roughly alone and waited for the enemy in big battles that were not expected before 1941.

The idea that there was a big French complot against Poland is pure anti-French fantasy and out of the context of 1939.

David

michael mills · Post by **michael mills** » 15 Jul 2005 02:38

Steve wrote:

I would not argue with most of what Mr Mill's quoted source Anna Ciencial says on the subject but she seems unaware of the meeting that took place between Beck and Kennard in Warsaw and the meeting between Raczynski and Halifax on 21 March 1939.

Steve, I have rechecked Anna Cienciala's book to see what she wrote about events on 21 March 1939, and I have found that there is not as much conflict between her and your source as I at first thought. She does describe the meetings on that day, but does not give them as much emphasis as your source does.

She describes how the British proposal for a Four-Power declaration was sent to Paris, Warsaw and Moscow on 20 March. On 21-22 March, Anglo-French conversations were held in London between the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, and the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet.

Cienciala continues (pp. 214-215):

Bonnet found that in his attitude to Poland he did not have the support of Lord Halifax. The Foreign Secretary expressed the opinion that a firm policy was needed to check German aggression. If the democracies were to ask Poland for aid to Rumania, they should give her 'a private undertaking' that in return for such aid they would also help her. Thus Halifax, unlike Bonnet, saw the need of offering Poland some guarantee in return for a policy which would most likely lead to conflict between Warsaw and Berlin. A fact of even greater importance for Poland was that the Foreign Minister was prepared to consider a German threat to Polish independence 'as a grave question which was of concern to us all' [Documents on British Foreign Policy, 3, IV, no. 484, p. 424].

It is of interest to note that Halifax had made up his mind on the subject of Danzig by 19 March at the latest. He had then told the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, that Britain would welcome a German-Polish agreement on the Free City, but if 'out of the Danzig question emerged a threat to Polish independence, that would at once, in my opinion, constitute a question of interest to us all' [DBFP, no. 432]. He had been even more explicit with Ambassadoe Raczynski. On the morning of 21 March, before the Anglo-French conversations began, Halifax told the Ambassador that if a Polish-German agreement on Danzig proved unattainable, the British offer in the Four-Power Declaration would also hold good for German aggression against Danzig, provided that this threatened Polish independence. He even envisaged the extension of protection to Lithuania if German demands should prove tooo high for Kaunas. During the course of the conversation the Foreign Secretary asked Raczynski whether, in view of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934, Poland would eventually be able to enter into armed conflict with Germany and how far Polish alliance guarantees extended to Rumania. The Polish Ambassador answered that the 1934 agreement recognised Poland's previous obligations to third parties, and that the Polish-Rumania alliance was oriented against Soviet aggression. He added that Poland was making a great effort to ameliorate Hungarian-Rumanian relations [Raczynski to Foreign Minister (Beck), 21 March 1939, cypher telegramno. 35, APEL, Cyphers, 1939; also DBFP, no. 471]. from the Halifax-Raczynski conversation of 21 March it seemed that the Foreign Secretary now considered the possibility of supporting Poland on Danzig, though this was put forward in a very cautious and tentative manner.

The above passage contains a number of highly significant points.

It emerges that Britain, through its Foreign Minister Lord Halifax, was not trying to seek a peaceful resolution to the Polish-German dispute over Danzig, and therefore avoid war, but rather to encourage Poland to remain obdurate, in the full knowledge that that would lead to a Polish-German conflict.

To be sure, Halifax made British support for Poland over Danzig dependent on failure by Poland and Germany to reach an agreement on that issue. But it must have been perfectly obvious to Halifax that the reason for such failure was Polish obduracy, and that by offering British support over Danzig he was simply encouraging that obduracy.

Halifax also made British support for Poland over Danzig dependent on German aggression against Danzig (which it must be remembered was not part of Poland but an autonomous entity) being also a threat to Polish independence. But on what criterion was it to be judged that a German move to occupy Danzig (in accordance with the will of its people, it must be added) constituted a threat to Poland's independence?

The conclusion must be that Halifax was not trying to avoid a military confrontation with Germany, which must mean war, but rather was trying to bring it on by fanning the dispute between Poland and Germany. That conclusion is valid, despite Chamberlain's private fears which he expressed to his sister, and despite Beck's own obduracy based on his delusions of grandeur.

Halifax's question about the effect of the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression of 1934 is also highly significant. The fact that he feared that declaration might prevent Poland fighting Germany shows that he was not interested in avoiding war between Poland and Germany, but rather in bringing it on, which would lead to war between Britain and Germany.

Cienciala continues on page 216:

Col. beck received the proposal of the Four Power Declaration on 21 March, the day on which Ribbentrop confronted Lipski once more with the demand for Danzig and the highway. In studying the British proposal, the Polish Foreign Minister had to take into account the fact that although Berlin had not yet put its demands in the form of an ultimatum it might soon do so, and that, without a clear guarantee of aid against Germany, Poland could not afford to risk a conflict with her. Beck's objective was, therefore, to obtain the support of Great Britain while avoiding, at the same time, any worsening of his relations with Berlin. As Ambassador Kennard put it, the proposed declaration faced Beck with 'a parting of the ways', for its acceptance carried the risk of an immediate hostile reaction on the part of the German government. The Ambassador also noted that Polish officials were reluctant to consider collective guarantees except in the case of immediate danger, and then only if they were accompanied by military commitments [DBFP, 3, IV, no. 465].

As a way out of his predicament, and as an alternative to the projected declaration - which Beck claimed would put him in the Soviet camp as far as Berlin was concerned [DBFP, no. 479] - he suggested a secret bilateral agreement on consultation between Great Britain and Poland [DBFP no. 485]. From the Polish point of view, such a solution had the advvantage of leaving out France and the USSR and thus avoiding the appearance of any 'encirclement' of Germany [Szembek, Journal, 22 March 1939, p. 434]. In a commentary on Col. Beck's intruction to Ambassador Raczynski, Jozef Potocki, the Head of the Western Department in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, elaborated the motives of the Minister. He wrote that the idea of a secret agreement had actually been mentioned by Ambassador Kennard, so that the concept was not new to the British Government, a comment borne out by the fact that Halifax himself had suggested a secret undertaking of aid to Poland in the Franco-British conversation of 21-22 March [DBFP, 3, IV, no. 458 (p. 424)]. Potocki wrote that Poland would be willing to consider a bilateral agreement providing for British support, especially in the case of Danzig, in return for which she would undertake to consult with Great Britain [Potocki to Raczynski, 23 March 1939, 'Top Secret', and Lubienski to Raczynski, 23 March 1939, APREL, P-GB, 1939; this was also Kennard's view, DBFP, 3, IV, no. 485].

Cienciala says that Raczynski delivered Beck's counter-proposal to Halifax on 24 March. As a result (p. 218):

it was agreed that the first stage of the agreement would be a confidential bilateral accord on consultations, which would presumably be followed later in the second stage by an accord on joint action in case of an attack on either country by a third state. The significance of the conversation lay in the fact that the British Foreign Secretary seemed to consider an alliance between Poland and Britain as a distinct possibility [DBFP 3, IV, no. 518]. At the same time it was clear that Warsaw could now hope for british support in the Danzig question.

Steve, note that Cienciala here quotes exactly the same document as the one you quoted. But that document refers to Beck's counter-proposal of 24 March, not to a British proposal on 21 March.

szopen · Post by **szopen** » 15 Jul 2005 11:32

michael mills wrote: With Poland knocked out and its large army (equal in size to the German) eliminated as a factor, and no prospect of the

Uhm? Poland has about 1 million soldiers, while Germans about 1,8 million soldiers (Not to say that Germans had huge advantage in tanks, artillery and aircraft). How 1 million is equal to 1,8 million?